


TRENDS IN BUDDHIST STUDIES

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In recent times people have begun to take an interest in meditation in general and Buddhist meditation in particular. There are several schools of Buddhist meditation, and they can all be brought under three principal groups: Vipassanā or Insight Meditation as practised in Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, etc.; Ch'an or Zen Meditation prevalent in China, Japan, Korea, etc.; and the Tantric form of Meditation followed in Tibet, Mongolia, Bhutan, Sikkim, etc. Though they follow various methods and differ in details, they agree on the essential points and that is what matters. Their goal is one and the same—attainment of peace, harmony and happiness culminating in the realization of Nibbāna.

This paper is related to Vipassanā meditation as taught in the Theravāda tradition. In this connection it has to be noted that Vipassanā is the last and the most important part of the Eight-fold Path represented by the three stages of *sīla* or virtue, *samādhi* or concentration and *paññā* or wisdom. Vipassanā is represented by *paññā* which leads to the comprehension of the true nature of things and the realization of the ultimate peace of Nibbāna.

Though the path has been taught in terms of these three stages, also known as the threefold training (*tisikkhā*), the last has been characterised as the very life-blood of Buddhism. The tradition refers to this fact in the following words:

Na hi silavatam hetu uppajjanti Tathāgata¹
aṭṭhakkharā tīṇi padā Sambuddhena sudesitā.

Tathāgatas are not born for promoting virtuous practices (alone). (The essence of) the doctrine taught by the fully Enlightened One is enshrined in eight letters and three words.

Here the reference is to the three characteristics (*tilakkhaṇāni*) of the conditioned states (*sankhata-dhammā*) namely *anicca* (impermanent nature), *dukkha* (unsatisfactory nature) and *anatta* (unsubstantial nature). They are the very subject-matter of Vipassanā meditation. The *gāthā* in question does not mean that the teaching of the Buddha attaches all importance to Vipassanā and ignores the importance of *sīla* and *samādhi*. The path being an integrated one, *paññā* is not possible without *samādhi* and *samādhi* is not possible without *sīla*.

The traditional interpretation by implication only means that while Vipassanā *paññā* represents the distinct and essential doctrine of the Buddha, *sīla* and *samādhi* are common to other religious systems as well, of course with different emphasis on this point or that point, on this aspect or that aspect. This is borne out by the life-story of the Buddha himself. It is said

that as a result of his religious practices under Ālārakālāma and Uddakarāma-putta, Siddhattha attained higher levels of concentration and tranquillity represented by *rūpa-jhānas* and *arūpa-jhānas*. But then he found that they too were conditioned states and as such could not guarantee lasting peace and happiness. He therefore took to the middle path and attained the unconditioned state of Nibbāna. The speciality of this path is *paññā* or wisdom representing Insight-knowledge (*vipassanā-paññā*) which penetrates into the true nature of things (*yathābhūta-ñānadassana*). Hence this importance attached to Vipassanā by the tradition.

Since the days of Lord Buddha there was a living tradition of Vipassanā meditation handed down from teacher to pupil. It continued for several centuries in India and other Buddhist countries. But then, at a certain stage in the history of Buddhism, the continuity of the living tradition was interrupted by new developments including political upheavals. From the accounts handed down in the tradition, we learn that in the beginning Vipassanā was practised even by the lay devotees, and as regards the members of the Sangha it was a regular practice of day-to-day life. However, as a result of the interruption of the continuity of the living tradition, it came to be confined only to a few groups and individuals, here and there. And it is evident from the relevant accounts that in spite of their devotion and dedication to the practice of Vipassanā, that inspiration, warmth, illumination, joy and the sense of liberation associated with it in the beginning began to diminish. So in course of time the belief began to gain ground that the age of Arahantas was over and that devotees had to keep on practising Dhamma as far as they could waiting for the appearance of Buddha Metteyya for their final emancipation.

According to an old tradition, Anurādhapura, the capital of Sri Lanka, was once teeming with so many saintly monks accomplished with psychic powers that when they moved to and fro through the space it became rather difficult for the people to dry their paddy due to their shadows.² After making allowance for the hyperbolic language, we can understand the nature of the spiritual climate that might have existed during the period under reference. But then, with the passage of time and the changing conditions, there resulted laxity in the spiritual effort also. The people in the island came to believe that Maliyadeva was the last Arahanta.³ Similar beliefs came into existence in other countries also. This belief became so common and strong that it worked as a formidable obstacle even on the path of those who dedicated themselves to the practice of Dhamma with all seriousness. However, there was an undercurrent of protest against this pessimistic belief and outlook based on the pronouncement made by the Buddha just before his parinibbāna that, as long as bhikkhus follow the path of Dhamma, the world would not be devoid of Arahantas.⁴ This kept up the sagging spirit of the spiritual life and saved it from extinction. This encouraging attitude might have given rise to the traditional belief that came to prevail in some of the South

and South-East Asian countries for a fairly long time that twenty-five centuries after the parinibbāna of the Buddha, there would take place a revival of Buddhism.

It may be mentioned here that it was this traditional belief that paved the way for the celebration of the 2500th Mahāparinibbāna day in 1956 on a grand scale all over the Buddhist world including the land of the Buddha. Certain events have taken place during this period which bear out this traditional belief. Among them what is of the greatest significance is that there has taken place a kind of re-awakening towards certain practical aspects of Buddhism which had been almost lost sight of for quite a long time. Here special mention has to be made of Vipassanā-bhāvanā or Insight meditation. For a fairly long time it remained confined only to a few groups and individuals at certain places. During the period in question, in certain circles special interest was shown in Vipassanā and before long it also began to receive popular attention. It was a kind of revival. And this revival of Vipassanā practice may be regarded as the revival of Buddhism itself.

This revival first started in Burma and then in other countries. Meditation centres in Burma attracted people from all parts of the world. The memorable occasion of the sixth Buddhist Council (Chaṭṭha Sangāyanā) highlighted the great event. At present there are meditation centres not only in traditional Buddhist countries but in other countries as well in both East and West. And people in many countries now take interest in meditation. The reason is there is restlessness in the world which Lord Buddha has characterised as a symptom of *dukkha* or suffering, the greatest ailment, and people find Vipassanā meditation an effective remedy for the same.

There are several teachers in East and West engaged in giving instructions on Vipassanā meditation. Their instructions are mainly based on the Sati-paṭṭhāna Sutta, the well known discourse of the Buddha on mindfulness, which has been characterised as 'The Heart of Buddhist Meditation' by Ven. Nyanaponika Mahāthera. These meditation teachers may differ in their method of approach and matters of detail but they all agree on the essential points and closely follow the instructions given in the Sutta.

The meditation camps conducted by these teachers are open to all men and women, monks and nuns, Buddhists and non-Buddhists. The only binding condition is that they all have to observe the discipline of the camps during the period of the retreat. So far thousands of *sādhakas* and *sādhikās* from all the five continents and from different walks of life—farmers, labourers, teachers, doctors, engineers, businessmen, administrators and others—followers of the major religions of the world—Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Christians, Muslims and Jews etc.—have participated in these camps.

At the end of a meditation camp it becomes a matter of joy to listen to the elevating experiences undergone and the ennobling benefits received by the participants. I, as one who has participated in some of these camps, should like to refer to some of these benefits, based on two reports which

I have published in two issues of *The Maha Bodhi*.⁵ The experiences referred to here are from a cross-section of the participants. It is edifying to know about the immense good done to them by Vipassanā. For instance, a businessman narrated how he used to spend a restless life full of worries and anxieties causing physical and mental ailments, and by practising Vipassanā he was able to lead a healthy and peaceful life.

A second meditator told how he indulged in all kinds of distractions to get away from his unpleasant 'self'. Instead of giving relief, this way of life created more and more complications for him. At last the path of Vipassanā taught him how to live a simple life with healthy thoughts and habits leading to peace and happiness.

A third meditator narrated how he used to blame others for the miseries he suffered. At last Vipassanā disclosed to him where the rub was. As a result he discovered that it was his own wayward life led without self-discipline that was responsible for the unhappy situation. And after practising Vipassanā he was able to settle down in life as a peaceful and useful member of the family and society.

A fourth meditator told how she had been going after preachers and teachers of Yoga to have peace and happiness, and everywhere she met with disappointment leading to despair. However, at last she was fortunate enough to meet Acharya Sri S. N. Goenkaji who taught her Vipassanā which gave her what she had been seeking for all her life.

Thus, every meditator related how he or she had to undergo suffering in one form or the other and the practice of Vipassanā gave relief from the same. *Dukkha* was the common element that urged them to take to the path of Vipassanā and the cessation of the same was the common experience they all underwent. On one occasion addressing his disciples Lord Buddha said: earlier as well as now two things do I teach—suffering and the cessation of suffering.⁶ This is what Vipassanā does—it teaches how to comprehend *dukkha* and bring about its cessation. These meditation camps had a wonderful effect on many of them.

Vipassanā has not been confined to law-abiding citizens leading the normal way of life. It has now gone to the jails. Some of the officers of the Rajasthan government who were greatly impressed by the changes that Vipassanā could bring about in the mentality of man, decided to introduce it in jails for the benefit of the prisoners. Accordingly Acharya Goenkaji was invited and he conducted several camps for prisoners—not ordinary convicts but hard-boiled criminals including dacoits and murderers, some serving life sentences. These meditation camps had a salutary effect on many of them. Letters written by some of them regarding their experiences to the meditation teacher remind one of the *udānas* of old.

Along with the survey reports of the prison camps and the Police Academy, Rajasthan, we have also published the report of a survey made of the meditation camps held at Varanasi, by several scientists of the Banaras Hindu

University. The close relation between mind and body is now an established fact. Mental changes that take place during Vipassanā meditation also produce their corresponding changes in the body. They can be studied with reference to breathing, blood-pressure, chemical changes and other phenomena. Though the technique is not a perfect one which could ascertain subtle changes taking place at deeper levels, it can give satisfactory results as far as it goes. The studies made in the light of this technique also bear testimony to the healthy results of Vipassanā meditation.

For some, meditation means a method for achieving miraculous power. It is true that at the higher levels of *samādhi* what are known as *abhinnās* or super normal powers can be achieved. They develop as a kind of by-product in course of these meditational practices. While *samādhi* is an essential condition of Vipassanā, these supernormal powers are not. Their value is psychic only and not spiritual. Being mundane in nature they are likely to create allurements for the Yogāvacara who has not developed full awareness and hinder his path of progress. Therefore the serious student of Vipassanā is warned not to take undue interest in them. Even when one is already in possession of them one is instructed to be mindful of their conditioned nature in the light of the three characteristics of *anicca*, *dukkha* and *anatta*.

We learn from the texts that Lord Buddha and many of his disciples were in possession of all the five *abhinnās* related to supernormal powers. At times they also made use of them to direct the minds of the devotees towards the higher life. But later on some unscrupulous elements began to abuse these powers, specially *iddhi*-power. Devadatta's is a glaring case in point. So by an act of Vinaya performance of miracles was made an offence. This rule of discipline was respected for a fairly long time. But in course of time in certain circles undue importance came to be attached to the performance of miracles. Because of its popular appeal certain obscure cults also came to be built up around miracle-mongering. According to some historians this was one of the factors responsible for the downfall of Buddhism in India.

The meditation teacher takes care to tell his students not to take to meditation with this misconception. Vipassanā, he tells them, is the art of living a life free from tensions and conflicts. It is a technique for living happy, fruitful and peaceful life while facing problems and situations with equanimity. He also tells them not to have the wrong notion that the ten-day meditation camp would do the job for the whole life. It is just the initiation into the technique which one has to keep on practising life-long with diligence and penetrate all levels of physical and mental phenomena.

It is true that the ultimate goal of Vipassanā is Nibbāna. Dhamma is a gradual path (*anupubba-ṭṭipadā*) which is progressive in nature (*opanayiko*). As one walks along the path one enjoys the fruits of liberation. This experience one undergoes from the first to the last step on the path. It is not something to be taken for granted but experienced. It is this dynamic aspect

of the Dhamma that invites one to come and see (*ehi-passiko*) its immediate results (*akāliko*).

Lord Buddha says: Just as the ocean has but one taste, the taste of salt, so also this Dhamma has but one taste, the taste of liberation.⁷ This is true of the path from beginning to end. This is what is meant when the Dhamma is said to be excellent in the beginning (*ādikalyāṇo*) excellent in the middle (*majjhe-kalyāṇo*) and excellent in the end (*pariyosāna-kalyāṇo*).

One who participates in Vipassanā camps begins to enjoy this taste of the Dhamma (Dhamma-rasa) as he begins to experience relief from the *dukkha* that is already there. In the light of this experience he or she can move forward on the path until full liberation from all *dukkha* is attained.

NOTES

1. *Vimuktisāgraha*, p. 154. Ed. Talahēnē Amaramōli, Colombo, 1889.
2. *Cullagallavattū, Rasavāhini*. Ed. B. Devarakkhita, Colombo 1917.
3. The *thera* (Maliyadeva) in question is believed to have lived in the first half of the 13th century. He is also believed to have lived in Waṭṭārama, which I had the occasion to visit the year before last and even saw the stone slab on which he is said to have slept.
4. *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, D II 119.
5. April 1972 and August-October 1977. The meditation camps under reference were conducted by Acharya Sri S. N. Goenka.
6. *Alagaddūpama Sutta*, M I 185.
7. *Cullavagga*, p. 357.

- 56 1990: Bechert, H. (ed.) Buddhist Studies), Tokyo 1990, p.5 f.; cf. No.39) in JIABS 12, 1, pp.158-63.
- 57 1991: Galloway, B. *Abkürzungsverzeichnis zur buddhistischen Literatur in Indien und Südostasien*, Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft 3 (pp.75, 182; 83, 195; 29, 135; 68, 180), Göttingen.
- 57 1991: Galloway, B. 'Thus Have I Heard: At One Time. . .' (cf. above Nos 39, 55) in IJJ 34, 2, pp.87-104.

Abbreviations

- ASAW *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Leipzig*, Philologisch-historische Klasse, Akademie Verlag, Berlin.
- BST *Buddhist Sanskrit Texts*, Darbhanga.
- EZ *Epigraphia Zeylanica*, London
- IJJ *Indo-Iranian Journal*, Dordrecht.
- JIABS *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, Madison/Northfield (USA).
- KS Friedrich Weller *Kleine Schriften*, ed. W. Rau, Stuttgart 1987.
- MIO *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung*, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin.
- PRS Lewis Lancaster (ed.) *Prajñāpāramitā and Related Systems*, Berkeley 1977.
- WZKMUL *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig*.

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CERTAINTY AND THE DEATHLESS

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There is a generally held opinion among scholars that at the time of the Buddha there were many lay persons who had become arahants, although during the early centuries of Buddhist history this had been a matter of dispute - some insisting that to achieve this goal a person would have to be a bhikkhu or monk, others that a lay person was able to become an arahant, but could not then retain his lay status. The Theravāda tradition is that if a layman did become an arahant he either 'went forth', that is, entered the Sangha, or passed away (*parinibbāyati*) that same day (*Milindapañha*, p.264). In the Tevijja-Vācchagotta Sutta (M 71) the Buddha states that no lay person can become an arahant without getting rid of the 'householder's fetter' (*gihisamyojana*). The household life was thus not considered propitious for arahantship. Is there, however, any firm evidence in the Sutta Piṭaka that lay arahants did exist? As it has been a matter of dispute this seems unlikely, but the purpose of this essay is to examine some of the evidence regarding the problem of the lay arahant and the nature of the *ariya-sāvaka* ('noble disciple') in Pāli canonical literature.

In *Dialogues of the Buddha* (Vol.III, p.5), the Rhys Davids' translation of the Dīgha Nikāya, there is a footnote giving several references said to demonstrate the existence of lay arahants at the time of the Buddha. The first reference is to Vin I (p.17) where Yasa becomes an arahant while the Buddha instructs his (i.e. Yasa's) father. In fact Yasa was not at that

moment a bhikkhu, but the circumstances being such he could hardly be said to be living an ordinary lay life. He immediately afterwards asks for the 'going forth', thus conforming to the tradition mentioned above. On consulting the second reference, S V 94, this mentions nothing about arahants lay or otherwise and must be an error. The next reference is to A III 451 which consists of the names of twenty or so laymen and of each it is said that he '... has arrived at certainty regarding the Tathāgata, has seen the Deathless and lives (motivated by) having experienced the Deathless' (... *tathāgate niṭṭhaṅgato amataddaso amatam sacchikatvā iriyati*).

That this passage does not refer to lay arahants is confirmed by the Commentary. It merely alludes to the fact that these laymen are *ariya-sāvaka*, assured of salvation. However, it is this reference (apparently) that has been adduced as being the main evidence for the existence of lay arahants by modern scholars. That the laymen named did indeed become either *sotāpannas*, *sakadāgāmins* or *anāgāmins* (stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners) can be confirmed by consulting the further references to them to be found in various places¹. Most are well-known individuals, such as Anāthapiṇḍika, Mahānāma, Purāṇa, Isidatta, Hatthaka of Āḷavī, etc., whose fates are known from elsewhere in the Sutta Piṭaka, but there are no arahants on the list.

That this Aṅguttara passage has been thought to refer to laymen becoming arahants was evidently due to C.A.F. Rhys Davids' misunderstanding of it and E.M. Hare's translating it

¹ Notably in the *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names* (PTS).

incorrectly in *Gradual Sayings*. Hare's rendering of *niṭṭhaṅgata* as 'gone to the end' (GS III, pp.313-14) is wrong if the various other contexts where the word occurs are consulted. *Niṭṭha* does indeed mean 'end, conclusion', but in combination with the verb *gacchati* ('to go'), it evidently means 'to come to a conclusion (about something), to be sure, to be certain, to come to or arrive at a certainty'. Note that the Pāli idiom 'gone' is used where in English we would say 'come'. In the Cūḷa-Hatthipadoma Sutta (M 27), for example, occurs the sentence: 'When I saw four footprints in the Samana Gotama I was certain [or, I came/went to the conclusion; *niṭṭham agamam*], "The Blessed One is fully enlightened. ..."'

- In the Aṅguttara passage, too, it is the Buddha or Tathāgata who is referred to. Again, in the Udāna Commentary (p.76) occurs this sentence: 'Therefore it must be concluded (*niṭṭham . . . gantabbam*), not by water is one cleansed.'

The negative *aniṭṭhaṅgata* is also found (e.g. A II 174, S III 99), meaning 'being unsure, uncertain', and is a synonym of hesitation or doubt (*kaṅkhitā*, *vicikicchitā*). It ought to be obvious that an adaptation of 'gone to the end' would not fit the examples quoted, nor is it likely anywhere else where the expression occurs. However, following Hare's rendering, it is probably Lamotte's paraphrase of this Aṅguttara passage in his *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* that has been crucial in misleading many scholars and authors. He says 'The Aṅguttara knows of some twenty lay people. . . who attained the end (*niṣṭhā*), the Immortal (*amṛta*), without ever having taken up the

religious life². This is a distorted and misleading account of what the text actually says. Nevertheless, it has apparently been accepted without question by many ever since it appeared in 1958 and it is thus this reference that is most often cited as evidence for the existence of lay arahants³.

Far from implying some final attainment, *tathāgate nīṭṭhaṅgato* simply means the person concerned has reached a conclusion about the Tathāgata; he has the certainty that the Buddha is indeed fully enlightened. It is because he has acquired the faith or confidence (*saddhā*) that arises through knowledge and insight into the Dhamma taught by the Buddha. His certainty arises because he has actually 'seen the Deathless' for himself. He is *amataddaso*: 'one who sees (*daso*) the Deathless (*amata*)'. The Buddha has revealed to him the four Noble Truths (*ariya-sacca*), specifically the ending of suffering, which is the Deathless, and the path leading to it. And he has understood it, that is, he has acquired Right View and thus

2 Etienne Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, English tr. by Sara Webb-Boin [correctly Boin-Webb], Louvain 1988, p.80.

3 Richard Robinson, in what is obviously a quote of this Lamotte passage, states, 'The Sūtras list twenty upāsakas who attained the highest goal without ever becoming monks' (*The Buddhist Religion*, Belmont 1970, p.37); also H.W. Schumann, 'The Pāli Canon lists the names of twenty-one householders who became Arahants without ever becoming monks' (*The Historical Buddha*, tr. by M.O.C. Walshe, London 1989, p.191). And Nathan Katz too, when he says, 'Certainly if one reads the primary texts on this issue, one learns of numerous lay arahants' (*Buddhist Images of Human Perfection*, Delhi 1982, p.179), one may hazard a guess he is referring to Lamotte. These are just three examples.

stepped onto the Path, the *ariya-magga*⁴. Right View is acquired by hearing the Teaching with the Dhamma-ear (*dhammasota*) and seeing the goal by having the Dhamma-eye (*dhammacakkhu*) opened for him by the Buddha. It is by means of the Dhamma-eye that the Deathless is seen. The whole process is described in the story of Suppabuddha the leper (Udāna 5,3), where the Buddha by a gradual talk prepares Suppabuddha's mind, uplifts and purifies it from the hindrances to understanding, and when the moment is right, reveals the four Truths: suffering, origination, cessation and the Path. Whereupon the 'stainless Dhamma-eye arises' that sees 'whatever is of the nature to originate (through conditions), all that is of a nature to cease (through their removal)'. Suppabuddha declares he has understood, affirms his faith in the Buddha by going for refuge, and is later said to have become a *sotāpanna*. The point is, Nibbāna or the Deathless or the four Truths are seen at the moment of entry onto the ariyan-plane. Thus, to have 'seen the Deathless' is again not a final attainment, but the initiation into what, for us who have not seen it, must remain a profound mystery; the opening of the 'door to the Deathless', whereby the ordinary person, the outsider or *puthujjana*, is transformed into an *ariya-sāvaka*.

However, there is still work to be done, the Path has still to be trodden, and this is indicated by the ending of this brief Aṅguttara passage. The verb *iriyati* means: 'to go on, to proceed, to progress, to live or behave in a particular way'. It

4 The Path always begins with Right View and progresses stepwise in a causal sequence as indicated in the Mahācattārisaka Sutta (M 117). This is despite Nyanatiloka's denial, - see his *Buddhist Dictionary* under 'Magga'.

indicates activity, movement, and the reason for it is because of 'having experienced, or realised, the Deathless' (*amatam sacchikatvā*). In other words, the experience of having seen the Deathless is now the motivating force in his life, that impels him onward towards its final attainment.

Are there any other references in the Sutta Piṭaka that can establish there were arahants at the time of the Buddha who continued living as laymen? We believe there are none that stand up to serious consideration. There is S V 410, for instance, which deals with how a wise lay-follower (*sapañño upāsako*) should admonish another wise lay-follower who is sick so that the latter gets rid of all attachments. It ends with the Buddha declaring there is no difference between such a layman who so avers and a bhikkhu who is rid of the *āsavas* (i.e. an arahant). However, the point is that this is a deathbed exhortation and so conforms to the idea, mentioned above, that the attainment of the highest goal by a lay person necessitates either dying or 'going forth' as a bhikkhu. Another example of such an exhortation is that of Sāriputta instructing Anāthapiṇḍika as he lay on his deathbed (M 143), but this did not lead to Anāthapiṇḍika becoming an arahant. Here it is said that he was a *sotāpanna* and after death was reborn as a deva in the Tusita heaven. Another possibility is the Sekha Sutta (M 53), which was addressed to a company of lay people headed by Mahānāma the Sakyan. This deals with the course of training leading up to the highest goal. But practising this course necessitates becoming a bhikkhu, for the Sutta states that the disciple undertakes to observe the Pātimokkha and thus implies the removal of the 'householder's fetter': the ownership of property, the accumulation and storing of possessions, the procreation of children and so forth.

It may seem unfair that the laity are excluded from the highest goal. However, this view is based upon a number of misconceptions and the assumption of a rivalry between the laity and the Sangha, an assumption for which there is no justification at the time of the Buddha. Although arahantship evidently necessitated living the bhikkhu-life, lay people could be *sotāpannas*, *sakadāgāmins* and *anāgāmins*, and many were, and in large numbers, if the suttas are to be believed. All these constituted the Blessed One's community of disciples assured of salvation, the *ariya-saṅgha*. And not only human beings, for divine beings, too, devas and brahmas from the various heavenly worlds, were included in this spiritual community. It is this *ariya-saṅgha* in its entirety that is said to be '... worthy of offerings, worthy of hospitality, worthy of gifts, worthy of salutation, an incomparable field of merit for the world', it should be noted, and not merely the Bhikkhu Sangha *per se* as is sometimes suggested and assumed. All these various kinds of noble persons are equally assured of salvation, in contrast to the *puṭhujjana*, the outsider, who has had no such assurance. So the *sotāpanna*, etc. should not be regarded as being inferior to the arahant in this respect. There is also another consideration. The Theravāda commentarial tradition assumes that the goal of all Buddhist endeavour is arahantship and the three 'lower' paths of the *sotāpanna*, etc. are stages on the way to that goal. However, in the suttas themselves there is very little to support this theory and it may be that originally the four 'paths' were possibly regarded not as 'stages' but as alternative goals that were realised by the individuals concerned. Depending upon the capacity of the person - perhaps due to past kamma which varied for each individual - upon being instructed in the Dhamma, he or she attained one or other of the paths (of the

sotāpanna, etc.). This instruction in the Dhamma is sometimes said to be initiated by the Buddha when he perceives, by reading the minds of his audience, someone there is capable (*bhabbo*) of understanding it and realising one or other of these paths, as was the case with the leper Suppabuddha. In the suttas, furthermore, once named individuals are declared to be *sotāpannas*, etc., it is never said they finally ended as another kind of noble person (*ariya-puggala*). Nor is it ever suggested that those who became arahants had first to become *sotāpannas*, then *sakadāgāmins* and *anāgāmins* as is assumed in the Commentaries. In fact it is the definitions of these various persons that preclude one kind from becoming any other, as Horner once pointed out⁵. All are equal in that, upon being taught the Dhamma by the Buddha, they have been granted a vision of the Deathless and established upon the path leading to its actualisation, to *aññā* or final knowledge. However, the several kinds of *ariya-sāvaka* are distinguished by the length of time they must continue in existence before realising this aim, this probably being due to the nature of their past kamma still awaiting fruition. The arahant attains *aññā* 'here in this present life' (*diṭṭh'eva dhamme*, 'in this invisible state'). In a number of places (e.g. S V 237, etc.) it is said, if a person '... does not attain *aññā* beforehand [*paṭihacca*, a gloss on *diṭṭh'eva dhamme*] here in this present life, then he attains it at the time of dying. If he does not attain *aññā* beforehand here in this present life nor... at the time of dying, then by the destruction of the five lower

5 I.B. Horner, *Early Buddhist Theory of Man Perfected*, London 1936, p.223f. See also Peter Masefield, *Divine Revelation in Pāli Buddhism*, London 1986, p.127f.

fetters he attains extinction in the interval' (*antarā-parinibbāyī*⁶, i.e. without returning 'here', that is, he is the first of the five kinds of *anāgāmin* or non-returner). Elsewhere, final knowledge in this present life and the state of non-returning are called the twin fruits of the holy life (*brahmacariya*)⁷. For the *sakadāgāmin* and the *sotāpanna* a yet longer period must elapse before final knowledge is attained. They have to undergo several more births up to a maximum of seven. The significance of all this is that, once an individual has left his present life before attaining *aññā*, he has passed beyond the point where he could become an arahant. Moreover, the once-returner or *sakadāgāmin*, because he is a 'returner' cannot, naturally, then become a non-returner and so forth.

Not only could lay people become *sotāpannas*, *sakadāgāmins* and *anāgāmins*, but references in the Sutta Piṭaka to the first and second especially allude more often to the lay *ariya-sāvaka* than to the bhikkhu. This is in contradiction to the view sometimes stated by modern writers⁸. In fact when,

6 This is a term of uncertain meaning. There are a number of reasons for thinking it may indicate the existence of an 'intermediate state' between death and rebirth, an *antarābhava*, and accepted as such by some Buddhist schools, the Sarvāstivāda, etc. But this is not countenanced in the Theravāda exegetical tradition which denies the existence of such a state. For an examination of this problem see Masefield, *op. cit.*, p.109f.

7 E.g. M 10; It, suttas 45-7, etc. '... one of these two fruits is to be expected, final knowledge in this present life or, there being some residual defilement (*upādisesa*), the state of non-returning'.

8 E.g. Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons*, Cambridge 1982, p.92, says, '... the idea of being a person on the Path, and therefore at least a stream-winner

upon being instructed in the Dhamma by the Buddha, a person declares he goes for refuge 'to the Lord, to the Dhamma and to the Order of bhikkhus' and then says, 'May the Lord accept me as a lay-follower as one gone for refuge from this day forth for as long as life lasts', one may conclude that person to be an *ariya-sāvaka* and at least on the *sotāpanna* path. Whereas if, instead of becoming a lay-follower, he says, 'May I, Lord, receive the going forth in the Lord's presence. . .', this is almost invariably followed by, 'Then the venerable so-and-so. . . soon realised even here in this present life through his own direct knowledge that unequalled goal of the holy life. . . And the venerable so-and-so became one of the arahants'. It seems as if it is expected that one who goes forth will become an arahant, or that he goes forth because he knows he has the capability to become one.

In the Mahā-Vacchagotta Sutta (M 73) there is found a threefold division of the Buddha's followers. First there are the monks and nuns who are arahants, then there are the lay-followers who are of two kinds (1) householders, both men and women, who are living the holy life (*brahmacariya*, which must mean the practice of celibacy here) and are *anāgāmins*, and (2) householders of both sexes who are enjoyers of sense-pleasures (i.e. non-celibates) who 'have accepted the Teaching, overcome doubt and perplexity (i.e. 'have arrived at certainty') and live confident and independent of others in the

(*sotāpanna*), must originally have meant no more than being a monk'. This is not the picture one derives from the early Pāli literature. It is more likely *sotāpanna* was a term brought in to accommodate the pious lay-follower who was unable to take the step of 'going forth' into homelessness.

Teacher's instruction'. Of each of these six categories (three pairs of male and female) the Buddha says there are not merely a hundred. . . five hundred, but many more such followers and Vacchagotta remarks that if any one of these categories was missing the holy life propagated by the good Gotama would be incomplete in this regard.

That there actually existed lay people who were celibates during the Buddha's lifetime may seem surprising, even a novel idea, hardly mentioned in modern Buddhist writings. However, although the large numbers could be attributed to pious exaggeration, that they existed is confirmed in one or two other places. There is, for example, the instance of Uggā of Hatthigāma who gave up his four young wives, giving the eldest in marriage to a man of her choice, when he became an *anāgāmin* (A IV 214). It is because the *anāgāmin*, like the arahant, is rid of the five lower fetters (*saṃyojana*) that bind beings to the sensual world that he leads a life of continence (*brahmacārī*). The *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmin*, the 'enjoyers of sense-pleasures' and hence still sexually active, while having overcome the three fetters of personality-belief (*sakkāya-diṭṭhi*), doubt and attachment to outward observances, still have the fetters of sensual desires and malevolence and will return again after death to this world, the Kāmaloka (the world of sense-desires). The *anāgāmin* is free of these fetters although not yet free of the five higher fetters, and so will arise in the Pure Abodes of the form world (Rūpaloka), but cannot return again here to the Kāmaloka. The arahant, being rid of all fetters, is not liable to be reborn anywhere. The higher fetters are: desire for form and formless realm existence, conceit,

restlessness and ignorance⁹. It is the subtle residual clinging supplied by these fetters that enables the *anāgāmin* to continue living a limited lay-life. It is the absence of these fetters in the arahant that precludes him from so living and for whom the Bhikkhu Sangha was established by the Buddha.

A number of lay *anāgāmins*, such as Hatthaka of Ālavī and Ugga of Vesālī, are said to have had large numbers of followers. Although the Commentaries sometimes suggest their following was of a purely secular nature, that they were communal leaders, headmen or rājas, it does seem more likely they were actually preachers of the Dhamma with other lay people as their pupil-disciples. After he passed away, Hatthaka visited the Buddha as a brahma-god of the Aviha heaven and remarked that now devas come from afar to hear the Dhamma from him (A I 279). Citta of Macchikāsaṇḍa even instructed bhikkhus (cf. Citta Samyutta, S IV 281ff).

A distinction perhaps should be drawn between the actual state of affairs and the 'ideal' picture that is presented (e.g. in M 73, Ud 6.1, etc.). There must have been many who heard the Buddha preach but remained unaffected and we learn of quarrelsome, badly behaved monks, schismatics and so forth.

9 Perhaps 'ignorance' as a translation of *avijjā*, especially in the context of the *samyojana*, may be misleading. It cannot here refer to ignorance as stupidity or delusion (*moha*), but rather the absence of the specific knowledge(s) possessed by the arahant, that is, the threefold knowledge or *tevijjā*: the knowledge of former births, seeing the arising and passing away of other beings according to kamma, and especially the knowledge of the ending of the flow of defilements (*āsava*).

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These were the *puthujjana*, those who were apart (*puthu*) from the 'ariya'. They were outsiders, foolish people who could not comprehend the Dhamma when it was taught to them and retained their various erroneous views. The ideal was that all bhikkhus should be arahants and that the attainment of the arahant path was the sole reason for going forth. The laity then consisted of both celibate *anāgāmins* and *sotāpannas* still enjoying sense-pleasures, all entirely devoted to the Buddha and supplying the Order of bhikkhus with its needs. The arahant bhikkhus were full-time professionals, the elders of the community, the guardians of the Teaching, instructors and advisors. Whether or not this ideal was ever realised during the lifetime of the Buddha, after his passing away the *ariya-saṅgha* underwent a rapid decline. And indeed this was inevitable. The literal meaning of *sāvaka* is 'hearer' and upon the departure of the Buddha there would soon be no more of that '... community of "those who had heard" (the Dhamma directly from) the Blessed One' (the *bhagavato sāvaka-saṅgho*). Thus Subhadda was not only the last *sāvaka* converted by the Buddha (D II 153), but the last *sāvaka* of all!

Although there would still be those who by their own efforts successfully practised the Path to enlightenment, as is testified throughout the long history of Buddhism, this was on a more limited scale than formerly. Evidently few *sāvakas* were able to make others 'see the Deathless' in the same way that the Buddha could. And it would be more difficult to 'arrive at the certainty' of faith in the Blessed One when one could no longer meet him face to face. As the venerable Ānanda said, shortly after the Buddha passed away, 'There is not even one bhikkhu, brahmin, who is possessed in every way and in every part of all those things of which the Lord was possessed. . . this Lord was

one to make arise a path that had not arisen before, to bring about a path not brought about before, to show a path not shown before. . . But the *sāvakas* are now path-followers who do so by following after him' (M 108).

Interestingly, as Peter Masefield has pointed out¹⁰, when it is said the Buddha 'makes arise a path. . . shows a path', this must have been meant in the sense of making it arise in a particular person on a particular occasion and not in a general sense of propagating a universal teaching for all. Despite the Buddha's stricture on accepting teachings based on hearsay, the latter view arose after the passing of the Buddha and the disappearance of the original *sāvaka-saṅgha* when direct contact was no longer possible. The Buddhist community had to come to terms with this new situation and to interpret what had been collected and preserved of what the Buddha had said and taught. In this interpretation one of the ideas that appeared was that the four paths were stages on the way to the ultimate attainment of Nibbāna, and this in turn has led inevitably to further changes in outlook in present day Theravāda Buddhism. If the view is entertained that arahantship is to be regarded as the sole goal of Buddhist endeavour and the *sotāpanna*, etc. is relegated to a stage on the way to that goal, then the tendency is to regard the arahant as the only true 'ariyan disciple'. Again, if the arahant has to be a bhikkhu, the *ariya-saṅgha* is then conceived as some kind of élite within the Bhikkhu Sangha itself. The laity being excluded from any meaningful spiritual attainment is then demoted to a secondary rôle. In recent times undue emphasis has been placed upon the social division of the Buddhist world,

10 Masefield, *op. cit.*, pp.141-2.

widening the gulf between the Sangha and the laity, and even going so far as to identify the latter with the *puṭhujjana*. However, this is to ignore and confuse the evidence of the texts themselves, which conceived of a spiritual dimension cutting across the purely social divide of the bhikkhu and the layman.

EPITHETS OF THE BUDDHA

1. *Buddho dasabalo satthā sabbaññū dipadutamo*
Murindo bhagavā nātho cakkhumā (a)ṅgīraso muni.
1. The Awakened One, Him of the Ten Powers, the Teacher, the All-knowing One, the Supreme Biped. The Lord of Sages, the Blessed One, the Protector, the Seeing One, the Resplendent One, the Sage.
2. *Lokanātho (a)nadhivaro mahesi ca vināyako*
Samantacakkhu sugato bhūripaṇṇo ca mārajī.
2. The World Protector, the Unexcelled One, the Great Seer and the Guide. The All-seeing One, the Happy One, Him of Extensive Wisdom and the Conqueror of Māra.
3. *Narasīho naravaro dhammarājā mahāmuni*
Devadevo lokagaru dhammasāmī tathāgato
Sayambhu sammāsambuddho varapaṇṇo ca nāyako
3. The Lion of Men, the Excellent Man, the Dhamma-king, the Great Sage. The God of Gods, the World Teacher, the Dhamma-Lord, the Thus-Gone. The Self-made, the Fully Enlightened One, Him of Excellent Wisdom and the Leader.
4. *Jino sakko tu siddhattho ca gotamo*
Sakyasīho tathā sakyamuni vā (a)diccabandhu ca.
4. The Conqueror the Sakyan, then the Accomplished One, (Son of) Siddhodana and Gotama. The Lion of the Sakyas, also the Sakyan Sage and the Kinsman of the Sun.

(Moggallāna's *Abhidhānappadīpikā*, edited by Velligalla Siddhattha, Ceylon 1900, p2. *Translated by John D. Ireland*)

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING THE LANGUAGE OF THE EARLIEST BUDDHIST TRADITION

Heinz Bechert

The almost simultaneous publication of works by Franklin Edgerton on Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit (*Grammar/Dictionary/Reader*, New Haven 1953; Delhi 1970) and by Heinrich Lüders on the language of the original Buddhist Canon (*Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons*, ed. W. Waldschmidt, Berlin 1954) touched off a scholarly discussion on the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition and on the nature of the Middle Indian dialects underlying 'Buddhist Sanskrit', which was reflected not only in the numerous reviews of both these works, but also in a series of articles in academic journals. At that time, a symposium on this subject was held during the German Oriental Conference ('Deutscher Orientalistentag') in 1954. It should be emphasised, however, that this interest failed to produce a general *communis opinio* regarding the questions that were raised, or that was even accepted by the greater part of the scholarly world; indeed, the discussion merely seemed to die away. It was revived, however, more than twenty years later, and most of the relevant arguments as well as various theories were formulated in the volume *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung/The Language of the Earliest Buddhist*

Tradition (ed. H. Bechert, Göttingen 1980)¹. Relevant problems were further discussed by Oskar von Hinüber (*Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick*, Vienna 1986). and by K.R. Norman in various essays.

The question, of course, has a long history. Both N.L. Westergaard (*Om de oeldste Tidsrum i den indiske Historie med Hensyn til Literaturen*, Copenhagen 1860, p.84) and E.A.W. Kuhn (*Beiträge zur Pāligrammatik*, Berlin 1875, especially pp.6 and 9) had asserted long ago that the language of the Pāli Canon could not be identical with the language spoken by the Buddha himself, as the Sinhalese tradition maintains. Both identified Pāli as the language of Ujjayanī, and their most prominent follower has been R.O. Franke (*Pāli und Sanskrit*, Strassburg 1902, p.131 ff.). Franke even proposed that the tradition according to which Kaccāyana, the author of the oldest surviving Pāli grammar, had lived in Ujjeni, should be considered 'a dim recollection' of this original Pāli (*op. cit.*, p.139, n.2; cf. also O. von Hinüber, 'Zur Geschichte des Sprachnamens Pāli', *Beiträge zur Indieforschung*. Ernst Waldschmidt zum 80. Geburtstag gewidmet, Berlin 1977, pp.237-46).

In 1912 Sylvain Lévi proposed the thesis that a language of the 'precanonical' Buddhist tradition could be detected in the

1 This essay is based on my paper 'Allgemeine Bemerkungen zum Thema "Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung"' therein, representing methodological considerations which, it seems to me, remain valid for the further study of the problems involved even today. I wish to thank James Di Crocco for preparing the English translation and Philip Pierce for rereading the text.

earliest terminology of the Buddhists, especially in the terms used in the Vinaya; he maintained that in this 'precanonical' language - and by this he meant essentially what H. Oldenberg (e.g. in 'Studien zur Geschichte des buddhistischen Kanons', NAWG 1912, p.206 = *Kleine Schriften* 2, Wiesbaden 1967, p.1024) somewhat misleadingly called simply 'Māgadhi' - the intervocalic tenues are weakened (S. Lévi, 'Observations sur une langue précanonique du bouddhisme', JA 1912, pp.495 ff.; cf. also E.J. Thomas, 'Pre-Pāli Terms in the Pātimokkha', *Festschrift M. Winternitz*, Leipzig 1933, pp.161 ff.). H. Lüders, who had already taken up this problem in connection with his epigraphical studies (see 'Epigraphische Beiträge' III, 1913 = *Philologica Indica*, Göttingen 1940, p.288), stated at first that 'the earliest Buddhist scriptures were written in Old Ardhamāgadhi', and that 'the works constituting the available Pāli canon, like those of the Sanskrit canon are, at least in part, translations of works in Old Ardhamāgadhi'. Later he called the language in question simply an 'eastern dialect' or also 'the eastern language' (cf. *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistischen Urkanons*, p.8) and used the term 'Urkanon' - 'original canon' - for the material underlying the available texts. W. Geiger advanced a different opinion; he stated that 'Pāli was not a pure Māgadhi, but was rather a kind of *lingua franca* based on Māgadhi which the Buddha himself had used', and that 'the Pāli canon represented an attempt to reproduce the *buddhavacanam* in its original form' (*Pāli Literatur und Sprache*, Strassburg 1916, p.4). As we know, there was no general agreement with Geiger's thesis. Finally Helmer Smith ('Le futur moyen indien', JA 1952, p.178) stated that we must postulate the existence of a 'koiné gangétique, dont l'ardhamāgadhi et le pāli représentent les normalisations les plus anciennes' for the period in question. If this is accepted, then the approach to the problem of

methodology must be quite different from that of the scholars quoted above.

We can proceed from the above on the assumption that none of the canonical texts exactly reflects the language of the Buddha or even of the earliest Buddhist tradition, and that accordingly the various textual versions are based in one way or another on earlier stages of the tradition couched in a different linguistic form. Thus we must further assume that there has been a transference of the texts from one linguistic form to another, with or without intermediate stages, either in the form of a deliberate translation or a gradual transformation in the oral tradition. In the course of this transformation certain peculiarities have been preserved which represent the linguistic form of earlier stages of the tradition that has since been lost. We have agreed to call these 'Magadhisms', and some of them might well have belonged to the language of the Buddha. The primary task now before us is to make sure that we are fully aware of the implications of the terminology which we employ in this field. A second essential task is to move our thinking ahead from the isolated discussion of certain individual observations of a linguistic nature, on which we have concentrated the greater part of our deliberations to date, to a consideration of the broader interrelationship of the questions associated with our problem. Thirdly, we must review our research methods and strive to develop them even further, and we should make use of the results of research into related developments outside India.

Now I should like to try to formulate some questions in this vein and thereby venture some suggestions as to how we should go about the problem, without in any sense intending to

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propose definite solutions. In this connection it would be best to start with the subject itself, which has long been formulated as the question of what was 'the language of the Buddha'. Taking into consideration the circumstances of the life of the Buddha as we know them, we can certainly come up with conjectures about which local dialect the Buddha must have spoken, but it would be much more appropriate to formulate the question in such a way that what we are really setting out to find is the linguistic form of what we term the 'earliest Buddhist tradition' - that is, the body of traditional material that underlies all the variants of the tradition that have come down to us, and thus represents, as it were, the archetype of the Buddhist tradition. At this point it is only natural to recall the passage in the Vinaya where the Buddha himself may have given us a clue as to the linguistic form in which his teaching was transmitted (see E. Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988, pp.552-5), and along with it the controversy over the interpretation of this passage. (See John Brough, 'Sakāya nirūṭṭiyā: Caul kale het', *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung*, pp.35-42.)

The question as to the linguistic form of the earliest Buddhist tradition cannot be separated from the question of the content and structuring of this tradition. Was there really such a thing as an 'Urkanon', or is it not more likely that separate bodies of traditional material came to be integrated into one Canon, gradually at first, in the course of the dissemination and diversification of Buddhism, eventually to form the 'earliest tradition'? The corpus of traditional material would then have been organised into Piṭakas, Nikāyas, Āgamas, Aṅgas, etc., in accordance with various principles of classification. It now appears as if, along with the fusion of distinct regional traditions

into supra-regional streams, there also ensued a fusion of different principles of organisation, in accordance with which the division into Piṭakas was largely accomplished; the other organisational systems which originally had equal standing were then used for the subdivision of the Sūtrapiṭaka. It would thus seem that these same organisational principles were applied simultaneously at several places, independently of each other, to traditional material which itself had already become locally diversified, so that many correspondences arose which would not necessarily have had to derive from an archetype. Consequently we have to be extremely sceptical about any assumption that an 'Urkanon' ever actually existed.

We can now formulate our question more precisely. In every case we much check to see at what stage of development certain complexes of tradition were so organised that they could already be regarded as constituting a structured literary work. There can be no doubt that this occurred very early for the formulary for confession (P. *pātimokkha*, Skt. *prātimokṣa*); it is much more difficult, however, to determine in which phase of the tradition the formularies for governing the life of the community (P. *kammavācā*, Skt. *karmavācanāḥ*) were put in order and came to underlie the broader context of a 'skandhaka' text. For the history of the formation of the Vinayapiṭaka we can refer to the book by E. Frauwallner (*The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*, Rome 1956) and to an entire series of other studies which have appeared since, while for the text of the four Nikāyas or Āgamas no really serious attempt to reconstruct the four 'Ur-Āgamas' has yet been undertaken. So far as we can see at this time, such an attempt would probably be doomed to failure, because in this case the application of the principles of organisation was introduced at a

time when the local diversification of the tradition was already further advanced than with the Vinaya. The compilations available to us hardly go back to any 'Ur-Āgamas', but originated as the result of local applications of the same principles of organisation to bodies of traditional material that were still largely in agreement. As a natural consequence of this, various compilations of texts came into being that resembled each other in many respects, and their similarities can lead to the erroneous assumption that there might have been an original form of the corpus as a whole.

Besides, in the early period we must also take into account numerous borrowings from other branch traditions; thus we are dealing with a tradition that is largely 'contaminated', and consequently if we try to reconstruct the oldest form of the tradition on the principle of a genealogical tree we can easily go astray.

The question now arises as to when the tradition was actually established in definite form. Buddhist tradition of course maintains that the texts were already established at the time of the First Council, but were still being transmitted orally for a long time thereafter - in Ceylon from the advent of the Theravāda until the time of King Vattagāmaṇi Abhaya (89-77 B.C.E.). As for the traditional date when the Pāli Canon was first written down, we can declare with certainty that, in view of the most recent research into the source history of the Ceylonese chronicles, the traditional account constitutes reliable historical information. Also, if my conjecture is correct that the process of committing these texts to writing had actually been initiated in the motherland some time previously, we can reject outright the possibility that a written translation into Pāli of the

works of the earlier Pāli Canon was made from some other dialect, even if the other well-known arguments against such a notion did not exist.

To be able to pass on textual complexes as large as these by word of mouth while still maintaining an acceptable level of accuracy requires a special system, and it is precisely this that is attested to by the tradition that there existed specialists in the skill of recitation (*bhāṇaka*), which represented a parallel with the methods of transmission used by the Vedic schools. To a certain extent the Buddhist practice of oral transmission continues to exist side by side with the written even today, especially in Burma.

Thus, there cannot be a shadow of doubt - and at this point I believe I can pass from asking a question to making a flat assertion - that what we are dealing with in the early period is an oral tradition. Indeed, literary historians have long since determined with great exactitude the effect of a long oral tradition on the form of literary texts (see G. von Simson, 'Zur Phrase yena . . . tenopajagāma/upetya und ihren Varianten im buddhistischen Kanon', *Beiträge zur Indienforschung*, pp.479-88).

Now that we have come to this conclusion we can answer more accurately the question as to the nature of the 'transmission' of the texts. If we look for remnants of earlier linguistic forms in the available texts, we must do so bearing in mind the characteristic features of oral tradition; to interpret the differences between the versions of the Buddhist text we must bring to bear an entirely different methodological approach from that which we would use, say, in comparing the versions of the Aśokan inscriptions, even though these inscriptions

belong to the same linguistic and chronological domain.

Thus, in seeking out traces of earlier linguistic forms, we must heed the principle already formulated by S. Lévi for our own question and later applied successfully by Hermann Berger (in *Zwei Probleme der mittelindischen Lautlehre*, Munich 1955) to the solution of a large number of individual problems; namely, we must always look for the specific conditions which have led to the preservation of forms from an alien dialect in these linguistic monuments. This precept applies whenever we see in the language in question not simply a 'hybrid dialect' but a specific linguistic form into which the given textual material has been 'transformed' or 'transmitted'. We have accepted as a premise that this applies to Pāli. Thus H. Berger has designated as 'Magadhisms' (*op. cit.*, p.15 ff.) such linguistic doublets as occur only or chiefly in stereotyped series of synonyms (e.g. *kiṇha* along with *kaṇha*), or which are found in verses whose metrical structure would be distorted if the normal Pāli form (e.g. *kičchā* for the 'Magadhisim' *kasira*) were used. Both premises are in keeping with the special demands of oral transmission and oral conversion.

I should like to cite as an additional example the use of *bhikkhave* and *bhikkhavo* in the earlier prose sections of the Pāli Canon. We find the 'Magadhisim' *bhikkhave* in the actual sermon of the Buddha, while the vocative *bhikkhavo* occurs in the introductory formula. The text of the Majjhima Nikāya begins as follows :

tatra kho Bhagavā bhikkhū āmantesi: bhikkhavo ti. bhadante ti te bhikkhū Bhagavato paccassosum. Bhagavā etad avoca: sabbhadhammāpariyayaṃ vo bhikkhave desessāmi.

The form *bhikkhave* is thus established as a specific usage in the Pāli text which can be explained as a way of recalling the actual speech of the Buddha. Once such a standard procedure has been devised, it could be applied to newly created texts without further ado, and thus the occurrence of this 'Magadhism' would tell us nothing about the original language of the text in question. On the other hand, it would explain why we find only *bhikkhavo* throughout the verses of the Suttanipāta, which otherwise is so full of 'Magadhisms'.

The forms in *-e* (for Sanskrit *-as*), which of course were determined very early to be Magadhisms in the Pāli Canon (Kuhn, *Beiträge*, p.9; V. Trenckner, *Pali Miscellany*, Copenhagen 1879, p.75 etc.), also provide exemplifications of this methodological principle, which are plausible in other ways. If we refer to the list of such cases compiled and expanded by H. Lüders (*Beobachtungen*, §§ 1-24), we find that - except for set expressions to which e.g. *seyyathā* and *yebhuyyena* owe their adoption into Pāli - the causes for the preservation of such forms are generally speaking misunderstandings in transmission. This applies also to those passages in the Pāṭikasutta (Lüders, *op. cit.*, § 5) that can obviously no longer be correctly understood. As with *seyyathā* and *bhikkhave*, the easily remembered formulation - and thus the existence of a stereotyped mode of expression - may have contributed significantly to the preservation of the *-e* in the passage of the Sakkapañhasutta (Geiger, *op. cit.*, § 80; Lüders, *op. cit.*, § 6) and the Sunakkhattasutta (Trenckner, *op. cit.*, p.75; Lüders, *op. cit.*, § 7).

On the other hand, this very form provides an example of how we can go astray if we rely exclusively on the grammatical

form and do not pay attention to the context. Lüders, for instance, explains (*Beobachtungen*, § 8) the nominative in *-e* in the language of the heretics in the Sāmaññaphalasutta as 'Magadhisms', although it is difficult to perceive why an historical peculiarity of the language of the Buddha should be preserved in the language of the heretics only, while it is not found in the speech of the Buddha himself. I have attempted to explain these forms and related passages in the Jātaka as 'Sinhalsisms', i.e. as forms first adopted in Ceylon from the local vernacular to characterise the uncultivated patois of the heretics ('Über Singhalesisches im Pālikanon', WZKSO 1, 1957, pp.71-5). This implied that these forms were inserted in the text in early Ceylon during the period of oral tradition. K.R. Norman disagreed ('Pāli and the Language of the Heretics', *Acta Orientalia* 37, 1976, pp.113-22), but I am not at all convinced by his arguments which I shall discuss elsewhere. In any case, we may not consider these forms as 'Magadhisms' in the usual sense of the term. They do not seem to be residua from the language of the oldest tradition, but are forms which came into the text later, even though they look like 'Magadhisms' purely from the standpoint of form. If, on the other hand, the ending *-āse* in the nominative plural, which occurs in the verses, was not transformed into *-āso* in the Pāli texts (with one or two possible exceptions under peculiar conditions only), it was for the reason that the form in *-āso* was not usual in 'genuine' Pāli and thus there was no point in substituting it.

I am still in agreement with a thesis advanced by H. Berger (*op. cit.*, p.15) that, in general, forms like *pure* which appear in the traditional Pāli texts should not be regarded as 'Magadhisms', although *-e* appears for *-ah* instead of **puro* which the laws of Pāli phonetics would lead us to expect; hence Berger's comment

(*ibid.*), 'It is hard to understand why the Pāli translators would have neglected to put this particular word, common as it is, into the corresponding western form while they never made the same slip with other adverbs (*tato, bahuso* etc.)'. This must be a case of formation by analogy (and indeed with a significance corresponding to that of *agge* and similar forms; cf. Karl Hoffmann in Berger, *op. cit.*, p.15, n.6). The same holds true for Pāli *sve* or *suve* (Skt. *svah*). Here again we must not allow ourselves to be misled by a merely apparent congruence with the Eastern dialect.

Thus we can clearly see the general applicability of the principle enunciated above to the example of the occurrence of *-e* for *-as* in Pāli, and, as we proceed to exclude, on the basis of convincing arguments, forms like these, which are not 'Magadhisms', we can then turn to working out the complex of true 'Magadhisms' which remains. The example has also shown us how important it is to take note of the further destinies of the transmitted texts. Aspects of the history of the transmission of the Pāli Canon have been examined recently by O. von Hinüber, K.R. Norman and other scholars. Various orthographic and grammatical peculiarities result from the influence of the vernaculars of the countries in which the texts were handed down, or from the influence of Sanskrit.

These basic considerations also hold true for that form of the language known to us from the 'Gāndhārī-Dharmapada' (J. Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London 1962); this was tentatively identified by F. Bernhard ('Gāndhārī and the Buddhist Mission in Central Asia', *Añjali*. O.H. de A. Wijesekera Felicitation Volume, Peradeniya 1970, pp.55-62) and even earlier by H.W. Bailey ('Gāndhārī', BSOAS 11, 1946, pp.764-97) as the

language of the Canon of the Dharmaguptaka school before its Sanskritisation. (Cf. also J.W. de Jong, *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America*, Varanasi 1976, pp.62f.).

The situation is more complicated in the case of the texts in 'Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit'. There was an indigenous term for this language, viz. *ārṣa*. It is used in Kaumārāla's grammar, as has been pointed out by H. Lüders (*Philologica Indica*, Göttingen 1940, pp.686 f., 693 f., 713 ff.) and more recently recalled by D. Seyfort Ruegg ('Allusiveness and Obliqueness in Buddhist Texts', *Dialectes dans les littératures indo-aryennes*, ed. C. Caillat, Paris 1989, p.285 f.).² Most of these texts were written in various forms of Middle Indic before Sanskritisation. We can proceed on the basis of the traditions of the Buddhists themselves that - depending on which sect was involved - they are based on different languages. The familiar tradition that four different languages were used by the four main sects (Lin Li-kouang, *L'Aide-mémoire de la vraie loi*, Paris 1949, pp.175-81) is not, of course, an actual description of the historical facts, yet we can perceive that it represents a recollection of the linguistic differences of the various versions of the canonical texts. Akira Yuyama has presented a detailed critical discussion of this

2 Seyfort Ruegg remarks that 'this specific use of the word *ārṣa* has also been omitted from the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* even though the term, as noted by Lüders, is attested in the "Turfan" collection'. However, this use is found in grammatical literature only, but not in the corpus of texts to be evaluated in this dictionary. The guidelines governing the choice of material to be included in this dictionary were explicitly approved by Seyfort Ruegg in his review in JAOS 106 (1986), p.597, so that his criticism concerning the entry for *ārṣa* is not justified.

tradition ('Bu-ston on the Languages Used by Indian Buddhists at the Schismatic Period', *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung*, pp.175-81). Accordingly, the thesis once expressed by F. Edgerton concerning an 'essential dialectic unity' of the Prakrit underlying the hybrid Buddhist Sanskrit (see, e.g. *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar*, § 1.80) no longer requires any specific refutation.

Our task now lies in differentiating between the various strata of dialectic change. There is good reason to believe that Sanskritisation began when the texts were committed to writing, and we can be helped along by the fact, well-known from the lessons of textual criticism, that textual changes occurring in the course of written transmission come about in a different manner from those developed in an oral tradition. Sanskritisation itself is known to have been a multi-stage process, and we are much better informed about it than we are about the previous stages of textual development, especially since we actually have available to us earlier versions of many texts which are closer to the Middle Indic variants as well as later, more strongly Sanskritised versions. Naturally we are speaking here only of the Buddhist works in Sanskrit which are actually based on a Middle Indic original. Various other Sanskrit Buddhist works were written from the beginning in the so-called 'hybrid dialects'; for a discussion of this question, see C. Regamey, 'Randbemerkungen zur Sprache und Textüberlieferung des Kāraṇavyūha' (*Asiatica*. Festschrift Friedrich Weller, Leipzig 1954, pp.514-27).

As has already been demonstrated by the foregoing discussions, the question of the relationship of the individual versions to the earliest tradition must be viewed in connection

with the problems of the history of the early Buddhist sects, and we must also enquire into their localisation. The home of Pāli, for example, cannot be determined exclusively on the basis of linguistic arguments, but only with due regard to the early history of the Theravāda. Consideration of that history made it possible to classify Pāli as the language of Vidiśā (cf. E. Frauwallner, *The Earliest Vinaya*, Rome 1956, p.18 ff.), a determination which would not have been possible on the basis of current arguments from the standpoint of historical linguistics, but which nevertheless was in close agreement with the results of philological research. Local factors also help to explain the noteworthy similarities between Pāli and the language of the texts of the Lokottaravādins, which the history of the formation of the sects leaves quite obscure.

Yet we must still keep in mind the linguistic aspects of the problem. The comparison of the language of the early Buddhist texts with the language of the Aśokan and other early Prakrit inscriptions has been carried out in the minutest detail. Indeed, much of the research has, if anything, been undertaken too systematically. For example, we can only view with the greatest scepticism any attempts to come to conclusions about pronunciation on the basis of orthography, since we must never lose sight of the broad spectrum of possible divergences between orthography and pronunciation that we are familiar with from our knowledge of the development of other languages and from examination of later stages in the evolution of the Indic languages themselves.

Similarly, the questions of the conditions necessary for the emergence of a written language must be approached by methods which are predominantly linguistic. Fortunately we

possess a number of examples from other areas - such as the origin of the written form of the Romance languages - for which we have developed an extremely useful research apparatus. The question of the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition and its progressive development into the corpus of material as it stands today must undoubtedly be viewed as part of the formation of standardised (and therefore also in certain ways 'hybrid') languages during the developmental stages of Middle Indic, which ultimately came to be written languages. Moreover, the use of Middle Indic languages in the earliest Indian inscriptions, which of course constitute the oldest written evidence of the Indo-Aryan languages, suggests the hypothesis that we have here the earliest written Indic language, to which, however, the established tradition of a language of priests and scholars that was transmitted orally at first and nevertheless became standardised down to the last detail - i.e. Sanskrit - stands in the same relationship as Latin does to the written Romance languages. We can infer from the passage in the Vinaya that we have mentioned, and also from the actual development of language, that originally, and indeed in deliberate contrast to the Brahmanic tradition, the Buddha had definitely not been striving to bring about a linguistic standardisation to be used in the propagation of his teachings.

Does it not seem reasonable, then, to assume that the earliest tradition actually consisted of a linguistic multiplicity, and that a specific 'language of the earliest Buddhist tradition' does not exist at all? In view of all this there would hardly seem much point in continuing to look for this language; instead we should redirect the thrust of our enquiry towards the process of 'standardisation' of the linguistic form of the tradition as such. In this connection it would be quite helpful if we could answer

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the question as to how the traditional canonical texts of the Jains developed up to the point when they took definitive form, and how the Ardhāmāgadhī of the Śvetāmbara texts actually originated. The significant differences between the language of the canonical prose of the Pāli Canon and the language of the early verses give rise to the further question as to whether or not a poetic language existed in Middle Indic, which was possibly supra-regional in use but in certain places may have been subjected to a process of assimilation with local languages, as Helmer Smith conjectured. Whatever answers we finally come up with to all these questions, it would seem imperative, in any case, always to keep in mind the wide variety of points of view and be wary of supporting just one principle argument.

Considered in isolation and viewed only with reference to individual linguistic phenomena, this question might well appear to be one of those abstruse problems of detail in a highly specialised science the solution to which touches on the progress of that science as a whole only with reference to a narrowly limited issue. If, however, we view our question in its broader ramifications, its answer will prove to be an important element in the task of elaborating an accurate understanding of the entire linguistic, literary and religious development in India during the fifth to the first century B.C.E.

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DANḌAPĀṆĪ

John D. Ireland

As a general principle, the Buddha always spoke to the point and only taught Dhamma to those capable (*bhabbo*) of understanding. He did not waste words but spoke only what was appropriate on any particular occasion according to the capacity of his audience. Then, it may be asked, what about the concise teaching to Daṇḍapāṇi ('Stick-in-Hand') the Sākyan (Madhupiṇḍika Sutta, M 18) which was quite beyond his comprehension? The whole episode was subsequently related to the bhikkhus and was beyond them too until explained by Mahākaccāna. However, there are a number of indications in this story that make one suspect Daṇḍapāṇi was not a 'real' person at all in the usual sense. Perhaps we should regard him as a 'type'; a hypothetical case, employed by the Buddha as a teaching device. In fact, looking at this episode closely, Daṇḍapāṇi was actually a Māra-like figure. Māra the 'Evil One' can also be viewed symbolically, as a psychological entity - in a sense the personification of the ego and sensual attachments, and an obstacle to be overcome before enlightenment is attained. For the arahant Māra poses no problem; he is always recognised immediately and is, accordingly, sent packing. As in a great number of Māra episodes, Daṇḍapāṇi appeared when the person, in this case the Buddha, was in solitude and in an open place, 'under a tree'. Like Māra he was always roaming about seeking a 'victim' to debate with. Again, as so often with Māra, he assumed an arrogant stance, leaning on his stick, when putting his question. Finally, he departs, like Māra once did when defeated, with a wrinkled brow and leaning on his stick (see Māra Saṃyutta, S I, p.118). Māra defeated and recognised departs dejected, downcast and uncomprehending.

THE DĪGHA NIKĀYA DEBATES:
DEBATING PRACTICES AT THE TIME OF THE
BUDDHA¹

Joy Manné

Eighteen out of thirty-four suttas in the Dīgha Nikāya (D 1-13, 23-25, 28, 31) are debate suttas, that is to say that each of these has all or most of the following features: a central character, most usually the Buddha, and a statement of his credentials; an adversary, and a statement of his credentials; a description of a location that functions to set the scene and the atmosphere; an audience; a greeting ceremony; a challenge; a refutation of the adversary's position; the establishment of the Buddhist position; a hypothetical case history²; a surrender, in the form of an acceptance formula, by the adversary; a reward³. Witzel has already drawn attention to similarities between the debates in the Vedic texts and those in the Pāli texts, notably on the

issue of the severed head⁴, on the relationship between the *sahadhammika* type of questioning 'which takes place in a kind of open challenge or tournament, (which is) similar to the Vedic *brahmodya*'⁵, and on the similarity of both the *anati-praśnya* and the *sahadhammika* questions and the general rules of discussion found in the Vedic and Pāli texts⁶. He particularly observes, 'As often, it is the early Buddhist texts which provide more detailed and useful information. The Pāli texts . . . frequently describe in lively and graphic detail what is only alluded to in the Vedic texts which were, after all, composed by Brahmins for Brahmins: one did not have to explain ritual matters of everyday occurrence or of common knowledge to one's fellow Brahmins or to *brahmacārin* students . . .'.⁷ Witzel comments further, 'Interestingly, the challengers seem to be the best among the various groups of Brahmins (and both Yājñavalkya's and their personalities require further study)'⁸.

The Buddhist debates of the Dīgha contain information regarding contemporary debating practices, including customs or conventions related to the debate situation, information regarding the types of utterance that were usual in religious

1. These investigations were supported by the Foundation for Research in the field of Theology and the Science of Religions in the Netherlands, which is subsidised by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.), and constitute Chapter IV of my doctoral dissertation, 'Debates and Case Histories in the Pāli Canon' (Utrecht 1991).

2. Most usually a repetition of §§ 40-98 of the *Sāmaññaphala* Sutta, D 2.

3. See J. Manné, 'Categories of Sutta in the Pāli Nikāyas and their implications for our appreciation of the Buddhist Teaching and Literature' *JPTS* XV, 1990, pp.29-87 (abbrev. Manné, 1990), cf. pp.44-68.

4. M. Witzel, 'The case of the shattered head', *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 13/14, 1987, pp.363-415 (abbrev. Witzel, 1987), but see S. Insler, 'The shattered head split and the Epic tale of Śakuntalā', *Bulletin d'études indiennes* 7-8, Paris 1989-90, who takes a different view of the history of the theme of the shattered head.

5. Witzel, 1987, p.408.

6. 'Both the *saccakriyā* and the *anatipraśna* / *sahadhammika* statements deal with truth, but both do so in a formalised context: either a discussion with a challenger and one or more opponents.' *Ibid.*, p.110.

7. *Ibid.*, p.381.

8. *Ibid.*, p.365.

debate, and criteria for judging success in debate, beyond those that Witzel discusses in his article (by no means all of which have been referred to above). It is the very large number of features in common between Vedic and Buddhist debates that Witzel has drawn attention to in his article, and others that I have pointed out⁹ that permits me to say this. The purpose of this article is to present this material. It is beyond its scope to make extensive comparisons with the Vedic tradition. This article then analyses the Buddha's debating style and techniques in terms of these conventions and compares them with those of one of his disciples, Kumāra Kassapa.

In three of the debate suttas, the Brahmajāla (D 1), the Kassapa-Sihanāda (D 8) and the Udumbarikā-Sihanāda (D 25), contemporary debating practices, including customs or conventions related to the debate situation, are specifically mentioned. In the Brahmajāla there is information regarding the types of utterance that were usual in religious debate (and the Buddha's attitude towards them). In the Kassapa-Sihanāda are the criteria for judging success in debate, and in the Udumbarikā-Sihanāda the value placed upon discussion between religious practitioners of different persuasions is demonstrated. In these suttas the Buddha is the debater on behalf of the Buddhists. This is the normal state of affairs in the Pāli texts, which lends support to Witzel's observation cited above that 'interestingly, the challengers seem to be the best among the

9 Manné, 1990.

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various groups of Brahmins, . . .'¹⁰ In a fourth sutta, the Pāyāsi (D 23), the wordy Kumāra Kassapa takes this role. It is because he is so explicit about his tactics in the discussion that this sutta also provides useful information on debating techniques.

In the Brahmajāla Sutta the Buddha criticises the disputatious habits of brahmins and samanas, particularly the use of expressions like:

- (1) 'You don't understand this doctrine and discipline, I do.'
'How should you know about this doctrine and discipline?'
'You have fallen into wrong views. It is I who am right.'
'I am speaking to the point, you are not.'
'You are putting last what ought to come first, and first what ought to come last.'
'What you have excogitated so long, that's all quite upset.'
'Your challenge has been taken up.'
'You are proved to be wrong.'
'Set to work to clear your views.'
'Disentangle yourself if you can'¹¹.

Because of the many features in common between the Vedic

10 Witzel, 1987, p.365.

11 'Na tvaṃ imaṃ dhamma-vinayam ājānāsi, ahaṃ imaṃ dhamma-vinayam ājānāmi, kiṃ tvaṃ imaṃ dhamma-vinayam ājānissasi? - Micchā-paṭipanno tvam asi, aham asmi sammā-paṭipanno - Sahitam me, asahitan te - Pure vacanīyaṃ pacchā avaca, pacchā vacanīyaṃ pure avaca - Avicīṇan te viparāvattaṃ - Aropito te vādo, niggahito 'si - Cara vādappamokkhāya, nibbeṭhehi vā sace pahositi, D 8, § 18. Tr. T.W. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha I*, p.14f. See also his extensive notes.

and the Buddhist debates, the reference to these types of utterance may be taken to indicate that they were in general use in contemporary debating practice.

The expression of criteria for success in debate in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta takes the form of a categorical denial, uttered by the Buddha, of a set of criticisms that he suggests might be made against him by religious wanderers of other sects¹². The structure of the sutta shows that these criticisms are important: it is the Buddha himself who, unprovoked, first introduces them and then denies that they can be applied to him. Once again, because of the many other features in common between the Vedic and the Buddhist debates, this suggests that these were genuine contemporary criticisms which accurately reflected contemporary conventions of the debate situation. In this case, however, because Kassapa was a naked ascetic (*acelo*), they may not apply strictly to the Vedic debates¹³. The points that the Buddha disputes provide us, nevertheless, with the criteria of the time for judging and evaluating the competence of the debater.

The following are the potential criticisms that the Buddha suggests might be made against him: that although he issues his challenge¹⁴,

12 *thānaṃ kho paṇ' etaṃ Kassapa vijjati yaṃ aññatitthiyā paribbājakā evaṃ vadeyyūṃ*. D I 175, § 22.

13 'JUB [Jaiminiya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa] 3.7.2 sqq. expressively states that such discussions were held only among the Brahmins and Kṣatriyas (and Vaiśyas?) but not among the Śūdras.' Witzel, 1987, p.410.

14 *siha-nādaṃ nadati* - 'utters his lion's roar', 'makes his assertion', 'issues his challenge'.

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- (2) 1. he does this in empty places, and not in assemblies¹⁵,
2. he issues his challenge in assemblies, but he does it without confidence¹⁶,
3. he challenges with confidence, . . . but people do not ask him questions¹⁷,
4. people ask him questions, but he does not answer¹⁸,
5. he answers their question, . . . but he does not win over their minds with his exposition¹⁹,
6. he wins over their minds with his expositions . . . but they do not find him worth hearing²⁰,
7. they find him worth hearing but after they have heard him they are not convinced²¹,
8. having heard him, they are convinced, . . . but the faithful make no sign of their belief²²,
9. the faithful give the sign of their belief, . . . but

15 *icā ca kho suñhāgāre nadati no parisāsuti*. D II 175. *parisā* - 'group', 'assembly'.

16 *parisāsu ca nadati, na ca kho visārado nadati*. Ibid.

17 *visārado ca nadati . . na ca kho naṃ pañhaṃ pucchanti*. Ibid.

18 *pañhaṃ ca naṃ pucchanti . . na ca kho paṇ' etaṃ* [Nālanda ed. *nesaṃ*] *pañhaṃ puṭṭho vyākaroṭi*. Ibid.

19 *pañhaṃ ca nesaṃ puṭṭho vyākaroṭi . . na ca kho pañhassa veyyākaraṇena cittaṃ ārādheti*. Ibid.

20 *pañhassa ca veyyākaraṇena cittaṃ ārādheti . . na ca kho sotabbaṃ assa maññanti*. Ibid.

21 *sotabbaṃ c'assa maññanti . . na ca kho sutvā pasidanti*. Ibid. *pasidati* - 'a mental attitude which unites deep feeling, intellectual appreciation and satisfied clarification of thought and attraction towards the teacher'. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London 1963, § 655.

22 *sutvā c'assa pasidanti . . na ca kho pasannā pasannākāraṃ karonti*. Ibid. Presumably this means that they utter no acceptance formula, provide no meals for the bhikkhus, etc.

they do not follow the path to the Truth (Nibbāna)²³,
10. they follow the path . . . but they do not succeed²⁴.

The Udumbarikā-Sihanāda Sutta contains a list of criticisms which provide further evidence that a religious leader was required to discuss his views and indeed to put himself before his critics in the public debating arena rather than to remain in solitude. These criticisms are made by Nigrodha, a wanderer (*paribbājaka*) and not a brahman, against the Buddha. Nigrodha challenges Sandhāna, a householder (*gahapati*) and lay disciple, on the subject of the Buddha's habits:

(3) 'With whom does he talk?

With whom does he engage in conversation?

With whom does he attain wisdom and distinction?

His wisdom is damaged by solitude.

The samaṇa Gotama is outside the assembly.

He does not converse enough.

He busies himself with peripheral matters²⁵.

He ends his criticisms with the boast: 'If the Samaṇa Gotama were to come to this assembly, with a single question only could we settle him; yea, methinks we could roll him over like an empty pot'²⁶.

23 *pasannā pasannākārān ca karonti . . na ca kho tathattāya paṭipajjanti.* Ibid.

24 *tathattāya ca paṭipajjanti . . na ca kho paṭipannā ārādhenti.* Ibid.

25 . . . *kena Samaṇo Gotamo saddhiṃ sallapati? kena sākacchaṃ samāpajjati? kena paññā-veyyattiyam āpajjati? Suññāgara-hatā Samaṇassa Gotamassa paññā, aparisāvacarō Samaṇo Gotamo, nālaṃ sallāpāya, so antamantā' eva sevali.* D III 38, § 5.

26 *Ingha gahapati, Samaṇo Gotamo imaṃ parisam āgaccheyya, ekā-pañhen' eva naṃ saṃsādeyyāma, tuccha-kumbhi va naṃ maññe orodheyyānāti.* D III

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As this criticism comes from Nigrodha, whose followers have been criticised for their talkativeness by Sandhāna (§ 4), and who will be criticised for the same fault by the Buddha later in the sutta (§ 21), its content is evidently defensive in character. For this reason it might be expected that the Buddha, as he is represented by the composers of the texts, would not take it entirely seriously. As in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, however, these criticisms are given importance in the sutta: the Buddha hears Nigrodha's accusations by means of his clair-audience, and takes them seriously enough to come out of his solitude on the Vulture Peak into the area where the discussion was taking place in order to refute them.

Finally, Kumāra Kassapa, who is so explicit about what he is doing in the debate situation, by suggesting an earnest desire to conform to standards, provides samples that support the rules in the previously cited suttas. He provides further examples of the techniques a debater was expected to use, and indeed was admired for using. These are supported by examples of similar strategies in debates where the Buddha is the protagonist.

Kumāra Kassapa attempts the Buddha's technique of gradually leading the adversary on 'by the usual Socratic method adopted in so many of the Dialogues, to accept one self-evident truth after another'²⁷, explaining to his adversary:

(4) 'Therefore, Prince, I will question you in this matter

38, § 5. Tr. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha II*, p.35.

27 T.W. Rhys Davids' introduction to the Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta (D 4). *Dialogues I*, p.138.

and you answer if you please²⁸.

In the same explicit way he offers a simile:

- (5) 'Well then, Prince, I will make you a simile, for by a simile some intelligent persons will recognise the meaning of what is said²⁹.

The text tells us that Kumāra Kassapa was considered a skilled debater. At the end of the debate his opponent says to him, 'I was delighted, satisfied, by Master Kassapa's first simile, but I wanted to hear the variety of (his) answers to the question'³⁰.

The suttas above provide information concerning the conventions, rules and customs connected with the debates that took place between religious leaders of one sect, or their senior followers, and those of another. They refer explicitly to a number of debating techniques or strategies. How far does the Buddha's performance in the debate suttas conform to these conventions?

In the Erahmajāla Sutta the Buddha's choice not to express himself in certain ways (see (1) above) is reported, and indeed the Buddha adheres to his standards throughout the Dīgha debates.

28 *Tena hi Rājāna taṃ yev'ettha paṭipucchissāmi, yathā te khameyya tathā nam vyākareyyāsi.* D II 319, § 5.

29 *Tena hi Rājāna upamaṃ te karissāmi. upamāya pi ida' ekacce viññū purisā bhāsitaṃ atthaṃ ājānanti.* Ibid., § 9. Tr. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues II* p.354.

30 *'Purimeṃ' evāhaṃ opammaṃ bhoto Kassapaṃ attamaṃ abhiraddho, api cāhaṃ imāni vicitrāni paṇha-paṭibhānāni sotu-kāmo . . .* D II 352.

The criticisms in the Udumbarikā-Sihanāda Sutta emphasise certain features of the customs that formed part of the debate situation, notably the expectations placed upon a religious leader, that he should be willing to enter into public debate and discussion. The large number of debate suttas in D alone attest to the Buddha's conformity to these expectations.

The criteria of the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta (see (2) above) relate to the conventions of the debate situation. The debater was expected confidently to issue a challenge or make an assertion to an assembly (see (2), points 1 and 2). The challenge or assertion should be so important (or interesting?) that people wish for further information or elucidation, i.e. they ask questions (see (2), points 3 and 4). Questions should be so competently answered that the attention of the questioner is captured, he appreciates the value of the message, and he becomes so convinced that he makes his convictions publicly manifest (see (2), points 5 - 9). Furthermore, he should undertake to follow the path being taught and he should succeed in his efforts, thus proving that the assertions were well-founded (see (2), point 10).

The defeat of and surrender by the adversary is a significant feature of the Buddhist debate suttas as well as of the Vedic debate tradition³¹. It regularly attests to the Buddha's success as a debater. There is, however, only one occasion where the eventual attainment (see point 10 in (2) above) of the

31 'In the course of the discussion, participants who do not know the whole truth have to state this clearly, they must cease questioning, . . . and thus declare defeat, or they must even become the pupil of the winner.' Witzel, 1987, p.372.

erstwhile adversary is attested (Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta). The Pāyāsi Sutta adds to the above requirements a point of style: the technique, richly adhered to by the Buddha in the debate suttas, of furthering one's argument through the use of similes and analogy.

The seemingly simple conventions of the debate situation are used in a variety of powerful ways.

The first requirement in a debate is that a challenge should be issued. When the Buddha receives a challenge he may accept it and respond directly, answering point by point, as in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta (D 2) when he shows his thirty-two marks, the Kūṭadanta Sutta (D 5) where he describes the higher sacrifice, the Mahāli Sutta (D 6) where he explains the relationship between achieving the hearing of heavenly sounds and the seeing of heavenly sights, the Poṭṭhapāda Sutta³² where he answers Poṭṭhapāda's questions on the summits of consciousness³³, and many further occasions.

The Buddha may, however, reject a challenge. The grounds for this are that it is misplaced, i.e. he will reject a challenge on subjects with regard to which he has made no claims. This demonstrates a convention, not directly named in the suttas, that a challenge on a position that was never asserted could rightfully be dismissed. Into this category comes the Buddha's refusal to answer certain questions, for example the *avyā-*

32 D 9 [I 185, §§ 19,20]

33 *saiṇāgga*.

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kata questions (Poṭṭhapāda Sutta³⁴) because they do not conform to the purpose of his teaching³⁵. Also in this category is his refusal in the Pāṭika Sutta³⁶ to reveal the Knowledge of the Beginning³⁷, and his refusal in the Kevaddha Sutta (D 11) and the Pāṭika Sutta (D 24, § 4) to produce miracles³⁸. The Buddha may simply reject a challenge on this ground, or he may first reject it and then redefine it and answer it (Kevaddha Sutta: the mystic wonder)³⁹. The Buddha may use the technique of both issuing and answering his own challenge. He does this in the form of a rhetorical question⁴⁰, or by referring to a challenge made by a hypothetical opponent⁴¹.

The technique of the question-challenge is fundamental to a further strategy that the Buddha uses. He will accept his adversary's position and then, by posing subtle questions, lead him to refute his own position through his own answers⁴². In this way he gets him to cede point after point, and then uses what is left of the adversary's position to his own advantage⁴³. In a similar way, the Buddha will prove his case by asking a

34 D 9 [I 187f, §§ 25-27]

35 Defined in this sutta, § 28.

36 D 24 [III 4, § 5]

37 *aggaññaṃ pañhāpeti*.

38 *iddhi-pāṭihāriya*.

39 . The Pāṭika Sutta, D 24, however, demonstrates that although the Buddha may refuse to perform miracles and to reveal the Knowledge of the Beginning, he both performs the former and knows the latter.

40 Brahmaṅgala Sutta, D 1; Kevaddha Sutta, D 11; Lohicca Sutta, D 12.

41 Poṭṭhapāda Sutta, D 9 [I 197, § 43]. *Pare ce . . . amhe evaṃ puccheyyū . . .*

42 Poṭṭhapāda's position on the soul/self, Poṭṭhapāda Sutta, D 9, §§ 21-23; the limitations of ascetic practices, Udumbarikā-Sihanāda Sutta, D 25.

43 Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta, D 4.

sequence of rhetorical questions to which he will provide answers. These answers add increasing weight to his argument, and point by point he gets his adversary to agree with him⁴². He will also use simile and analogy strategically in his argument to attain this goal. He will provide an analogy with the case presented, and get the adversary to agree to his own (i.e. the Buddha's) position in terms of the analogy. The Buddha will then relate the analogy to the opponent's position, and in this way show that the latter has condemned himself⁴³.

The Buddha is also successful at eliciting questions from his opponent, the requirement of the third point in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta. This occurs so generally in the debate suttas that it is not worth citing examples. What is noteworthy in the Buddha's use of this strategy is his ability to force from his adversary a question which demonstrates the latter's ignorance, and hence the Buddha's superior knowledge⁴⁴. So Soṇadaṇḍa, having been led to reduce the number of qualities that permit a person to be defined as a brahman to two, is forced to ask the Buddha to explain these qualities⁴⁵.

There are a variety of further strategies or conventions which occur regularly in the debates but which have not been specifically mentioned in any of the suttas cited above. Two strategies especially favoured by the Buddha are those of

42 Sāmaññaphala Sutta, D 2.

43 Sāmaññaphala Sutta, §§ 35, 37; Poṭṭhapāda Sutta, §§ 34-38; Lohicca Sutta D 12; Tevijja Sutta, D 13.

44 See Witzel, 1987, for the importance of this strategy and its occurrence in the brahman texts.

45 Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta, D I 124, § 22.

appealing to authority, both his own and that of another person, and of undermining the opponent's authority and status.

The Buddha will appeal to his own authority as Tathāgata. He will enhance his authority by telling the story of a previous lifetime in which his competence to answer the present challenge is established, and he is proved to be an expert on the subject (Kūṭadaṇḍa Sutta: when he was the brahman chaplain in charge of the sacrifice). He will present the adversary's position exhaustively and systematically, and then put himself above it because of his knowledge and achievements⁴⁶. He will resort to his transcendental vision⁴⁷. He will put himself forward as the example that is also the ultimate proof of his own position: 'Could such a bhikkhu (i.e. one who has achieved the described advanced state) say that?' ... 'But I am such a bhikkhu and I do not speak thus'⁴⁸. Similarly he puts his discipline above and out of reach of that of certain adversaries⁴⁹. In this context too

46 Brahmajāla Sutta, *Atthi bhikkave aññ' eva dhammā gambhirā duddasā duranubodhā santā pañitā atakkāvacarā nipuṇā pañita-vedaniyā, ye Tathāgato sayam abhiññā sacchikavīta pavedeti* . . . D I [I 12, § 28], and *Ime diṭṭhānā evam-gahitā evam parāmatthā evam-gatikā bhuvissanti evamabhisampwāyā ti. Tañ ca Tathāgato pajānāti, tato ca utaritarāṃ pajānāti, tañ ca pajānaṃ na parāmasati, aparāmasato c'assa pacettaṃ yeva nibbuti viditā, vedanānaṃ samudayañ ca atthagamañ ca assādañ ca ādinavañ ca nissaranañ ca yathā-bhūtaṃ viditvā anupāda vimutto, bhikkhave Tathāgato*. D I 16f.

47 Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, D 8 [I 161f, § 3]: . . . *dibbena cakkhunā visiddhena atikkanta-mānusakena* . . .

48 Mahāli Sutta, D 6 [I 157, § 16] and variously; Jāliya Sutta, D 7: *Yo nu kho āvusa bhikkhu evaṃ jānāti evaṃ passati kallaṃ nu kho tass' etaṃ vacanāya . . . Aham kho pañ' etaṃ . . . evaṃ jānāmi evaṃ passāmi. Atha ca pañāhaṃ na vadāmi* . . .

49 Udumbarikā-Sihanāda Sutta, D 25 [III 39f, § 7]: *Dujjānaṃ kho etaṃ Nigrodha tayā añña-diṭṭhikena añña-khantikena añña-ruccikena aññat' āyogena*

come the Buddha's assertions that he is 'the greatest'⁵⁰

The Buddha quotes or resorts to external or non-present authorities to enhance his authority. He cites the gods in the Ambaṭṭha Sutta⁵¹, where he quotes a verse by Brahmā Saṅgumāra and agrees with it, and in the Pāṭika Sutta⁵² where he supports his assertion that he knows by adding that he has also been told this by a deva. He tells a story which shows that the highest god recognises that only the Buddha can answer a certain question⁵³. In the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta⁵⁴, he imputes a decision in his favour to 'the wise'. Also in this sutta⁵⁵, he invokes Nigrodha's support, although the latter is absent, when he refers to an occasion when Nigrodha found an answer that he (the Buddha) gave very satisfying.

The strategy of undermining or reducing the adversary's status and authority is also frequently used. In the Ambaṭṭha Sutta⁵⁶, the Buddha humiliates Ambaṭṭha by revealing the latter's humble origins; in the same sutta⁵⁷ he reveals that

aññat' ācariyakena yenāham sāvake vinemi . . .

50 Cf. Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, D 8 [I 174§ 21], and variously. *Yāvata Kassapa ariyā paramā vimutti, nāhaṃ tattha attano samasamaṃ samanupassāmi kuto bhīyyo.* Cf. On the claim to be the best, Witzel, 1987, p.365, quoting the Taittiriya Brāhmaṇa 3.10.5. Also, 'One cannot just claim to be better than the rest . . . Mere brazen assertion does not suffice; one must be able to prove one's knowledge.' p.372f.

51 D 3 [I 99, § 28]

52 D 24 [III 14§ 18]

53 Kevaddha Sutta, D 11 [I 215, § 67-end]

54 D 8 [I 163, § 8]

55 § 23.

56 D 3 [I 92f, § 16]

57 D I 103, § 6.

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Pokkharasādi, Ambaṭṭha's teacher, is not sufficiently respected to be permitted into the direct presence of the king. Also in this sutta he tells Ambaṭṭha that the ability to recite mantras of the ancient rishis does not make him a rishi⁵⁸. He resorts to ridicule of brahman knowledge and habits in the Tevijja Sutta (D 13). Similarly, Kassapa ridicules his adversary when he tells him, 'I have never seen or heard anyone professing such a position, such a view'⁵⁹.

There are further general strategies in use. The Buddha will establish the criteria for winning the debate and then maintain that he conforms to them, as in the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta⁶⁰, where he defines the criteria for the appellation 'samaṇa' or 'brāhmaṇa', and in the Udumbarikā-Sihanāda Sutta, where he defines true asceticism⁶¹. The Buddha will show both the pros and cons in the adversary's position, and then demonstrate that his own position is still stronger⁶². Like Kumāra Kassapa, but not so explicitly, the Buddha will use similes and analogy. He may use these poetically, to reinforce the ideas he is presenting, as the many similes in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta. He may also use these strategically in his argument, especially with the goal of getting the opponent to refute his own position. The Buddha can also be reasonable. In the Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, when Kassapa challenges him whether he condemns all asceticism, he

58 . . . *tyāhaṃ mante adhiyāmi sācariyako' ti tāvatā tvaṃ bhavissasi isi vā isittāya vā paṭipanno ti n' etaṃ ṭhanaṃ vijjati.* D 3 [I 104, §§ 8, 10]

59 *Nāhaṃ Rājañña evaṃ-vādiṃ evaṃ-diṭṭhiṃ addasaṃ vā assosin vā.* (Pāyāsi Sutta, D 23 [II 319, § 5])

60 D 8 [I 167, § 15]

61 *tapo-jigghucchā parisuddhā.*

62 Kassapa-Sihanāda Sutta, D 8; Udumbarikā-Sihanāda Sutta, D 25.

replies, 'How then could I, O Kassapa, who am thus aware, as they really are, of the states whence men have come, and whither they will go, as they pass away from one form of existence, and take shape in another, — how could I disparage all penance; or bluntly revile and find fault with every ascetic, with every one who lives a life that is hard?'⁶³ The Buddha can open himself up to the judgment of others. Also in the Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta, he tells Kassapa of an occasion when in discussion with certain *samaṇas* and *brāhmaṇas*⁶⁴ he offered them to put aside all the subjects on which they held mutually incompatible views, and to judge solely with regard to those qualities that they mutually agreed were unskillful (*akusala*), blameworthy (*sāvajja*), ignoble (*nālam-ariya*) and wicked (*kiṇha*), whether the Buddha was not the one among them who had most completely abandoned them (*anavasesam pahāya vattati*)⁶⁵.

An interesting feature that occurs in two of the debates is the sub-challenge.

Sub-challenges have a particular character. They occur when the followers of an adversary interfere in a debate. The Buddha responds to these sub-challenges in a standard way. He counters by challenging his adversary's supporters to debate with him themselves, if they think that their leader is not performing

63 Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta, D I 161f, § 3: *Yo 'haṃ Kassapa imesaṃ tapassīnaṃ evaṃ āgatiṃ ca gatiṃ ca cutiṃ ca uppattiṃ ca yathābhūtaṃ pajānāmi. so 'haṃ kiṃ sabbāṃ tapaṃ garahissāmi sammaṃ tappasim lūkhajivāṃ ekamsena upakkosissāmi upavaddissāmi?* Tr. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues* I, p.224.

64 I.e. in a debate with potential opponents. See Manné, 1990, p.58f.

65 Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta, D I 163, § 5.

adequately.

The sub-challenges occur only in debates with brahmins⁶⁶. In the Ambaṭṭha Sutta, once the Buddha has accused Ambaṭṭha of being descended from the slave of a Sākya⁶⁷, Ambaṭṭha's followers defend him. The Buddha then challenges them: 'If you, young brahmins, think that the young brahmin Ambaṭṭha is ill-born, not of good family, not learned, not a fine reciter, without wisdom, and not able to debate with me, then let him be silent, and you debate with me. If you think the opposite, then you be silent and let Ambaṭṭha debate with me'⁶⁸. Ambaṭṭha's companions are silent. In the Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta (D 4) the Buddha extracts from Soṇadaṇḍa the concession that only two attributes are essential for a man to claim truthfully to be a brahmin. Soṇadaṇḍa's companions accuse him of betraying them: 'Do not, Venerable Soṇadaṇḍa, speak in this way. The Venerable Soṇadaṇḍa rejects our caste; he rejects our sacred verses, he rejects our birth!'⁶⁹ The Buddha's reply is the same as

66 *Mānavas*, Ambaṭṭha Sutta, D 3; *brāhmaṇas*, Soṇadaṇḍa Sutta, D 4.

67 D I 92f, § 16.

68 *Sace kho tumhākaṃ mānavakā evaṃ hoti, "Dujjāto ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, akulaputta ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, appassuto ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, akalāyāna-vākkaraṇo ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, duppāṇṇo ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, na ca pahoti Ambaṭṭho mānavo samaṇena Gotamena saddhim asmim vacane patimantetun ti", tiṭṭhatu Ambaṭṭho mānavo, tumhe mayā saddhim mantetūti.* *Sace kho tumhākaṃ mānavakā evaṃ hoti, "Sujāto ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, kulaputta ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, bahussuto ca Ambaṭṭho mānavo, ca pahoti Ambaṭṭho mānavo samaṇena Gotamena saddhim asmim vacane patimantetun ti", tiṭṭhatu tumhe, Ambaṭṭho mānavo mayā saddhim mantetūti.* D I 93f, § 18.

69 *Mā bhavaṃ Soṇadaṇḍo evaṃ avaca! Apavada! eva bhavaṃ Soṇadaṇḍo vaṇṇaṃ apavadata manta apavadata jātim . . .* D I 122, § 17.

in the Ambaṭṭha Sutta, but without the opening remarks about birth and family⁷⁰.

The style of debate is remarkably consistent in all the debate suttas, with the single exception of the Pāyāsi Sutta (D 23), where Kumāra Kassapa, and not the Buddha, is the protagonist. This enables us to compare the Buddha's debating style and techniques with those of one of his disciples. The style of the Pāyāsi Sutta is qualitatively different from that of the suttas in which the Buddha is the protagonist. Where Kumāra Kassapa says, 'I, Prince, have neither seen or heard of any one holding such a view, such an opinion'⁷¹, the Buddha is never surprised by a view expressed by his adversary. Where Kumāra Kassapa asks the adversary his reasons⁷² the Buddha never invites extensive representations of the opponent's views. It is his style rather to ask brief pointed questions to which only one answer is possible and which leads to the rebuttal by the adversary himself of his own position. Kumāra Kassapa thus pays more attention to the details of his adversary's case, while the Buddha goes straight to the weak point of his adversary's argument.

Kumāra Kassapa's is a poor imitation of the Buddha's method of asking a series of questions whose answers manoeuvre the adversary into denying his own position: he takes much longer to convince his adversary than the Buddha ever does. Kumāra Kassapa's arguments contain notably less Buddhist teaching than those of the Buddha. Where the Buddha

70 *Ibid.*, § 171

71 See n.61. Tr. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues* II, p.351.

72 *pariyāya*, §§ 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16.

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produces similes, without explicitly saying that he is doing so, Kumāra Kassapa is explicit (§ 9). In every way the Buddha is both more subtle and more skilful than Kumāra Kassapa in his use of debating techniques and strategies.

Fully half of the debates in the Dīgha are with brahmins (D 1, 3-5, 10, 12, 13, 23). Debates exist also in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upaniṣads. They appear too in the earliest Vedic literature, the Ṛgveda, as Speech Contests⁷³. So far the rules for these have not yet been fully described by scholars. Insofar as they have been⁷⁴, they show that this is another case⁷⁵ where we need Buddhist texts to help us understand brahmanical literature.

73 F.B.J. Kuiper, 'The Ancient Aryan Verbal Contest', *Indo-Iranian Journal* IV, 1960, pp.217-81.

74 Witzel, 1987.

75 See J. Bronkhorst, 'The Mahābhāṣya and the Development of Indian Philosophy' in *Three Problems pertaining to the Mahābhāṣya*, Poona 1987, third lecture.

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NOTES ON THE UDĀNA¹

John D. Ireland

The Udāna or 'Inspired Utterances' is the third book of the Khuddaka Nikāya or Minor Collection. It consists of eighty short suttas or discourses of the Buddha, divided into eight groups (*vaggā*) of ten suttas each. The title refers to the pronouncement, usually in verse, made at the end of each sutta and prefaced by the words; 'Then, on realising its significance, the Lord uttered on that occasion this inspired utterance' (*atha kho bhagavā etam atthaṃ viditvā tāyaṃ velāyaṃ imaṃ udānaṃ udānesi*). Here it is the Buddha who pronounces them, although others are sometimes so inspired (e.g. in Ud. 2.10 and 3.7). Such utterances also occur elsewhere in the Sutta Piṭaka (e.g. M I 508; M II 104-5, 209; S I 20, 27-8, etc.).

The prose suttas which precede the 'inspired utterances' themselves could be regarded as a kind of commentary, supplying the introductory circumstances to the essential Dhamma-teachings found in the utterances. Because they are introductory, relating circumstances and containing little doctrinal material, they betray their lateness in a variety of ways and strongly suggest they are actually an ancient

¹ The present essay was compiled from notes made and problems encountered while preparing a translation of the Udāna. This translation, to which the references herein are made, was published as *The Udāna. Inspired Utterances of the Buddha* (BPS, Kandy 1990), and was reviewed in BSR 9, 1 (1992).

commentary. Sometimes the utterances do not appear to fit neatly into the context in which they are set (e.g. 5.2, 5.5), though in other cases the story and the *udāna*-utterance are integral to each other (e.g. 1.8, 4.5, etc.). Being expressions of the Buddha's teaching, the utterances often allow for a wider interpretation than the circumstances surrounding them suggest and have, moreover, multiple meanings and allusions to the teachings referred to in other portions of the Sutta Piṭaka. The fact is there exists an intricate network of cross-references throughout the Tipiṭaka and no one passage can be studied in isolation. A particular topic or aspect of the teaching found in one place begins to become meaningful only when everything else that has been said about it is known. Everywhere the Dhamma is spoken of in brief and no one place can be pointed to as being exhaustive and definitive of any aspect of the Dhamma. When a topic, word or phrase is come across and occurs apparently nowhere else in the Canon, it always presents the problem of determining its exact meaning and significance. An example would be *kappa*, *āyu-kappa* in 6.1. We have to rely on the Commentary to tell us that *kappa* does not mean the aeon in this context, but the normal human life(*āyu*)-span. However, there is no certainty that it was always so interpreted.

Could the *udāna*-verses once have existed as a collection apart from the introductory sutta, like the verses of the Dhammapada? These verses are also described as *Buddha-udāna*, but the stories supplied to explain when and where they were spoken are found in the Commentary and are not reckoned as the word of the Buddha. In the first *vaggā* of the Udāna, the Bodhivagga, the *udāna*-utterances form a group united by the common word 'brahmin' (*brāhmaṇa*), which is obvious when they are read apart from the introductory suttas.

So this *vagga* could well have been called Brāhmaṇavagga, following on from the last *vagga* of the Dhammapada, the preceding work in the Khuddaka Nikāya. Similarly, the second *vagga* has the unifying theme of *sukha*: happiness, bliss. Subsequently there is no obviously discernible theme linking the utterances. However, there is a suggestion of an overall plan to the work as a whole, in that the beginning of the first *vagga* does deal with the start of the Buddha's career beneath the Bodhi tree. Additionally, the final *vagga* contains material also to be found in the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya, which recounts the last days of the Teacher before he passed away. The first sutta of the sixth *vagga* is also an important episode in the life of the Buddha. It is found in the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta too and is the beginning of the events leading up to the passing away of the Buddha and contains Ānanda's failure in not requesting him to delay his departure from this world.

As well as being uplifting and inspiring, the stories from the Udāna also reveal much humour. For example, the response of Nanda on being asked to compare those pink-footed nymphs with that Sākya girl, 'the loveliest in the land'. Again, in the story of Suppavāsā, when the Buddha elicits from her the response that she would like another seven sons, despite the trouble and pain she had to undergo to produce just one — all forgotten in the pride of motherhood! And then there is the incongruity of a new-born baby being able to hold a conversation. These, and other subtle touches, reveal the inspiration, humour, joy and delight — and devout faith too — of those ancient and unknown story-tellers who collected and put together this literature. Also noticeable is their love of puns and allusions, the word-play and the ingenuity involved. Thus in

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1.8, the pun on Sangāmaji's name, and, in the 'Bull-Elephant' story (4.5) the play on the word *nāga*, meaning both perfected one and elephant. In this last is also the charming touch of the elephant bringing water 'for the Lord's use' with his trunk. Then there are the similes and parables, like that of the blind man and the elephant (6.4), that are both entertaining and instructive. Although it should be pointed out that this parable is best suited to Jain rather than Buddhist doctrine — a theory of partial truth being somewhat un-Buddhistic — the story is probably older than both Jainism and Buddhism and is still used today by modern Hindu teachers (e.g. by Ramakrishna).

The thought processes of the compilers of the Pāli Canon are also revealed when it is discovered that there is a connection between two adjacent suttas, although this may not be too obvious at first sight. One example in the Udāna is between suttas 5.8 and 5.9 where a reference to Devadatta's schism is followed in the next sutta by the inclusion of a verse that is found elsewhere (e.g. Vin. I, p.349) in the context of the Kosambi rift. Other examples may be found in the Aṅguttara Nikāya. These connections are often so well hidden they need great ingenuity to discover them. They would also constitute necessary aids to memory in an oral literature and an indication of how it was gradually put together, a word or phrase in one sutta acting as a cue or trigger for the next. Also to be found are connections and allusions within the same sutta that are not at first obvious; some so subtle that one could be forgiven for thinking they are accidental rather than deliberate. An example is contained in Ud. 5.4. What is more natural than for little boys, caught out in some misdemeanour ('tormenting fish in a pond') by a passerby, attempting to run away, as is suggested in the last line of the verse:

'If you have done a bad deed or do one now,
You will not escape pain, though you try to flee.'

Another device the ancient compilers of the Canon have employed is the occasional interposing of lines of explanatory narrative prose, or verse that repeats what was previously said in prose. This has been done in the Cunda Sutta (8.5.), heightening the solemnity of the events being described with dramatic effect. This sutta also has a number of curious features. It consists of four separate pieces, actually four short suttas that have been strung together. The composition of *sāḥkaramaddava*, the Buddha's last meal, has been the subject of continuing controversy from the earliest times and much has been written about it. Although it is thought to have been the cause of the Buddha's sickness, this is not borne out by a careful examination of the commentarial tradition. It was possibly medicinal in nature and acted as a purge and was prepared by Cunda with the purpose of prolonging the Buddha's life. In any case the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta suggests the Buddha fell ill during the last rains-retreat, prior to informing Māra he would pass away in three months' time and the visit to Cunda's dwelling. The remorse of Cunda was probably because his preparation did not succeed. Another feature of the Cunda Sutta is the sudden appearance of the venerable Cundaka as the Buddha's attendant, whilst the final section reverts to Ānanda again. An intriguing question is whether there is any connection between Cunda the Smith (Cunda Kammāraputta) and the venerable Cunda(ka). Thus, is there a portion of the story missing where Cunda the Smith 'goes forth' and becomes the venerable Cunda or Cundaka? Moreover, are the narrative verses actually fragments of an alternative verse recension of the story? The text we have is very much an edited and

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selected version of the whole mass of floating oral material, much of it now lost forever. An example of some of this material is the survival of the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit work, the Mahāvastu, which gives a glimpse of the extent and richness of it. Herein are to be found both prose and verse alternative versions of various tales and episodes within the Buddhist tradition, many of which are absent from Pāli literature altogether².

In the Commentary to the Suppavāsā Sutta (2.8) it is said Koliyaputta was the son (*putta*) of the Koliyan king. However, this is anachronistic as the Koliyans, like the Sākyans their neighbours, formed a republic during the lifetime of the Buddha. As Suppavāsā herself is designated Koliyadhītā ('a Koliyan daughter'), this might then give the impression that they were brother and sister instead of husband and wife! The word *putta* (as also *dhītā*) when used as a suffix to a name, here and elsewhere, seems to mean 'a member of', 'belonging to' or 'one born in', a certain family or clan, rather than the 'son' or 'child' of a particular person. It is used especially by *khattiya* clans such as the Koliyans and Sākyans in whose republic-states³ there was a legislative assembly (*saṅgha*) of leading members, heads of families. These members are called *rājas*, whilst the other

2 I disagree now with my observation in the introduction to the Udāna translation (p.8) that, 'The Udāna is an anthology, many pieces being taken from elsewhere in the Pāli Canon . . .', which is misleading. Neither the Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta nor the Udāna can be pointed to as the original source for those suttas they have in common.

3 These are either truly tribal, ruled by the elected elders of a council, or republican states governed by an aristocratic (i.e. *khattiya*-born) oligarchy.

male members of the clan were the *puttas* or *rājaputtas*, the 'sons' of the *rājas*. That the Buddha was a *rājaputta* would not necessarily mean that he was a 'prince' as the later tradition would have it, the son of King Suddhodana, but merely that he was a member of the Sākyan clan. He was a Sākyaputta or Rājaputta, that is, he belonged to a clan or tribe that was governed by an assembly of *rājas*, a Rajput tribe in modern parlance. A remnant of such a tribe, the Forest Rajputs, still existed in recent times in the foothills of the Himalayas on the borders of Nepal. Their origin had much in common with the ancient traditions recorded in Pāli literature of the origin of the Sākyans, whose home was that very same region.

This system of government of the Koliyans and Sākyans is also reflected in the heavenly worlds with the distinction between 'devas' and 'devaputtas'. The leader of the devas, the *devarāja* of the Tāvatiṃsa (the 'Assembly of the Thirty-three') reveals in the name of 'Sakka' his connection with the Sākyans. Possibly he was originally a tribal god, hero or ancestor, who in later times came to be identified with the Indo-Ariyan thunder-god, Indra. Because of this tribal connection it is appropriate that Sakka should have become the special patron and protector of the Buddhadhama, the teaching of the Great Sage (*mahāmuni*) Sākyaputta Gotama, the Sākyamuni, the Sage of the Sākyans. The devas, it may be gathered, lived an idyllic existence as *rājas*, in aristocratic or 'regal' splendour, attended by retinues of devaputtas, celestial maidens (*devakaññā*) or devadhītās (the 'daughters', also called *accharā* or nymphs), musicians (*gandhabba*), etc. Here, as in the human world which it mirrors, there is to be seen the transition in the actual meaning of the term *rāja*, from the original tribal/republican connotation to the idea of 'kingship', the single rule of a

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mahārāja, when kingdoms replaced the tribal territories. References to devatās or devaputtas belonging to 'a Tāvatiṃsa company' (*Tāvatiṃsa-kāyikā devatā*) may be taken to mean referring to this heaven as organised into presumably thirty-three companies or divisions. Each of these are headed by a 'deva' as the leader which, like that of the overall leader Sakka himself, is an office held by that deva and who is replaced upon his decease. The term 'devaputta' then refers to the other members of the various companies under the leadership of a particular deva. These companies also resemble military battalions and are so employed in the mythical warfare that takes place between the devas and the asuras. As well as this warrior/*khattiya* ethos, the Tāvatiṃsa is characterised by its sensual delights which here reach unsurpassed heights of indulgence and perfection.

In the Udāna (3.7) there is a reference to Sakka's consort, Sujā the asura maiden. In 3.2 Sakka is revealed being ministered to by five hundred beautiful pink-footed nymphs (*accharā*) or the *Kakuta-pādānī*, literally, 'the Dove-footed Ones', referring to their delicacy and complexion, rather than any bird-like characteristics. Some texts (e.g. the Burmese⁴) have *kukkuta-* ('chicken'), instead of *kakuta-* ('dove'). In the Commentary (UdA, p.172) it is stated that their feet were of a reddish or pinkish colour 'like the feet of a pigeon' (*pārāpata-pāda-sadisa*), whilst the PTS edition of the Udāna reads *pādinī* instead of *pādānī* - the only reference to these nymphs in the Sutta Piṭaka, making the correct reading difficult to ascertain.

4 Khuddakanikāya I, Chātṭhasangāyana ed. 1956.

Some other words and phrases of interest in the Udāna are the following:

sabbattha ekarattiparivāsa (1.10). This seems to mean 'staying one night at each place (upon the journey)'. However, the Commentary takes it to mean 'taking (but) one night to complete the journey', despite *sabbattha* which ought to mean 'everywhere', 'each place'.

In 1.10 also occurs the phrase *gāvī taruṇavacchā*: 'a cow accompanied by a young calf'. This should pose no particular problem, except that Woodward mistranslated the sentence, implying that Bahiya (and also Suppabuddha in 5.3) was killed by 'a calf' instead of 'a cow with a calf', the latter being more plausible. Normally gentle and inoffensive, a cow can be dangerous and unpredictable when she has a young calf to protect. Woodward's mistake seems to have gone unnoticed for it is found repeated in books and articles by other authors when referring to the deaths of Bahiya and Suppabuddha. Pukkusāti (M 140) and Tambadāthika (DhA II 203f.) were also similarly killed by cows, the former by a cow rushing to protect her calf according to the Commentary (MA V 62).

Janapadakalyāṇī (3.2) meaning 'the loveliest in the land' is taken by the Commentary to be the personal name of the Sākyan girl with whom Nanda is infatuated, rather than merely descriptive. One feels the Commentary is stretching a point here but it had to fit the manifestly late and absurd tale of

5 F.L. Woodward, *Minor Anthologies of the Pāli Canon II: Verses of Uplift*, PTS 1935, p.11.

Nanda's going forth as found in DhA.

In 3.9 occurs a list of crafts. The fifth is *muddāsippa*: communicating by gestures. The Commentary is of little help, merely adding 'hand gestures'. Woodward's explanation of it as bargaining by signs or hand-touching employed by merchants⁶ is far-fetched and quite wrong according to the late I.B. Horner in a personal communication. Possibly it may have had a military significance as do the previous crafts, i.e. directing the course of the battle by signalling commands. T.W. Rhys Davids' proposal that *lokāyata* means 'nature lore' has been disposed of by Jayatilleke who has shown that it originally meant 'the art of debate' as a branch of brahminical learning⁷. *Lokāyata* came to mean materialism at the time of the Pāli commentators and, outside Buddhism, it is also used as a term for materialism. It is so described in Haribhadra's *Saddarśanasamuccaya* (8th cent. C.E.) and in the Vedāntin Mahādeva's *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (14th cent.). There are two distinct readings of the final craft mentioned: (1) *khattavijjā*: political science or statecraft, the craft of the ruling or warrior class (*khattiya*); (2) *khettavijjā*: the knowledge of, or the ability to locate, suitable sites for building upon. There is also a possible reading of *nakhattavijjā* (astrology).

Most translations of the verse beginning *abhūtavādi nirayaṃ upeti* (4.8; also found in DhA 306 and It. 48), render this line: 'The liar goes to hell'. However, this does not clearly differentiate the subject from the person of the next line. That

6 Woodward, *ibid.*, p.38, n.2.

7 K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London 1963, p.48f.

the verse should be translated as:

'The false accuser goes to hell

And he who denies the deed he did . . .'

is suggested by the story of Sundarī's murder (also found in Dhpa) and also the prose of It. 48.

In 5.9 occurs the phrase *saddāyamānarūpā*, 'making an uproar', in the PTS edition of the text. However, on consulting the various readings noted by the texts, none of the Mss used in its preparation actually has this reading. Paul Steinthal, the PTS editor, apparently took *saddāya-* from the Commentary which gives this as an alternative, possibly because he considered his Ms reading meaningless. These various readings are: *padhāya-*, *pathāya-*, *vadhāya-*, *saddhāya-*. More recent Oriental printed editions of the text are of little help in resolving the problem. The Burmese edition has *sadhāya-*, as does the Nālandā edition⁸, and this may be equated with *padhāya-*, because *sa* and *pa* are similar in the Brāhmī script and easily confused. There is a verb *sadh-* (Skt. *śṛdh-*) meaning 'abuse', which ought to give the Pāli present indicative *saddhati*, not *sadhati*⁹. The Udāna Commentary¹⁰ gives the reading *vadhāya-*, meaning 'harm', 'injury', but 'harm by verbal abuse', which seems to be what is intended, would be a peculiar use of the word. To establish the correct form of the text is a complicated problem and cannot be resolved with the material available.

Parūlha-kaccha-nakha-loma: 'with long-grown nails and hair'

8 Khuddakanikāya I Nālandā Devanāgarī Pāli Series, Bihar Government, 1959.

9 Private communication from K.R. Norman, Cambridge.

10 Both PTS, and Simon Hewavitarne Bequest ed. 1920.

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(6.2). Woodward translated as 'with long nails and hairy armpits' ('Verses of Uplift', p.78), and at *Kindred Sayings I* (p.104) it appears as 'with hairy bodies and long nails'. There seems to be uncertainty as to the meaning and derivation of *kaccha*, as either 'marshy land', 'the long grass', etc., growing in such a place, or 'a hollow' such as 'an armpit', etc.¹¹. The whole phrase appears to imply being unkempt, dirty, sweaty and smelly ('hairy = sweaty armpits, caked with dust', etc.¹²). Later in the sutta the king says, '... when they have washed off the dust and mud, are well-bathed and perfumed, and have trimmed their hair and beards . . .', which seems to support this interpretation.

Koñca khīrapako va ninnagaṃ (8.7). I translate it, 'as a fully-fledged heron leaves the marshy ground'. However, *khīrapakā* actually means 'milk-fed', i.e., 'a suckling(-calf)' and seems hardly appropriate for a bird, although possibly it could refer to a fledgling being fed with regurgitated food by its parents, but far-fetched. The Commentary (UdA, p.427) refers to the notion of certain birds (heron, goose or swan, etc.) having the ability to separate milk from water, leaving the water behind (*ninnaga* = *udaka*). Another possibility is that *koñca* is not a heron at all, but an elephant. See PED *koñca*¹²: trumpeting (of elephants; also the sounds made by certain water-birds that are similar. cf Milindapañha chap 6, '... an elephant's sound is like a heron's'). *koñca* = *koñcanāda* (*kuñcanāda*). *koñca* / *kuñca* / *kuñja* / *kuñjara*: an elephant.

11 Cf PED *kacchā*⁽¹⁾, *kacchā*⁽²⁾, also *kacchan:ara*, *upakaccha*, and Skt. *kacchā*, *kaṣṣa*, *kaca*.

12 This interpretation was suggested to the writer by the late Ven. H. Saddhātissa.

However, it seems best to accept the commentarial explanation here. Although it has not been possible to locate the concept of the milk-drinking heron elsewhere in any Pāli work, it is a known convention in Sanskrit literature¹³. It is used as a simile for accepting the good but rejecting the bad, thus: 'He takes the good utterances (away from the bad) as the goose takes milk from water' (Mahābhārata I 69.10) and, 'The royal goose drinks milk, (but) avoids water' (Subhāṣitaratnaśāstra, 1374). Therefore, the Udāna passage should be amended to translate as: '(the wise man . . . abandons evil) as the milk-drinking heron leaves the water behind'¹⁴. However, the substitution of 'heron' for the more usual 'goose' (or 'swan') does leave the suspicion that this interpretation may not be entirely correct. Perhaps it would be going too far to consider this as another example of the Pāli redactor's subtle humour!

Sutta 8.6. betrays its lateness by the prophecy about Pāṭaliputta (modern Patna) put into the mouth of the Buddha, concerning its future greatness when it was to become the capital of Magadha and the centre of the Aśokan empire. The sudden introduction of the name Pāṭaliputta itself, and also the explanation calling one of the entrances to the city the Gotama

13 That this was a widespread belief is substantiated by the fact that it is actually mentioned in a 9th cent. Chinese (Tang Dynasty) Buddhist source. After hearing a report of a conversation with the Ch'an master Huang-po, another remarks, 'That swan is able to extract the pure milk from the adulterated mixture . . .' (J. Blofeld, *The Zen Teaching of Huang Po*, London 1958, p.101).

14 This information and the references were supplied by K.R. Norman in a personal communication.

Gate, look very much like a late interpolation.

In conclusion, a word should be added regarding the text and translation of the Udāna. The PTS edition is in a very unsatisfactory state. It was prepared by P. Steinthal in 1885 from three Mss (two Sinhalese and a Burmese), all containing many defects. An attempt was made to improve the text by E. Windisch who produced a list of alternative readings¹⁵. This list was subsequently further improved and added to by F.L. Woodward when he made his edition of the Commentary (1925). Despite these attempts, the fact is that there is still much left to be desired in the text and what is really needed is a completely new edition to replace Steinthal. There are now in existence several Oriental printed editions, such as that contained in the Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition of the Tipiṭaka (1956), that are more satisfactory or at least 'readable' compared with many portions of the PTS text. This Burmese edition, the Nālandā Devanāgarī edition and the Sinhalese Buddha Jayanti Tripiṭaka Series edition were consulted by the present writer in preparing his translation of the Udāna. The initial purpose of this translation was to 'improve upon' Woodward's 1935 version ('Verses of Uplift') which is unsatisfactory in many respects. However, I have refrained from being overtly critical of Woodward's work for, although many of the errors in his translation have been corrected, this new translation has produced a new crop of errors. These were discovered only subsequent to publication and hopefully may be corrected in a future edition.

15 'Notes on the Edition of the Udāna', JPTS 1890, pp.91-108.

A NOTE ON THE ORIGIN OF THE PĀLI DHAMMAPADA VERSES

Nissim Cohen

The purpose of this 'note' is twofold: first, to provide up-to-date material on the parallels to the Pāli Dhammapada (Dhp) and between the various Dharmapadas, as well as comments on their relative antiquity; second, to develop a thesis on the origin of the Dhp, hinted at elsewhere¹, and which is based on contextual and literary evidence. It may stimulate further investigations on this matter and, if carried out by more able researchers, the outcome may prove fruitful and our knowledge concerning the origin of the Pāli Dhp stanzas enriched.

1. The Dhp is, admittedly, the most widely translated and read of the canonical texts. Notwithstanding its popularity, the greater part of the research work done so far gravitates, with a few exceptions, towards the parallels to the Dhp and the similarities between the various extant Dharmapadas, to the exclusion of other linguistic and literary studies. One of the most outstanding contributions in the field of contemporary studies in recent years is the work published by Professor K. Mizuno²; more important still, his research has helped to resolve the question of the antiquity of the Dhp in relation to the Dharmapadas of other schools. My aim in this section is to produce complementary material, based on my own studies, and in a systemised manner to comment on the relative age of these texts.

Usually, editors and translators supply references to other texts. However, besides the inconvenience of being scattered throughout the texts, these references are sometimes incomplete and even misleading³. The author of this article has, in recent years, surveyed the Pāli canonical and non-canonical texts as well as Dharmapada texts for parallels to the Dhp, trying to discover and identify additional similarities or parallels. The outcome is presented here in the form of Tables I-III⁴.

To my knowledge, this is the most complete inventory of the Dhammapada's parallels so far published⁵. It will also be noted that the canonical texts have been divided into two groups, CANONICAL TEXTS-I (CT-I) comprising those texts whose final composi-

tion dates are considered, by certain scholars, to be earlier than or, in a few cases (Udāna, Itivuttaka?), contemporary with the Dhp. In CANONICAL TEXTS-II (CT-II) have been included texts which are, in all probability, later than Dhp.

A question that may arise in this connection is why the Jātakas have been listed as non-canonical. It is well known that there is still no consensus as to what should be considered as canonical in the Jātakas, and what as commentarial literature. As our concern here is to define the probable sources of the Dhp verses, it should suffice to mention that we have the testimony of the Jātakas proper which, in some cases, state clearly that the verses have been pointed out by the Buddha from the Dhp and not the other way round (for example, Ja I 76, 132; II 441; III 73, 3J3)^{6, 4}.

Let me now present some remarks related to the work of Prof. Mizuno and the editors of other Dharmapada texts on this topic. According to Mizuno, in the Pāli canonical texts there are altogether 137 gāthās (non-repetitive), and in the non-canonical texts, 59 in all⁷. It will be seen from the 'Table I-Summary: Sources and Parallels to the Pāli Dhammapada Verses' that I have found these numbers to be 123 and 60 respectively; however, as he does not give exact references, no further comment is possible here (incidentally, in his reckoning he does not include the Vimānavatthu). We see in the table that the total number of single Dhp stanzas traceable to the canonical texts are 110, if CT-I only is considered; this is about 26% of the total.

J. Brough, in his *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada* (GDhp), states that 'Of 350 Prakrit stanzas, between 225 and 230 are shared with the Dhammapada'⁸. This figure is higher by about 31% from that in Table I (177) and may be attributed, first, to the errors found in his identification and reckoning of the parallels as registered in Concordance II (p.287): about two dozen partial stanzas (one, two or three lines) have been considered as exact equivalents to Pāli Dhp; second, to the inclusion, in this reckoning, of fragmentary stanzas whose equivalence to the Dhp cannot be asserted. The manuscript of the GDhp contains quite a few fragmentary stanzas of one and, to a lesser extent, two lines.

similar to the Pāli Dhp. Further, Brough assumes (p.23), based on the proportions in the surviving Prakrit, the text to have shared between 350 and 360 verses with the Dhp. We may safely state that, in view of the former considerations, this figure could not be higher than 250.

In his translation of the Tibetan version of the Udānavarga⁹, Rockhill identified 306 parallels with Dhp (which, deducting the few errors found, becomes 297). I identified seven more. Brough, in his GDhp (p.23, n.1), noted just over 50 others which are not included in the tables of Rockhill - a figure that seems too high.

A Dharmapada text, in mixed Sanskrit, brought from Tibet and deposited at the Bihar Research Society of Patna, has been edited twice, more or less simultaneously: *The Patna Dharmapada* (PDhp) by G. Roth, and *The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dharmapada* (BHSDhp) by N.S. Shukla¹⁰. The former comprises 415 stanzas, the latter, 414; this is due to a difference in the method of arrangement of the verses adopted by the two editors. They mention that in the colophon of the manuscript the gāthās are referred to as being 502; a hint as to a possible explanation to account for this discrepancy may be had, perhaps, by a comparative study of Dhp and PDhp¹¹. Roth believes that '... PDhp is based on a Prakrit-Pāli version which is older than the existing Pāli Dhp. Besides, there are also other differences in the verses themselves and the sequence of their order which exclude the Pāli Dhp in its present form as the direct source of PDhp' (p.94). Shukla is of the opinion that the present version of the BHSDhp can have the distinction of being regarded as an earlier Dharmapada: '... The division found in the Pāli text and other versions ... indicates that it was at a very late stage that these texts gained a streamlined form, and for this purpose they must have depended on one common base' (p.viii). I do not know whether the author carried out his intended study which would prove the anteriority of this text; meanwhile, Mizuno has given us a comparative study of the Dharmapadas, wherein this matter is discussed and an attempt made to prove the anteriority of the Pāli Dhp in relation to other Dharmapadas¹².

Another way of looking at this problem of anteriority, and one that could give us the chronology of compilation of these texts, would be to pick up a doctrinal issue and examine how it is tackled in them. As an example, let us take the case of the Arahant. The Dhp has an *Arahanta Vagga*, verses 90-99; the term is expressly mentioned only in stanza 98. PDhp has equivalent stanzas, not grouped together, but scattered throughout different chapters; its parallel verse 245 also mentions the term *arahanto*. Udānavarga has, instead, the term *ārya* (XXIX.18) in it we find only five out of ten stanzas. The GDhp has none of these stanzas. We may, therefore, try to establish the chronology of these texts, based on the historical evolution of the ideal of perfect man, which started with that of Arahantship, turned out to be an issue of controversy some time after the Parinibbāna of the Buddha, and ended with the emergence of the ideal of the Bodhisattva in Mahāyāna schools. The order would be: Dhp → PDhp (or PDhp → Dhp) → Ud → GDhp, which is slightly different from that given by Mizuno, viz. Dhp → PDhp → GDhp → Ud.

Further help for the establishment of the relative chronology of the Dharmapadas may be found in the *Buddha Vagga*, vv.179-196. GDhp has parallels to only two of them (182, 193); significantly enough, vv.188-192, which deal with the Threefold Refuge, are absent in it. There are no parallels to vv.193-196 in any of the Dharmapadas (on these, see later). We thus have confirmation of the chronology we tried to establish above¹³.

As to the parallels found in PDhp-BHSDhp, my comparative study of the texts shows these to total 285 - a figure different from that found in the references of both edited texts, due to errors and omissions contained therein which will not be elaborated on here. Since the former text is very akin to Dhp, we would expect the divisional structure of the stanzas, which are parallels to Dhp, to be similarly related in its edited form - which is not always the case. For instance, PDhp 23-26 have, respectively, 6-4-4-4 pādas; rearrangement into 4-4-4-6 pādas would make 23 and 24 the exact parallels to Dhp 31, 327, and PDhp 27 is a partial parallel to Dhp 27¹⁴.

The edition of BHS DhP contains two oddities worth mentioning: BHS DhP 247 and 260 contain seven and five pādas respectively - a unique instance in all the Dharmapadas. BHS DhP 204 is an extra stanza not found in PDhp - and yet both editors used the same manuscript. It remains to be mentioned that BHS DhP 203, 204 = DhP 131, 132, and that these two stanzas form a complete pair, that is are complementary in their contents¹⁵.

2. The view that the Dharmapada is an anthology of verses culled from various Buddhist texts has been prevalent since the last century¹⁶. No evidence whatsoever has been put forward to sustain this view except pointing to the parallels existing in the 'canonical texts, which, as we have just seen above, account for only about 26% of the verses. As to the rest of the missing parallels, the opinion has been expressed lately that '... the other two-thirds seems to have been collected from losing [sic] sūtras'¹⁷. Mizuno invokes, among other things, the testimony of Chinese authors (who expressed a view many centuries later than the events we are evaluating) as support for his opinion of 'losing sūtras'. (Curiously, a statistical argument against this thesis comes to mind: the above-mentioned 26% of stanzas are scattered throughout 25 volumes of texts in the PTS edition: with the same proportion of dispersion in view, the remaining 74% of stanzas would have to be scattered throughout 71 volumes of supposedly lost suttas - a mass of texts larger than the Tipitaka itself!).

I will try now to present some evidence which, I hope, will show that DhP is an original work, and that we have no need to look for its verses elsewhere. When we scrutinise the earlier and later texts of the Theravāda school, we ascertain that no tradition related to any 'lost' texts has been handed down; neither can it be inferred from the literature of other schools which are offshoots of the Sthaviras. Quite the contrary, the canonical as well as the extra-canonical accounts indicate that the whole of the Buddha's teachings as then known to his immediate disciples and remembered by them, has been rehearsed and recorded¹⁸. In the Vinaya of the Dharmaguptas (a branch of the Sarvāstivādins), in the passage about the First Council, among

the texts said to have been rehearsed a 'Dharmapada Sūtra' is mentioned¹⁹. Although it is unlikely that DhP existed at the time in its present form, nonetheless it does point to it as an independent work of equal status to other suttas (see later on).

The testimony of the Jātakas - that they drew on the stanzas of DhP - has already been mentioned above. It is worth noting that, in those instances at least, the verses have no equivalents in the canonical texts except in the DhP - additional evidence for the thesis proposed here. It is plausible to suppose that, should these verses have been found in other (later lost) suttas at the time, the compilers of the Ja would not have failed to indicate it. It may also be observed from the tables that other non-canonical texts include stanzas from DhP which have no parallels in the suttas. Another very significant fact is that about 234 stanzas, or 55% of the total, are not mentioned at all in any of the main texts of Pāli or Sanskrit literature.

A thorough analysis of DhP stanzas not found in the canonical texts (CT) would supply very instructive internal evidence as to their originality. Let me present a small sample of these:

- vv.1-2: *manomayā*. This term or expression is employed in the CT: (a) as an attribute of the form/nature of the *devas*, 'mind-made or 'made of/by mind' (M I 419; A III 122, etc.); b) as a psychic power acquired by the disciples of the Buddha as the result of meditational practices, whereby, among other things, the ability is imparted to create 'mind-made' forms or bodies (M II 17; A I 24, etc.) As a psychological term, corresponding to its meaning in the present verses ('consisting of mind, produced by mind, mind-made'), it is not found in the Tipitaka. To bring this term 'seems only to imply a Vijñānavāda view', with which Mizuno agrees²⁰. It is significant enough that these verses appear in the Mahākarmavibhaṅga (Sarvāstivādin text), but not in the equivalent older Mahākammavibhaṅga Sutta (M, No. 136). No less important is the fact that none of the approximately 12 stanzas in DhP in which the term *mana* appears is traceable to any canonical text. As we know, this term comes into prominence in the abhidhammic literature²¹.

- vv.19-20: *sahitam*. Generally translated as 'scripture', 'scriptural text', 'sacred text'; in this acceptance it is not found in CT-I²².
- v.25: *ogho*. In its literal sense of 'flood', it is unlikely to be found in CT, but appears in later texts (Vva 48, etc.).
- v.29: *abalassam*. 'Weak horse'. An expression that seems to be peculiar to Dhp (= *dubbalassam* DhA I, 262, both given in CPD and PTSD).
- v.30: *Maghavā*. A title of Sakka quite common in the Jātakas; but it is not met with in CT except indirectly when '... the Buddha says that Sakka, who visited him, and whose conversation is recorded in the Sakkapañha Sutta, was also known as Maghavā²³.
- vv.44-5: *yamaloka*. This expression is not found in CT, but is quite frequent in commentarial literature (PvA 33, 107, etc.).
- v.47: *mahogho*. See the remarks to *ogho* above (examples: Vism 512; Vva 110, DhA II 274, etc.).
- v.70: *kusagga*, 'the point of a blade of grass'. Found in later literature (Vva 73; PvA 254, etc.).
- vv.97, 383: *akataññū*, 'knowing the uncreated/not made' (Nibbāna?) (Nd I 237). In this sense, it seems peculiar to Dhp.
- v.149: *alōpūn eva*, 'gourd'. Brough (p.226) says that 'the spelling with a -p- is probably a late pedantry.'
- vv.157-166: *ATTA VAGGA* 'On Self'. The stanzas of this chapter do not have parallels in CT-I.
- v.171: *rājarathūpamaṃ* (*rājaratha*). I could not find this term in CT-I.
- v.218: *anakkhāto*. Usually thought to designate Nibbāna, is translated as 'Undeclared', 'Ineffable', etc. We will meet this word in three places in Majjhima Nikāya (I 331; III 8, 15), always in its primary meaning of the regular verb 'to tell, show, point,' etc.) The above designation is, clearly, indicative of a later period. (The occurrences of this word in other canonical texts always reflect the regular meaning.)
- v.302: *addhagū*. Only in ThI 55 and Ja III 95. In S I 212 its form is *panthagū*.
- v.322: *Sindhava* (a thoroughbred horse). Unknown in CT; mentioned with some frequency in Ja (I 175; II 96; III 278, etc.).
- v.324: *Dhanapālako* (elephant's name). Only known to Ja (I

66; III 293, etc.). According to Ja No.533, the famous elephant Nālāgiri, after its conversion by the Buddha, came to be known as Dhanapālako (keeper of treasure).

- v.351: *bhavasalla*, 'occhiddi bhavasallāni' ('who has cut the thorns of existence'). No other instance of this expression has been observed in CT. In Lalitavistara 550, the Buddha is called *maḥāsalyaharta* 'the great remover of thorns'.

We could add to this short list the enigmatic vv.294-5 - they seem to be tinged with a non-Buddhist colour; they resist any elucidation, despite the fair effort of the Commentaries to untangle their complexities by ascribing a symbolic meaning to the words²⁴.

A more profound contextual study of Dhp, if carried out, could be expected to reveal additional clues to its originality. Another helpful source for the determination of the age of Dhp is its metrical structure. A.K. Warder, in his *Pali Metre*, deals extensively with this subject²⁵. To sum up, '... Of the large collections we can say only that some of them contain a preponderance of older... or later (e.g. Dhp) texts... (p.6); 'Dhp verses represent quite a long period of composition, overlapping some of the... [canonical] texts...' (p.173). He calculates this to have occurred in the Mauryan Period, 300-200 B.C. (p. 225). The present writer has been working on a study of the Pāli metre in Dhp. Preliminary results indicate that the above time span could be stretched backwards, at least, one century more (fifth to third century B.C.). The hypothesis that a Dhammapada text might have existed at the time of the First Council should not be discarded. If so, it would have been a short anthology of verses that gradually expanded during the whole period of formation of the Canon itself, as reflected in its different metres and their variants and some linguistic peculiarities, before it received its final polished form as we have it now.

Indeed, it is possible to distinguish between three historical periods in the composition of Dhp: the earliest period is represented by a small kernel of stanzas which, probably, originate with the Buddha's time. It is characterised by ideas which con

stituted early Buddhism, such as (1) the unsettled, eremetical life of a recluse (which prototype is the 'Rhinoceros' of Sn): 49, 90-92, 305, 395?; (2) emphasis on meditational and allied subjects: 209, 202, 372; (3) contempt for the body: 146, 148-50 (these develop the idea expressed in v.147, M^o II 64); (4) doctrinal issues: 273-5, 277-9; (5) self-reliance/efforts, Tathāgatas are only teachers, etc.: 158, 165, 166?, 276; (6) on the qualities of the (ideal) bhikkhu: 31, 360-1, 365-8; (7) association with virtuous ones: 207, 208, 375; (8) on the ideal of Nibbāna: 23, 75, 126, 369; (9) qualities of the followers of the Way: 57, 81-2, 296-301; (10) definition of a samāna, recluse: 391; (11) reverence to those who can make known the Dhamma: 391-2; (12) exhortations to laymen and bhikkhus: 53, 283; (13) utterances of the Buddha, made after his Enlightenment: 153-4, 353.

The intermediate (pre-Mauryan) period, to which appertain about two-thirds of the stanzas; this is the formative period of the co-called 'primitive' text on which drew all the Dharmapadas, including Dhp.

During the last (mid-Mauryan) period, additional stanzas (40-50?) were composed or incorporated into Dhp. During this same period occurred the first schism in the Sangha; and the final redaction of Dhp, in the form we have it now, probably took place around Asoka's time. Due to the pressure and influence of the rival sects, the Sthaviras (or Theravādins) made efforts to popularise the Buddhist teachings. Accordingly, there is nothing in these latest stanzas about the fundamental tenets of the Buddha's teaching; the emphasis is on morality in general, on the fruits of kamma based on bad or good actions, on happiness in this life and rebirth in heaven after death, echoes of the schismatic discussions, etc. Some of the themes, briefly, are: (1) on the states of woe and bliss, on heaven and death, on the fruits of kamma: 17-18, 127-8, 174, 219-20, 237-8, 319 (this last complementary to vv.316-18); (2) on good and bad behaviour: 62, 129, 137-40, 247-8, 270, 340, 349, 355, 360; (3) association with good friends: 78; (4) on the virtuous and wise: 95, 145 (cf. v.80), 347, 350-1; (5) on the fruit of a stream-winner, longing for Nibbāna: 178, 218; (6) echoes of the schismatic discussions, criticism or complaints of other sects' behaviour,

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etc.: 164, 195-6, 254-8, 268-9; (7) on the difficulty of renunciation: 302; (8) on happiness and suffering: 202; (9) exhortations to bhikkhus: 343, 379, 381; (10) on the gift of Dhamma: 354 (one of Asoka's inscriptions reads: 'There is no gift that can equal the gift of Dharma')²⁶; (11) the stanza (324) already mentioned above on Dhanapālako. Due to their late composition, these stanzas, with a few exceptions, could not be expected to have parallels in canonical or non-canonical Pāli or Sanskrit literature.

The metre in the older stanzas is, approximately: vatta, normal (pathyā) - 66%; vatta, mixed - 30%; tuṭṭhubha - 4%. In the last-period stanzas, the metre is: vatta (pathyā) - 44%, vatta, mixed - 23%; tuṭṭhubha - 8% vatta-tuṭṭhubha - 2%; mattāchandas - 23%. (The existence of a large quantity of the new metre mattāchandas is very significant.)

Based on such contextual and literary evidence as above, I am induced to believe that the Pāli Dhammapada is an original work and not a mere collection of canonical verses. The author or authors made use of some stanzas, culled from the CT, as seemed appropriate to the objectives and themes of the text. It may be adduced, in favour of this proposition, that original anthologies were not a novelty at the time - Theragāthā and Therīgāthā are two such examples. As Dhp was a didactic and impersonal work, it had to maintain in anonymity the name(s) of the author(s) in line with canonical tradition²⁷. This point, obviously, will have to be investigated further; my aim here has been to draw the attention of other researchers to the problem of the Dhammapada's origin which has not yet received serious consideration.

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NOTES

¹ A few years ago, after I had drawn my conclusion concerning the second

part of this article, I came across this passage: 'This is an anthology which drew on the more original parts of the Sūtra and added further verses to it' (A.K. Warder, *Indian Buddhism*, rev. ed., Delhi 1980, p.279). I take it to imply the same idea and so do not lay claim to originality.'

2 K. Mizuno, 'Dharmapadas of Various Buddhist Schools' (*Studies in Pali and Buddhism*, ed. A.K. Narain, Delhi 1979) and 'A Comparative Study of Dharmapadas' (*Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhātissa*, ed. G. Dhammapala et al., Nugegoda 1984). In these articles, additional bibliography is included.

3 I intend to prepare, in the future, a list of these errors and submit them to any publishers interested in correcting them in new editions.

4 A single Pāli text, Apadāna, was not available to me for verification as to the presence of Dhp verses. However, we would expect not more than one or two parallels in it.

5 To render the tabulated statistical data more complete, in addition to parallels of integral verses, parallels of partial stanzas found in the old canonical texts are also included: 4 and 5 pādas cut of six-line stanzas; 2 and 3 pādas out of four-line stanzas.

6 There is evidence, however, to show that the composition of some of the verses of Ja extended over a long period, overlapping that of Dhp.

7 See 'Dharmapadas of Various Buddhist Schools', *op. cit.*, p.258.

8 J. Brough (ed.), *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London 1962, p.20.

9 W.W. Rockhill (tr.), *Udānavarga*, London 1883, repr. Taipei 1972 and New Delhi 1982.

10 N.S. Shukla (ed.), *The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dharmapada*, Patna 1979; G. Roth (ed.), 'Text of the Patna Dharmapada' in *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*, ed. H. Bechert, Göttingen 1980.

11 Unlike GDhp and Ud and considering that SDhp is, in form and text, very akin to Dhp, we perceive a lacuna where we would expect to find parallel stanzas. Vv 150-1, 185, 222-3, 260, 278, 297-8 are examples of this. It may indicate that, in reality, the original text contained a larger number of stanzas.

12 See 'A Comparative Study of Dharmapadas', *op. cit.*

13 To make it clearer, two distinct historical layers may be detected in Ud: the older one, comprising about 300-350 stanzas, drew on the more 'primi-

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tive' text of Dhp. It is this older layer - before it received additions, probably by the hand of Dharmatrāta - that I consider older than GDhp.

14 The same may be said of PDhp 37, 38; PDhp 63; PDhp 193, 194 and PDhp 325, 326, which, rearranged, would make them parallels to Dhp 393, 401; 375; 121, 122; and 166 respectively.

15 In all but one case, Shukla follows the same structural division of verses as that of Pāli Dhp. The exception is BHS Dh 63, 64 (4-6 → 6-4 would give BHS Dh 63 = Dhp 375 and BHS Dh 64 = Dhp 376 a-c).

16 T.W. Rhys Davids, *The History and Literature of Buddhism*, repr. Varanasi 1975, pp.32, 45-6. - B.C. Law, *A History of Pali Literature*, repr. Varanasi 1974, Vol.I, p.214. - M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, repr. New Delhi 1977, Vol.II, pp.83-4. - K. Mizuno, *op. cit.*, p.256, etc.

17 K. Mizuno, *op. cit.*, p.258. He was able to find no more than 20 additional gāthās in the Chinese sources (p.259); hence his conclusion on lost texts mentioned here.

18 'In the Pali canon is recorded an interesting tradition in the form of two appendices to the Vinaya-pitaka section (*Collavagga*, *Khandhakas XI and XII*) to the effect that the canon received in this way, by united congregational recital... and the texts recited were therefore the only definitive canon of Buddhism. Two famous occasions on which, not portions but excerpts merely, but the whole of its *Dhamma-vinaya* contents was rehearsed...' J. Brough, *The Buddha and Five After-Centuries*, repr. Calcutta 1978, p.100. The first rehearsal of the Tipitaka is dealt with in many books; see, for instance, A. K. Warder, *op. cit.*, p.201 ff.

19 The passage, in full, is given in E.J. Thomas, *The History of Buddhist Thought*, repr. London 1971, p.270.

20 J. Brough, *op. cit.*, p.243; Mizuno, 'A Comparative Study of Dharmapadas', *op. cit.*, p.172.

21 This word (*manomajā*) poses a difficulty which seems unsurmountable: in no place, not even in later commentarial literature, could I find a single example of the use of this word in its present meaning. I am, therefore, inclined to accept the original word to have been *manojavā* (swift as thought), as in the other Dharmapadas. Contrary to the opinion of Mizuno, I do not consider this word 'illogical' within the context of the stanzas; in the words of Brough, 'This reading reflects the *ksanika* [momentary] nature of the dharmas...' (p.243).

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22 Although I myself translated it as such in my version of Dhp, I am now convinced that the word should be rendered as in the suttas: to the point, coherently, consistently, sensibly.

23 G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, repr. Pali Text Society, London 1974, Vol. II, p.406.

24 Some scholars are of the opinion that Dhp has come to include some sayings which were originally not Buddhist at all. See, for instance, Winternitz, *op. cit.*, p.84, n.2.

25 A.K. Warder, *Pali Metro*, London 1967.

26 Rock Edict XI. For probable influence of Dhp on Asoka's behaviour, see E. Hultzsch, *Inscriptions of Asoka*, repr. Delhi 1969, pp.11 ff.

27 The traditional view of the Sangha concerning the Dhp has been expressed by the late Narada Thera, in his preface to *The Dhammapada*, London 1972, p.ix. That the Dhp could have existed in its present form at the time of the First Council is far from probable, and does not tally with the evidence at our disposal.

TABLE I - SUMMARY: SOURCES AND PARALLELS TO THE PALI DHP VERSES

TEXTS	Dhammapada Stanzas			
	Complete Stanzas		Part. Stanz.	
	Repetitive Verses Considered ¹	Once-Counted ²	4&5 pādas	2&3 pādas
CANONICAL TEXTS - I				
Vinaya Piṭaka	9	9		1
Dīgha Nikāya	3	3		
Majjhima Nikāya	15	7	1	1
Saṃyutta Nikāya	26	24	2	7
Aṅguttara Nikāya	13	9	1	3
Udāna	5	4		4
Itivuttaka	7	4	1	4
Sutta Nipāta	32	28	1	4
Theraḡāthā	34	22	1	11
Therīḡāthā	--	--		2
(TOTAL)	(144)	(110)	(7)	(37)
CANONICAL TEXTS - II				
Vimānavatthu	4	3		
Petavatthu	1 ⁷	-		
Mahāniddeṣa	10	8		
Colaniddeṣa	5	-		
Kathāvatthu	3	2		
(TOTAL)	(23)	(13)		
NON-CANONICAL TEXTS				
Jātaka Aṭṭhakathā	42	26		
Nettipakaraṇa	29	15		
Peṭakopadesa	16	9		
Milindapaṛha	10	5		
Commentary Books	6	1		
Visuddhimagga	10	4		
(TOTAL)	(113)	(60)		
OTHER DHARMAPADAS				
Gāndhārī Dhp	169 [177] ³			
Sanskrit (Patna) Dhp	285 ⁴			
Udānavarga	304 ⁵			

- 1 Included here are all the verses to be found in the texts, irrespective of whether they are mentioned in more than one text or not.
- 2 Registered by order of arrangement of canonical texts.
- 3 Source: *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, ed. by J. Brough, London 1952. Figure in brackets includes those fragmentary verses which, in all probability, were exact parallels to Pāli Dhp in their original form.
- 4 Based on G. Roth, 'Text of the Patna Dharmapada', in *The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*, ed. H. Bechert, Göttingen 1980; and *The Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dharmapada*, ed. N.S. Shukla, Patna 1979.
- 5 Source: *Udānavarga*, by Dharmatrāta (tr. W.W. Rockhill), repr. Taipei 1972.

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TABLE II - SOURCES TO PALI DHAMMAPADA VERSES (complete stanzas)**

SOURCE	Dhp VERSES	SOURCE	Dhp VERSES	SOURCE	Dhp VERSES
CANONICAL TEXTS - I					
Vinaya Pitāka		i.114	200	Sutta-Nipāta	
i.8	353	i.164	125	V 45	328
i.349	3-6	i.182	266-7	V 46 ¹⁰	329
i.358	320-30	i.233	98	V 257	285
iii.98	300	ii.204	387	V 620-4611	396-422
		v.24 ⁶	87-9	V 661	306
				V 662	125
Dīgha Nikāya		Aṅguttara Nikāya		Theragāthā	
ii.49-50	183-5	i.226	54-6	V 15, 633	370
		ii.8	230	V 17	325
Majjhima Nikāya		ii.29	230	V 191 ² , 877	80
i.171	353	ii.48	32	V 77	326
ii.64	147	iii.285 ⁷	246	V 92	93
ii.104	177-3, 382	iv.195	241-2	V 133-4	13-4
ii.185	26-7, 80	v.732	85-8	V 285-615	94
iii.154	3-6, 320-30	v.233	89	V 275, 490	6
		v.253	85-9	V 277	312
Saṃyutta Nikāya		Udāna		V 323-4	51-2
i.3 ¹	370	p.12 ^b	131-2	V 399-402	334-7
i.7	143	p.39	42	V 635-6	297-3
i.13	125	p.43	185	V 676-8	277-9
i.23	221	p.45	386	V 769, 1020	147
i.24	85			V 871-2	172-3
i.25 ^{2,3}	26-7, 221	Itivuttaka		V 873	382
i.49 ⁴	311-4	p.17-8	191	V 883-414	26-7
i.57	66-8	p.18	176	V 969-78	9-10
i.71	151	p.48 ⁹	32	V 991-2	98-9
i.77 ⁵	345-6	p.42-3	380-8	V 993-4	76-7
i.83	281	p.82	364	V 1032	364
		p.98	380		

Notes: **Old canonical texts - original sources to Dhp verses.

Repetitive verses considered.

- S 1.3 (variation in *pāda* b) - 2. V 27: S 1.25 (var.d) - 3. V 221: S 1.25 (var.d) - 4. Vv 312-14: S 1.49 (different arrangement) - 5. V 346: S 1.77 (var.c) - 6. V 87: S v.24 (var.b) - 7. A iii.205 (var.a) - 8. V 131: Ud p.12 (*pāda* 'a' is lacking in the PTS text; an editorial or typographical error/omission?) - 9. It p.40 (var.a) - 10. Sn V 46 (var.d) - 11. V 400: Sn V 624 (var.b) - 12. Thag V 19 (var.d) - 13. Thag V 205 (var.a.); V 206 (var.a,d) - 14. V 27: Thag V 884 (var.b.).

TABLE III - PARALLELS TO D^{hp} IN CT-II, NON-CANONICAL TEXTS AND OTHER DHAMMAPADAS¹

Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp ^a	Udānavarga
1	Nett 129; DhsA 211	201 ³	1 ³	XXXI.23 ³
2	Nett 133; DhsA 211; Peṭ 24, 163, 165	202	2	.24
3	Ja III.212, 488		5	XIV. 9
4	Ja III.212, 488		6	.10
5	Ja III.212, 488		253 [254]**	.11
6			254	
7		217	7	XXIX.15
8	Peṭ 64	218	8	.16
9	Ja II.198; v.50	192	94	. 7
10	Ja II.198; v.50	193	95	. 8
11		213	171	. 3
12		214	172	. 4
13	Vism 37	219	351	XXXI.12
14		220 ³	352	.14
15	Peṭ 7	205	3	XXVIII.33
16		206	4	.35
17				.37
18				.39
19		190	290	IV.22
20			291	.23
21	Ja V.99; Nett 34	115	14	. 1
22	Peṭ 102	116	15	. 2
23	Peṭ 102		16	. 3
24		112	28	
25		111	29	. 5
26		117	17	
28	Mil 387	119	19	. 4
29		118 ³	18	
30		120		
31		74	23	
32	Mil 408	73	22	.30
33		136 ¹	342	XXXI. 8
34			343	. 2
35	Ja I.312		345	. 1
36			346	
37			344	
38			335	
39			347	
40	Peṭ 14		350	XXXI.35
41		153	349	I.36
42				XXXI.10
43				.11
44		301	131 ^a	XVIII. 1
45		302 ³	132	. 2
46		300 ¹	134	.18
47		294 ¹	128	.13
48			129 ³	.14
49	Ja I.349; Nett 184	292	127	. 7 ³
50		271 ³	310	. 8

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Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp*	Udānavarga
51		290	125	XVIII. 6
52		291	126	
53		293	130	.11
54	Mil 333	295	121	VI.16
55	Mil 333		122	.17
56	Mil 333		123	.18
57		297	124	.19 ³
58		303	135	XVIII. 9
59		304 ³	136	.10
60			185	I.19
61	Ja III.73			XIV.15
62				1.20
63			164	XXV.22
64		233 ³	191	.13
65		234 ³	192	.14
66	Nett 131		174	IX.12
67	Nett 132		175	.13
68			176	.14
69				XXVIII.18
70			385-6,389	XXIV.19
71	Nett 161; Peṭ 48		107	IX.16
72			177	XIII. 2
73			178	. 3
74			179-180	. 4
75			180-181 ³	. 5
76	Nid I.503	231	206	
77	Nid I.503	230 ³	207	
78				XXV. 3
79		224	348	
80				XVII.11
81	Mil 386	239	93	XXIX.52
82		225	275	XVII. 9
83		226 ³	80	
84		324 ³	326 ³	
85			261	XXIX.36
86			262	.37
87			263	
88			264 ³	
89			265	XXXI.39
90			86	
91			231	XVII. 1
92			87	XXIX.24
93			270	.25
94	Nett 162; Peṭ 48		89	
96			88	
97	Nid I.237		333	
98			245	XXIX.18 ³
99			155	.17
100		306	376	XXIV. 1 ³
101		308		
102		309 ³	377	. 2 ³
103		305	378	XXIII. 3

Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp*	Udānavarga
104			319	XXIII. 4 ³
105			320	. 5 ³
106			379	
107		320	380	XXIV.17
108		321	381	.34
109		172		
110			390	. 3
111			391	. 5
112		316	392	. 4
113		317	393	. 6
114			395	. 9
115		318	394	.10
116	Ja IV.490?		96	XXVIII.23
117	Ja IV.490?	207	97	.21
118	Ja IV.490?	208	98	.22
119	Ja I.231		102	.19
120	Ja I.231		103	.20
121		209	193	XVII. 5
122		210	194	. 6
123			116	XXVIII.14
124			106	.15
125	Ja III.203; Pv II.9.9; Vism 301-2		115	. 9
126			274 ³	I.24
127	Mil 150 ³			IX. 5
128				I.26
129				V.19
130			202	V.20
131	Nett 33,130		203	XXX. 3
132	Nett 134		204 ⁴	. 4
133			197	XXVI. 3
134			199	. 5
135			200	1.17
136				IX.11
137				XXVIII.26
138				.27
139				.28
140				.29
141			195	XXXIII. 2
142	KvA 73	80 ³	196 ³	. 1
144				XIX. 1
146	Ja V.11		233	I. 4
147	Vv No.16			
148		142 ¹	259	.35
149		154-5		. 5
150		284 ³		XVI.22 ³
151	Ja V.483	160		1.29
152			209	
153	Ja I.76			XXXI. 6
154	Ja I.76			. 7
155	Peṭ 7		229	XVII. 3
156			230	. 4

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Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp*	Udānavarga
157			312	V.16
158	Ja II.441, III.333	227	317	XXIII. 6
159			318	. 8
160			321	.20
161	Nett 183		307	XXVIII.12
162	Nett 183	330	306	XI.10
163		264	167	XXVIII.16
164		258	315	VIII. 7 ³
165	Nid I.32; Nid II.269; Kv 525,527		308	XXVIII.11
166			325	XXIII. 9
167		121 ³	31	IV. 8
168	Ja I.90, III.268	110	27	
169	Ja I.90	328	224	XXX. 5
170			258	XXVII.14
171				.16
172		122	20	XVI. 5
173				. 9
174				XXVII. 4
175			232	XVII. 2
176			297	IX. 1
177			293	X. 2
178	Ja I.79		276	XXIX.54
180	Ja I.79		277	.56
181			244	
182		263	334 ²	
183	Nett 43,81,171,186; Pet 54,91; Sp I.186		357	XXVIII. 1 ³
184	Sp I.186		239	XXVI. 2
185				XXXI.54
186	Ja II.313		145	II.17
187	Ja II.313		146	.18
188	Ja I.97		216	XXVII.28
189	Ja I.97		217	.29
190	Ja I.97		218	.30
191	Ja I.97			.31
192	Ja I.97		219	.32
193		173 ¹	79	XXX.29
194			68	.24
197		166	235	.48
198				.45
199		165	256	.44
200				.50
201		180 ³	81	. 1
203		163	75	XXVI. 7
204		162	76	. 6
205	Ja III.196			
206		175	69	XXX.27
207		176	70	XXV.24
208		177	.71	.25
209		266 ³	173	
210			73	V. 5

Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp*	Udānavarga
211			74	V. 7
212			72	. 1
214				II. 3
215				. 2
217		322 ³		V.25
219	Vv 52.1			.21
220	Vv 52.2			.22
221		274	238	XX. 1 ³
222		275		.21
223	Vv No.15; Ja II.4	280		.18
224		281	292	.15
225			240	VII. 8
226			269	
227		237 ³	283 ³	
228		240 ²	284	XXIX.49 ²
229		241	286	.51
230		242	287	.51
231			279	
232			280	
233			281	
234			282	
235			161	
238				XVI. 3 ³
239	Kv 108,219		163	II.10
240	Nett 129		160	IX.19
241			157	
242			158	
243			159	
244		221	164	XXVII. 2
245		222	165	. 3
249			327	X.12
250			328	.13
251				XXIX.40
252		272	166	XXVII. 1
253			268	
254		114	32	IV.21
260		182		XI.11
261				.12
262		186	288	
264		188	235	.13
265			236	.14
266		67		XXXII.18
267		68 ³		.19 ³
268	Nid I.58,336;Nid II.230			
269	Nid I.58,336;Nid II.230			
271		65	271	
272		66	272	
273	Kv 600;Nett 188; Pet 56	109 ³	358	XII. 4
274	Pet 10 ³ ,52		360	.11 ³
276			359	. 9
277	Nett 6,167,175	106	373	. 5

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Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp ^a	Udānavarga
278	Nett 6,167,175	107		XII. 6
279	Nett 6,167,175; Peṭ 44,52	108 ³	374	. 7
280		113	30	xxxI.32
281	Nett 183		278	vii.12
282			375 ³	
283			361 ³	xviii. 3
284			362	xviii. 4
285	Ja I.183; Nett 36	299	363	. 5
286			364	I.38
287			365	
288		261	366	.39
290		164	77	xxx.32
291		179 ¹	117	
292			266	
293	Nett 30		267	
294	Nett 165	12 ³	47	xxxiii.70
295				.71
296		100		xv.12
297		101		.13
298		102		.14
299		103	243	.18
300		104	241	.21
301		105	242	.22
303		323 ³	331	
304	Nid I.448; Nett 11			xxix.19
305			313	
306	Ja II.416	269	114	viii. 1
307			113	
308		331 ¹	295	ix. 2
309		270	210	iv.13
310			211	.14
311		215	296	xi. 4
312				. 3
313				. 2
314		337	100-101	
315			234	v.17
316		273	169 ²	xvi. 4 ²
317		273	169 ²	. 4
318			170	
320		329	215	xxix.21
321	Nid I.243; Nid II.219		90	xix. 6
322	Nid I.243; Nid II.219		91	. 7
323	Nid I.243		92	. 8
325	Nett 34,129			xxix.13
326				xxxI. 5
327	Mil 379 ³	132 ³	24	iv.26
328	Ja III.488		9	xiv.13
329	Ja III.488		10	.14
330	Ja III.488		11	.16
331			65	
332			66	xxx.23

Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp ^a	Udānavarga
333				xxx.22
334			137	iii. 5
335			138	.10
336			139	.11
337				.12
338	Nett 42		156	.18
339			237	xxxI.29
341			148	iii.14
342			149	. 6
344			151	xxvii.26
345	Ja II.140; Nett 35,153; Peṭ 25,214	169	143	ii. 5
346	Ja II.140; Nett 35,153	170	144	. 6
348				
349	Pet 60 ³			
350	Mil 391	161	150	xxix.59
352			147	
354				xxvi.33 ³
356			152	xvi.15
357			153	.16
358			154	.17
359				.19
361	Peṭ 57	52	51	vii.11
362		53	52	xxxii. 8
363	Ja II.350	54	54	viii.10
364		64	226	xxxI. 9
365		61	55	xiii. 7
366		62	56	xxxii. 1
367		79		
368		70 ³	59	.21
369		76	57	xxvi.12
370	Nett 170	78		
371		75		
372		50	62	xxxii.28 ³
373		55	60	.10
374		56	61	.11
375		59	63	. 7
377		298	133	xviii.12
378			53	xxxii.27
380			322	xix.16
382				xvi. 7
383		10	34	xxxiii.69
384		14	41 ³	
385		35 ¹	40	xxxiii.26
386			49	
387		50	39	xxxiii.82
388				83
389		16		
390		11	46	.72
391	Nett 183	15 ³		
		23	45	.18

Pāli Dhp	Canonical (CT-II) & Non-Canonical Texts	Gāndhārī Dhp	Sanskrit Dhp*	Udānavarga
392		3	35-36	XXXIII.75
393				.9
394	Ja 1.481, III.85	2		.8 ³
396		17		.17
398		42 ³		
399		28		.20
400				.21
401	Sp 1.273	21	38	.34
402		30 ³		
403		49 ³	48	.42
404	Mil 386	32	44	.22
405		18		
406		29		
407				.47
408		22	43	
409		19		.28
410				.49
412		46 ³		
413				.37
415		20		.44
417				.52
419		44 ³		.57
420		43 ³		.53 ³
421		34 ¹		
422		41 ¹		.59
423				.55

Notes: * Repetitive verses considered.

* Numbering of the stanzas follows that of BHS DhP. See next note.

** The verses of PDhp corresponding to BHS DhP.195 through 205 and BHS DhP.248 through 414, are one higher. As a reminder, only the first occurrence is given here.

¹ Fragmentary extant stanzas.

² Different arrangement of the stanzas.

³ Variation in one of the *pādas*.

⁴ Extra stanza in BHS DhP, not found in PDhp.

ON TRANSLATING THE DHAMMAPADA

K.R. Norman

The Dhammapada is one of the most, perhaps the most, popular of Theravādin Buddhist texts. As evidence of the popularity of texts of the same *genre* in ancient times we have extant, in part or whole, besides the Pāli version, a version in the Gāndhārī Prakrit perhaps belonging to the Dharmaguptaka school, sections of a Mahā-sāṅghika-Lokottaravādin version, a Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit version (the so-called Patna Dharmapada), three versions of the Udānavarga in Sanskrit, a Tibetan version of the Udānavarga, and four Chinese versions. We can guess that a Dharmapada of some sort was probably included in the canons of all the sects of Buddhism which have disappeared.

There are various reasons for this popularity. There are those who have rated it among the masterpieces of Indian literature, although others have disagreed with this judgement. Some say that it can be regarded as the most succinct expression of the Buddha's teaching found in the Pāli Canon, and the chief spiritual testament of early Buddhism. It is (they say) a perfect compendium of the Buddha's teaching, comprising between its covers all the essential principles elaborated at length in the forty-odd volumes of the Pāli Canon.

If this is so, then it is perhaps strange that the Pali Text Society does not at present have an edition of the text in print, nor does it have a translation currently available. When John Brough, one of the greatest British Sanskrit scholars of this century, had just spent several years producing his study of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada, and had the whole Dhammapada-related literature at his fingertips, he was asked if he would produce a translation of the Dhammapada for the PTS. He replied: 'I cannot. It is too difficult.'

It is probable that many readers will find this hard to understand. After all, new translations of the Dhammapada appear almost every year, and there are by now probably forty or more in existence in English alone. What, they may well ask, is so difficult about it when so many translators seem to manage it? The thing to notice about most of these new renderings is that they

differ from other translations only in minor details, such as the word order in sentences, or the choice of words which are used to translate specific technical or semi-technical terms. No translator is ever satisfied with the words which his predecessors have used for such terms as *dhamma*, *āsava*, *nibbuta*, etc., and a translator sometimes believes that he has made a better translation because he has thought of a different word, without considering whether he has obtained a better grasp of the meaning of the phrase or the sentence as a whole. We can very often get some idea about translators of the Dhammapada from the way in which they render the word *dhamma* in the very first verse. We get a broad range of equivalents such as: 'ideas, things, mental states, phenomena of existence, (mental) natures, knowables'. An advertisement has recently appeared for a translation in which Dhammapada 1 is rendered as: 'Our life is shaped by our mind; we become what we think.'

The intention of the two new translations which have recently appeared¹ is to do more than this. They both aim at putting the Dhammapada into a framework and a background - Carter and Palihawadana (= C&P) into the framework of the Pāli commentarial tradition, and Kalupahana (= K) into the background of brahmanical Hindu thought contemporary with the Dhammapada.

Both these translations are to some extent inspired or, rather, stimulated by Brough's edition of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada², and their reaction to him and it is clearly visible. The reason for this is not hard to find. Brough believed that Buddhism had its own share of great art but he politely dissented with those who have rated [the Dhammapada] among the masterpieces of Indian literature (one wonders what he would have thought of the dust-jacket's statement 'ranks among the classics of the world's great religious literature'). He expressed his view that those who write in this way can hardly have made any serious comparison with great literature; nor could anyone with a sense of literary values describe the whole collection in terms scarcely merited by its best parts, if he had himself lived day and night close enough to those verses for long enough to arrive at an assessment of his own disencumbered of hearsay³. Brough was a poet in his own right, as his translations of Sanskrit poetry show, and his

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view should not be disregarded lightly, for religious or other reasons, by those who, almost certainly, have not lived as close to the text as he did for several years while dealing with the Gāndhārī Dharmapada. On the other hand, it must be agreed that some of his preferences for particular readings, based upon poetic considerations, are purely subjective and are unlikely to be accepted by all.

Brough also shook his head sadly over those who despite all the discoveries of the last 100 years in Gilgit, Chinese Turkestan, and elsewhere, still thought that the Pāli version of the Dhammapada and other canonical texts were the oldest and best. Of his decision to place the verses of the Pāli Dhammapada alongside their parallels in the Gāndhārī Dharmapada he wrote: '... it must not lead anyone to assume that there is a special degree of kinship between our text and the Pali, still less that the Pali represents a norm from which other versions have deviated. Perhaps this last warning is superfluous, since any such theory has long been obsolete; but I am not sure that it is entirely extinct'⁴.

After a brief introduction, dealing with the Buddhist literary tradition in Sri Lanka, problems regarding the received text, and the arrangement of verses in this volume, C&P begin by giving a complete translation of the Dhammapada (pp.13-82). Despite the statement on the dust-jacket, this is not accompanied by the original Pāli of the text. Portions of the Commentary (excluding the narrative sections, which are already available in Burlingame's translation)⁵ are then translated (pp.87-416). For each verse (or verses, since the Commentary sometimes puts verses into groups of two or more) they repeat - a rather space-consuming exercise - the translation they have just given, and follow this with the original Pāli. The explanatory portion of the Commentary, which follows the verses in the original edition of the Commentary, is then translated. Throughout the compilation there are numbers in square brackets, which presumably refer to the pages of the edition of the *Aṭṭhakathā* which they are translating. I have searched through the book and cannot find any reference to the source volume, and am therefore unable to identify the edition. Their translation ends with very extensive notes (pp.417-512), a bibliography and an index. In the notes they explain where

they are following a reading other than that found in the PTS edition⁶, and they quote from two medieval Sinhalese commentaries upon the Dhammapada, which give help with the interpretation of Pāli terms. The earlier, at least, of these seems to have made use of old Sīhala commentaries, now lost.

Their translation of the Dhammapada verses is set out in short lines, approximating to the pāda structure of the Pāli original. The order of the English words often follows the Pāli order closely, which sometimes lends a somewhat archaic sound to the English, but their version is for the most part clear and straightforward, and one can see exactly how they are construing the Pāli. The translation of the Commentary contains many extracts from the Pāli original, and the English is expanded wherever necessary to make it intelligible, while the sequence of the comments is sometimes rearranged to make the translation read more smoothly. It is, however, not always clear why they translate the way they do. In 11 'essential' is contrasted with 'nonessential', but in 12 with 'superficial'. Only recourse to the Pāli reveals that 'nonessential' and 'superficial' are both *asāra*. In 56 they translate *sīlavatam* as a genitive singular, despite the gloss *sīlavan-tānam*, which they translate correctly.

K begins with a very extensive (pp.1-75) introduction, in which he develops his theory that the Dhammapada was composed with the Bhagavadgītā in mind. It is clear that the Buddha's teaching was intended to be anti-brahmanical, with his rejection of the *ātman* and *varṇa* serving as the centre of his attack. Since the Bhagavadgītā is a brahmanical text, one would expect that work and the Dhammapada to be diametrically opposed about these and other teachings. I cannot, however, see any evidence of the precise parallelism of content and order in the two texts which one would look for if one wished to prove that the compilers of the Dhammapada actually chose and arranged the verses with the Bhagavadgītā in mind.

K then gives (pp.79-110) the text of the Dhammapada (using Fausbøll's second edition of 1900, but omitting Fausbøll's somewhat bizarre metrical emendations). He alludes to minor editorial changes he has made, giving suggestions made by Jayawickrama as his authority. The one instance he mentions, however, viz. the

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reading of *noyāti* (presumably from *n' oyāti = na uyyāti*) in place of Fausbøll's *no yāti* [in 179], is actually to be found in the *Atthakathā*. His translation follows (pp.113-53), and the notes (pp.157-92) and an index of Pāli terms (pp.193-221) conclude the volume.

Despite the facts that C&P include all the grammatical comments from the *Atthakathā* and quote from two other commentaries, and their translation and that of K are both heavily annotated, these two translations of the Dhammapada (as I have already suggested) differ little from those already available. Although K states specifically (p.ix) that he thought that it was time for a new translation because the interpretation of the philosophy of the Dhammapada given by Radhakrishnan⁷ (= R) in his translation had survived too long, his debt to R is especially evident, with occasional pādas identical with his version. He sometimes agrees with R in interpreting the Pāli in a way which cannot be justified without comment, e.g. *viveke yattha dūramam* (87) translated 'at a solitary freedom so hard to enjoy', (R: 'that retirement so hard to love'), which seems to assume that *viveke* is in agreement with *dūramam*; and *dhīro ca sukhasaṃvāso* (207) translated as 'the amiable company of the sagacious ones' (R: 'association with the wise is... happiness'), which may be correct, but only if *dhīro* is taken as something other than a nominative singular. Where K differs from R in philosophical interpretation, it is more in the exegesis in the notes than in the actual translation.

He occasionally departs from R's translation, sometimes correcting his mistakes, e.g. *anivesano* in 40 correctly translated 'free from attachment' instead of R's 'attached to it', and *vivekam anubrūhaye* in 75 translated as 'cultivate detachment' in place of R's 'strive after wisdom'. Sometimes there is no apparent reason for his change, and as his command of English is not of the same standard as R's, the results are occasionally somewhat opaque. It is not immediately obvious what one is meant to understand by: 'Neither a mother nor a father nor other relatives will do that (whereby) a rightly directed thought will make him one superior to it' (43); or 'even unto one there nought is oneself' (62); or 'An ignorant man who is conceited as a wise one, he indeed, is called an ignoramus' (63); or 'taking upon this refuge'

(189, 192).

K's translation has other oddities, which are possibly based upon confusion of forms. He translates *vannagandham* in 49 as 'colorful' and we may suspect that he has confused it with *vanna-vantam* in 51-52 which he renders in the same way. In 44-45 he translates *dharmapadam sudesitam* as 'the well-taught path of righteousness', presumably confusing *pada* with *patha*, although in the notes (p.164) he includes a reference to 'the well-taught verses of the doctrine'. In 168 he translates *uttitthe na ppamajjeyya* ('one should stand up, one should not be careless') as 'let one not be indolent in (the gathering of) scraps (as alms)', which looks as though he has taken *uttitthe* to be *ucchitthe*, perhaps helped by R's misprint *utthitthe*. In 188 *bahum ve saraṇam yanti* is translated as 'Many are they... that resort as refuge...', which suggests that *bahum* is being taken as a nominative plural.

Sometimes K improves on R, although it is not always clear that he knows how or why he is doing so. So in 74 he translates 'Let both householders and recluses know that this has been done by myself', where R and C&P have 'think', translating *maññantu*, which is also read by the Commentary. Udānavarga XIII.5, however, reads *jānīgur* 'let them know', and it seems preferable to divide the word *kata maññantu* as *kātam aññantu*, where the latter word is the third plural imperative from *ājānāti* 'know'. In 179 he translates *koci loke* as 'anywhere in the world', which is certainly correct, since *koci* stands for *kvaci*, whereas the Commentary (followed by R and C&P) takes it as a nominative singular. In his notes, however, K gives no hint that he is consciously departing from R's interpretation.

Similarly, he translates *vijessati* in 44 as 'will comprehend', i.e. the equivalent of *vijānissati* 'will know', instead of 'will conquer' as R and C&P take it. He does this, he says, at Jayawickrama's suggestion (although this is in fact the explanation given in the Commentary), because "'will conquer' makes no sense in the present context" although, as noted, other translators find this a satisfactory interpretation. C&P read *vijessati* in the Dhammapada itself but *vicesatti* for the lemma in the Commentary, and they have a note pointing out that the various traditions are undecided about whether to read -c- or -j-. It is clear

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that there is a pun intended on *vici-* in *pāda a* 'to distinguish, separate, understand' and *pacī-* in *pāda d* 'to pluck'. The various readings have come into existence because the verse has at some stage been transmitted through (and possibly even composed in) a dialect which turned intervocalic consonants into -y-. When the Pāli redactors (or the redactors of the version upon which the Pāli Dhammapada is based) were faced with this verse they were uncertain about the correct forms to adopt in their own dialect. When translating the *pāda* about picking flowers there was no doubt - the verb there had to be *ci-*. In the first *pāda* the decision was not so easy. Although the verb *vici-* existed and made very good sense, and must indeed have been the form which the commentator had in mind when he gave his explanation, nevertheless (pace K) the idea of conquering the world and becoming a *jina* was also very possible. Hence the ambivalence of the tradition.

Sometimes we may suspect that a departure by K from R's interpretation is based upon a misunderstanding of the Pāli, e.g. in 34 *māradheyyam pahātave* is translated 'The dominion of Mara should be eliminated', which suggests that *pahātave* (an infinitive of purpose = 'to avoid the dominion of Mara') has been taken as though it were the future passive participle *pahātabbam*. C&P have a long note on this word (pp.435-6) which reveals that they were rather baffled by the inclusion of the form *pahātabbam* in the Commentary. They explain their efforts to reconcile this form with the infinitive which they correctly realise *pahātave* to be. Their confusion is hard to understand. The Commentary rightly explains *pahātave* by an alternative form of the infinitive (*pahātum*), but in the exegesis of the verse the sentence is changed to the passive construction and reworded so that the future passive participle is included. I do not think that the Commentary is trying to explain the infinitive by the future passive participle as C&P seem to believe, and I cannot accept their translation '[Fit] to discard [is] Māra's sway'.

The possibility of the word *amata* having the meaning 'immortality' has caused problems for both C&P and K. In his note on verse 21 K states: "*amata-padam* has been translated by R as the 'abode of eternal life'. *Amata* (Sanskrit *amṛta*), being the goal

of the religious life, was assumed to be the avoidance of death, including death in this life, and the attainment of eternal rest in the future. Such a view of immortality seems incompatible with the rest of the teachings of the Buddha. ... *Amata* or immortality, therefore, could be taken only in the sense of absence of rebirth." A reader may well feel that, although K has made a good point here, 'absence of rebirth' is not the most obvious way to define 'immortality', and it would have been helpful if he had expanded his explanation.

The commentary on verse 27 explains that *nibbāna* is called *amata* because, as a result of not being born, it does not grow old and die. Such a statement makes no sense and must be incorrect, because *nibbāna* is the opposite of *samsāra*, and yet it could equally well be said that *samsāra* is not born, and therefore will not grow old and die. On the other hand, we cannot say that *samsāra* is born and will grow old and die. It is clear that the epithets must refer, not to *nibbāna*, but to the conditions which pertain in *nibbāna*, which must be the opposite of those which pertain in *samsāra*. In their translation C&P quote a later commentary upon the Dhammapada which seems to recognise this problem. It gives the information that *nibbāna* is called 'deathless' because it is free from old age and death and because it destroys old age and death for the noble ones who have attained it. Once we realise that these epithets must refer to the condition of those beings who have gained *nibbāna*, then we can see that the translation 'immortality' for *amata* gives the wrong impression, because it implies that such beings live for ever which, as K has made clear, is an untenable view. The correct translation must be 'where there is no death.'

Strangely, although K has this lengthy note about *amata* and C&P quote the explanation from one of the later commentaries, both translations nevertheless follow their predecessors. K translates the compound word *amata-padam* in 21 as 'the path to immortality'; in 114 he renders *amatam padam* as 'path of immortality'; in 374 he translates *amatam* as 'immortality'; in 411 he renders *amat-ogadham* as 'immersed himself in immortality'. C&P translate: 'the path to the Deathless', 'the immortal state', 'ambrosia' and 'the Deathless' respectively. They are clearly following

others: Max Müller⁸ translated the same passages as: 'the path of immortality', 'the immortal place', 'the immortal' and 'the Immortal' respectively. Radhakrishnan translated: 'the path to eternal life', 'the deathless state', 'life eternal' and 'the eternal' respectively.

It is noteworthy that C&P sometimes follow the commonly accepted translation elsewhere too, even when the Commentary gives another explanation, and there is nothing which prevents them following it, e.g. in 175 they translate *nīyanti* as 'are led', although the presence of *yanti* twice in the first line shows clearly that we are dealing with a development of *niryānti* 'they go forth', as the Commentary's explanation *nissaranti* ('they go out') shows. To translate as they do misses the whole point of the verse, which means 'Geese can go high in the sky; men can go in the sky by supernormal powers; but the wise (i.e. the followers of the Buddha) can go away from this world (i.e. attain *nibbāna*)'. K gets this right, but he gives no note about his interpretation, and it may be that he is merely following the Commentary (see above). C&P usually draw attention to anomalies in the Commentary, e.g. while translating *diso* in 42 as 'foe', they point out that the Commentary explains it as 'thief'. On the other hand they sometimes ignore such anomalies, e.g. in 166 they translate *sadatthapasuto* as 'intent on the true purpose', and make no comment upon the Commentary, which must have interpreted *sadattha* as *sad-d-attha* (< *sva* + *artha* with a sandhi *-d-*), since it explains this as 'engaged in one's own purpose' (*sake atthe*). K, on the other hand, devotes a long note to the verse, justifying his rejection of the Commentary's interpretation.

K's reaction to Brough leads him to make incorrect statements about him - referring to 82 he says (p.167) that Brough thinks that the occurrence of the word *dhammāni* in Jātaka V 221,27* is incorrect. Brough actually says 'the neuter plural occurs, and probably correctly...'⁹. On the same verse C&P take a more sober line, and agree that the plural is unusual (p.451). They are perhaps putting more trust in the Patna Dhammapada than is justified when they say its reading *dhammāni sottāna* decisively supports the Pāli reading. The Patna Dhammapada reading does nothing more than show that the reading

sent in the version upon which the Patna Dharmapada is based. Although it suits C&P here to be able to say that 'the Patna Dharmapada decisively supports the Pāli reading', I have not found anywhere in their translation a statement that 'the Patna Dharmapada here decisively refutes the Pāli reading'. Elsewhere, however, when the Patna Dharmapada, unknown to Brough when he made his edition, agrees with the Pāli against the Gāndhārī Dharmapada and the Udānavarga they are often content merely to state the fact. In one place, however, their reaction leads C&P to forget their Sanskrit - on p.421 they reject Brough's suggestion that *vahato* in 1 is the genitive of the word *vahatu* 'draught ox', on the grounds that the Udānavarga reads *vahataḥ* and the Patna Dharmapada reads *vahato*, 'both of which support the [traditional explanation in the] Pāli commentary'. In saying this they overlook the fact that Patna *vahato* (like Pāli *vahato*) is the expected development in the dialect of that text from Brough's conjectured *vahatoḥ*, while the Udānavarga *vahataḥ* represents the Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit's redactor's 'translation' of the *vahato* which he received in his exemplar, and cannot be used as evidence one way or the other. Bizarrely, having objected to Brough's explanation, they adopt his translation: '... as a wheel the draught ox's foot'.

C&P quote extensively from Brough. They do not do this merely to reject his views, but are prepared to discuss variant traditions, e.g. *svākhyāta-dharma* as opposed to **samkhyāta-dhamma* in 70, although they do not consider **samskrīta-dharma* which, despite the note on p.447, would seem to be the only possible antecedent to the form *samkhata-dhamma* which they actually read in the verse. They seem, however, to be unacquainted with other literature about the Gāndhārī Dharmapada, and have a long note on *saṅkārābhūtesu* in 59, because they do not realise the possibility of separating *su* from *saṅkārābhūte* and taking it as a particle. They refer to Roth's edition of the Patna Dharmapada¹⁰ and Bernhard's edition of the Udānavarga¹¹, both unused by K, but neither their translation nor K's seems to owe anything to Lüders' work¹². There is, for example, no hint of any knowledge of the existence in Pāli of an ablative singular in *-am*, and although C&P state that 'from a flower' would be a better translation for *puppham* in 49, and point to the existence of the ablative forms *puspā* and *puspād*

in the parallel texts, they do not suggest that *puppham* might be an ablative. Nor do the translators reveal any knowledge of an accusative plural in *-am* in Pāli, with the result that both translations take *kaṅgham dhammam* and *sukkam* in 87 as singular ('a shady/shadowy *dhamma*... the bright'), whereas the Commentary on Samyutta-Nikāya V 24,21, where the verse recurs, makes it clear that it is referring to *akusala* and *kusala dhammas*. Patna Dharmapada 284 and Udānavarga XVI.14 both have plural forms in the parallel versions of the verse.

K seems to have interpreted Brough's statement, quoted above, as meaning that the Gāndhārī Dharmapada was 'more primitive' than the Dhammapada, although Brough quite clearly stated that the Udānavarga, Pāli Dhammapada and Gāndhārī Dharmapada 'show, simply on inspection, that no single one of them has a claim superior to the others to represent this section of a 'primitive' Buddhist canon'¹³. K seems to believe that Brough was the first person to have stated that the Pāli version was not necessarily superior to all others, which would suggest that he had not read Brough's introduction very carefully. He accuses Brough of exhibiting a 'prejudice which does not help towards a proper understanding of the different versions and their relative positions' (p.vii).

It must be stressed that all the versions of the Dhammapada we possess are translations of earlier versions, all going back ultimately to a corpus of verses, the core of which came into existence at a very early stage of Buddhism, possibly at the time of the Buddha, although it is very likely that additions were made to the corpus after that time. Even if we could date the versions we have; we should be dating only the translation of an earlier version. If we look at any one of this group of texts we will find that each one of them has some features which might reasonably be surmised to be, if not original, then at least close to the original, and yet at the same time each one has features which are manifestly incorrect or late. The relationship between Pāli Dhammapada, Patna Dharmapada, Gāndhārī Dharmapada and Udānavarga is very complicated, with patterns of equivalence between them varying from verse to verse, and sometimes even from *pāda* to *pāda*. The fact that any two or more

of them agree in some feature tells us only that in some way, in the history of the texts, they were dependent upon a common source for that particular feature. The number of verses each redactor selected, the numbers of vargas into which they were sorted and the way in which verses were apportioned to each varga, give us no information whatsoever about the date at which each selection was made.

To translate the Dhammapada one needs to be entirely without pre-conceived notions about which version is 'best'; one must be thoroughly acquainted with all the other versions; one must know about all the secondary literature which has been written about these, especially articles dealing with the relationship between them; one must be an expert in the grammar of Sanskrit, Pāli and other Middle Indo-Aryan languages; one must have a flair for seeing a point which other translators have not even realised presents a difficulty and for being able to solve the problem. Moreover, to translate the Dhammapada into English one must be able to write good, clear, unambiguous and idiomatic English. No wonder Brough said it was too difficult!

NOTES

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² John Brough, *The Gāndhārī Dharmapada*, London 1962.

³ *Ibid.*, p.xvii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p.xvi.

⁵ E.W. Burlingame, *Buddhist Legends*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vols.28-30, 1921, repr. PTS 1979.

⁶ H.C. Norman, *The commentary on the Dhammapada*, Vols 1-4, PTS 1906-14.

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⁷ S. Radhakrishnan, *The Dhammapada*, Madras, OUP, 1950, repr. Delhi 1980.

⁸ Max Müller, *The Dhammapada*, Sacred Books of the East Vol.X, Oxford 1881, repr. Delhi 1980.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p.245.

¹⁰ G. Roth, 'Particular features of the language of the Ārya-Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravādins and their importance for early Buddhist tradition' in H. Bechert (ed.), *The Languages of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*, Göttingen 1980, pp.78-135.

¹¹ F. Bernhard, *Udānavarga*, Göttingen 1965.

¹² H. Lüders, *Beobachtungen über die Sprache des buddhistisches Urkanons*, Berlin 1954.

¹³ *Op. cit.*, p.xiv.

THE DHAMMAPADA - EAST AND WEST

Russell Webb

The factors that have contributed to this text's continuing popularity are: (i) its self-sufficiency as a guide to Buddhist thought and practice (i.e. it 'represents' the Sutta Piṭaka to a greater degree than any other text); (ii) its readability, and (iii) its relative concision.

It is interesting to recall the vast number of editions and translations that have been produced, especially since the text in question is, in many cases, the only complete canonical work that has appeared on a commercial basis.

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
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EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND THE WEST*

Etienne Lamotte

In the first century of the Christian era, the history of India was marked by the peaceful co-existence of several kingdoms of both local and foreign origin: in the north-west, the great Indo-Scythian empire of the Kusānas which stretched from the Caspian Sea to Vārāṇasī and from Kāśmīr to the region of Bombay; in the Deccan, the Andhra kingdom of the Śātakarnis, the Kaśharāta kingdom of Surāṣṭra and the Śaka satrapy of Ujjayinī; to the extreme south of the peninsula, the Dravidian kingdoms of the Keralas or Ceras (Calicut and Travancore), the Pāṇdyas (Madura region) and the Colas (Trichinopoly and Tanjore).

Until the end of the pre-Christian era, India had lived in isolation and had been able to assimilate without difficulty the hordes of foreign conquerors who had ventured across the north-west frontier: Graeco-Bactrians, Scythians and Parthians. She had compelled them to bow to indigenous habits and customs and inculcated her beliefs in them. At the beginning of the Christian era, the situation changed radically. The development of trade routes by land and sea brought India into daily contact with the great neighbouring civilisations of the West and the East. The trans-Iranian routes and the tracks of Central Asia were crossed by merchants; Graeco-Alexandrian ships commissioned by Roman capital regularly touched at the ports of Barbaricon, Barygaza, Sopāra and the Malabar coast; the Chinese themselves occasionally visited the settlements on the east coast. In fact, India had not sought these contacts; it was the foreigners, attracted by her wealth, who started the trading which was to intensify as the centuries passed. It was no longer possible for the Indians to remain in an isolation caused by ignorance or disdain; it was in their own interest to establish trade relations, welcome the merchants from overseas and exchange raw materials and manufactured goods as well as ideas with them. A new opportunity arose for India to make the voice of her thinkers and philosophers heard and, before showing in a study to follow to what degree she responded, we would like to examine here the possibilities

which were established over the centuries between East and West¹.

During the pre-Christian era, the *peripla*, military expeditions and embassies in the direction of India were no more than voyages of exploration and discovery. Under the Roman Empire, once the routes were open and curiosity satisfied, dealings between East and West were entirely dominated by trade.

I. DISCOVERIES IN THE PRE-CHRISTIAN ERA

Scylax of Caryanda (519 B.C.). - Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was ordered by Darius to reconnoitre the marine route which links the mouths of the Indus to Egypt. Setting out from Kaspatyrus (Kāśyapapura, modern Multan near Attock), the explorer descended the Indus as far as the Arabian Sea, ran along the coasts of Makran and southern Arabia and, entering the Gulf of Aden, went up the Red Sea to Arsinoe in the Gulf of Suez². The *periplus* lasted for thirty months, and the length of its duration is enough to prove that the navigator, travelling with a head wind, knew nothing of the ways of the monsoon.

Alexander the Great (331-324 B.C.). - Not in pursuit of Bessus after his victory at Gaugamela (331 B.C.), the Macedonian conqueror made use during his march of the great twisting artery which linked the Caspian Gates to the southern slopes of the Hindu Kush, passing through Herat (Haraiva or Alexandria-in-Aria), Faraz (Phrada or Prophthasia), Drangiana, the southern shore of Lake Hāmūn, the right bank of the River Hēlmand (Haetumant, Setumant, Etymander, Hermandrus), Kandahār (Harahuvati or Alexandria-in-Arachosia), Parvān (Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus or in the Paropamisadae)³. The bematists Diognetus and Baeton, who accompanied Alexander on his expedition, surveyed the route and carefully measured the distances⁴.

The revolt in Aria had prevented Alexander from returning to Bactria via the most direct route linking the Caspian Gates to the Jaxartes which passed through Bactria (Zariaspa) and terminated at Khojend (Alexandria-Eschate) on the Syr Darya. Notwithstanding, this route was also explored by his surveyors⁵.

Now lord of Bactria and Sogdiana after a campaign lasting two years (329-328 B.C.), Alexander set out to conquer India

to his mind 'the region which extends eastwards from the Indus'⁶. He took the old highway of India connecting Bactra to Taxila across the Hindu Kush. Setting out from Bactra at the beginning of the year 327, in ten days he crossed the Afghan massif and, by way of Bāmiyān, reached the southern slopes where his settlement, Alexandria-under-the-Caucasus, present-day Parvān, was located. By three or four stages, he arrived at Lampaka where he concentrated his troops in Nicaea, a temporary encampment to be found between the villages of Mandrāwar and Chabār-bāgh. The majority of his Macedonian forces, led by Perdikkas and Hephaestion, descended the south bank of the Kōphēn (Kubhā, today the Kabul River), reprovisioned in Nagarahāra (Jelālābād), occupied Pūkarāvati (Peucalaotis, modern Chārsadda) and reached the Indus between Udabhānda (Uṇḍ) and Amb. Alexander, who had been fighting in the upper valleys of the Kunar (Khoēs), Swāt (Suvastu, Suastos) and Būnēr, then rejoined his lieutenants; the Macedonian army, at last regrouped, crossed the Indus by a pontoon-bridge and made peaceably for Taxila where it was welcomed by the local king Omphis (Ambhi). In Taxila began the great artery which is still used today by the Trunk Road: pointing in the direction of the south-east, it reached Mathurā on the right bank of the Yamunā, where it communicated respectively with the west coast via Ujjayinī and Bharukaccha and the east coast through Kauśāmbī, Pātaliputra and Tāmraliptī. Alexander, halted at the Hydaspes by the resistance of King Porus (Paurava), turned directly east, and, arms in hand, crossed the great tributaries of the Indus: the Jhelus (Vīstā, Hydaspes), Chenab (Asiknī, Candrabhāgā, Acesines) and Rāvi (Parusnī, Irāvati, Hydraotes), and finally reached the Beas (Vipās, Vipāsā, Hyphasis) where his troops mutinied. The route taken by Alexander as far as the Beas, with indications of the distances, was also noted by the professional surveyors⁷. All the topographical works carried out on Alexander's orders and whose starting-point was the Caspian Gates were collected and published, before the establishment of the Parthian domination of Iran, in the *Asiatikoi Stathmoi* by a certain Amyntas, who had followed Alexander on his expedition⁸.

The order to retreat was given in November 326 and the Macedonian army, reinforced by a fleet of 800 to 1,000 ships, descended the Hydaspes and the Indus to the delta of Patalene, which

Alexander explored for six months (January to July 325). The return to Susiana was made by three routes.

Craterus, who had not gone as far as the delta⁹, left, in July 325, the right bank of the Indus off Skikarpore, crossed the Mulla Pass, Quetta and Kandahār, and skirted the south bank of the Helmand and Lake Hāmūn; then, through the desert of Dashti-Lut and Nazretabad, he reached Galashkird in Carmania, where Alexander had preceded him¹⁰.

In the meantime Alexander, at the head of some ten thousand men, had left Patala in September 325 and set out along the Makran coast to Gedrosia. Then turning northwards, in December 325, he reached Galashkird in Carmania where Craterus and Nearchus were not long in joining him.

Nearchus, at the head of a fleet of one thousand units concentrated in the Indus Delta, had been ordered to delay his departure until the arrival of the monsoon from the north-east which breaks in October: clear proof that at that time the movement of the etesian winds was well known¹¹. However, the hostility of the local populace forced the admiral to weigh anchor on 21 September 325. He skirted the Oreite and Makran coasts and, after eighty days of eventful voyaging, in December of the same year, reached the mouth of the Anamis (Minab), in fertile Harmosia, near Hormuz. Nearchus, having placed his fleet in safety, went inland to Galashkird and rejoined Alexander and Craterus who anxiously awaited him¹². The reunion was an occasion for joyful festivities and a new Alexandria was founded. The fleet then sailed up the [Persian] Gulf and the Pasitigris and reached Susiana where, in the spring of 324, it was joined by the land army.

The Seleucids (312-64 B.C.). - After his victorious return from Babylonia, Seleucus I Nicator (312-280) set out to reconquer the eastern satrapies which had broken away from the Alexandrian empire, and his armies again travelled the routes of Iran and Bactria. The operations begun in 305 by the Diadochus [Alexander's successor] against the Indian empire of Candragupta once again drew Seleucus onto the ancient Indian route linking Bactra to Taxila, and his momentum took him to the banks of the Yamunā, possibly as far as Mathurā: we know that this campaign ended

in a compromise in the terms of which, in exchange for five hundred war-elephants, Seleucus ceded the possession of India and the greater part of Afghanistan to his rival¹³. Seleucus' interest then turned to the neighbouring countries of the Caspian Sea, the strategic and commercial importance of which did not escape him. Deodamas, the commander of Seleucus and Antiochus, identified the course of the Jaxartes, which until then had been confused with the Don¹⁴; Patrocles, governor of the northern provinces and a geographer of great authority, explored the Caspian Sea but, on the basis of misinterpreted local records, was led to claim that not only the Ochus (Tejend) but also the Oxus and Jaxartes, tributaries of the Aral Sea, flowed into the Caspian, the surface of which, according to Patrocles, equalled that of the Black Sea¹⁵. The geographer discovered, or rediscovered subsequent to Artobulos, the southern Indian trade route: at that time the Oxus, which was easily navigable, served to transport a considerable amount of merchandise from India to the Hyrcanian [Caspian] Sea: from there it rapidly reached the coast of Armenia (Azerbaijan), there to ascend the Cyrus (Kour), reach the opposite side and redescend to the Black Sea¹⁶. Finally, it seems that the maritime route skirted the coast of Gedrosia and, after being explored by Scylax and Nearchus, was occasionally used by the ships of the Diadochus. Seleucus transported, from the Indus Delta to the mouth of the Euphrates, some Indian spices for which the journey proved fatal¹⁷.

Antiochus I Soter (280-261), the son of Seleucus, himself re-explored eastern Iran and built and fortified, under the name of Antioch, Alexandria-in Margiana (Merv) and Alexandria-Eschate (Khojend [now Leninabad])¹⁸.

During the same period, the Mediterranean world was making remarkable progress in its knowledge of India as a result of the detailed and exact information supplied to it by its ambassadors who had been sent by the Diadochus to the Mauryan court. Megasthenes and Deimachus had both been sent as ambassadors to Pātali-putra, Megasthenes to Candragupta (313-289) and Deimachus to his son Bindusāra Amitrāghata (289-264), and they have left us records of their journeys¹⁹. In fact Megasthenes, who was attached to the person of Sibyrtius, the satrap of Arachosia, visited Candragupta²⁰ several times and wrote the *Indika* which for centuries

remained the best, not to say the only source of information on India. His description of Pāṭaliputra, reproduced in Arrian's *Indike*²¹, is remarkably accurate, as is proved by recent excavations; moreover, the precise details supplied by Megasthenes on the Indian nation, its manners, institutions and castes²² agree with the majority of the more authoritative indications supplied by the *Kauṭilya-Arthaśāstra*²³, a summary of the Indian institutions whose author, or one of several, was possibly Cānakya, also known as Viṣṇugupta, a minister and counsellor of Candragupta.

What is more, Megasthenes, on behalf of Seleucus, reconnoitred and measured in *schoeni* the Royal Highway or *basilike hodos* - in Sanskrit *rājavāhī* - which crossed India from west to east, linking the Hydaspes to the mouths of the Ganges. Pliny kept the topographical record compiled by Megasthenes and added to it corrections supplied later by other bematists: 'From the Hypasis to the River Sydrus, 169,000 paces; from there to the River Iomanes, as much (a few copies add 5 miles); from there to the Ganges, 112.5 miles; from there to Rhodapha, 569 miles (others evaluate this distance at 325 miles); from there to the town of Callinipaza, 167.5 miles (according to others, 165 miles); from there to the confluence of the Iomanes and the Ganges, 625 miles (a great many add 13.5 miles); from there to the town of Palibothra, 425 miles; from there to the mouth of the Ganges, 637.5 miles²⁴. As far as we know, the towns of Rhodapha and Callinipaza have yet to be identified; conversely, there is no difficulty in recognising the Beas in the Hypasis, the Sutlej in the Sydrus, the Yamunā (Jumna) in the Iomanes, Prayāga in the confluence of the Iomanes and Ganges, and Pāṭaliputra or Patna in Palibothra. Already by the time of the Mauryas, a great communication artery connected Taxila to Tāmraliptī, present-day Tamluk on the east coast, by way of Mathurā, Kauśāmbī and Pāṭaliputra. Ptolemy II Philadelphus (285-247), whose reign partly coincided with that of Aśoka, was represented at the Mauryan court by an ambassador with the name of Dionysius²⁵; as for the Indian emperor, it is known in which circumstances and for what purpose he sent his messengers of the Dharma to Syria, Egypt, Macedonia and Cyrenai-
ca²⁶.

The secession of the satrapy of Bactria in 250 B.C., shortly followed by the revolt of Parythene in 249, was the first blow

to Seleucid supremacy in Asia. Relations which had been maintained until then with the Indian empire became desultory: the progressive weakening of the Magadhan kingdoms under the last Mauryas and the Śūnga usurpers made them, moreover, less desirable. The attempt begun between 247 and 246 by Seleucus II Callinicus to reconquer eastern Iran failed due to the coalition of the Parthian Mithridates and the Bactrian Diodotus II²⁷. The operations carried out in Bactria, from 207 to 206, by Antiochus III the Great proved fruitless: vanquishing the Parthian Artaban, he forced his way across the Arius (Hēri-rūd) and blockaded Euthydemus of Magnesia in his stronghold at Zariaspa (Charjui); however, after two years of investment, the Epigonus eventually treated with his rival and raised the siege in order to return to Syria by taking the route through the Hindu Kush - Bactra, Bāmiyān and Parvān - then the tracks in Arachosia and Carmania which had previously been used by Craterus²⁸.

The defeats inflicted by the Romans on Antiochus III, at Thermopylae (191), Corycus and Magnesia-under-Sipylos (190), tolled the knell for Seleucid power in Asia. The Parthian rulers profited from this to consolidate their kingdom and enlarge it at the expense of Syria, henceforth cut off from all contact with India. In 138 Mithridates I defied Demetrius II Nicator and took him prisoner; in 128 his son Phraates II killed Antiochus VII Sidetes in combat. When Syria was annexed by Pompey to the Republican States (64 B.C.), the Arsacid Parthians continued to oppose any extension of the new Roman province to the east; in 53 B.C. the Suren of Orodes I bested the legions of the triumvir Crassus at Carrhae (Harran); more than twenty thousand Roman soldiers perished on the battlefield, ten thousand prisoners were taken in captivity to Merv, and the head of Crassus was transported to Artaxata and cast at the feet of King Orodes and his son Pacorus during a performance of the *Bacchantes* by Euripides. From 51 to 38, the Parthian armies commanded by Osaces and Pacorus invaded Roman Syria up to three times, finally to be repulsed at Gindarus (Jindaris in northern Syria) by General Ventidius Bassus. However, when [Mark] Antony, in the year 36 B.C., proceeded to the Euphrates under the pretext of revenging the affront meted out to the corpse of Crassus seventeen years previously, Phraates IV, the son and successor of Orodes, inflicted a bloody

defeat on him at the battle of Phraata (Takht-1-Sulemein) in Atropatene²⁹.

The incessant wars kept up by the Parthians at the end of the pre-Christian era against Seleucid Syria and the Roman Republic considerably slowed trade overland between India and the Mediterranean West; however, the growing progress of Alexandrian navigation under the Ptolemies of Egypt maintained contact between the two continents.

The Ptolemies (323-30 B.C.). - Under the first Lagidae, Ptolemy I Soter (323-285), Ptolemy II Philadelphus (285-246) and Ptolemy III Euergetes, Graeco-Egyptian ships attached to the port of Alexandria still went no further than to explore the Red Sea and reconnoitre the Arabian coast as far as Bab-al Mandeh and the shores of the Somalis to the west of Cape Guardafui, initiating exchanges with the Sabaean Arabs of the Yemen and the local Ethiopians. However Euergetes, whose victory over the Seleucids briefly gave him possession of Mesopotamia, Babylonia and Susiana, sent ships to re-explore the [Persian] Gulf, from the Euphrates to India. Without leaving the Gulf, however, this fleet sailed before the wind in the direction of Al Qatar then skirted the 'Pirate Coast' as far as Cape Maketa, modern Ras Masandan³⁰.

In the reign of Ptolemy VIII, known as Euergetes II Physcon (145-116), coastguards on the [Persian] Gulf discovered a half-dead stranger on a shipwrecked boat. He was taught Greek and, when he could speak it, the shipwrecked man explained that he had set out from India but, having gone astray and seen all his companions perish from hunger, he had been cast onto the Egyptian coast. He agreed, should the king intend to send an expedition to India, to act as guide. Euergetes II immediately equipped a ship, the command of which he entrusted to a certain Euxodus, who had come from Cyzicus to Alexandria as a *theoros* and *spondophorus* of the Chorean games. Euxodus therefore left with rich gifts for India from where he soon returned with a full lading of perfumes and precious gems, which Euergetes quickly acquired for himself. Some time later, Queen Cleopatra, the sister and widow of the king, sent Eudoxus back to India with greater resources; while returning, the explorer was carried off by the monsoon to the south of Cape Guardafui and stranded in Ethiopia. He col-

lected valuable information of a geographic and linguistic nature on that country and acquired a fragment of prow engraved with the effigy of a horse: the ship from which that piece of wreckage came had probably belonged to navigators from the West who had ventured too far beyond the Lixus (Oued Draa on the southern frontier of Morocco). Back in Egypt, Eudoxus was once again frustrated of his gains and Ptolemy IX Lathyrus, the son of Cleopatra, seized his cargo. Nonetheless, the explorer wanted to return to India, this time on his own account and by circumnavigating Africa to the west: setting out from Alexandria, he called at Dicaerchia (Puteoli) in Italy, Massilia (Marseilles) in Gaul and Gades (Cadiz) in Spain; from there he sailed before the wind out to sea, the Cape to his south. Wrecked on the coast which he hugged too closely, he built a pentecontor out of the remains of his ship and continued on his way until a point where he encountered peoples who obviously spoke the same language as the one whose vocabulary he had recorded on his previous voyage. He believed himself to be south of Cape Guardafui when in reality he was in Morocco. Wishing to obtain some larger ships before sailing on for India, he abandoned the expedition and went back. The ventures of Eudoxus, first narrated by the geographer Posidonius (born c. 135 B.C.), were repeated by Strabo³¹ who criticises them point by point and rejects the whole story as 'A tale in the style of Antiphanes'. Nevertheless, our geographers gladly give some credit to the peregrinations of Eudoxus while remarking that the record does not supply any precise details on India, the object of the voyage, and that his vague definition of it lacks accuracy.

Under Ptolemy XII Auletus (80-51), Greek adventurers set foot on the island of Socotra, formerly called *dvīpa sukhādāra* 'the Happiness-bearing Island', but to which they gave the name of Dioscorides. Socotra, located on the route to India off Cape Syagrus (Ras Fartak), was still too far from the departure bases and the new colonists immediately fell under the domination of the Arabs of the Hadhramaut³². At the time of the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*, that is about the first century of the Christian era, the island was still inhabited by Arabs, Indians and Greeks. Thrusting their reconnoitres further along the Arabian coast, the Graeco-Alexandrian navigators learned that Acila, pre-

sent day Ras as-Hadd, situated at the eastern extreme of southern Arabia, constituted an important emporium of the Sabaeans and that it was an embarkation-point for India³³; nevertheless, the hostility of the local inhabitants prevented foreigners from using this port.

II. TRADE UNDER THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

Relative peace in the East. The constitution of the Roman Empire and the policy of peace initiated in the East initiated by Augustus had most favourable results on the development of large-scale trade. The incessant hostilities which had formerly opposed the Parthians to the Romans lessened and long periods of peace, often continuing for several decades, cleared the way to Iran and India for merchants and navigators. After the victory of Actium (30 B.C.), Augustus became closer to the Parthian King Phraates IV (37-2 B.C.) and gave him his youngest son to keep as a hostage; in exchange, Phraates formally returned the eagles and standards of Crassus' legions to the Romans (20 B.C.). Phraates, wishing to demonstrate his confidence in Augustus, had his four sons educated in Rome. The king of the Persians was to die of poison through the manoeuvres of his own wife Musa, a slave of Italian origin, and of his son Phraates. The latter mounted the throne in the year 2 B.C. where he remained until 9 A.C. without Rome raising any objections. When Phraates was overthrown by a palace revolution, Augustus, at the request of the Iranian nobility, sent to Persia the eldest son of Phraates IV who assumed the crown in the year 9 under the name of Vonones I (9-11 A.C.) However, the Roman education the young prince had received displeased his compatriots who exiled him to Syria and replaced him by a nobleman of Hyrcanian origin, Artaban III, who ruled from the years 11 to 43. The new sovereign was on generally friendly terms with Augustus and Tiberius. The Roman emperors had understood that Iran, over de-centralised and sapped by dynastic quarrels, did not constitute any danger and there was no point in dealing with it except defensively: Persia occupied a key position on the great routes of communication and could at will stop or favour intercontinental trade. From the military point of view, imperial objectives were strictly limited

to the maintenance of the Roman protectorate over Armenia and the occupation of the strongholds in Mesopotamia.

Under Tiberius (14-37), Germanicus, who was named as commandant of the eastern province, established a client-state of Rome in Armenia (17), without provoking any reaction from the Persians. However, in 36 Vitellius, the governor of Syria, found it desirable to depose Artaban III and replace him on the throne of Seleucia with a rival, Tiridates III. The event ended in the triumph of Artaban, who returned victoriously to the capital, and Seleucia was lost to the Hellenic cause.

Under Nero (54-68), the Parthian King Vologeses I (51-78) won Armenia from the Romans and installed his brother Tiridates there. Vanquished by General Domitius Corbulo, he nevertheless obtained an honourable peace in the terms of which his brother would continue to govern Armenia but receive his crown from the hands of Nero. The ceremony took place in the year 66 at Rome, to which the emperor proceeded with great pomp. He was planning, in agreement with the Parthians, to make an expedition to the Caucasus and the heart of Asia when death put an end to his project.

Some fifty years later, Trajan (97-117), wanting to seize Armenia from the hands of Osroes or Khosrau (107-130), disembarked at Antioch and, in the course of two campaigns (115-116), took Ctesiphon and conquered the major part of the Parthian empire. However, while he was exploring the 'Erythraean Sea', near the [Persian] Gulf, the country rebelled. Once the revolt was quelled Trajan, having returned to Ctesiphon, placed the diadem on the head of Parthamaspates, the son of Osroes. Illness prevented him from consolidating his conquests and he died in August 117 on the way home, at Selinus in Sicily. However, in 123 his successor Hadrian (117-138) concluded peace with Persia and the boundary of the Roman Empire was, once again, extended to the Euphrates. Hostilities recommenced when Vologeses III (148-191) set his brother Pacorus on the throne of Armenia. Emperor Lucius Verus, co-regent of Marcus Aurelius, led the war for four years (162-165) with great success: vanquisher at Europos, he razed the palace of Ctesiphon and burnt Seleucia. It would have been worse for the Persian kingdoms had it not been

for a plague which decimated the Roman legions and forced them to retreat before they could spread throughout the empire. Again in 197, Septimus Severus (193-211) marched against Vologeses IV (191-208) who threatened the stronghold of Nisibis in Mesopotamia; Babylonia was conquered and Ctesiphon laid waste. The Persians were not long in recovering: the last Arsacid, Artaban V (213-227), despite the intrigues of his rival Vologeses, was able to inflict crushing defeats (217-218) on the emperor Macrinus and impose heavy war tributes on him. Finally, in 226, the Parthian empire of the Arsacids collapsed under the attack of the Persian Ardashir who inaugurated the Sassanid dynasty in Iran. The new kingdom was to endure until 651 and present a more formidable threat to the decadent Roman Empire than the Parthians.

Eviction of the Arab danger. - From the beginnings of the Roman Empire, the caravan towns located on the border of Parthian and Roman power, such as Damascus, Palmyra, Petra, etc., enjoyed a period of increased prosperity. However, the safety of commercial trade was threatened by the Himyarite and Sabaean Arabs who ransomed the caravans and controlled navigation on the coasts of the Hejaz, Asir, Yemen, Hadhramaut and Oman. Augustus resolved to make them see reason. A Roman expedition organised with the concurrence of the Egyptians, Jews and Nabataean Arabs from Petra was entrusted to Aelius Gallus. Setting out from Cleopatra in the Gulf of Suez in the year 25 B.C., it crossed the Red Sea, disembarked at El Haura, pushed across the Nejd and Asir as far as the frontiers of the Yemen and Hadhramaut. Aelius Gallus, launched in pursuit of an elusive enemy, wandered in the desert for more than six months and ended by reembarking at Acre in order to regain the west shore of the Red Sea at Myos Hormos³⁴. In about the year 1, Isodorus of Charax, commissioned by Augustus and with the authorisation of the Parthians, explored both shores of the [Persian] Gulf, and this reconnaissance probably led to a raid on Arabia Felix [the Yemen] as well as the sack of Aden 'by Caesar'³⁵.

Freed from the threat made on their expeditions by the pillaging Arabs, the Graeco-Alexandrian merchants, financed by Roman money, intensified trade between the West and the East, a trade

which was hardly interrupted by the hostilities which broke out at regular intervals between Rome and Ctesiphon. Goods were transported by land and sea, and the length of the regular routes was accurately reconnoitred and described in numerous works placed at the disposal of travellers, such as for example the *Geographica* of Strabo, the *Stathmoi Parthikoi* by Isodorus of Charax, the *Periplus of the Inner Sea* by Menippus of Pergamum, the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* by an anonymous pilot, etc.

The Silk Road. - Internal trade was carried out along the Silk Road³⁶, reconnoitred in the first century by agents of the Graeco-Syrian Maes Titianus. The information they collected was published in about the year 100 A.C. by the geographer Marinus of Tyre and reproduced a century later in the *Geographia* of Claudius Ptolemaeus (128-170 A.C.)³⁷. The Silk Road, linking the 30° and 105° meridians, started at Antioch, the capital of Roman Asia, and ended in Lo-yang, the capital of China; the route was divided into two parts of basically equal length: the western section, from the Euphrates crossing to the Stone Tower, and the eastern section from the Stone Tower to China.

Starting at Antioch on the Orontes, the Silk Road crossed the Euphrates at Heirapolis (Menbij) and entered the Parthian kingdom. From there it crossed Ecbatana (Hamadan), Rhagae (Rayy, near modern Tehran), the Caspian Gates, Hecatompylos (Charhūd) and Antioch in Margiana (Merv). Then, entering the Kusāna kingdom, it intersected the important communication junction of Bactra (Skt. Bāhli), the capital of Bactria (Skt. Tukhārasthāna) and, continuing eastward, reached, at the foot of the Komedai mountains, the Stone Tower (Gk. Lithinos Pyrgos, Skt. Kabhanda), present-day Taš Kurgān in the Pamirs. It was there that the Levantine merchants exchanged their goods for bales of silk from China.

On its eastern section, which was particularly frequented by Serindian and Chinese caravans, the Silk Road reached Kāšgar (Skt. Khaśa) where it subdivided into two tracks which ran respectively through the south and north parts of Chinese Turkestan.

The southern route, the oldest to be used, crossed Yārkand (Arghan), Khotan (Kustana), Niya and Miran, eventually to reach the Serindian kingdom of Lou-lan, later Shan-shan, in the region

of Lop-Nor³⁸.

The northern track, skirting the Tarim Basin to the north, passed through Uč Turfān (Hecyuka), Aksu (Bharuka), Kučā (Kuci), Karāšar (Agni), Turfān, Hami, the Jade Gate and finally Tunhuang, where it rejoined the southern route³⁹.

The Silk Road then entered China proper, continuing through Chiu-ch'uan, Chang-yeh, Ch'ang-an (present-day Sian or Xian) and ended at the Han capital Lo-yang (modern Luo-yang).

At Bactra the Silk Road was intersected perpendicularly by another artery linking the capital of Turkestan with Sogdiana to the north and India to the south.

Leaving Bactra, the route to Sogdiana crossed the Oxus (Vak-su), passed through the Iron Gates and reached Samarkand (Mara-canda), the capital of Sogdiana (SŪLI). Describing a huge arc circling Ferghāna, it crossed the Jaxartes, passed through Taš-kent and, traversing the Land of a Thousand Streams, reached the town of Aksu through the T'ien-shan massif⁴⁰.

The old Indian highway⁴¹ which also began in Bactra ran south to the high peaks of the Hindu Kush and, through the passes of Kara-Kotal (2,840 m.), Dandān Shikan (2,690 m.), Ak Rohāt (3,215 m.), Shibar (2,985 m.), as well as the valleys of Ghorband and Kabul, arrived at the Indus which it crossed in order to reach Taxila. The main halting-places on the Bactra-Taxila section, which was some 700 km long, were: Bāmiyān (Persian Bāmīkan), Kāpīśī (Begram), Nagarāhāra (Jelālābād), Puṣkarīvātī (Chārsadda), Udabhānda (Und on the Indus) and, finally, Takṣaśīlā⁴². The ancient highway diverged considerably from the modern Trunk Road which, starting in Mazar-e-Sharif or Khanabad, passes through Bāmiyān (or Salang), Kabul, Peshāwar and Attock, ending at Rawalpindi. In Takṣaśīlā, the Indian highway curved south, reaching Mathurā on the right bank of the Yamunā, a tributary of the Ganges. Mathurā communicated with the west coast via Ujjayinī and Bharukaccha, and with the east coast through Kauśāmbī, Pātaliputra and Tāmraliptī. A transverse track linked Ujjayinī, the chief town of Avanti, with Kauśāmbī, the Vatsa capital.

To the east of the old Bactra-Taxila artery, the obligatory route for any expedition of importance, began the mountainous tracks which connected India more closely with Kaśgaria and Kho-

tan. We will describe only three of them here⁴³:

1. The Chitral trail mounting the course of the Kunar and communicating with Chinese Turkestan through the Baroghil Pass and the Wakhjir Pass.

2. The Gilgit route across the great Himalaya and Karakorum mountains (6,000 km. as the crow flies). Starting out from Srinagar in Kaśmīr, it traversed Bandipur, the Rajingan Pass (3,590 m.), Gurez, the Burzil Pass (4,188 m.), Godhai, Astor, Bunji, Gilgit, Misgar, the Kilik Pass (4,750 m.), Mintaka, Taš Kurgān (3,210 m.), the Ullong Pabst Pass (4,230 m.), finally ending in Kaśgar (1,300 m.)⁴⁴.

3. The route via Leh, also beginning in Srinagar and linking the capital of Kaśmīr with the southern Tarim Basin. Crossing Leh in Little Tibet, it traversed the high passes of the Ladakh Range, the Karakorum and Kun-lun mountains, rejoining Chinese Turkestan between Yarkand and Khotan. Since it reached altitudes of 6,000 m., it was only practicable in summer.

The Silk Road and the secondary tracks did not serve exclusively for the transport of merchandise but were used also, as were the maritime routes at the same time, by the Chinese and Indian ambassadors to reach their diplomatic posts. In 138 B.C., the Han emperor Wu-ti sent his envoy Chang Ch'ien to the Greater Yueh-chih of Sogdiana and Bactria in order to conclude an alliance with them against the Hsiung-nu⁴⁵. In 97 A.C., the Chinese general Pan Ch'ao, who had just pacified Serindia, sent his lieutenant Kan Ying to open relations with the Arsacid Parthians and the Roman Empire of Nerva; however, overawed by the length of the route, he only partly accomplished his mission and turned back in Parthia without going as far as Ta-ch'in⁴⁶. The Indians and Scythians, of whom we know only the name, spontaneously sent ambassadors to Augustus to seek his friendship and that of the Roman people. One of these ambassadors sent by Pandion or Porus presented the emperor with rich gifts, and an Indian sophist who was included, Zarmanochegas or Zarmanus of Bargosa (Bharukaccha), repeating the spectacle presented earlier by Calanus to Alexander, burnt himself in Athens in 21 B.C.⁴⁷. In the reign of Claudius, between 41 and 54, a freedman having been carried by the monsoon to Taprobane, the king of Ceylon sent

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to Claudius in return an embassy led by a certain Rachias (rājan?) who supplied Pliny with information on the great island⁴⁸. In the year 99 an embassy from the king of India, doubtless Wima Kadphises, arrived in Rome at the moment when Trajan was returning after his brilliant victory over the Dacae. Seated with the senators, the Indian envoys witnessed the emperor's triumph. At the end of the reign of Hadrian (117-138), the kings of the Bactrians - undoubtedly the Kusāna sovereigns of the North-West - sent him legates to seek his friendship⁴⁹. In 138, during his accession, Antonius Pius (138-161) also received Indians, Bactrians and Hyrcanians who came, once again, to offer an alliance⁵⁰. Finally, between the years 218 and 222, the Babylonian historian Bardesanes was able to confer, at Emesa in Syria, with Dandamis, an envoy sent on an embassy to the emperor Elagabalus⁵¹.

(To be concluded)

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Ed. Since this essay was first published many of the place names, particularly Indian ones, have changed, but we have not tried to update them all as this would add further to the already long lists. Also a vast literature has grown up around many of the topics discussed by Lamotte but space precludes the insertion of all the relevant additions to the bibliography. However, the following two items warrant mention by virtue of their incorporating major themes featured in the author's own work:

Jean W. Sedlar *India and the Greek World. A Study in the Transmission of Culture*, Totowa, New Jersey 1980.

Irene M. Franck and David M. Brownstone *The Silk Road. A History*. New York 1986.

See also, of course, the updated bibliography in E. Lamotte, *History of Indian Buddhism*, translated from the French by Sara Boin-Webb, Publications de L'Institut Orientaliste de Louvain 36, Louvain-la-Neuve 1988.

(Notes follow)

NOTES

¹ The most valuable information is provided by the Greek and Roman geographers and naturalists. Main sources are the *Geographica* of Strabo (65 B.C.-20 A.C.), *Naturalis Historia, XXXVII libri*, by Pliny the Elder (23-79 A.C.), *De Chorographia, III libri*, by Pomponius Mela (post 44 A.C.), *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* by an unknown author of disputed date (end of the first century?), *Geographia* of Ptolemy (c.100-179 A.C.), *Historia Romana* of Dio Cassius (post 229 A.C.) etc.

Among the long lists of surveys, noteworthy are H.G. Rawlinson, *Intercourse between India and the Western World... to the Fall of Rome*, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1926; E.H. Warmington, *Commerce between the Roman Empire and India*, Cambridge 1928; M. Cary and E. Warmington, *The Ancient Explorers*, Cambridge 1929; and, more recently, J. Filliozat, 'Les échanges de l'Inde et de l'Empire romain aux premiers siècles de l'ère chrétienne', *Revue historique*, Jan-Mar 1949, pp.1-29.

² Herodotus, IV 44; cf. III, 102.

³ For details of the itinerary followed by Alexander in Asia see W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great*, 2 vol., Cambridge 1948.

⁴ Strabo, XI, 8, 9; XV, 2, 8; Pliny, VI, 61.

⁵ Strabo, XI, 8, 9; Pliny, VI, 45.

⁶ Arrian, *Indike*, II, 1: Τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰνδοῦ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τοῦτο μοι ἴστω ἢ τῶν Ἰνδῶν γῆ.

⁷ Strabo, XV, 1, 26-28; XV, 2, 8; Pliny, VI, 62.

⁸ Strabo, XV, 2, 8; XV, 1, 11; Athenaeus, XI, 102, 500 d; XII, 39, 529 e; II, 74, 67 a; X, 59, 442 b; XII, 9, 514 f; Aelianus, *De Natura Animalium*, XVII, 17; V, 14.

⁹ Arrian, *Anabasis*, VI, 15, 7.

¹⁰ Arrian, *Anabasis*, VI, 3; Strabo, XV, 2, 11.

- 11 Arrian, *Indike*, XXI, 1.
- 12 Arrian, *Anabasis*, VI, 28; *Indike*, XXXIII, 1-4; XXXV, 2-8; XXXVI, 3.
- 13 Strabo, XV, 2, 9; Pliny, VI, 49; Appian, *Syriaca*, 55; Justin, XV, 4; Plutarch, *Vita Alexandri*, 62; Atheneaus, I, 18 d.
- 14 Pliny, VI, 49.
- 15 Strabo, XI, 7, 1; XI, 11, 5.
- 16 Strabo, XI, 7, 3.
- 17 Pliny, XVI, 135.
- 18 Strabo, XI, 10, 2; Pliny, VI, 47.
- 19 Strabo, VI, 1, 9.
- 20 Arrian, *Anabasis*, V, 6, 2.
- 21 Arrian, *Indike*, X, 2 ff; cf. L.A. Waddell, *Discovery of the Exact Site of Pataliputra*, Calcutta 1892; *Arch.Surv. Rep.*, 1912-13, 1926-27; B.C. Law, *The Magadhas of Ancient India*, London 1946, pp.38-41.
- 22 *Indike*, VII-XI.
- 23 *The Kautalya Arthaśāstra*, ed. Ganapati Śāstri, 3 vol., Trivandrum 1921-
25. For a comparison with the *Indike*, cf. O. Stein, *Megasthenes and Kautilya*, Vienna, 1921; S. Konow, *Kautalya Studies*, Oslo 1945.
- 24 Pliny, VI, 63.
- 25 Pliny, VI, 58.
- 26 Thirteenth Rock Edict: cf. J. Bloch, *Les Inscriptions d'Asoka*, Paris 1950, p.130.
- 27 Justin, XLI, 4, 1-5.
- 28 Polybius, X, 29 ff, 49 ff; XI, 34; Justin, XLI, 5, 7.

- 29 For historical details, see C. Huart and L. Delaporte, *L'Iran Antique*, Paris, 1943, pp.322 ff; R. Ghirshman, *L'Iran dès Origines à L'Islam*, Paris 1951, pp.917 ff, 220 ff.
- 30 Pliny, IX, 6; cf. XII, 76.
- 31 Strabo, II, 3, 4-5.
- 32 Pliny, VI, 153; *Periplus*, 30; Cosmas Indicopleustes, III, 169 b.
- 33 Pliny, VI, 151.
- 34 Strabo, XVI, 4, 22-23; XVII, 1, 54; Pliny, VI, 160-2; Dio Cassius, LIII, 29; Virgil, *Aeneid*, VIII, 705.
- 35 Isodorus of Charax, LXXX ff; *Periplus*, 26.
- 36 On the Silk Road, see A. Hermann, *Die alten Seidenstrasse zwischen China und Syrien, Quellen und Forsch. z. alten Gesch. u. Geogr.*, Berlin 1910, 'Die Seidenstrassen von China nach dem römischen Reich', *Mitt. Geog. Ges.*, Vienna 1915, p.472; 'Die alten chinesischen Karten von Zentralasien und Westasien', in *Festschrift für Fr. Hirth*, Berlin 1920, p.185; *Das Land der Seide und Tibet im Licht der Antike*, I, Leipzig 1938; H. Lüders, *Weitere Beiträge zur Geschichte und Geographie von Ostturkistan*, Sitz. Pr. Akad. d. Wiss., Berlin 1930, p.17; P. Pelliot, *La Haute Asie*, and, as an appendix, 'Explorations et Voyages dans la Haute Asie', Paris 1931; R. Grousset, etc., *L'Asie Orientale dès Origines au XVe siècle*, Paris 1949, p.198; *L'Empire des Steppes*, Paris 1939, p.78.
- 37 Ptolemy, *Geographia*, I, 11, 5-7, 12.
- 38 The southern track was especially reconnoitred between 1900 and 1915 by Sir Aurel Stein, who gave an account of his work in the book by Sir John Cuming, *Revealing India's Past*, London 1939, p.152.
- 39 The northern route was the object of several academic expeditions, among which should be mentioned the French Pelliot-Vaillant mission (1906-8), the German expeditions to Turfan (1902-14), the geographical survey by Sven Hedin

peased by the absence of animosity... [incomplete].

13. If he finds a knowledgeable companion, who is always of good conduct in this world and surmounts all obstacles, let him go with him, his mind receptive and alert.
14. If he does not find a well-experienced companion, who is always of good conduct in this world, like a king departing from his lost kingdom, let him go alone and not commit any faults.
15. And if, while going, you do not find a companion who is your equal, (continue firmly on your) way alone: a fool is not companionship.
16. To go alone is better; a fool (is not) companionship. Go alone and do not commit faults, have few desires, like an elephant in the forest.

* This *varga* is also called *bhedavarga* in the present Ms although its title is given here as *drohavarga*.

(Translated by Sara Boin-Webb from the French of N.P. Chakravarti)

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EARLY RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND THE WEST

Étienne Lamotte

Conclusion

The maritime routes. - Under the last Lagidae, the metropolis of Alexandria, once so flourishing, was declining fast. The terrible reprisals taken on the populace by Ptolemy Euergetes II (145-116) after his return to Egypt had practically entirely exterminated the Alexandrian element in which were perpetuated, in opposition to the uneducated locals and indisciplined mercenaries, the traditions and customs of ancient Greece. The magistrature no longer functioned, laws and rules were no longer applied and, in all this anarchy, the prosperity of the town was no more than a memory. The situation improved rapidly when Egypt became a Roman province after the battle of Actium (31 B.C.): assisted by three army corps and nine cohorts, the legate and administrators sent to Egypt by Augustus reorganized the policing and re-established local magistratures. Alexandria soon recovered its activities: 'What today contributes most to its prosperity,' noted Strabo at the beginning of the Christian era, 'is that it is the only locality in Egypt which is equally well placed both for maritime trade, because of the excellent lay-out of its port, and for inland trade due to the ease with which all the goods sent down the Nile reach it, which causes it to be the greatest entrepot in the whole world.' Its commercial relations with India and Troglodytica (western Africa) have developed further. Since the most precious merchandise first reaches Egypt from those two countries, there to be distributed throughout the world, Egypt exacts double dues (entry and exit dues) therefrom, the heavier the more valuable are the goods, without counting the advantages inherent in any monopoly since Alexandria is, as it were, the only entrepot for such merchandise and it alone can supply other countries⁵². On the west coast of the Red Sea, particularly at Myos Hormos and Berenice, other ports had been fitted up where ships sailing up or down the Persian Gulf could find a sure haven⁵³. After the expeditions organized

by Augustus against the pillaging Arabs of the Yemen and Hadhramaut (25 and 1 B.C.), the way was free and, having gone up the Nile to Syene (Assuan) in the company of the prefect Aelius, Strabo was able to ascertain that 120 vessels left Myos Hormos annually for India whereas, under the Ptolemies, few merchants had risked such a voyage⁵⁴. The Alexandrian fleets generally called at the west coast of India, not caring to venture further east; nevertheless, certain merchants, though as yet very few, having touched land in India, hugged her coastline as far as the Ganges Delta⁵⁵.

Progress in navigation made under the Empire consisted in the fact that pilots, forsaking cabotage which they had practised until then, dared to risk the open sea by trusting in the movement of the monsoon. In addition to the old route from Aden to the Indus Delta along the coasts of Arabia and Makran, three new sea-ways were rapidly reconnoitred and used in the first century of the Christian era: Aden - Barbaricon or Aden - Barygaza, Aden - the ports of Konkan, and finally, Aden - the Malabar coast.

1. The earlier cabotage seems still to have been customary at the beginning of the Empire. The fleets carefully hugged the coastline of the Indian Ocean which had already been explored from east to west by Scylax of Caryanda under the Achaemenids, as well as by Nearchus under Alexander. Setting sail from Myos Hormos, the ships went down the Persian Gulf, at Aden skirted Arabia Felix, ran along the free Coast of Incense (Hadhramaut) to its easternmost point (Acila, present-day Ras-el-Hadd), sailed up the Gulf of Oman to the tip of Cape Maketa (Ras Masandan), regained the Makran coast which they followed to the mouth of the Indus, there to drop anchor at Barbaricon (Skt. Patala, modern Bahadipur), an important trading-post on the central arm of the Delta. 'Northward and inland,' says the *Periplus*, 'there is the metropolis of Scythia, Minnigara, governed by Parthians who, pressurised by internal dissensions, pursue each other; the ships remain at anchor in Barbaricon, but all the merchandise goes up the river to the capital'⁵⁶. In fact, Indo-Scythia included the Pahlava and Saka-Pahlava kingdoms respectively of Seistan and the Sindh which were unified in the reign of the Parthian sovereign Gondophares (c. 19-45 A.C.) but, on the death of the

king, fragmented into a series of independent satrapies which were forever in dispute: the western Punjab ruled by Abdageses, Arachosia and the Sindh reigned over successively by Orthagnes and Pacores, and the other territories governed by Sasas, Sapadana and Satavastra. This confused situation, which in no way impeded the activities of the ports or the movement of trade, continued until approximately the year 65 A.C., the probable date of the conquest of Indo-Scythia by the great Kusāna king Kujula Kadphises.

Although at the time the maritime route was mainly used by Graeco-Alexandrian navigators, the Indians in turn occasionally attempted one or two expeditions westward. Nicolaus of Damascus (c. 64 B.C. - 4 A.C.), whose evidence is recorded by Strabo and Dio Cassius⁵⁷, narrates how, while at Antioch in Syria, he met an embassy which the Indians had sent to Caesar Augustus. The deputies, whom the hazards of the journey had reduced to three in number, bore a letter in Greek from King Porus or Pandion, in which the sovereign declared that, while being lord and master of 600 kings, he nonetheless set great store by the friendship of Caesar. He offered to give him free passage through his lands to go wherever he wished, even to assist him personally in any honest and just enterprise. In addition to the letter were a young man both of whose arms were amputated but who could draw a bow with his feet, a serpent two cubits in length, a giant tortoise and a partridge larger than a vulture. This walking circus was accompanied by the gymnosophist philosopher Zarmanochegas or Zarmanus, a native of Bargosa (Bharukaccha, present-day Broach); repeating the exploit of Calanus, he burnt himself in Athens after having laughingly climbed his own pyre. On his tomb the following inscription was engraved: 'Here lies Zarmanochegas, an Indian from Bargosa, who died a voluntary death, faithful to the custom of his fathers.'

This account, which is full of anachronisms and contradictions, is probably a pastiche invented to transfer to the name of Augustus the Indian adventures of Alexander, the vanquisher of Porus, who was interested in exotic philosophies and magic. However, the legend enables us to infer the possibility, if not the frequency, of Indian expeditions to the West at the time of Augustus.

2. It was in the early years of the reign of Tiberius (14-37 A.C.), it is believed, that Hippalus, a particularly intrepid Greek pilot, - *illi robur et aes triplex*, Horace supposedly declared! - forsook in- and off-shore navigation in order to sail before the wind on the high seas, making use on his outward voyage of the south-west monsoon (May to October) and, for the return, the north-east monsoon (November to March). First skirting the coastline of southern Arabia to the tip of Cape Syagros (Ras Fartak), he then headed for the open sea in a straight line in the direction of India, landing either at Barbaricon on the Indus Delta in Indo-Scythia, or at Barygaza (Bharukaccha) at the mouth of the Narbadā. In memory of that exploit, repeated by numerous emulators, the name of Hippalus was given to the south-west monsoon, to a cape on the African coast, as well as to part of the Arabian Sea. Seemingly Hippalus is wrongly attributed with the discovery, or at least rediscovery, of the monsoon. Already by the time of Nearchus, as we saw above, the movement of the etesian winds was fully known to the Greeks and from then on never ceased regulating coastal navigation. However, Hippalus used it, not for coastal sailing, but for an excursion on the high seas. It is audacity rather than a knowledge of the winds that was Hippalus' merit. This fact is clear from a paragraph in the *Periplus of the Erythraean Sea*: 'All the coastal navigation from Kane (on the southern Arabian coast) and Arabia Felix (Aden) was made by earlier navigators by means of cabotage in small ships. But Hippalus, a pilot, having reconnoitred the situation of the (Indian) ports and the configuration of the (Arabian) Sea, was the first to discover sailing on the open sea. It is from him that... the Libonotus (south-west wind) which blows on the Indian Ocean, seems to have received its name (of Hippalus). Since then and until now, navigators set out directly (to the open sea), some leaving from Kane, others sailing from the Coast of Incense. Those who sail towards Limyrice (Malabar coast) tack for most of the time; while those who make for Barygaza (Broach on the Gulf of Cambay) or Scythia (Sindh) hug (the Arabian coastline) for no more than three days and, finding a wind favourable to their course, reach the high seas and sail in the open to the aforesaid ports'.⁵⁸

The northern route discovered by Hippalus seems, at least at

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the beginning of the Empire, to have been the most used. It led directly from Aden to Barbaricon (1,470 miles) or Barygaza (1,700 miles). Barbaricon, a great trading centre which served North-West India, was easy of access; conversely, entering Barygaza was highly dangerous: navigators coming from the open sea risked running aground on the sandy dunes of the Eirinos (Rann and the Gulf of Kutch) or breaking up on the reefs of the Barake promontory (Dvāraka, present-day Dwarka) at the eastern point of Surastrene (Saurāstra or the Kāthiāwār peninsula)⁵⁹. Those who were forced to sail that route therefore had to turn about and take to the high seas along the southern coast of Surastrene where local fishermen piloted them across the Gulf of Cambay to the port of Barygaza, at the mouth of the river Lamniaos (Narbadā in Sanskrit)⁶⁰. At the time of the *Periplus*, that is, towards the end of the first century A.C., this major port formed part of the possessions of King Manbanus who ruled over Aberia (Mālva) and Aparānta in northern Konkan. This Manbanus in the *Periplus* has been identified by A.M. Boyer with the *rājan kṣaharāta kṣatrapa Nahapāna*, The Kṣaharāta satrap king Nahapāna, that is, in Iranian, 'Protector of the People'. He struck coins of silver, nickel and copper bearing on the obverse the head of the satrap to the right, with traces of Greek characters and, on the reverse, the symbols of the thunderbolt and arrow with Indian legends in Brāhmī and Kharosthī script⁶¹. His name appears on eight Buddhist inscriptions discovered in the caves at Kārli, Nāsik and Junnar, commemorating the generosity of his son-in-law Usvadāta and his minister Ayama towards the Community of monks⁶². Two of them bear the dates 41, 42, 45 and 46, probably to be interpreted as the Śaka era: 119, 120, 123 and 124 A.C. Although the *Periplus* locates his capital at Minnigara in Aryake, probably Junnar, the Jaina legend makes him king of Bharukaccha and supplies details of the skirmishes of Nahavāhana (= Nahapāna) with his powerful neighbour, King Sālavāhana (= Śātavāhana) of Paihan⁶³. In about the year 124 in fact, Nahapāna was overthrown by a Śātavāhana king of the Deccan, Gautamīputra Śrī Śtakarnī, who was then in the eighteenth year of his reign⁶⁴. At the time of the *Periplus*, the kingdom of Nahapāna abounded in wheat, rice, sesame oil, butter, and cotton which served to make coarse fabrics; pasturages were numerous, the inhabitants taller than average

and black-skinned⁶⁵. Barygaza (Bharukaccha) was linked with the North West by a great artery, the main halting-places of which were Ozene (Ujjayinī) in Avanti, Modura (Mathurā) in Śūrasena country, Taxila (Takṣaśilā) in the western Punjab and, finally, Proklais (Puṣkarāvātī) the capital of Gandhāra. Proklais supplied extract of spikenard oil to Kaspapyrus (Multān) and in the Paropamisadae, *costus*, an aromatic Indian plant, and rubber; Ozene exported onyx stones, porcelain, linen textile and coarse fabrics in quantity⁶⁶. Barygaza also communicated via rough tracks with the interior markets of Dakṣiṇāpatha or the Deccan, the most important of which were Paithana (Pratiṣṭhāna) and Tagara (Ter), respectively situated twenty and thirty days by foot from Barygaza. Paithana supplied onyx, and Tagara, textiles and cotton goods. All this merchandise was taken by cart to Barygaza where it accumulated on the quays. The Graeco-Alexandrian merchants exchanged it for articles from the West: metals, glassware, gold and silver work, cheap perfumes, boy-musicians, girls destined to prostitution and especially 'gold and silver *denarii*, more highly valued on the exchange market than the local coinage'⁶⁷.

3. At the time of the *Periplus*, the ports and markets in the Bombay region were the object of protectionist measures and, consequently, avoided by foreign traders. It appears from the Indian sources that the port of Śūrparaka and the market of Kalyāna played a major part in maritime traffic and local trade, but the *Periplus* advises against them: 'Beyond Barygaza are situated local emporia of little importance, in this order: Suppara (Śūrparaka, modern Sopara) and Calliena (Kalyāna, present-day Calliani); the latter town, at the time of Saragenes the Elder, was a regular market but, when Sandanes captured it, its activity was heavily curtailed and the Greek ships which venture to those places (are seized) and taken under escort to Barygaza'⁶⁸. It was therefore not without reason that, half a century later, Ptolemy the geographer designated the towns of Konkan by the name of Towns of the *Andres Peiratai*⁶⁹, that is, of the piratical Andhras, from the name of the Andhra or Śātavāhana sovereigns who then ruled over the region. However, one of the versions of the legend of Saint Thomas claims that the apostle first reached India in the neighbourhood of Jaygarh in southern Konkan;

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a papyrus by Oxyrhynchus⁷⁰ records a meeting in the same place between the local inhabitants and Greek navigators; finally and in particular, the inscriptions rediscovered in the caves at Nāsik, Junnar and Kārli mention among the generous benefactors of the Buddhist Community several *Yavanas* who, at least in part, were Greeks (Iones)⁷¹.

4. However, the extreme south of the peninsula supplied traders with even more coveted goods: pearls from the Gulf of Manaar, beryl from the mines of Coimbatore and pepper from the Malabar coast. The Romans were informed of all these riches by four Sinhalese ambassadors who went to Rome during the reign of Claudius (41-54 A.C.). An enfranchised slave of Annius Plocamus, a 'tax-farmer' of the imperial treasury at the Red Sea, was carried away by the winds when he was turning the Cape of Aden and, after sailing for fifteen days, was cast onto the coast of Taprobane (Sri Lanka) near Hippuri. Made welcome by the king of the country, at that time Bhātikābhaya⁷², the freedman learned Sinhalese and was able to answer the questions put to him by the locals on Italy and the Romans. The king of Taprobane, wishing to establish friendly relations with Emperor Claudius, sent an embassy to Rome under the leadership of a certain Rachias, doubtless an anonymous rājan. Once they had reached their destination, the envoys provided the Romans in general and Pliny in particular with all kinds of information concerning the island of Ceylon and Sinhalese trade with the Seres (Chinese) beyond the Himalaya mountains⁷³.

Doubtless attracted by the lure of fabulous gains, an unknown navigator, even more audacious than Hippalus, attempted to reach the Malabar coast by setting sail from Aden and following an arc bent northwards, some 2,000 miles in length. This exploit which, it is believed, took place around the year 50 of the Christian era, opened up a fourth sea-route towards India. The *Periplus* alludes to it when it speaks of hardy intrepid navigators who, setting out from Kane or the Coast of Incense, 'steer towards Limyrice (Malabar coast) by tacking for most of the time'⁷⁴, and Pliny states that in order to use that route, the most advantageous departure point is Ocelis (Cella near Aden) and that from there one sails with the Hippalus wind for forty days as far as Muziris, present-day Cranganore, the foremost market of India⁷⁵.

According to the evidence of Pliny the Elder, the *Periplus* and Claudius Ptolemy, the ports of southern India were the scene of intensive trade during the second half of the first century and the whole of the second century of the Christian era. Here we shall mention only those whose Tamil name is easily recognisable through their Greek and Latin transcription.

In the Cera region, on the Malabar coast:

Tondi: *Τόνδις Κηροπόλις* of the *Periplus* (Nos 53, 54) and of Ptolemy (VII, 1, 8).

Muziri: the Muziris of Pliny (VI, 104), *Μούζιρις* of the *Periplus* (Nos 53, 54) and of Ptolemy (VII, 1, 8), 'a port packed with Greek ships from Ariake' where long pepper (pippali, Greek *πικέρι*) was purchased with gold. The *Peutinger Tables* (Ch. XII), published in about the year 226 A.C., mention a temple of Augustus there.

Karuvur: *Καρούρα*, the royal town of *Κηροπόλις*; (Ptolemy, VII, 1, 86).

In the kingdom of the Pāndyas, on the west and east coasts of Cape Comorin:

Nelcynda and Bacare noted by Pliny (VI, 105), the *Periplus* (Nos 55, 58) and Ptolemy (VII, 1, 8 and 9), the Tamil name of which as well as the exact location are unknown, perhaps Kotayam and Pokarad.

Kumari: *Κομάρι, Κομαρτί* of the *Periplus* (Nos 58, 59), *Κομαρτί* of Ptolemy (VII, 1, 9), Cape Comorin.

Korkei: pearl fisheries of the *Κόρκει* (*Periplus*, No. 59; Ptolemy, VII, 1, 10), the town of King *Πανδίων*.

In the Cola kingdom, on the Coromandel coast (Colamāṇḍala):

KāvīripaṭṭiNam: the Cabirus of Pliny (VI, 94), *Καυίρις* of the *Periplus* No. 60), *Καβήρις* of Ptolemy (VII, 94), the great emporium of the *Σουβίγγου* (Colas) at the mouth of the Kāveri.

URandai: *Ουρανδαί* of Ptolemy (VII, 1, 91), capital of the *Σουβίρις* (Cola sovereign), today buried beneath the sands.

Pushing their reconnaissances further east, a small number of Greeks, doubtless making use of local embarkation points, risked venturing into the Gulf of Bengal. Among the Indian markets and ports on the east coast where the navigators from Limyric and the north put in, the *Periplus* records in this order: Camara (KāvīripaṭṭiNam), Poduce (Pondicherry?) and Sōpatma (Mad-

76/2

ras?)⁷⁶. Small coasters there served the ports of Limyric, *sangarās* assembled by joining up large 'piraguas' [barques made from a single piece of timber], and *kolandias* (from the Skt. *kola*, 'raft'), vessels of the high seas, sailing from the Ganges Delta or the Chrysē Chersonesos, the ancient El Dorado corresponding to the *Suvarnabhūmi* of the Indians and which may vaguely be located in Malaysia or part of Burma. It was, according to the *Periplus*, these local ships which the Greeks used to reconnoitre the island of Taprobane or Ceylon, Maisolia (Masulipatam) or Andhra country between the mouth of the Kistna and the Godāvāri, Dosarene (Daśārṇa) or the region of Tosali in Orissa, and doubtless also Burma and Malaysia⁷⁷.

Penetration inland. - In the first century of the Christian era foreign navigators, retained by their commercial activities at the ports, hardly ventured into the interior of the Indian lands. We know, however, from the *Periplus*, that they were acquainted with some half-dozen Indian kingdoms on the central mainland and the Deccan: 1. The Ariake of Manbanus or Nahapāna, which was referred to above (*Periplus*, No. 41); 2. The Dakkhinabades (Dakṣiṇāpatha) under Saraganus or rather the Śātakarnis or Śātavāhanas of the Deccan (Nos 50, 52); 3. Limyric or Dimyric (Tamilakam, Dravida) including the whole of the coast of Malabar (Nos 31, 32, 47) and containing the kingdoms of Cerebothros or Keralapūtra (No. 54), Pandion or Pāndya (Nos 54, 59), Argalos or Urāgapura (No. 59); 4. Maisolia or the modern district of Masulipatam (No. 62); 5. Dosarene (Daśārṇa) or the region of Tosali (No. 62).

Fifty years later, under the Antonine dynasty (96-192 A.C.), foreign traders, gaining in assurance, ventured further inland, and the Indian kingdoms listed in Book VII, chapter . of the *Geographia* by Ptolemy are more than a dozen in number: 1. 'Ozene (Ujjayinī), the royal town of Tiastenes' (VII, 1, 63), the Mahākṣatrapa rājan Caṣṭana who ruled about the year 130 A.C., and who left coins and Sanskrit inscriptions on which he bears the sonorous titles of Lord (*svāmin*), Well-Named (*suḡrḥitanāman*) and August Visage (*bhadramukha*)⁷⁸. - 2. 'Kingdom of Baithana (Pratisthāna) ruled by Siri Ptolemaius' (VII, 1, 82), more precisely Vāsisthīputra Śrī Pulumāyi, whose reign lasted for at

least twenty-four years (c.131-155 A.C.), and who left numerous inscriptions at Kānheri, Nāsik, Kārli, Dharanikōt and Amarāvati⁷⁹. - 3. 'Kingdom of Hippokoura (Kolhapur) governed by Beleokouros' (VII, 1, 6 and 82), Vilivāyakura, a royal title appearing on certain coins of Gautamīputra and Vāsisthīputra⁸⁰. - 4. Kingdom of Musopallis in Canarene country (VII, 1, 84). - 5. Kingdom of Karoura (Karuvur) governed by Cerebothros or Keralaputra (VII, 1, 86). - 6. Pounnata in southern Mysore (VII, 1, 86). - 7. Kingdom of the Aloi, capital Kottiarā, to the south of Travancore (VII, 1, 9 and 87). - 8. Kingdom of the Kareoi in the valley of Tāmraparṇī (VII, 1, 10 and 88). - 9. Kingdom of Modura (Madura) governed by the Pandions or Pāṇḍyas (VII, 1, 89). - 10. Kingdom of the Batoi, capital Nikama (VII, 1, 12, 74 and 90). - 11. Kingdom of Orthura (URandei) ruled by a Sōrnas or Cola (VII, 1, 91). - 12. Kingdom of Sōra (Cola), governed by Arkatos (VII, 1, 68). - 13. Kingdom of Malanga (Mavilanga? Kāñchi?) ruled by Barsatonax (VII, 1, 92). - 14. Kingdom of Pitura or Pithuda (VII, 1, 93).

Indian evidence. - The Greek and Latin naturalists and geographers were not alone in emphasising the importance of the trade initiated at the beginning of the Christian era between West and East; the fact is also stressed by the Tamil Sangam writers⁸¹, discoveries of Roman coins in the Deccan area and the cosmopolitan nature of harbour establishments on the Indian coast.

The Tamil Sangam literature, which describes events that occurred during the first two or three centuries of the Christian era, celebrates the abounding prosperity of Muciri 'where fine vessels, masterpieces of Yavana workmanship, arrive with gold and depart with pepper'⁸². It is the town 'where fish is sold, where rice is amassed, where sacks of pepper accumulate, where liquor abounds, and which presents all comers with a confusion of goods from the mountains and goods from the sea'⁸³. At Korkei, a town of the Pāṇḍya king, 'fine pearls, precious marvels greatly esteemed throughout the world, grow and mature in brilliant shells'⁸⁴; there is savoured 'teRal (wine) of sweet perfume, brought by the fine Yavana vessels'⁸⁵.

The rapid increase of wealth in Rome at the beginning of the Empire created an unprecedented demand for Eastern merchandise:

spices, pearls, ivory, wood and silk. The measures taken by Tiberius to check this spread of luxury which carried Roman money to foreign and hostile peoples failed lamentably⁸⁶. India, China and Arabia relieved the Empire of an hundred millions sesterces a year⁸⁷; Indian alone drained half this sum against local merchandise sold in Italy and an hundred times its value⁸⁸. Imperial currency abounded in the ports of Malabar, Muziris, Nelcynde and Bacare⁸⁹. Of the eighty-odd treasure-troves of Roman coins found on Indian and Sinhalese soil, the richest were discovered in the Deccan: thirty-six in the State of Madras, four in Mysore, and twenty-two in Ceylon, the majority of them being *denarii* of Augustus (14 A.C.), Tiberius (37 A.C.) and Claudius (54 A.C.).

The bleeding of the currency continued until the end of the fourth century: at Sigiriya, in Sri Lanka, 1,675 coins have been collected, the last of which dates from the reign of Emperor Honorius (395-423).

Recent excavations undertaken in the region of Pondicherry at Virapatnam⁹¹, also known to archaeologists as Kakayentope or Arikamedu, and which possibly corresponds to the ancient Poduce of the *Periplus* and of Ptolemy, have, in the northern sector of the site, brought to light the ruins of a huge warehouse, 150 feet in length, and in the southern sector, traces of a muslin manufactory enclosed by walls and containing bottomless wells, with a vast network of canals for the draining of water. Indications of an archaeological nature serve to situate the warehouse in about 50 B.C. and the manufactory in approximately 50 A.C. This latter date appears to be confirmed by the few Brāhmī inscriptions in middle Indian or Tamil discovered on site: one of them bears the figure 275, in which J. Filliozat sees a date referring to the introduction of Aśokan culture in the Tamil region in approximately 251 B.C. The inscriptions would therefore date from the year 24 A.C. The most important finds consist of minor objects made of terracotta, metal, stone and glass. Alongside local Indian artefacts are others of foreign origin: a Roman terracotta lamp, some wooden bowls, a cornaline ring setting engraved with the effigy of Augustus, a quartz intaglio representing Cupid, and especially Italic pottery bearing the seal of the workshops of Arretium (Arezzo in Tuscany): *vibii*, *camuri*, *itta*, etc. In the opinion of R.F. Pauchaux and (Sir

Mortimer Wheeler, Virapatnam was a Roman factory, a branch of the great Italic workshops which the slump of Arretine pottery in Western markets from the year 50 A.C. made them decide to expatriate. The existence of a Roman emporium in the Gulf of Bengal at the beginning of the Christian era implies that, according to M. Wheeler, the south-west monsoon was known and utilised by Western navigators at a period much earlier than had generally been presumed. However, we have already expressed the opinion that the movement of the etesian winds was known to the companies of Alexander, in particular to Nearchus, and that the new sea-routes opened up by Hippalus in the reign of Tiberius consisted simply in making use of the monsoon for voyages on the high seas. Furthermore, the hypothesis which suggests that Virapatnam was a Roman factory is not tenable: according to the judicious remark made by J. Filliozat, the Indians were sufficiently skilled and active to create by themselves an industry imitating the luxury articles imported from the Mediterranean world. The presence in Virapatnam of millstones, polishers and rough or semi-carved stones proves that the lapidarist craft was practised on the spot; while continuing to manufacture Indian objects, the local craftsmen could well have reproduced articles of foreign origin. The problem posed by Virapatnam is connected with that of the workshops of Central Asia: at Rawak, Yotkan and in the Niya Valley have been found, alongside intaglios of Indo-Scythian or Partho-Sassanid inspiration, other intaglios derived directly from the classical tradition representing Zeus, Athene, Eros and Herakles. It may be wondered whether these seals were imported directly from the workshops of Bactria and Roman Syria or whether they were not rather made on the spot by local artists and itinerant lapidarists. As for the Arretine pottery discovered at Virapatnam, it could have come from old stock sold off at the Indian markets after the closure of the Western bazaars in which, after the year 50 A.C., this merchandise found no takers.

Indian navigation. - While not displaying anything like the same amount of activity as the Graeco-Alexandrian navigators, Indian sailors occupied an honorable place on the sea-routes, whether as simple coastal traffic, as attested to from the highest antiquity, or as expeditions out to sea. Unfortunately, accounts

of voyages consigned to Indian texts are so surrounded by legend and lacking in chronological indications that there is little upon which to depend.

The Sinhalese chronicles of the Dīpa- and Mahāvamsa demonstrate how easy and frequent relations between the Indian sub-continent and the island of Ceylon were. In the sixth century B.C., in the remote times of the Buddha, a group of Simhalas, natives of Lāla or Lāta (Gulf of Cambay) embarked at the port of Sūrpāraka; after a long expedition, they set foot in Ceylon and gave the island their name, 'Island of the Simhala' (Simhaladvīpa), and their dialect, Sinhalese, closely linked to the language of Kāthiāwār⁹². After the ninth year of his rule (252 B.C.), Aśoka sent his messengers of the Dharma to Tāmrāparṇī, thus establishing relations with the kings of Ceylon which were never to be broken⁹³. Ten years later (242 B.C.), Devānampiyatissa despatched to Pāṭaliputra an embassy which returned to him laden with gifts and bearing a pressing invitation to embrace the Doctrine of the Buddha⁹⁴. That same year the Buddhist monk Mahinda, Aśoka's son, and his companions landed in Ceylon and began their teaching tours which were rapidly to culminate in the conversion of the island⁹⁵. The novice Sumana soon returned to Pāṭaliputra where he acquired relics of the Buddha⁹⁶; he was followed almost immediately by Ariṭṭha, the king of Ceylon's nephew, who was sent to Aśoka to obtain the assignment of Buddhist nuns⁹⁷. These last, with Saṅghamittā, Aśoka's own daughter, at their head immediately embarked at Tāmrāliptī and, after a day's crossing, landed at Jambukola, carrying a Bodhi tree with them⁹⁸. These religious conquests were to be succeeded by other less peaceful ones: during the last centuries of the pre-Christian era, Ceylon was invaded as many as three times by Tamil conquerors from the mainland who succeeded in remaining on the island for several decades: Sena and Guttika from 172 to 150⁹⁹; the Cola prince Elāra from 140 to 96¹⁰⁰; his nephew Bhalluka, who disembarked with an expeditionary force of 60,000 men but was promptly repulsed back to sea by Duṭṭhāgamaṇi¹⁰¹; the five Damilas, Pulahatta, etc., who ruled in Anurādhapura from 39 to 24¹⁰².

In the Vinayas, Jātakas and Avadānas we find several accounts of voyages on the high seas, but the present state of the documen-

tation does not enable us to date them precisely. This literature is both fantasist and stereotyped. The heroes, whom they call Mahātyāgavat, Kalyāṇakārīn and Pāpakārīn, Maitrakanyaka or Maitrayajña¹⁰³, performed exploits or underwent adventures, the setting of which was fixed in advance. A group of merchants, invariably numbering five hundred, plan an expedition and choose a young man of great virtue as their captain. His parents or betrothed attempt in vain to put him off the voyage. The merchants assemble at a port and ensure the services of an old half-blind pilot: he has already sailed the open sea six times and this new venture will be his last, 'since a man has never been seen who, having returned from the high seas safe and sound with his boat six times, has returned a seventh.' The ship anchored in port is attached by seven mooring-ropes and, once the departure has been decided, one of them is cut each day; on the seventh day propelling wind rises which drives the ship out to sea. The great ocean is divided into three superimposed zones, sheltering sharks, shark-eaters and finally cetaceans of monstrous proportions. The makara, which dwells in the deepest waters but which sometimes emerges on the surface, has a head as high as the sky, from a distance its eyes resemble two suns in the firmament, and its teeth, steep cliffs. When it opens its jaws, fish, tortoises, dolphins and sea-horses are engulfed as a whole, and a ship that sails too close runs the great danger of being swallowed by it. If it avoids that danger, it then encounters a tempest which generally breaks out seven days after departure, when the ship has already sailed seven hundred leagues. The five hundred merchants perish in the shipwreck and the captain alone escapes the catastrophe. However, his adventures continue and it takes him seven weeks to reach the end of his journey; for seven days he swims in deep water until he reaches shore; for three weeks he continues his way submerged up to the neck, up to the hips and then up to the knees; for a further three weeks he successfully crosses a mud-bank, a lotus park, then a lair of poisonous snakes. He finally arrives at a marvellous town, made of seven jewels and defended by seven trenches. There he finds coveted treasure, precious gems or the philosopher's stone. On the way back, his treasure is usually stolen from him by Nāgas and, in order to recover it, he undertakes to empty

the sea with his hands. His energy is then recompensed and his treasure returned to him. Once back home, he rediscovers his old parents, who have been blinded by tears, and his betrothed who has waited for him.

A Timiṅgilajātaka or 'Jātaka of the Leviathan' is represented on a medallion at Bharhut with the mention: 'Vasugupta taken to the shore after having been rescued from the stomach of the leviathan through the intervention of Mahādeva'¹⁰⁴. The medallion was made about the year 150 B.C., and the legend in question is recorded at length in several texts¹⁰⁵: the monk Dharmaruci, having been reborn in the form of a gigantic whale, was on the point of swallowing a ship when the distressed passengers invoked the Buddha. The former monk, recalling his previous vows, closed his jaws and the ship was spared.

The ports of embarkation most frequented by Indian sailors were those of Tāmraliptī (Tamluk) on the east coast, Bharukaccha (Broach) and Sūrpāraka (Sopara) on the west coast. At the time of the *Periplus*, access to the last-named was reserved for Indians, and Greek ships which ventured there were seized and taken under escort to Barygaza¹⁰⁶. Local navigation used many other ports, the list of which is found in the Mahānidessa, Milindapañha and Bṛhatkātha¹⁰⁷; it contains close analogies with Ptolemaic nomenclature and like it must date from the second century A.C. Sylvain Lévi, who studied it in detail¹⁰⁸, remarks that it developed as the plotting of a huge periplus which sets out from the Far East, touches the coasts of India and loses itself in the depths of the West. If, he says, we find in it some names as yet little known or unknown, we nonetheless have sure references to Java, Suppāra, Bharukaccha, Suratttha, Yona and Allāsanda (Alexandria).

Indian merchants seem to have been particularly attracted to the markets of Babylonia, wood from Timor and gold from Suvarṇabhūmi. Merchants from Vārāṇasī went to Bāveru (the Babiru of the cuneiform texts, ancient Babylonia) where, for gold, they sold peacocks which they used together with crows to guide their navigation¹⁰⁹. Dealers in the wood of Sūrpāraka attempted to exploit the great forest of Gośīrsa sandalwood, located beyond distant oceans; they regularly encountered terrible storms.

as did Dhārukarnin who, on the open sea, was subjected to a hurricane unleashed against him by the yakṣa Maheśvara and he owed his escape only to the intervention of his brother Pūrṇa; that holy man flew through the air to the distressed ship and, seated cross-legged above the vessel, soon calmed the fury of the waves¹¹⁰. However, according to the evidence of the Mahākarmavibhaṅga, it was especially for Ceylon, the islands of the Archipelago and Suvarṇabhūmi that the sailors of the Great Ocean made¹¹¹. Suvarṇabhūmi, the Chrysē Chersonesos of the *Periplus* and Ptolemy, which is vaguely situated in Burma or Malaysia, by turn attracted merchants from Vārāṇasī such as Saṅkha, from Campā such as Mahājanaka and even a musician from Śūrpāraka, such as Sagga¹¹². The Sinhalese chronicles claim that Suvarṇabhūmi was converted to Buddhism shortly after the Council of Pāṭaliputra (c.242 B.C.), by the missionaries Sona and Uttara¹¹³; but other sources have no hesitation in dating that conversion as far back as the time of the Buddha himself, who supposedly entrusted the holy Gavāmpati with teaching the Dharma to the population of Suvarṇabhūmi over an area of an hundred leagues. The legend recorded in the Karmavibhaṅga is still widespread in Burma today¹¹⁴. In fact, however, the Indianisation of Burma dates from no earlier than the fifth century A.C.¹¹⁵, and it is most unlikely that Buddhist propaganda could have reached the region before then¹¹⁶.

The foregoing brief account, in which the history of the relations between India and China should also have found its place¹¹⁷, is enough to demonstrate that, in the first years of the Christian era, India came out of her millenary isolation and entered the world complex. New routes were thus opened up to religious propaganda, particularly to the Doctrine of the Buddha which was able to make use of the possibilities offered to it, but only in part. For reasons which we shall explain elsewhere, it disdained the Western world, which was indifferent or hostile to the Good Word, and turned all its solicitude to China and the Far East, ready to receive the teachings of the Buddha.

(Concluded)

Translated by Sara Boin-Webb with thanks to the Buddhist Society of London

NOTES

- 52 Strabo, XVII, 1, 13 (tr. after Tardieu).
- 53 Strabo, XVII, 1, 45.
- 54 Strabo, II, 5, 12.
- 55 Strabo, XV, 1, 4.
- 56 *Periplus*, 38-39.
- 57 Strabo, XV, 1, 73; cf. XV, 1, 4; Dio Cassius, LIV, 9.
- 58 *Periplus*, 57: Τοῦτον δὲ ὄλον τὸν εἰρημένον περίπλουον ἀπὸ Κανῆς καὶ τῆς Εὐδαίμονο Ἀραβίας οἱ μὲν <πρότεροι> μικρότεροις πλοίοις περικλιζόντες ἔπλεον, πρῶτος δὲ Ἰσπλος κυβερνήτης, κατανοήσας τὴν θέσιν τῶν ἐμπορίων καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς θαλάσσης, τὸν διὰ πέλγους ἐξεύρε πλοῦν, ἰδὼν οὐ καὶ τριπλῶς ἐκ τοῦ ὠκεανοῦ φερόντων, [τῶν] κατὰ καιρὸν τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν, ἐτησίων ἐν τῷ Ἰνδικῷ πελάγει λιβόντος φαίνεται <ἵππαλος> προσονομαζεσθαι [ἀπὸ τῆς προσηγορίας τοῦ πρώτως ἐξευρηκότος τὸν βιάπλουον]. Ἀφ' οὗ μέχρι καὶ νῦν τινὲς μὲν εὐθὺς ἀπὸ Κανῆ, τινὲς δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν Ἀρωμάτων ἀφίενται, οἱ μὲν εἰς Λιμυρικὴν πλοῖον ἐπὶ πλείον ἑξαημέροισι, οἱ δὲ εἰς Βαρύγαζαν οἱ τε εἰς Σκυθίαν οὐ πλείον ἢ τρεῖς ἡμέρας ἀνχοῦσι καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν † παρεπιφέρον πρὸς ἴδιον ὄρμον ὑψηλοὶ ἐκ τῆς χώρας αὐτῆς τοῦ ἔωθεν ἢ παραπλέονσι τοὺς προειρημένους κόλπους.
- 59 *Periplus*, 40.
- 60 *Periplus*, 44.
- 61 E.J. Rapson, *Indian Coins*, §§78-79 and pl.III, 1.
- 62 H. Lüders, 'List of Brāhmi Inscriptions' (*Epigraphia Indica*, X, Appendix) Nos 1099, 1131-1136, 1174.
- 63 Cf. the *Cūrṇī* by Jinadāsagaṇi, a commentary upon a gāthā by Bhadrabānu passage edited and translated by S. Lévi, 'Kaniska et Śātavāhana', *Journal Asiatique*, Jan.-Mar. 1936, pp.67-70.
- 64 See the inscriptions of Gautamīputra Śrī Śātakarṇi and Vāsisthīputra Śrī Pulumayī at Nāsik (Lüders, *op. cit.*, Nos 1125 and 1123).
- 65 *Periplus*, 41.
- 66 *Periplus*, 48.
- 67 *Periplus*, 49 and 51.

- 68 *Periplus*, 57.
- 69 Ptolemy, VII, 1, 84.
- 70 *Oxyrhynchus Papy.*, III, 413, pp.41-57.
- 71 Lüders, Nos 1140, 1154, 1156, 1182, 1094; cf. W.W. Tarn, *The Greeks in Bactria and India*, 2nd ed., Cambridge 1951 [repr. New Delhi 1980], pp.254-8, 371-3.
- 72 *Dīpavāṃsa*, 21, 30; *Mahāvāṃsa*, 34, 69.
- 73 Pliny, VI, 84-88.
- 74 *Periplus*, 53.
- 75 Pliny, VI, 104.
- 76 *Periplus*, 60.
- 77 *Periplus*, 60-62.
- 78 E.J. Rapson, *Indian Coins*, 581; Lüders, *op. cit.*, Nos 963, 964a, 965-7.
- 79 Lüders, *op. cit.*, Nos 994, 1100, 1122-24; 1248, 1106; *Epigraphia Indica* XXVI, 1936, p.259.
- 80 E.J. Rapson, *Indian Coins*, 586.
- 81 See P. Meilke, 'Les Yavanas dans l'Inde tamoule', *Mélanges Asiatiques*, 1940-41, pp.85-123.
- 82 *Id.*, *ibid.*, p.90.
- 83 *Id.*, *ibid.*, p.93.
- 84 *Id.*, *ibid.*, p.97.
- 85 *Id.*, *ibid.*, p.103.
- 86 Tacitus, *Annals*, II, 33; III, 53; Dio Cassius, LVII, 15.
- 87 Pliny, XII, 84.
- 88 Pliny, VI, 101.

- 89 *Periplus*, 49, 56.
- 90 R.E.M. Wheeler, 'Roman Coins, first century B.C. to fourth century A.D., found in India and Ceylon', *Ancient India*, No.2, Delhi 1946, Appendix 1, pp. 116-21.
- 91 On the excavations at Vīrapatnam, see R.F. Facheux, *Une vieille cité indienne près de Pondichéry, Vīrapatnam*, Pondicherry 1945; R.E.M. Wheeler, 'Arikamedu: an Indo Roman Trading Station on the East Coast of India', *Ancient India*, No.2, Delhi 1946, pp.17-124; J. Filliozat, 'Les Inscriptions de Vīrapatnam', *Comptes-Rendus de l'Académie d'Inscriptions*, Jan. 1947, pp.110-18; 'Les échanges de l'Inde', *Revue historique*, Jan.-Mar. 1949, pp.16-23.
- 92 *Dīpavāṃsa*, IX, 1-37; *Mahāvāṃsa*, VI.
- 93 Thirteenth Rock Edict: J. Bloch, p.130.
- 94 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XII, 25-40; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XI, 18-41.
- 95 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XII, 35-39; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XIII, 18-21.
- 96 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XV, 6-28; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XVII, 9-21.
- 97 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XV, 81-95; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XVIII, 1-8.
- 98 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XVI, 3-7; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XIX, 17-23.
- 99 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XVIII, 47; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XXI, 10.
- 100 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XVIII, 49; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XXI, 13; XXVII, 6.
- 101 *Mahāvāṃsa*, XXV, 77 ff.
- 102 *Dīpavāṃsa*, XX, 15-17; *Mahāvāṃsa*, XXXIII, 56-61.
- 103 On the adventures of Mahātyāgavat, Kalyānakārin and Pāpakārin, see the references in the *Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nāgārjuna*, II, Louvain 1949, pp.755-7, notes; on those of Maitrakanyaka, see S. Lévi, *Mahākarmavibhaṅga*, Paris 1932, p.51.
- 104 A. Cunningham, *The Stūpa at Bhārhut*, London 1879 [repr. Varanasi 1962], pl.XXXIV, 2; S. Barua and K. Sinha, *Bhārhut Inscriptions*, Calcutta 1926, p.61.
- 105 *Divyāvadāna*, pp.231-3; *Mahāvastu*, I, pp.244-6; *Avadānakalpalārāṅga*, II.

- pp.777-8; Apadāna, II, p.430, *Traité*, I, pp.410-14.
- 106 *Periplus*, 52.
- 107 Mahāniddeśa, I, p.154; Milindapañha, p.359; Brhatkathā of Buddhasvāmin, XVIII, vv.428 ff.
- 108 S. Lévi, 'Ptolomé, Le Niddeśa et la Brhatkathā', *Études Asiatiques*, Paris 1925, II, pp.1-55.
- 109 Bāverujātaka, No.339, III, p.126; on 'land-sighting crows', see also Dīgha, I, p.222.
- 110 On the adventures of Dhārukarnin, also called Stavakarnika, cf. Milasarvastivādin Vinaya, T 1448, ch.3, p.13a; Divyāvadāna, pp.41-2; Avadānaśataka, II, p.166; Buddhacarita, XXI, v.22, in E. Johnston, 'The Buddha's Mission and Last Journey', *Acta Orientalia*, XV, 1937, p.55 [included in *The Buddhacarita or Acts of the Buddha*, Delhi 1984].
- 111 S. Lévi, *Mahākarmavibhāṅga*, pp.51, 53
- 112 Samkajātaka, No.442 (IV, p.15); Mahājanakajātaka, No.539 (VI, p.30); Sussondijātaka, No.360 (III, p.187).
- 113 Dīpavamsa, VIII, 12; Mahāvamsa, XII, 6 and 44; Samantapasādikā, I, p.64.
- 114 *Mahākarmavibhāṅga*, p.62; P. Bigandet, *Vie ou Légende de Gaudama, le Bouddha des Birmans*, Paris 1878 p.371 [English ed., Rangoon 1858, repr. Varanasi 1979].
- 115 Cf. G. Coedès, *Les États hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie*, Paris 1948, p.37 [English ed. *The Indianized States of Southeast Asia*, Honolulu 1968]
- 116 The small amount of information assembled here on Indian navigation should not allow us to forget that, at least for mainland India, prejudice against the sea persisted for a long time. On this subject, see the authoritative remarks by L. Renou, *La civilisation de l'Inde ancienne*, Paris 1950, pp.202-3.
- 117 On this subject, see J.V. Mills, 'Notes of Early Chinese Voyages', *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1951, Parts 1 and 2, pp.3-25, where a good bibliography can be found.

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MASTER JU-MAN FU-KUANG OF LOYANG

A Short Record from the *Ching-tê Ch'uan-têng Lu*

During a courtesy visit to the Master's monastery, the Emperor Shun-tsung asked Ju-man, 'Where did the Buddha come from, and where did he go at his passing? As it is said that he is eternally abiding in this world, then where is the Buddha now?'

The Master replied, 'The Buddha came from his transcendent state, and returned to that transcendent state at his passing. The Dharma-body is absolutely empty, eternally existent, without room for thought. Existing thoughts should be returned to no thought; existing things thought of as having an abiding place should be returned to (the Mind of) 'non-abiding'. Sentient beings come into existence and cease to be, but the immaculate Bhūtatahatā-ocean's tranquil substance abides forever. On this the wise ones skilfully meditate, without giving rise to further doubtful fears.'

The Emperor further asked, 'The Buddha was born in a royal palace, and entered Nirvāṇa between two sāla trees (at Kuśinagara). He dwelt in the world for forty-nine years after his enlightenment in order to teach, yet he also said that he had a fixed Dharma. The mountains, rivers and great oceans, the universe, the sun and moon - all must eventually pass away, so why is it said that there is 'no birth and death'? As I still have doubts about this, would the wise Master kindly explain further?'

The Master replied, 'The Buddha's body is fundamentally 'non-acting'. Any such distinctions (such as you have made) are erroneous. The Dharma-body is like empty space and has never been subject to 'birth and death'. When there is an appropriate cause for it, a Buddha appears in the world; when there is no further cause to stay, the Buddha enters Nirvāṇa. The Buddha's teaching influences sentient beings everywhere, but it is like the reflection of the moon in water (and not the real moon). There is neither 'permanence' nor 'impermanence', neither 'birth' nor 'death'. Living beings are never really 'born'; those that are said to have 'died' never really pass away. Understand clearly

CATURĀRAKKHĀ : The Fourfold Protection*

Translated by Hammalava Saddhātissa

Buddhānussati mettā ca asubham maraṇassati,
iti imā caturārakkhā bhikkhu bhāveyya sīlavā.

Buddhānussati

1. Anantavitthāraguṇam guṇato 'nussaram munim,
bhāveyya buddhimā bhikkhu buddhānussatim ādito.
2. Savāsane kilese so eko sabbe nighātiya,
ahū susuddhasantāno pūjānaṃ ca sadāraho.
3. Sabbakālagate dhamme sabbe sammā sayam munim,
sabbākārena bujjhitvā eko sabbaññutam gato.
4. Vipassanādivijjāhi sīlādicaranehi ca
susamiddhehi sampanno gaganābhehi nāyako.
5. Sammā gato subham thānam amoghavacano ca so,
tividhassāpi lokassa nātā niravasesato.
6. Anekehi guṇoghehi sabbasattuttamo ahū,
anekehi upāyehi nāradamme dāmesi ca.
7. Eko sabbassa lokassa sabba-atthānusāsako,
bhāgyaīssariyādīnam guṇānam paramo nidhi.
8. Paññāssa sabbadhammesu karuṇāsabbajantusu,
attatthānam paratthānam sādhikā guṇajetthikā.
9. Dayāya pāramī citvā paññāy'attānam uddhari,
uddharī sabbadhamme ca dayāy'aññe ca uddhari.
10. Dissamāno pi tāv'assa rūpakāyo acintiyo.

Translation

The virtuous monk should meditate on these four protections:
Recollections of the Buddha, of Lovingkindness, of Impurities
of the Body and the Recollection of Death.

The Recollection of the Buddha

1. The intelligent monk should at the outset meditate on the
Buddha, endowed with infinite and pervasive qualities, re-
flecting on these qualities.
2. The Buddha alone has destroyed all the defilements together
with their habits and, with an extremely pure mind, is always
worthy of offerings.
3. The Buddha has rightly realised by himself, in every way,
all matters pertaining to all times and has attained omni-
science alone.
4. The Lord is endowed with insight, knowledge, as well as vir-
tue and pure conduct as widespread as the sky.
5. The Buddha has rightly gone to the blissful place. He is
endowed with treasured speech. He has known the three worlds
in their entirety.
6. The Buddha has become supreme among all beings by his mani-
fold qualities. He has subdued by various means those who
should be subdued.
7. The Buddha alone is a teacher to the entire world in all
matters. He is a repository of such qualities as fortune
and prosperity.
8. The Buddha's wisdom is directed towards all matters and his
compassion over all beings. He is beneficial for himself
and others. He is supreme in all qualities.
9. That Buddha elevated himself by the wisdom gained through
the perfection so attained by preaching the Doctrine in all
its aspects; and elevated others through compassion.
10. The body of form of that Buddha which is visible in itself

asadhāraṇānānāḍḍhe dhammakāye kathā va kā ti.

Mettānussati

1. Attūpamāya sabbesaṃ sattānaṃ sukhakāmatāṃ,
passitvā kamato mettāṃ sabbasattesu bhāvaye.
2. Sūkhī bhavēyyaṃ niddukkho ahaṃ niccaṃ ahaṃ viya,
hitā ca me sūkhī hontu majjhata c'atha verino.
3. Imāmi gāmakkhettāmi sattā hontu sūkhī sadā,
tato paraṃ ca rajjesu cakkavālesu jantuno.
4. Samantā cakkavālesu satta 'nantesu pāṇino,
sūkhino puggalā bhūtā attabhāvagatā siyū.
5. Tathā itthipumā c'eva ariyā anariyā pi ca,
devā narā apāyatthā tathā dasadisāsu cā ti.

Asubhānussati

1. Aviññāṇa 'subhanibhaṃ saviññāṇa 'subhaṃ imaṃ,
kāyaṃ asubhato passaṃ asubhaṃ bhāvaye yati.
2. Vannaṣaṇṭhānagandhehi āsayokāsato tathā,
patikkūlāni kāye me kuṇapāni dvisolasa.
3. Patitamhā pi kuṇapā jegucchaṃ kāyanissitam,
ādhāro hi sucī tassa kāyo tu kuṇape thitam.
4. Mīlhe kimi va kāyo 'yaṃ asucimhi samutthito,
anto asucisampunṇo punṇavaccakutī viya.
5. Asucī sandate niccaṃ yathā medakathālikā,
nānākimikulāvāso pakkacandanikā viya.
6. Gaṇḍabhūto rogabhūto vanabhūto samussayo,
atekiccho 'tijeguccho pabhinnakuṇapūpamo ti.

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cannot be conceptualised. How much more would it be with regard to his body of Doctrine endowed with unique wisdom.

The Recollection of Lovingkindness

1. Having compared oneself with others, one should practise lovingkindness towards all beings realising that everyone desires happiness.
2. May I be free from sorrow and always be happy: may those who desire my welfare, those who are indifferent towards me and those who hate me, also be happy!
3. May all beings who live in other regions in this world-system be happy!
4. May all beings living in every world-system and each element of life within each system be happy having achieved the highest bliss!
5. Likewise women, men, the noble and ignoble ones, gods, and those in woeful states and those living in the ten directions - may all these beings be happy!

The Recollection of the Impurities of the Body

1. The monk, perceiving this body as repugnant as a conscious and non-conscious entity, should meditate on its repugnance.
2. The thirty-two impurities of my body are abhorrent in respect of colour, form, associated elements and space.
3. The impurities within the body are more abhorrent than those that fall from the body since in the case of the latter, that upon which they fall is pure, while the body itself incorporates impurities.
4. Like a worm born in excreta, this body is also born in excreta. Like a cesspit that is full up, this body is full of impurity.
5. Just as fat pours overflowing from a pot full of fat, even so impure matter flows out of this body. Like a cesspit, this body is an abode of the hosts of bacilli.
6. This body is like a boil, a disease, a wound, it is incurable. It is extremely abhorrent. It is comparable to a decomposed corpse.

Maranānussati

1. PavātaḍIpatulyāya sāyusantatiyākkhayam,
parūpamāya sampassam bhāvaye maraṇassatiṃ.
2. Mahāsampattisampattā yathā sattā matā idha,
tathā ahaṃ marissāmi maraṇam mama hessati.
3. Uppattiyā sahevedam maraṇam āgatam sadā,
maraṇatthāya okāsam vadhako viya esati.
4. Īsaḅam anivattantam satatam gamanussukam
jīvitam udayā attham suriyo viya dhāvati.
5. Vijjububbulaussā va jalarājīparikkhayam,
ghātaḅo va ripū tassa sabbatthā pi avāriyo.
6. Suyasatthāmapuññiddhi-buddhivuddhi jinadvayam,
ghātesī maraṇam khippam kā tu mādisake kathā.
7. Paccayānaṅ ca vekalyā bāhirajjattupaddavā,
marāmoram nimesā pi maraṇāno anukkhanan ti.

Atthasamvegavatthu

1. Bhāvetvā caturārakkhā āvajjeyya anantaram,
mahāsamvegavatthūni attha atthita vīriyo.
2. Jātijarāvyādhicutī-apāyā
atīta-appattakavattadukkham,
āḍāni āhāragavettḥidukkham
samvegavatthūni imāni attha.
3. Pāto ca sāyam api c'eva imam vidhiñño
āsevate satatam attahitābhilāsī,
pappoti so 'tivipulam hatapāripantho
settham sukham munivisitthamatam sukkena.

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The Recollection of Death

1. Seeing, with wisdom, the end of life in others, comparable to a lamp kept in a draughty place, one should meditate on death.
2. Just as in this world, beings who once enjoyed great prosperity will die, even so will I, too, die. Death will indeed come to me.
3. This death has come along with birth. Therefore, like an executioner, death always seeks an opportunity.
4. Life, without halting for a moment, and ever keen on continuing, moves like the sun that hastens to set after rising.
5. This life come to an end like a streak of lightning, a bubble of water, a dew drop on a leaf or a line drawn on water. Like an enemy intent on killing, death can never be avoided.
6. If death came instantly to the Buddha, the teacher of the one and only way, endowed with great glory, prowess, merit, supernatural powers and wisdom, what could be said of me?
7. Dying every moment, I shall die within the twinkling of an eye, either without food or through internal ailments or external injuries.

The Recollection of the Eight Sorrowful Stages of Life

1. Having practised this fourfold protective meditation, the monk who has put forth effort should reflect on the eightfold sorrowful stages of life.
2. The sorrow pertaining to birth, old age, disease, death, the spirit world, the past cycles of births and the future cycle of birth and sorrow, difficulty experienced in the search for food in the present life - these are the eight sorrowful stages of life.
3. A person who, desirous of his own welfare and knowing the types of meditation, practises this regularly in the morning and evening, will, having destroyed the impediments, happily attain the supreme state of Nibbāna, extolled as the highest bliss by the Buddha.

Ed.* These stanzas are recited twice every day in the vihāras of Sri Lanka where they were originally composed. They constitute devotional meditation in that the first recollection strengthens one's confidence in the Buddha as supreme teacher and guide; the second counters illwill and promotes feelings of compassion; the third weakens bodily attachment and restrains sensual desire; and the fourth emphasises awareness and exertion to utilise the advantages of human birth.

See *Caturarakkha Bhavana*. The four protective meditations. Pāli text and translation by Bhikkhu Bodhi; commentary (by Pelene Siri Vajirañāna) translated by F.M. Rajakaruna. Bhikkhu Training Centre, Maharagama 1984.

* No-one seriously interested in Buddhist teaching or practice can overlook the work of Nyanaponika Thera, a scholar with an extraordinary gift of clarifying difficult concepts and making the Theravāda intelligible, meaningful and easily accessible to the Western reader.

THE VISION OF DHAMMA

is an anthology of his writings which first appeared through the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Sri Lanka, and apart from eight short essays comprises the following Wheel series: The Worn-out Skin, The Power of Mindfulness, The Roots of Good and Evil, The Four Nutriments of Life, The Threefold Refuge, The Four Sublime States, Anattā and Nibbāna. Pp. xxv, 267. £7.95

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EKOTTARAGAMA (VII)

Traduit de la version chinoise par

Thich Huyēn-Vi

Fascicule quatrième

Partie 9

L'Enfant unique¹

1. 'Ainsi ai-je entendu. Lorsque le Bouddha, le Bienheureux, résidait dans le parc d'Anāthapīṇḍada à Śrāvastī, il disait à ses bhikṣu: Ô bhikṣu! Une mère ayant un enfant unique, sa préoccupation principale est de réfléchir sur la manière d'éduquer son fils pour qu'il devienne un jour un homme utile pour la société. Les bhikṣu demandaient alors: Nous vous prions, Ô Bienheureux, de bien vouloir nous expliquer votre pensée pour que nous puissions bénéficier de votre précieux enseignement.

Le Bienheureux répondait: Je vais accéder à votre demande. Alors écoutez-moi bien et réfléchissez bien. Quant aux upāsaka, on doit suivre l'exemple de Citra Grhapati² et de Gaja Kumāra. Ces deux personnes sont des laïcs qui ont mis leur foi dans le Dharma et ont suivi avec application les enseignements. Si l'on veut entrer en religion et porter les trois habits de religieux (kāsāya)³, on doit prendre exemple sur Śāriputra et Mahā-Maudgalyāyana. Pourquoi? Parce qu'ils ont étudié assidûment le Dharma, n'ont pas commis d'actes répréhensibles au Dharma ou ébauché des idées contraires à leur conscience. Si par hasard des idées erronées survenaient dans leur réflexion, ils seraient condamnés à retourner dans les trois mauvaises voies⁴.

Si vous vous appliquez à faire du bien, vous récolterez les bonnes conséquences dans un proche avenir. C'est pourquoi les offrandes pèsent très lourdes car elles peuvent empêcher les bhikṣu d'atteindre le but visé. Alors, vous ne devez pas aimer recevoir les offrandes, si vous y éprouvez déjà du plaisir, détruisez ce sentiment le plus vite possible. Ayant entendu ces paroles du Bouddha, les bhikṣu étaient heureux et les mettaient respectueusement en pratique.

HOW IS THE BUDDHA DIFFERENT FROM AN ARAHANT IN THERAVADA BUDDHISM

Arvind Sharma

At the second annual conference of the Australian Association for the Study of Religions, Dr Telwatte Rahula of the University of Melbourne (now at McGill University, Montreal, Canada), who had himself formerly been a monk in Sri Lanka, read a paper entitled: "The Buddhist Arahant: Is his attainment of *nirvāṇa* as perfect as the Buddha's Enlightenment?" He concluded that though some scholars maintain that "the arahants were not as fully emancipated as the Buddha" ¹, "so far as the Pali canon is concerned, there is absolutely no ground even to suggest that the essence of the arahant's attainment was different from that of the Fully Awakened One... they all without exception claim to have realized the threefold knowledge" ², this threefold knowledge consisting of:

- (i) the knowledge of one's own previous births ³;
- (ii) the knowledge of the rebirths of others ³; and
- (iii) knowledge regarding the utter cessation of *āsavas* ⁴ or mental intoxicants.

Nevertheless, although the Buddha and arahants are seen as identical in the achievement of salvation in the state of *Nibbāna*, it is clear that in some ways the Buddha is more than an arahant. This paper is an effort to identify the ways in which he may be regarded as different from an arahant in the Theravāda tradition.

At first there seems to have been virtually no distinction between the Buddha and the arahants. Thus, "In the Buddhist movement the Buddha was the first arahant. He was regarded as an arahant, along with other arahants, without any distinction. Thus after the conversion of the group of five monks (*pañcavaggiya*), the first converts to the teaching of Gotama, it is stated that there were six arahants in the world (*Vin. I, 14*), the Buddha being reckoned one of them" ⁵.

The last sentence provides the clue to the first line of differentiation between the Buddha and arahants. The Buddha was the first arahant and the arahants subsequent Buddhas. In the Theragāthā, for instance, the arahants are described as *buddhānubuddha*:

"... the Buddha as well as his disciples follow the same path and reach the same goal, and the distinction between the Buddha and the disciples who became arahants is not with regard to the attainment, but with regard to the fact that the Buddha rediscovered the age-old path (*purāṇam añjasam*) to the city of *Nibbāna*, while the disciples come to the same city having followed the

path discovered by the Buddha. The Buddha is, therefore, called the revealer of the path (*maggassa akkhātā*). He is the teacher (*sattḥā*) who teaches the disciples to attain the same ideal as attained by him" ⁶.

Dr Rahula amplifies this point of distinction. After maintaining that, "An arahant may even with justification be called a *buddha*", he adds: "It should be admitted that the arahant's status was never regarded to be equal to that of the the Buddha. The Buddha is esteemed as unparalleled (*asama*) equal only to those who are themselves unequalled Buddhas (*asamasama*). Disciples cannot be the equals of the Master who finds the path for the first time. Being the pioneer and path-finder, he deserves to be venerated as such. Apart from that, the early strata of the Pali canon make no distinction between the Buddha's attainment of *nirvāṇa* and that of the arahant. Although he was later regarded as omniscient in the popular sense of the word the Buddha himself never claimed to be so" ⁷.

The question of the Buddha's omniscience may be postponed awhile to consider another significant fact here. The Buddha, though he spent some time with Ālūra Kūlāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta, had no Master as such; it is equally important to realise that none succeeded to his position in the Buddhist movement. For, "After the *parinirvāṇa* his place as Way-shower (*Majjhima-Nikāya* iii 6) was to be taken, not by any monk (*Majjhima-Nikāya*, Sutta No. 108), for, being Way-followers, not one of them resembled him, but by Dharma: 'Dharma is our support' (or mainstay, *Majjhima-Nikāya* iii 9), as monks are recorded to have said after the teacher had died. This statement fully accords with the injunction the Buddha had given to Ānanda, his constant companion, shortly before this event: 'The Dharma I have taught and the Vinaya I have laid down - that after my passing is to be your Teacher' (*Dīgha-Nikāya* II 154)" ⁸. Not only is the Buddha unique by virtue of being the first Teacher, he was also unique, in the context of the early community, in being the last.

The claim to omniscience which the Buddha did make was that he knew all that was to be known to achieve salvation. ⁹ Such a claim could not be made by the arahants. Thus another dimension to the distinction between the Buddha and the arahants enters the picture now. Not only is the Buddha different from an arahant in that he was the pioneer of the spiritual path they followed; because he was a Teacher, as distinguished from disciples, or a leader as distinguished from followers but also different in the comprehensiveness of his knowledge. There are suggestions in the Pali texts that he knew more than he taught. He did not have the closed fist of teacher only where matters of salvific significance were concerned for we are told that "once when sitting under a *śimṣupa* tree, Buddha took a few of its leaves in his hand and asked his disciples that

had assembled there to tell him whether they were all the śimśupa leaves or whether there were more on the tree. When they replied that there were surely many more, he said: 'As surely do I know more than what I have told you'. But he did not dwell upon all that he knew, since he saw no practical utility in doing so. It would, on the contrary, he thought, only make his hearers idly curious and delay their setting about the task of exterminating evil. 'And therefore, my disciples, have I not told you that? Because, my disciples, it brings you no profit, it does not conduce to progress in holiness, because it does not lead to the turning from the earthly, to the subjection of all desire, to the cessation of the transitory, to peace, to knowledge, to illumination, to Nirvāṇa; therefore have I not declared it unto you'.¹⁰

It seems that the line of differentiation between the Buddha and the arahants, originating in the fact of the Buddha being the Master and the arahants being the disciples, must have been accentuated by the formation of the Order or the Saṅgha. Not only was the Buddha to be distinguished as the first arahant; not only was he to be distinguished as soteriologically omniscient but once the corpus of his discourses began to take shape he also became further distinguished by the fact that a body of doctrines was associated with him as distinguished from an arahant; a body of doctrine in the emergence of which the early followers may or may not have had enough part to play to justify C.A.F. Rhys Davids calling them the co-founders of Buddhism, but a body of doctrine in any case uniquely associated with him. As I.B. Horner points out, "the epithet of *dharma-kāya* (*Dīgha-Nikāya* 111 84), the body of dharma, was applicable to the Buddha alone".¹¹ This point is picked up by the Milindapañha. One of the pieces of conversation between Nāgasena and King Menander runs as follows:

"The king said: 'Is there such a person as the Buddha, Nāgasena?'

'Yes.'

'Can he then, Nāgasena, be pointed out as being here or there?'

'The Blessed One, O king, has passed away by that kind of passing away in which nothing remains which could tend to the formation of another individual. It is not possible to point out the Blessed One as being here or there.'

'Give me an illustration.'

'Now what do you think, O king? When there is a great body of fire blazing, is it possible to point out that any one flame has gone out, that it is here or there?'

'No, Sir. That flame has ceased, it has vanished.'

'Just so, great king, has the Blessed One passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains for the formation of another

individual. The Blessed One has come to an end, and it cannot be pointed out of him that he is here or there. *But in the body of his doctrine he can, O king, be pointed out. For the doctrine was preached by the Blessed One!*

'Very good, Nāgasena!'¹²

Thus the statement that the Buddha was different from the arahants in that he was the Master is easily made but its ramifications are far-reaching in setting the Buddha apart from the arahants.

Thus one obvious way in which the Buddha is different from the arahants consists in his having shown the path to them and his ability to show it to everyone else. This seems to represent the first stage in the differentiation between the Buddha and the arahants. But as Weeraratne points out: "...as time passed, the Buddha-concept developed and special attributes were assigned to the Buddha. A Buddha possesses the sixfold superknowledge (*chaḷ-abbhiññā*); he has matured the thirty-seven limbs of enlightenment (*bodhipakkhiya dhamma*); in him compassion (*karuṇā*) and insight (*paññā*) develop to their fullest; all the major and minor characteristics of a great man (*mahāpurisa*) appear on his body; he is possessed of the ten powers (*dasā bala*) and the four confidences (*catu vesārajja*); and he has had to practise the ten perfections (*pāramitā*) during a long time in the past.

• "When speaking of arahants these attributes are never mentioned together, though a particular arahant may have one, two or more of the attributes discussed in connection with the Buddha (S 11 217, 222)."¹³

The distinction here now turns on the question of the possession of supernatural powers by the Buddha and the arahants. However, as Dr Rahula points out: "Now the position of the great arahants endowed with supernatural powers is still not equated with that of the Buddha. In the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* there is a list of chief disciples who are declared by the Buddha to be pre-eminent in particular achievements or talents, e.g., intelligence, meditation, energy, confidence and so on. Sāriputta is thus proclaimed to be superior in wisdom, Moggallāna in magical powers and Kassapa the Great in ascetic practices. They are foremost, the Buddha declares, in these achievements amongst 'my disciples' (*mama sāvakā-nāṃ*), implying that the Master remains above comparison. This superiority of the Buddha's powers is maintained, with an increasing emphasis, throughout the post-canonical literature. Sāriputta, the pre-eminent in wisdom, fails to recommend to a monk a subject of meditation that would suit his character and sends him to the Buddha. Moggallāna, despite his superior magical powers, has to be advised by the Buddha while taming a stubborn *nāga*. After Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja's performance, again, the Buddha displayed his wonderful supernatural pow-

ers, unsurpassed by anyone else in the world. Such episodes may reflect the strong tendency to hold the Master above his disciples in all matters; nevertheless, the attitude of the early Buddhist literature seems to be rather ambiguous in this regard, for we find on some occasions the Buddha conceding to individual arahants unreserved pre-eminence in certain qualities or personal virtues. The arahant Sivali is highly praised for his power to receive gifts, and Kassapa the Great is extolled for his strict adherence to ascetic practices. It is probable that in such references survives the memory of an early tradition which held that individual arahants may claim equality with the Buddha in spiritual attainments. On the other hand, it is not unusual of the Buddha to praise someone or something merely in order to encourage others.¹⁴

The superior psychic attainments of the Buddha may be taken to constitute another possible point of distinction with the arahant. But the juxtaposition of the adverse happenings overtaking both Moggallāna and the Buddha provides an interesting occasion for introducing some relevant material from the "Questions of King Milinda", which takes us into the consideration of another point: is there any difference karmically between the Buddha and the arahants after they have attained Nibbāna? On this point of the post-Nibbānic state of karma, Lama Anagarika Govinda remarks:

"Still, in most cases, a last unresolved remainder will be left over, for even if the mind has already come to a state of peace and harmony, that is, if the karmic after-effects are equilibrated, or, removed through a change of attitude, the karma that is bound in corporeal form may still for a long time go on vibrating before complete harmonizing within the same (in form or corporeal perfection, as far as this is possible), or complete emancipation takes place. To the saint it is naturally given to withdraw himself from bodily pains with the aid of concentration; but, generally speaking, so long as the body exists, so long exists also the possibility of the sensation of pain, not so much on account of organic disturbances (illnesses) which hardly come into consideration - for mental well-being (saintliness) signifies also bodily well-being (health) - as rather the ground of external influences, such as, in the case of the Buddha, was the partaking of unwholesome food, or in the case of Āṅgulimāla, wounding through stone-throwing and the like. That, however, here also the external influence, the apparently external happening, does not dispense with the inner, fate-like connexion, is clearly evident from the story of Āṅgulimāla. The robber (converted by the Buddha) who, in consequence of the knowledge that suddenly dawned within him, had become a saint, one day on his round for alms of food is recognized by the crowd and ill-treated so that he comes to the Buddha, all streaming with blood."¹⁵

The interesting point here is that Govinda does not connect the Buddha's

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dysentery due to external agency to any "inner, fate-like connexion". Does he imply that in the case of the Buddha there is no such connection, while it exists in the case of the arahant? Govinda is not specific on the point but the fact that "Moggallāna ... was murdered by hired assassins and the Buddha himself had to encounter a number of unfavourable things" does indicate that both the arahant and the Buddha are subject to post-Nibbānic adversity. This is a common point between the two. What, if any, is the difference?

This point emerges clearly from a comparison of two dilemmas presented to Nāgasena by King Menander. The first of these is the 31st dilemma: How could Moggallāna have possessed miraculous powers seeing that he was murdered?¹⁶ From the point of view of this paper, the significant fact is that he was one of the Buddha's chief disciples¹⁷ and an arahant¹⁸, and that in spite of being an arahant "his death took place by his being beaten with clubs, so that his skull was broken, and his bones ground to powder, and all his flesh and nerves bruised and rounded together".¹⁹ And Nāgasena attributes this end of Moggallāna to the power of karma as "no other influence can avail the man in whom Karma is working out its inevitable end. That is why the venerable one, great king, the great Moggallāna, great king, at a time when he was possessed by Karma, he was being beaten to death, was yet unable to make use of his power of Iddhi".²⁰

Moggallāna's case may be compared with that of the Buddha in the 8th dilemma: The Buddha's sinlessness and his sufferings.²¹ As Menander put it to Nāgasena:

"...if the Tathāgata, on his becoming a Buddha, has destroyed all evil in himself - this other statement that his foot was pierced by a splinter, that he had dysentery, and so on, must be false. But if they are true then he cannot have been free from evil, for there is no pain without Karma. All pain has its root in Karma; it is on account of Karma that suffering arises."²²

In this case Nāgasena maintains that, "It is not all suffering that has its root in Karma" and shows how some of it might arise from natural or present causes. He lists eight causes by which suffering may arise:

"And what are the eight? Superabundance of wind, and of bile, and of phlegm, the union of these humours, variations in temperature, the avoiding of dissimilarities, external agency, and Karma. From each of these are some sufferings that arise, and these are the eight causes by which many beings suffer pain. And therein whosoever maintains that it is Karma that injures beings, and besides it there is no other reason for pain, his proposition is false."²³

And he goes on to show that all the sufferings the Buddha underwent were on account of factors other than his karma. To take the case of the Buddha's foot being hurt:

"Now when the Blessed One's foot was torn by a splinter of rock, the pain that followed was not produced by any other of the eight causes I have mentioned, but only by external agency. For Devadatta, O king, had harboured hatred against the Tathāgata during a succession of hundreds of thousands of births. It was in his hatred that he seized hold of a mighty mass of rock, and pushed it over with the hope that it would fall upon his head. But two other rocks came together, and intercepted it before it had reached the Tathāgata; and by force of their impact a splinter was torn off, and fell upon the Blessed One's foot, and made it bleed. Now this pain must have been produced in the Blessed One either as the result of his own Karma, or of someone else's act. For beyond these two there can be no other kind of pain. It is as when a seed does not germinate - that must be due to the badness of the soil, or to a defect in the seed. Or it is as when food is not digested - that must be due to either a defect in the stomach, or to the badness of the food.

"But although the Blessed One never suffered pain which was the result of his own Karma, or brought about the avoidance of dissimilarity, yet he suffered pain from each of the other six causes. And by the pain he could suffer it was not possible to deprive him of his life. There come to this body of ours, O king, compounded of the four elements, sensations desirable and the reverse, unpleasant and pleasant. Suppose, O king, a clod of earth were to be thrown into the air, and to fall again on the ground. Would it be a consequence of any act it had previously done that it would so fall?

"No, Sir. There is no reason in the broad earth by which it could experience the result of an act either good or evil. It would be by reason of a present cause independent of Karma that the clod would fall to earth again.

"Well, O king, the Tathāgata should be regarded as the broad earth. And as the clod would fall on it irrespective of any act done by it, so also was it irrespective of any act done by him that that splinter of rock fell upon his foot.

"Again, O king, men tear up and plough the earth. But is that a result of any act previously done?

"Certainly not, Sir.

"Just so with the falling of that splinter. And the dysentery that attacked him was in the same way the result of no previous act, it arose from the union of the three humours. And whatsoever bodily disease fell upon him, that had its origin, not in Karma, but in one or other of the six causes referred to." ²⁴

In other words, while arahants had to undergo the results of residual karma, it was not so with the Buddha, who "had burnt out all evil from within

him".

It is clear, therefore, that although the Nibbāna of the Buddha and of the arahants is the same in Theravāda Buddhism, the Buddha is different from the arahants in the various ways pointed out above. ²⁵

Notes

- 1 *Religious Traditions* [Dept of Religious Studies, University of Sydney], Vol.1, No.1 (April 1978), p.39.
- 2 *Ibid.*
- 3 W.C.Weeraratne, "Arahant" in *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* II, 1 (Colombo 1966), p.42.
- 4 Weeraratne, "Āsamkkhaya-Nāna", *ibid.*, p.155.
- 5 Weeraratne, "Arahant", *op.cit.*, p.41.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p.42.
- 7 T.Rahula in *Religious Traditions*, *op.cit.*, p.40.
- 8 J.B.Horner, "Buddhism: The Theravāda" in R.C.Zachner (ed.) *The Concise Encyclopaedia of Living Faiths* (Boston 1959), p.282.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p.301.
- 10 H.Hiriyanna, *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* (London 1932), p.137. For a detailed discussion of the concept of the Buddha's omniscience in the Pali Canon see K.N.Jayatillicke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London 1963), pp.376-81, etc.
- 11 Horner, *op.cit.*, p.282.
- 12 III.9.10: tr. T.W.Rhys Davids in *The Questions of King Milinda* (repr. Delhi 1969), pp.113-4 - emphasis added. It is interesting to note that the fire metaphor is used in the Pali text in the context of the discussion of the post-mortem state of the arahants and not just of the Buddha (Majjhima Nikāya, Sutta 72).
- 13 Weeraratne, "Arahant", *op.cit.*, p.42.
- 14 T.Rahula, *op.cit.*; pp.38-9. Dr Rahula goes on to add: "Granted that the Buddha was in fact superior to his disciples, the arahants, in these psychic attainments, still it would not affect the early Buddhist ideal of perfect liberation, materialized by the great arahants. The Buddha himself was not interested in magical performances, and actually made it an offense against the disciplinary rules for a monk to display such powers. A person's spiritual quality cannot be judged by his supernatural attainments alone,

and even an evil person like Devadatta could acquire them. Moggallāna, the best authority in such powers, was murdered by hired assassins, and the Buddha himself had to encounter a number of unfavourable things" (*ibid.*, p.39).

- 15 Lama Anagarika Govinda, *The Psychological Attitude of Early Buddhist Philosophy* (London 1961), pp.110-1.
- 16 T.W.Rhys Davids, *op.cit.*, pp.261-3.
- 17 Edward Conze, *Buddhism, Its Essence and Development* (repr. New York 1959), p.14.
- 18 Kenneth W.Morgan (ed.) *The Path of the Buddha* (New York 1956), p.48.
- 19 T.W.Rhys Davids, *op.cit.*, p.261.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p.263.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p.190.
- 22 *Ibid.*, p.191.
- 23 *Ibid.*
- 24 *Ibid.*, pp.193-5.
- 25 Two final observations may be made, one common, the other somewhat uncommon. One difference between the Buddha and the arahant is so patent that it has not even been mentioned hitherto in the paper, that in a previous existence the aspirant to Buddhahood resolves to become a Buddha and thenceforth becomes a Bodhisatta. No such resolution is associated with an arahant. The other difference is that while there can be a female arahant there can be no female Buddha in Theravāda Buddhism.

VIETNAMESE BUDDHIST LITERATURE: An Introduction

[Russell Webb] *

The literature of Vietnam is as distinctive as the prevalent indigenous Buddhist tradition which is a remarkably successful and influential amalgam of Ch'an (Zen) and Ch'ing-tu (Jōdo), known locally as Thiēn and Tịnh-ĐỘ respectively. In comparison to the attention lavished on the neighbouring Indian-based and Chinese Buddhist traditions, however, very little has been written on either Buddhism in Vietnam or its canonical and exegetical works. This observation also applies to the otherwise unique achievements of the École française d'Extrême-Orient which, based at Hanoi and later Saigon for half a century, rarely contributed studies relevant to Buddhism in the region other than describing the popular observances. However, this attitude may have resulted from the fact that a Confucian veneer overlaid Vietnamese society at the time and that a resurgence of a dynamic and nationalistic Buddhism, accompanied by popular writings in the adopted romanised script, did not begin to surface until the 1920s and 1930s.

Buddhism first penetrated the northernmost region of Giao-Châu (Tonkin) from the end of the second century A.C. The most notable Dharmadūtas were, in chronological order, as follows:

Mau-Po (Mâu-Bác or Mâu-Tu) from Han China (189 A.C.).

K'ang Seng-Hui (Khu'ang-Tung-Hội), a Sogdian who subsequently settled in Nanking, China, in 247.

Kalyāṇaruci (Cubng-Lubhg-Lâu), a Yüeh-Chi (or Indo-Scythian) who translated the Saddharmasamādhisūtra etc. into Chinese from 255.

MāraJivaka (Ma-La-Kỳ-Vật), an Indian who went on to Loyang, China, c.306.

Vinītaruci (Tỳ-Ni-Đa-Lu-Chi), an Indian who trained in China before coming to Pháp-Văn temple, Hà-Đông province. He translated into Chinese the Mahāyānaśālistrasūtra and founded the first Thiēn (Ch'an) school in Vietnam in 580.

Wu-Yen-Tung (Vô Ngôn-Thông), a Chinese who settled at Kiēn-So' temple, Bắc-Ninh province, in 820, and founded the second school of Thiēn.

Ts'ao-Tang (Thảo-Dương), a Chinese monk captured during a defensive campaign against Champa (an Indianised region which became a vassal state of Annam) in 1069. Appointed National Teacher (Quốc Sư), he resided in the capital Thăng-Long (now Hanoi) and established the unified practice of Thiēn and Tịnh-ĐỘ.

King Trần Nhân-Tôn (1258-1308) [Tuệ-Trung Thợng-Sĩ, according to Thích Nhất-Hạnh] founded the Trúc-Lâm ('Bamboo forest') school which fused Confucianism and Taoism with a dominant Buddhism and resulted in a humanistic and

nationalistic religion.

Nguyễn-Thiều (d.1712) fled the Manchu invasion of China and settled in Huế (1665) where he founded a school of Lin-Chi (Lâm-Tế or Rinzai Zen) which was, in turn, systematised by Liễu-Quán (d.1743).

From the establishment of the nation's first independent dynasties - the Ngô (939-967) and Đinh (968-980), the bhiksus who comprised the learned élite composed most of the indigenous prose and poetry, either in Chinese or in the partly modified script of Chũ'-Nôm ("popular writing"). Such writers included at least one Sangharāja, Chân-Luh (d.1011), whilst Buddhist literary endeavours continued to flourish during the Lê (980-1009) and Lý (1010-1225) dynasties which spanned the golden age of the Buddhadharma in Vietnam. Society was enriched by such activities of the bhiksus who were influential in affairs of state and provided educational facilities in the temples where their spiritual and narrative literature was imparted.

The treasures of Vietnamese literature are largely inaccessible to a wide readership because they have rarely been translated into Western languages. Exceptions include the sixteenth century collection of *jātaka* literature, the *Truyện Kỳ Man Lục*, translated by Nguyễn Trăn-Huân under the title, *Vaste Recueil des Légendes merveilleuses* (Paris 1962), and the national epic poem, *Kim-Vân-Kiêu* (or *Truyện Kiêu*, *The Tale of Kiêu*). Although its author, Nguyễn-Du (1765-1820), was a Confucian scholar, this ever popular work incorporates the themes of *karma*, *anitya* and *duhkha*. It has been lauded as "...a masterpiece which enjoys unrivalled popularity because of its lively musical quality, the beauty of its verse which is incomparable, and above all because of its rich treasurehouse of thoughts from noble Buddhist inspiration. It would be no exaggeration to state that this poem which elaborates a theme which is akin to the life of the country, has of itself achieved much more than thousands of treatises on morals or philosophy as regards the good fight it led for the triumph of goodness, forgiveness, purity of thoughts, and loftiness of ideals. Even now a hundred years later and in spite of the attractions of modern culture, it still is for some a sort of encyclopaedia of the Vietnamese language or a sort of literary Bible, and for others a civic and moral code, and finally for the whole world a manual of elementary and practical Buddhism". **

The poem was first transcribed in Quốc-Ngữ (the romanised "national Language" devised by Catholic missionaries in the seventeenth century but not officially recognised until 1910) in 1875. From the first modern edition by Nguyễn Duy-Ngũng and Vũ Đình-Long (Hanoi 1928), several versions and studies have appeared as listed in the full bibliography of Huỳnh Sanh-Thông's English translation (New York 1973; revised edition with Vietnamese text, Yale University Press, New Haven 1983). The only other English translation was made by Lê Xuân-

Thuy (Saigon 1968), whilst five French versions were made by Abel des Michels (Paris 1884-5), René Crayssac (Hanoi 1926), Nguyễn Văn-Vinh (Hanoi 1943), Xuân-Phúc and Xuân-Việt (Paris 1961) and Nguyễn Khâm-Viễn (Hanoi 1965). To celebrate the bi-centenary of the poet's birth, Maurice Durand edited a collection of essays entitled *Mélanges sur Nguyễn Du* (EFEO, Paris 1966).

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, French academic circles and the colonial authorities began to take a serious interest in Vietnamese culture. A *Bulletin de la Société Académique Indo-chinoise* was published in Paris and this was followed by the establishment in Saigon of the Société des études Indo-chinoises, as evidenced by the regular appearance of its *Bulletin* from 1883-1975. These developments were, however, overshadowed by the foundation in Hanoi of the École française d'Extrême-Orient. Its world renowned quarterly *Bulletin* was launched in the same year (1901).

Beginning with *Histoire ancienne et moderne de l'Annam, Tong-King et Cochinchine* (the three main provinces of Vietnam) (Paris 1884) by Adrien Jau-nay, a majority of French scholars concentrated on the art and archaeology of Indochina. However, a substantial number of works appeared on the religions of the region in general and Buddhism in particular. Gustave Dumoutier described, inter alia, *Le Grand-Bouddha de Hanoi. Étude historique, archéologique et épigraphique sur la pagode de Trăn-Vũ* (Hanoi 1888), *Les cultes annamites* (Hanoi 1907) and "Le clergé et les temples bouddhiques au Tonkin" (*Revue Indochinoise* X, Hanoi 1913) and contributed some "Notes sur le Bouddhisme tonkinois" (*Revue d'Ethnographie* VII, Paris 1888). These were followed by Edouard J.J. Diguet *Les annamites: société, coutumes, religions* (Paris 1906), Charles-Georges Cordier *Littérature annamite* (Hanoi 1914) and *Études de littérature annamite* (Saigon 1933), Paul Mus "Les religions de l'Indochine" (in S.Lévi *Indochine*, Paris 1931), A.Coué "Doctrines et cérémonies religieuses du pays d'Annam" (*Bulletin de la Société des études indochinoises*, NS VIII, Saigon 1933), Émile Gaspardone "Bibliographie annamite" (including Buddhism and its literature) (BEFEO, Hanoi 1934), Lucien Escalère *Le Bouddhisme et cultes d'Annam* (Shanghai 1937), Léopold-Michel Cadière *Croyances et pratiques religieuses des Vietnamiens* (I - Saigon 1944, repr.1958; II - Saigon 1955; III - EFEO, Paris 1957), Maurice Durand "Littérature vietnamienne" (in R. Quenau *Histoire des littératures* I, Paris 1955) and, with Nguyễn Trăn-Huân, the definitive *Introduction à la littérature vietnamienne* (Paris 1969). The last-named study constitutes a detailed historical survey where the Buddhist component is noticeable in the chapters on "Littérature folklorique" and "Le Kim Vân Kiêu et les romans en vers". A unique forty-page biographical dictionary is also featured and it was upon that basis that Dr Ivo Vasiljiev of The Oriental Institute at the Charles University (Prague) contributed several entries on Vietnamese writers to the *Dictionary of*

Oriental Literatures II (ed. D.Zbavitel, London 1974), including the most prominent Buddhist poet in this century, Khái Huh (1896-1947). Editions Thanh-Long, a Vietnamese distributor in Brussels, have published two relevant works by Jacques Baruch: *Essai sur la littérature du Viêt-Nam* (1963) and *Bibliographie des traductions françaises des littératures du Viêt-Nam et du Cambodge* (1968).

The foregoing activity served as a stimulus to indigenous scholars and writers. General works from their pens include *La Civilisation annamite* (Hanoi 1944) by Nguyễn Văn-Huyền and *Le Viêt-Nam, histoire et civilisation* (Paris 1955) by Lê Thành-Khôi, whilst Trần Văn-Giáp contributed "Le Bouddhisme en Annum. Dès origines au XIIIe siècle" (BEFEO, Hanoi 1932), "Les deux sources du Bouddhisme annamite. Des rapports avec l'Inde et la Chine" (*Cahiers de l'EFEO* XXXIII, Hanoi 1942) and *Contribution à l'étude des livres bouddhiques annamites conservés à l'EFEO* (Tokyo 1943). However, almost every other item relevant to this field of study has appeared in Vietnamese. During the 1920s and '30s Nguyễn Văn-Ngọc and his brother, Nguyễn Quang-Oánh, promoted the series, *Viết-Văn Thu-Xã* ("Library of Vietnamese literature") and *Cổ-Kim Thu-Xã* ("Library of old and new works"). We also have on record the following studies: Phan Kê-Bính, *Viết-Hán Văn Khảo* ("A study of Sino-Vietnamese literature", Hanoi 1918, repr.1930); *Viết-Nam Phật-Điền Tông San* ("A collection of Vietnamese Buddhist literature", Hội Việt-Nam Phật-Giáo [Vietnamese Buddhist Association] and EFEO, Hanoi 1936); Đào Duy-Anh, *Viết-Nam Văn Hóa Sử* Cubhg ("History of the evolution of Vietnamese civilisation", Hanoi? 1938), Phan Văn-Hùm, *Phật-Giáo Triết-Học* ("The philosophy of Buddhism", Hanoi? 1941), Ngô Tất-Tố, *Viết-Nam Văn-Học-Sử* ("History of Vietnamese literature", Hanoi? 1942), Thích Mật-Thế, *Viết-Nam Phật-Giáo Sử-Lược* ("History of Buddhism in Vietnam", Saigon 1942, 8th ed., Nha-Trang 1964), Dubhg Quảng-Hùm, *Viết-Nam Văn-Học Sử-Yếu* ("Summary of the history of Vietnamese literature", Hanoi 1944, repr.1951), Nghiêm-Toán, *Viết-Nam Văn-Học-Sử trích yếu* (ibid., Saigon 1949) and, with Hoàng Xuân-Hãn, *Thi Văn Việt-Nam* ("Vietnamese literature", Hanoi 1951); Văn-Tấn et al., *Sơ Thảo Lịch Sử Văn-Học Việt-Nam* ("Outline of a history of Vietnamese literature", Hanoi 1957), Phạm Văn-Diêu, *Văn-Học Việt-Nam* ("Vietnamese literature", Saigon 1960) and Thích Thiên-Ân, *Lịch-Sử Phật-Giáo Việt-Nam* ("History of Buddhism in Vietnam", Saigon 1965), *Gia-Trị Triết-Học Tôn-Giáo trong Truyện Kiều* ("Philosophical and religious values in the Tale of Kiều", Saigon 1966) and *Ảnh Hưởng Phật-Giáo trong Văn-Chubhg Truyện Kiều* ("Influence of Buddhism in Vietnamese literature with reference to the Tale of Kiều", ?).

The Tripitaka (Đại-Tạng Kinh) was imported from China in the late tenth century and several studies and translations from both this corpus and the Pali Canon have been made by Vietnamese bhikkus in recent years. Such work was facilitated by the establishment of the Institute of Higher Buddhist Studies in

Saigon (1964) and this was shortly transformed into Vạn Hạnh University. This centre was soon recognised as the most prestigious of its kind and allowed for exchange scholarships with external universities, as a result of which some bhikkus students were enabled to pursue higher studies in which the use of English or French led to a wider dissemination of their writings. (For further details of Vạn Hạnh see pp.98-109 in *International Seminar on Higher Education in Buddhism*, WFB Books Series 17, Bangkok 1968.)

The Rector of Vạn Hạnh University (- since 1975 changed to the status of "Institute"), Thích Minh-Châu, had written on the "Influence of Buddhism on Vietnamese literature" (*The Maha Bodhi* 66, Calcutta 1958) before enrolling at the Nava Nālandā Mahāvihāra - a post-graduate institute of Pali and allied studies in Patna. In affiliation with the University of Bihar, he obtained his Ph.D. in 1961 for a study and partial translation of *The Chinese Madhyama Āgama and the Pali Majjhima Nikāya* (published Saigon 1964). This was followed by a comparative study of the *Milindapañha* and *Nāgasenabhikkhusūtra* (Calcutta 1964). Thereafter he devoted all his energy to translating the entire Sutta Pitaka into Vietnamese. By 1975 both the Dīgha and Majjhima Nikāyas were printed with the original texts and within the next three years the Samyutta and Aṅguttara Nikāyas, Dhammapada, Udāna and Sutta-Nipāta were translated and published in cyclostyle format. The remaining books of the Khuddaka Nikāya have now been translated and duplicated in Vietnam. In collaboration with his students, A.P. Buddhadatta's *New Pali Course* and *Higher Pali Course* have also been translated.

Thích Huyền-Vi, the spiritual supervisor of Tự-Viện Linh-Soh in Paris (and President of Linh-Soh Buddhist Association in France and England), obtained his doctorate in 1970 from Magadh University (Bodh-Gaya) for *A Critical Study of the Life and Works of Sāriputta Thera* (published Saigon 1972) - an unique survey in need of reprinting. He has also produced a study based on the Abhidhamma-tthusaṅgaha, *The Four Abhidhammic Reals* (Linh-Soh, 1982); *Lược Sử Tổ Bồ-Đề Đạt-Ma* ("History of Master Bodhidharma", Saigon 1961); *Tu Sĩ và Hòa-Sĩ trên Đất Phật* ("The Buddhist Monk and the Painter in the Buddha-land", Suối Tả 1966); *Phật-Lý Căn-Bản* ("The Basis of Buddhist Doctrines", Hướng-Đạo 1974); *Gubha Sáng Người Xưa* ("The Bright Mirrors of the Predecessors", Hướng-Đạo 1975). A fellow bhikkus at Magadh University, Thích Thiện Thanh, has also obtained a Ph.D. for "A comparative study of the Pāli Dīgha-Nikāya and Chinese Dīghāgama" (c.1976), whilst Thai Văn-Chai was awarded his doctorate in 1972 for an "Early History of Buddhism in Vietnam".

Thích Thiện-Châu, the spiritual director of the Association des Bouddhistes Vietnamiens en France and incumbent of Chùa Trúc-Lâm in Paris, has been honoured with two doctorates from the Sorbonne: for a translation of a Chinese sutra

galavādin treatise, "Le Tridharmakāśāstra" (Ph.D. 1971), and a pioneer survey of "La littérature des personnalistes (Pudgalavādin) du Bouddhisme ancien" (D. Litt. 1977). He has also translated the Pali Dhammapada into Vietnamese.

Apart from the foregoing, only privately produced secondary translations have appeared, such as George Grimm's *Die Lehre des Buddha* as *Tuê-Giác Của-Phật* (Saigon 1964), Nārada Mahāthera's authoritative version of the Dhammapada (from English, Saigon 1971), his exposition of Theravāda Buddhism, *The Buddha and His Teachings* (translated, Saigon 1970) and his translation of the *Abhidhammatthosaṅgaha*, *A Manual of Buddhism* (translated, 2 vols, Saigon 1973/5).

* In the course of preparing this essay, the author gratefully acknowledges the advice of Ven. Thích Huyền-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsāḍaka. To the former he owes his knowledge of the intricacies of Vietnamese diacritical marks even if they could not all be reproduced accurately here.

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TWO SŪTRAS ON-DEPENDENT ORIGINATION

Translated by John M.Cooper

Two sūtras on Dependent Origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) edited by N.Aiyasvami Sastri are here translated from the Sanskrit for the first time with the kind permission of the publishers¹. The first sūtra is from a Sanskrit original, but the second had been rendered by Sastri into Sanskrit from its Tibetan translation.

The first sūtra belongs to the Hīnayāna tradition according to Nanjio's Catalogue of the Chinese Tripiṭaka. It gives an explanation of the factors of the Dependent Origination formula.

The second sūtra's connection with this formula lies mainly in the fact that it contains a verse called *Pratītyasamutpādagāthā*. The mention of Nārāyaṇa together with Mahābrāhma and Maheśvara seems reminiscent of the triad, Brāhma, Viṣṇu and Śiva, of Hinduism.

I am grateful to Dr M.N.Kundu who went over the translation and made a number of useful suggestions.

The sūtra called the elucidation of the starting-point and the explanation of dependent origination

Salutation to the Triple Gem.

Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was living at Śrāvastī, at the Jeta grove, in the monastery of Anāthapiṇḍada, with a great community of monks, 1,250 monks. On that occasion the Blessed One addressed them: "To you, monks, I shall teach to you the starting-point of dependent origination and its explanation. Therefore, listen well and duly ponder on it. I shall speak (as follows).

"What is the starting-point of dependent origination? That is to say (i) This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises. (ii) Conditioned by ignorance are volitional activities, conditioned by volitional activities is consciousness, conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality, conditioned by mentality-materiality are the six senses, conditioned by the six sense senses is contact, conditioned by contact is feeling, conditioned by feeling is craving, conditioned by craving is clinging, conditioned by clinging is becoming, conditioned by becoming is birth, conditioned by birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, misery, dejection and perturbation arise - thus is the arising of this whole mass of misery. This is called the starting-point of dependent origination.

"What is its explanation? In 'conditioned by ignorance are volitional

35. Use your endeavour! No heedlessness! Practise the Doctrine of good practice! Whoever practises the Doctrine dwells happily in this world and the other.
36. Delight in heedfulness, O monks! Be of good conduct, O monks! With your thoughts well recollected, watch your minds!
37. Begin now! Come out! Harness yourself to the Doctrine of the Buddha! Rout the army of death as an elephant lays waste to a hut made of branches!
38. Whoever is free from heedlessness in this Discipline and Doctrine, by rejecting the round of rebirths will reach the end of suffering.

(Translated by Sara Boin Webb from the French of Sylvain Lévi as it appeared in the *Journal Asiatique*, Sept.- Oct. 1912, and published with the kind permission of the editors.)

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NIBBĀNA AND ABHIDHAMMA

L.S.Cousins

The nature of nibbāna in the teaching of the Buddha was already a subject of discussion in ancient times. More recently it has been much debated both in modern Western scholarship and also in more traditional Buddhist circles.¹ One issue which has recently been a focus for discussion is the ontological status of nibbāna. Is it some kind of metaphysical absolute? Or is it better seen as the mere cessation of suffering or even as a total ending of existence?

In the nikāyas

A definitive answer to this question cannot easily be found on the basis of the *nikāya* material. Some passages would seem to suggest that nibbāna refers initially to the destruction of defilements at the attainment of enlightenment but ultimately more particularly to the consequent extinction of the aggregates making up the mind and body complex at the time of death. Other passages can be used in support of the belief that nibbāna is some kind of absolute reality. Nevertheless it is evident that most relevant contexts in the Sutta-pitaka are so worded as to avoid any commitment on this issue. This is clearly intentional.

Such a manner of proceeding has many parallels in early Buddhist thought. The most well-known example is probably the ten unanswered questions of Mālunḱyaputta, but some other questions are treated in the same way in the suttas.² The accompanying passages make it quite clear that the main reason for not answering these kinds of question is because they 'are not connected with the spirit, not connected with the letter, not belonging to beginning the holy life, (they) conduce neither to turning away, nor to passionlessness, nor to cessation nor to peace nor to higher knowledge nor to full awakening nor to nibbāna'. This of course is illustrated with the parable of the arrow which strongly suggests that answering such questions would only give rise to endless further questions. The attempt to answer them would take up too much time and distract from the urgent need to follow the path towards the goal.

Some scholars, notably K.N.Jayatilleke, have suggested that this was partly because no meaningful answer was possible. There

may be something in this, but the texts do not seem to go quite so far. More emphasis is laid on the need to avoid one-sided views, particularly eternalism and annihilationism. Acceptance of such ways of seeing things would become fertile soil for various kinds of craving which would themselves lead to further or more fixed views, thus creating or rather furthering the vicious circle of unhealthy mentality. Clearly this would defeat the very purpose of the Buddha's teaching. The Buddhist tradition is very emphatic that Buddhas only teach what is conducive to the goal.

This is perhaps worth spelling out in a little more detail. If body and soul (*jīva*) are one and the same thing, then physical death entails annihilation of the individual. If however they are distinct (and unrelated?), then death does not necessarily entail individual extinction and personal immortality might be inferred. These views are not necessarily wrong. They are however partial and misleading; exclusive adherence to them will lead to trouble. The Buddha's simile of the blind men and the elephant (Sn - a 529) illustrates this perfectly. Each blind man correctly recounted his experience of some part of the elephant. Unfortunately each one wrongly generalized his experience and insisted on its unique validity. In the end they came to blows. In fact the elephant was much more than partial experience for each blind man to suppose.

Similarly in the Brahmajālasutta the majority of wrong views are based upon genuine meditation experience and knowledge, but this has been incorrectly interpreted and dogmatically asserted: 'this is truth, all else is foolishness'. Only a minority of views are the products of reasoning. Without a basis in experience this too can only lead to obsession. If the existence or non-existence of the Tathāgata after death is not specified, this is surely to avoid the two alternatives of eternalism and annihilationism. If the Tathāgata were declared to exist after death, then the Buddhist goal is some kind of immortality. Such a view would lead to some form of craving for renewed existence - the very thing to be abandoned. If on the other hand the Tathāgata were stated to be non-existent after death, then either craving for non-existence - yet another obstacle - would arise or the motivation to follow the path would be eroded.

The Buddha's silence makes very good sense in this light.

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 Provided that is that the immense strength of these two types of viewpoint and their associated craving is recognised. For the Buddhist they are understood as pervading and distorting in one direction or the other all our normal modes of thought. Provided also that the path set forth by the Buddha is seen not so much as an alternative way of salvation comparable to others but more as a deliberate attempt to reduce the spiritual life to its bare essentials and to trim away everything redundant. The Buddha therefore teaches only what is necessary without making any attempt to satisfy intellectual curiosity where this would not be profitable. So it is emphasized that the Tathāgata does not teach things which are true but serve no useful purpose or may even create obstacles for the hearer.

The account of nibbāna given in the *nikāyas* is clear and cogent. Much can be said in praise of nibbāna to encourage the seeker, especially if it is in the form of simile or metaphor. Such we find frequently. But there must be nothing so concrete as to encourage attachment or dogmatic convictions. Beyond this the Buddha did not wish to go. The *nikāyas* never depart wholly from this position. Passages which can be used to support a 'metaphysical' interpretation do not do so unambiguously. Nor is nibbāna ever unequivocally depicted as total annihilation. What we find are hints and suggestions, but never enough to undermine the fundamental aim.

The apparent ambiguity is not carelessness or inconsistency. It is not that 'the ancient Buddhist tradition was not clear on the nature of Nirvāna'.³ Rather it was quite clear that it did not wish us to be too clear! Nor is it that 'Nirvāna had several meanings, and...was variously interpreted'.⁴ Such a view does not see the interconnectedness and internal consistency of the Buddhist dhamma. The apparent ambivalence here arises centrally by the force of the dialectic of early Buddhism. If that dialectic is understood, the ambiguities and silences appear profoundly integral to the Buddha's message of salvation.

Nibbāna in the Abhidhamma-piṭaka

Whereas the suttā material on the subject of nibbāna is often cited and has been the source of much controversy, it does not appear that abhidhamma material is so well-known. There may then be some value in drawing attention to certain aspects. The abhi-

dhamma position is already clearly formulated in the Dhammasaṅgā: (Dhs), the first and no doubt oldest work in the Abhidhamma-piṭaki. The term nibbāna is not used in the main body of Dhs which prefers the expression *asaṅkhata dhātu*. This is usually translated as 'unconditioned element', i.e. that which is not produced by any cause or condition. Presumably this would mean 'that which is independent of relatedness'.

This interpretation of the term is supported by the Nikkhepa-kāṇḍa. In which the Mātikā couplet - *saṅkhata/asaṅkhata* - is explained as equivalent to the previous couplet - *sappaccaya/appaccaya*, i.e. conditioned/unconditioned.⁶ The first term in each case is explained as referring to the five aggregates. So for Dhs the unconditioned element is different to the five aggregates. From this point of view something *saṅkhata* exists in relation to other things as part of a complex of mutually dependent phenomena.

The use of the term *asaṅkhata dhātu* probably derives from the Bahudhātukasutta⁷, where it is one of a series of explanations as to how a monk is *dhātukasaṭṭha*. *Dhātu* usually translated by 'element' seems always to refer to a distinct sphere of experience: visible object is experientially distinct from auditory object, from organ of sight, from consciousness of sight, etc.; earth is distinct from water, etc.; pleasant bodily feeling from unpleasant bodily feeling, etc.; sense-desire from aversion, etc.; sense-objects from form or the formless. Likewise the unconditioned and the conditioned are quite distinct as objects of experience. Usually the analysis into *dhātu* is intended to facilitate insight into non-self. Presumably the purpose here is to distinguish conceptually the unconditioned element of enlightened experience in order to clarify retrospective understanding of the fruit attainment (*phala-samvatti*).

Asaṅkhata occurs occasionally on its own in the *nikāyas*. The most conspicuous occasion is in the *Asaṅkhata-samyutta* (S IV 359-68), where it is defined as the destruction of passion, hatred and delusion. In this context it is clearly applied to the Third Noble Truth. In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (I 152) the three unconditioned characteristics of the unconditioned are that 'arising is not known, ceasing is not known, alteration of what is present is not known'. These are opposed to the equivalent characteristics of the conditioned. In the *Cūlavédallasutta* of the *Majjhima-nikāya* (I 300) the Noble Eightfold Path is declared to be conditioned.

In the *Aṅguttara-nikāya* (II 34) the Path is called the highest of conditioned dhammas, but nibbāna (plus synonyms) is declared to be the highest when conditioned and unconditioned things are taken together.

It is, however, the verbal form corresponding to the much more frequent *saṅkhāra*. *Asaṅkhāra* is an activity which enables something to come into existence or to maintain its existence - it fashions or forms things. So something which is *saṅkhata* has been fashioned or formed by such an activity, especially by volition. The reference is of course to the second link in the chain of Conditioned Co-origination. The succeeding links refer to that which is *saṅkhata*, i.e. fashioned by volitional activity (from this or a previous life). Since this amounts to the five aggregates, the whole mind-body complex, it is virtually equivalent to the meanings given above.

The Nikkhepa-kāṇḍa (Dhs 180-234) gives a surprising amount of information about nibbāna in its explanation of the Mātikā. Before setting this out, it may be helpful to point out that the twenty two triplets which commence the Mātikā embody a definite conceptual order. The first five clearly concern the process of rebirth and the law of *kamma*. Then follow two connected with *jhāna*, after which are nine triplets concerning the path (*magga*). The final six seem to relate especially to nibbāna. This is not accidental. The intention is certainly to indicate an ascending order. This is perhaps more clear if set out in full, but in the present context I will confine myself to tabulating the information given concerning the unconditioned element only in the Nikkhepa-kāṇḍa expansion of the triplets, listed in numerical order.

Asaṅkhata dhātu and the abhidhamma triplets

1. It is indeterminate i.e. not classifiable as skilful or unskilful action. Here it is taken with purely resultant mental activity, with *kiriya* action particularly that of the arahat who does what the situation requires and with all matter.
2. is not classified as linked (*sampayutta*) with feeling i.e. not in the intimate connection with feeling which applies to mind. Here it is taken with feeling itself and with matter.

3. is neither resultant nor giving results
Here it is taken with *kiriya* action and matter.
4. has not been taken possession of and is not susceptible of being taken possession of
i.e. it is not due to *upādāna* in the past nor can it be the object of *upādāna* in the present - the reference is of course to Dependent Origination. - Here it is taken with the Paths and Fruits.
5. is not tormented and not connected with torment
i.e. not associated with *saṅkilesa* nor able to lead to such association in the future. Here again it is taken with the Paths and Fruits.
6. is not with *vitakka* and *vicāra*
i.e. not in the close association with these activities which applies to mind. Here it is taken with matter, the mentality of the higher *jhānas* and pure sense consciousness.
7. is not classified as associated with joy, happiness or equipoise
i.e. not in the close connection with one or other of these which applies to the mind of the *jhānas* paths or fruits. Here it is taken with matter, some feeling, painful tactile consciousness and aversion consciousness.
8. is not to be abandoned either by seeing or by practice
i.e. not eliminated by one of the four paths. Here it is taken with everything which is not unskillful including matter.
9. is not connected with roots to be abandoned by seeing or by practice
i.e. similar to the preceding triplet
10. leads neither to accumulation nor dispersal
i.e. does not take part in any kind of kamma activity whether skilful or unskillful not even the dispersive activity of the four paths. Here it is taken with resultant mental activity, *kiriya* action and matter.
11. is neither under training nor trained
i.e. distinct from supermundane consciousness. Here it is taken with matter and all mentality in the three

- levels.
12. is immeasurable i.e. superior both to the very limited mind and matter of the sense spheres and to the less restricted mind of the form and formless levels. Here it is taken with supramundane consciousness.
13. is not classified as having a small object, one which has become great or one which is immeasurable
i.e. the unconditioned element does not require any object (*ārammaṇa*) in contrast to mentality which requires an object in order to come into being. Here it is taken with matter.
14. is refined i.e. superior both to the inferior mentality associated with unskillfulness and to the medium quality of the remaining aggregates in the three levels. Here it is taken with supramundane consciousness.
15. is without fixed destiny i.e. does not involve a definite kamma result. Here it is taken with everything except the four paths and certain kinds of unskillfulness.
16. is not classified as having the path as object, as connected with path roots or as having the path as overlord
i.e. does not have an object. Here it is taken especially with matter.
17. is not classified as arisen, not arisen, going to arise
i.e. classification in these terms is inappropriate for the unconditioned element which cannot be viewed in such terms - it is non-spatial. Here it is classified on its own.
18. is not classified as past, future or present
i.e. it is non-temporal. Here again it is classified on its own.
19. is not classified as having past, future or present objects
i.e. it does not have an object. Here it is taken with matter.
20. is not classified as within, without or both
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11. is neither under training nor trained
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12. is immeasurable i.e. superior both to the very limited mind and matter of the sense spheres and to the less restricted mind of the form and formless levels. Here it is taken with supramundane consciousness.
13. is not classified as having a small object, one which has become great or one which is immeasurable
i.e. the unconditioned element does not require any object (*ārammaṇa*) in contrast to mentality which requires an object in order to come into being. Here it is taken with matter.
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i.e. does not have an object. Here it is taken especially with matter.
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i.e. classification in these terms is inappropriate for the unconditioned element which cannot be viewed in such terms - it is non-spatial. Here it is classified on its own.
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19. is not classified as having past, future or present objects
i.e. it does not have an object. Here it is taken with matter.
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i.e. it is not kamma-born. However the *Atthakathā-kanda* of the *Dhs*, which gives further comment on the *Mātikā*, traditionally attributed to *Sāriputta*, adds

here that nibbāna and inanimate matter (*anindriya-*
baddharūpa) are without whereas all other dhammas
may be within or without or both. Probably it is
following Vibh 115 which classifies the Third Truth
as without. The difference is perhaps due to an ambi-
guity in the terminology. Without can be taken in
two ways : a) without = the within of other people;
b) without = everything which is not within. Nibbāna
cannot be 'within' as it is not kamma-born.

21. is not classified as having an object which is within or with-
out or both
i.e. it does not have an object. Here it is taken
with matter.
22. cannot be pointed out and does not offer resistance
i.e. it is quite different to most matter and by impli-
cation can only be known by mind. Here it is taken
with mentality and some very subtle matter.

In general the Mātikā couplets do not add much to our
understanding of nibbāna. One point however is worth noting.
The first three couplets of the Mahantara-duka are merely a differ-
ent arrangement of the four fundamentals of the later abhidhamma:
citta, cetanika, rūpa and nibbāna. Taking this in conjunction with the
explanation of the triplets summarized above, we can say that
the Dhammasaṅgani makes very clear that the unconditioned element
is quite different to the five aggregates - at least as different
from the aggregates as their constituents are from one another.

The unconditioned is not matter, although like matter it
is inactive from a kammic point of view and does not depend upon
an object as a reference point. It is not any kind of mental
event or activity nor is it the consciousness which is aware
of mind and matter, although it can be compared in certain respects
with the mentality of the paths and fruits. The Dhammasaṅgani
often classifies paths, fruits and the unconditioned together
as 'the unincluded (*apariyāpanna*)', i.e. not included in the three
levels. Later tradition refers to this as the nine supramundane
dhammas. The unincluded consciousness, unincluded mental activities
and unconditioned element are alike in that they are not able
to associate with *upādāna* or with any kind of torment (*kilesa*), they
are all 'immeasurable' and they are all 'refined'. The uncondition-

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ed element is unique in that it is not classifiable in terms of
arising or as past, present or future. Suggestively, however,
it may be reckoned as *nāma* rather than *rūpa*.⁸ This does seem to
suggest some element of underlying idealism of the kind which
emerges later in the Vijñānavāda.

In other Abhidhamma works

The description given in the Dhammasaṅgani is followed very
closely in later canonical abhidhamma texts. The Vibhaṅga, for
example, gives the identical account in its treatment of the
truths, taking the third truth as equivalent to the unconditioned
element.⁹ The Dhātukathā does likewise.¹⁰ Some of this material
can also be found in the Paṭṭhāna which sometimes deals with
nibbāna as an object condition. The Paṭisambhidā-magga, which
contains much abhidhammic material although not formally in the
Abhidhamma-pitaka, also treats the third truth as unconditioned.
Equally, however, it emphasises the unity of the truths: 'In
four ways the four truths require one penetration: in the sense
of being thus (*tathatthena*), in the sense of being not self, in the
sense of being truth, in the sense of penetration. In these four
ways the four truths are grouped as one. What is grouped as one
is a unity. A unity is penetrated by one knowledge - in this
way the four truths require one penetration'.¹¹

The four ways are each expanded. One example may suffice:
'How do the four truths require one penetration? What is impermanent
is suffering. What is impermanent and suffering is not self.
What is impermanent and suffering and not self is thus. What
is impermanent and suffering and not self and thus is truth.
What is impermanent and suffering and not self and thus and truth
is grouped as one. What is grouped as one is a unity. A unity
is penetrated by one knowledge - in this way the four truths
require one penetration.'

This of course is the characteristic teaching of the Theravāda
school that the penetration of the truths in the path moments
occurs as a single breakthrough to knowledge (*ekābhīsamaya*) and not
by separate intuitions of each truth in different aspects. We
find this affirmed in the Kathāvatthu¹², but the fullest account
occurs in the Peṭakopadesa¹³ which gives similes to illustrate
simultaneous knowledge of the four truths. One of these is the
simile of the rising sun: 'Or just as the sun when rising accomp-

lishes four tasks at one time without (an, of them being) before or after - it dispels darkness, it makes light appear, it makes visible material objects and it overcomes cold, in exactly the same way calm and insight when occurring coupled together perform four tasks at one time in one moment in one consciousness - they break through to knowledge of suffering with a breakthrough by comprehending (the aggregates), they break through to knowledge of arising with a breakthrough by abandoning (the defilements), they break through to knowledge of cessation with a breakthrough by realizing (direct experience of nibbāna), they break through to knowledge of path with a breakthrough by developing.'

At first sight this runs counter to the characteristic Theravādin emphasis on the distinctiveness and uniqueness of nibbāna as the only *asaṅkhata* dhamma. This is most clear in the Kathāvatthu although obviously present elsewhere.¹⁴ Here a series of possible candidates for additional unconditioned dhammas are presented and rejected. What is interesting is the argument used. Essentially the point is made that this would infringe upon the unity of nibbāna. The idea of a plurality of nibbānas is then rejected because it would involve either a distinction of quality between them or some kind of boundary or dividing line between them. André Bareau finds some difficulty in understanding this as it involves conceiving nibbāna as a place and he rightly finds this surprising.¹⁵ However, the argument is more subtle than he allows. What is being put forward is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The argument may be expressed as follows: the unconditioned is by definition not in any temporal or spatial relation to anything. Qualitatively it is superior to everything. If then two unconditioneds are posited, two refutations are possible. Firstly, either only one of them is superior to everything and the other inferior to that one or both are identical in quality. Obviously if one is superior then only that one is unconditioned. Secondly, for there to be two unconditioneds, there must be some dividing line or distinguishing feature. If there is, then neither would be unconditioned since such a division or dividing line would automatically bring both into the relative realm of the conditioned. Of course if there is no distinguishing feature and they are identical in quality, it is ridiculous to talk of two unconditioneds.

One thing is clear. Both in their interpretation of the nature

of the unconditioned and in their understanding of the nature of knowledge of the four truths the Theravādin abhidhamma opts for a far more unitive view than the Sarvāstivādin. This is certainly due to what Bareau calls 'la tendance mystique des Theravādin'.¹⁶ We may say that the Theravādin abhidhammikas retained a closer relationship to their original foundation of meditative experience.

A unitary view of the truths has been interpreted in terms of 'sudden enlightenment', but it has not often been noticed that it involves a rather different view of the relationship between nibbāna and the world. This is significant. The view of nibbāna set forth in the Dhammasaṅgani appears to be in other respects common to the ancient schools of abhidhamma. The Sarvāstivādin Prakaraṇapāda, for example, has much of the same material.¹⁷ It seems clear that although lists of unconditioned dhammas varied among the schools to some extent, they were all agreed that there were unconditioned dhammas and that the unconditioned dharma(s) were not the mere absence of the conditioned. Only the Sautrāntikas and allied groups disputed this last point. It seems clear that their position is a later development based upon a fresh look at the Sūtra literature among groups which did not accord the status of authentic word of the Buddha to the abhidharma literature.

The Dhammasaṅgani account is perhaps the earliest surviving abhidhammic description of nibbāna. It is certainly representative of the earlier stages of the abhidhamma phase of Buddhist literature. Of course some of the *nikāya* passages cited above appear to suggest a very similar position. Very likely some of these were utilized in the composition of the Dhammasaṅgani, but this is not certain. At all events both are the products of a single direction of development giving rise to the abhidhamma. We may suggest that this represents a slightly more monist conception of nibbāna as against the silence of most of the suttas. Nevertheless such a position was at least implicit from the beginning.

J.R. Carter has drawn attention to the frequent commentarial identification of the word dhamma as *catusaccadhamma* (dhamma of the four truths) and *navaṅgā lokuttara dhamma* (ninefold supramundane dhamma).¹⁸ Here again a close relationship between nibbāna and the five aggregates or between nibbāna and supramundane mentality is implicit. What emerges from this is a different kind of model

to those often given in Western accounts of Buddhism which seem to suggest that one has to somehow leave *samsāra* in order to come to nibbāna. Such language is peculiar in relation to a reality which is neither spatial nor temporal. No place or time can be nearer to or further from the unconditioned.

It can perhaps be said that the supramundane mentality is somehow more like nibbāna than anything else. Compare, for example, the simile of Sakka in the Mahā-Govinda-suttanta: 'Just as the water of the Ganges flows together and comes together with the water of the Yamuna, even so because the path has been well laid down for disciples by the Lord, it is a path which goes to nibbāna, both nibbāna and path flow together.'¹⁹ Nevertheless nibbāna is not somewhere else. It is 'to be known within by the wise'.²⁰ 'In this fathom-long sentient body is the world, its arising, its ceasing and the way leading thereto.'²¹

Bareau has shown²² that the Theravādin abhidhamma retains an earlier usage of the term *asaṅkhata* as uniquely referring to nibbāna. The other abhidhamma schools are in this respect more developed and multiply the number of unconditioned dharmas. Inevitably this tended to devalue the term. So much so that the Mahāyāna tends to reject its application to the ultimate truth. Bareau is surely right to suggest that there is a certain similarity between the original unconditioned and the emptiness of the Mādhyamika. To a certain extent the Mahāyāna reaction is a return to the original position if not completely so.

A similar situation occurs with the peculiarly Theravādin position of a single breakthrough to knowledge.²³ So far as I know, it has not been pointed out how much nearer this is to the position of the early Mahāyāna than to the Vaibhāsika viewpoint. The Theravāda does not reify dharmas to anything like the extent found in the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma. Nor does it separate *samsāra* and nibbāna as dualistic opposites: knowledge of *dukkha* i.e. *samsāra* and knowledge of its cessation i.e. nibbāna are one knowledge at the time of the breakthrough to knowing dhamma.

To summarize the kind of evolution suggested here: we may say that the main force of the *nikāyas* is to discount speculation about nibbāna. It is the *summum bonum*. To seek to know more is to manufacture obstacles. Beyond this only a few passages go. No certain account of the ontological status of nibbāna can be derived

from the *nikāyas*. It cannot even be shown with certainty that a single view was held. By the time of the early abhidhamma the situation is much clearer. The whole Buddhist tradition is agreed that nibbāna is the unconditioned dhamma, neither temporal nor spatial, neither mind (in its usual form) nor matter, but certainly not the mere absence or cessation of other dharmas. The uniformity of this tradition is certainly a strong argument for projecting this position into the *nikāyas* and even for suggesting that it represents the true underlying position of the suttas.

In North India where the Sarvāstivādin abhidharma eventually established a commanding position, the term dharma came to be interpreted as a 'reality' and given some kind of ontological status as part of a process of reification of Buddhist terms. Nirvāna then tends to become a metaphysical 'other', one among a number of realities. In the South, at least among the Theravādins, dhamma retains its older meaning of a less reified, more experiential kind. It is a fact of experience as an aspect of the saving truth taught by the Buddha, but not a separately existing reality 'somewhere else'.

So the four truths are dhamma. Broken up into many separate pieces they are still dhamma. As separate pieces they exist only as parts of a complex net of relations apart from which they cannot occur at all. This is *samsāra*. Nibbāna alone does not exist as part of a network. Not being of temporal or spatial nature it cannot be related to that which is temporal or spatial - not even by the relation of negation! Nevertheless it is not somewhere else. *Samsāra* is much more like a house built on cards than a solid construction. Only ignorance prevents the collapse of its appearance of solidity. With knowledge nibbāna is as it were seen where before only an illusory reality could be seen.

Notes

1 I am indebted to Ven. Ananda Maitreya for a fascinating verbal account of some controversies on this topic in Ceylon. References in E. Lamotte *Histoire du bouddhisme indien*, Louvain 1958, p.43, n.57. A survey of some earlier Western scholarship in G.R. Welbon *The Buddhist Nirvāna and its Western Interpreters*, Chicago 1968 (reviewed by J.W. de Jong in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1, Dordrecht 1972, pp.396-403).

For other views see: K.N. Jayatilaka *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*.

- Lon on 1963, pp.475-6; D.J.Kalupahana *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, Honolulu 1975, e.g. p.179; *Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis*, Honolulu 1976, pp.87ff.; A.D.P.Kalansuriya 'Two Modern Sinhalese views of nibbāna', *Religion* IX,1, London 1979; K.Werner *Yoga and Indian Philosophy*, Delhi 1977, pp.77-81; E.Lamotte *The Teaching of Vimalakīrti*, London 1976, pp.LX-LXXII; D.S.Kuegg *La théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, Paris 1969 (for the developed Mahāyāna); J.W.de Jong 'The Absolute in Buddhist Thought', *Essays in Philosophy presented to Dr T.M.P.Mahadevan*, Madras 1962 (repr. in *Buddhist Studies. Selected Essays of J.W.de Jong*, Berkeley 1979); André Bareau *L'Absolu en philosophie bouddhique* (Paris 1951) covers some of the same ground as this article in his earlier sections, but my interpretation differs somewhat.
- 2 The ten unanswered questions are put by Malun̄kyaputta at M I 426ff., by Uttiya at A V 193ff., by Potthapada at D I 187ff. and by Vacchagotta at S IV 395ff. Four of them are discussed by Sāriputta and by an unnamed bhikkhu at S II 222ff. and A IV 68ff. A much larger list is treated in the same way at D III 135ff., while a whole section of the *Samyutta-nikāya* (IV 374-403) is devoted to these questions. Of course, this kind of expansion and variation is exactly what is to be expected with the mnemonic formulae of an oral tradition. The issue is being looked at from various slightly different angles.
- 3 Louis de La Vallée Poussin *The Way to Nirvāna*, Cambridge 1917 (repr. Delhi 1982), p.134.
- 4 Edward Washburn Hopkins, cited by Welbon, *op.cit.*, p.238.
- 5 Not only does Dhs have a canonical commentary appended to it. It is also quite evident that it is presupposed by the other works of the *Abhidhamma-pitaka* (except *Puggala-paññatti*). Of course, the material which has been incorporated into the *Vibhaṅga* may be older than Dhs, but in its present form it is younger.
- 6 Dhs 197-3.
- 7 N III 63 from here it has been included in the lists of the *Dasuttarasutta* (D III 274).
- 8 Bareau is wrong to suggest that the *Vibhaṅga* contradicts this, since the *Vibhaṅga* definition of *nāma* is in the context of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, which automatically excludes the unconditioned element.
- 9 e.g. *Vibh* 112-5; 404ff.
- 10 *Dhātuk* 9 and *passim*.
- 11 *Paṭis* II 105.

- 22 *Kv* Chap. II 9, III 3-4.
- 23 *Paṭ* 134-5.
- 24 *Kv* Chap. VI 1-6, XIX 3-5.
- 25 Bareau, *op.cit.*, p.31.
- 26 *Ibid.*, p.253.
- 27 *Ibid.*, pp.47-61.
- 28 John Ross Carter *Dhamma. Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations. A study of a religious concept*. Tokyo 1978.
- 19 D II 223.
- 20 D II 93; PTC gives twenty-four *nikāya* references sv *akālika*.
- 21 S I 62; A II 48,50.
- 22 *Op.cit.*
- 23 Closely related schools of the *Vibhajjavādin* group probably adopted the same position, but it was completely rejected by the *Pudgalavādin* and *Sarvāstivādin* groups. The *Mahāsāṃghikas* appear to have adopted a compromise (see Bareau *Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule*, Saigon 1955, p.62).

AN ATLAS OF ABHIDHAMMA DIAGRAMS¹

Bhikkhu Nānajiṅṅako

Anatta, the teaching of no permanent 'self' entity or soul, required for its explanation a theory of 'psychology without soul'. The essential task of abhidhamma literature was to work out this basic theory. In modern Western science and philosophy the same problem arose in the 19th century with the task of establishing a basic science of physiological psychology. One of its best known American founders, William James, has done most in this field to elicit also the philosophical aspects and implications of this new science and its relevance for the general world-view of our age. Among his philosophical essays the most significant for our analogy was 'Does consciousness exist?' - challenging the classical theological tenet of the soul theory. James welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm the appearance of the basic works of the founder of a metaphysically much broader conceived vitalist philosophy, his younger French contemporary, Henri Bergson: *The Creative Evolution*, based on the function of an *élan vital*, interpreted as 'the creative surge of life', as the primeval moving force of the whole process of the universal 'flux' of existence, conceived as the 'stream of life', of 'consciousness', of 'thought' and *Matter and Memory*, explaining the relation of mind and matter as consisting of the pulsation of an apparently continuous flow of instantaneous flashes of memory (like pictures in a movie show). 'Memory, by its active registration and connecting function of instant-events' was thus discovered as the missing link connecting the 'hard and static' atomic 'elements' of both mind and matter postulated by the earlier hypothesis of scientific materialism. Now, on the contrary, physics becomes 'simply psychics inverted' and 'cosmology, so to speak, a reversed psychology'. Thus vitalism meant the end of the 'classical' materialism in European philosophy and science.

This was underscored and 'elicited most extensively by the third best known vitalist philosopher, A.N. Whitehead. Speaking of 'actual occasion', of 'throbbing actualities' understood as 'pulsation of experience' whose 'drops' or 'puffs of existence' guided by an internal teleological aim in their 'concrecence' (analogous to the Buddhist *saṅkhārā* in karmic formations) join the 'stream of existence' (*bhavaṅga-soto*), - Whitehead has taken over the

terms under quotation marks from W. James and extended their interpretation in a 'theory of momentariness' corresponding to the Buddhist *khanika-vādo* (of course essentially, without any direct reference to the possibility of such analogies).²

As a direct offshoot from vitalism there appeared in Europe, after the First World War, an authentic philosophy of *dukkham* whose representatives considered themselves to be the philosophers of existence, or 'existentialists'.

After the Second World War, when the correctness of these trends in European philosophy and their need for orientation were most obviously felt and confirmed, European philosophy with all its classical and historical precedents was forcibly suppressed by a militant Anglo-American anti-philosophical embargo imposed by the so-called 'logical positivists' and their reduction of philosophy to the exclusiveness of semanticist analyses and 'protocols' of allowable and unallowable word-meanings, a trend criticised and rejected already by the Buddha under the designation of 'logical analysts (*takkī-vimamsī*) believing only in empty words'³ and 'meanings' arbitrarily attributed by 'the rules invented for a game', as their modern successors formulated it.

Upajiva Ratnatunga applies in his presentation of the abhidhamma modern criteria and terms implicitly analogous to the vitalist model. He translates, for example, *cittam* with 'tele-pulses' in physical sense-organs in explaining their 'vital factors'. He describes 'the occurring of a pulse of the vitality factor' and how it 'generates a momentary mental sub-personality', 'the experience of the life momentum' and the formation of the 'ego complex' led in its instantaneous transformations by the stream of 'cravings and desire for further physical experience'. The basic 'vitalising factor' - *jīvitindriyam* - is translated as 'the pulsation'. In a 'living being's experience...objects and phenomena exist because they are reached directly'. And that is the exclusive criterium of their 'reality'.

The most significant and useful salient point in Ratnatunga's model is, in my view, the essential restriction of the too wide extension of the range of abhidhamma conceptual numerology, confusingly unpracticable for our modern means and capacities of scientific computerizing. Remaining within the limits of the programmatic draft explicated in the Preface, it is encouraging

to see at the outset that the thematic range is restricted to 'a very small area of the Abhidhamma philosophy', of 'information gathered over the years' by the author in his specific quest 'that is connected with how a living being gathers information about the physical world around its body and then reacts to the perception'. Thus he 'realized that what was discussed in the philosophy was not the physical world, itself, but the living being's observed and inferred experience of matter and material phenomena in its body and in the physical world around it'.

No less important than this restriction of the basic subject matter is the author's critical attitude and its criterium in using Pali terms in their technical meaning and their contextual explanation. 'The subject matter of the Abhidhamma philosophy is very involved and the Pali terms used in describing the concepts were intended to be very precise. In consequence any error in the translation of Pali terms leads to confusion. Instead of translating Pali terms, the process of how the living being observes objects and phenomena in the environment of the body and reacts to the perception, has been described using a model that could stimulate much of the living being's behaviour as described in the philosophy. ...The English terms used in this book are those used for the same concepts in a more comprehensive book now under preparation in which I am covering a somewhat larger area.' U.Ratnatunga cannot conceal his 'hesitation to publish what I know', confessing that he 'tried to put the information together, in much the same way as an archeologist would do in attempting to reconstruct a shattered clay pot from the pieces found at an ancient site'. - 'The Abhidhamma texts appear to have been obscured by errors in memorising and errors in copying and also by misinterpretations largely through failure to grasp the fundamentals that have been set out in this book.'

Toward the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century a revival of abhidhamma studies in the traditional ambience of the Theravāda Buddhist world was noticed mainly in Burma from where it spread to neighbouring countries. The best known centres of this renewed trend in Buddhist studies were established by Ledi Sayadaw between 1887 and 1923. At that time (since 1900) also the first English translations of abhidhamma books, prepared in collaboration with Burmese scholars, were published by the Pali Text Society. At the same time European students of Buddhism

started going to Burma for special abhidhamma studies. Most of the early Western bhikkhus were ordained there and continued their missionary work as abhidhamma scholars. The best known among them was the German Nyānatiloka Mahāthera, ordained in Burma in 1903. In 1911 he founded his Island Hermitage in Ceylon (Dodanduwa) whose head he remained until his death in 1957. His main contribution to abhidhamma studies was the *Guide through the Abhidhamma-Pitaka* first published in Colombo 1938, and later in the Buddhist Publication Society's editions. His German disciple, Nyāṇaponika Mahāthera, published his *Abhidhamma Studies* first in 1949, in the Island Hermitage Publications. This book was later reprinted by the Buddhist Publication Society (Kandy). In the series of the same editions there appeared in English translation some works of Ledi Sayadaw (not to be confused with the later meditation teacher, Mahasi Sayadaw) and others on the 'Abhidhamma Philosophy', including recent editions of Nārada's *Manual of Abhidhamma*, containing the English translation of the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*. Short summary presentations of 'Abhidhamma Philosophy' in diagrams were often preferred also by authors with intentions more popular and superficial than U.Ratnatunga's work. To him we should be grateful now if he continues with less 'hesitation to publish what he knows' in turn, adequated to our 20th century capacities and habits of understanding the anthropological and historical backgrounds of such investigation.

In the meantime there arises a question of critical importance for the reader: To whom and how will the present schematic atlas be useful and helpful for the actual study of abhidhamma? Certainly not to the unprepared beginner, the *assutava puthujjhano*. Its value will be much increased by the following more comprehensive book. Yet there are already in the Buddhist world many students who have tried to study such intricate summaries as the *Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha*, or even to learn by heart at least parts of it in parivenas. Speaking of my own experiences with a few translations of this historically latest layer of dry bones survived archeologically, or rather palaeontologically, I found out after many years and attempts to approach it that there was the need of such a pedagogical talent as the Vajirārāma Nārada Mahāthera, a disciple of the late Pelene Vajirañña (who stirred up the interest of U.Ratnatunga in the abhidhamma philosophy in 1930), to help me correct at least a few terms heaped up in single statements.

- 1 Upajiva Ratnatunga *Mind and Matter*. Lake House, Colombo 1982.
- 2 More information on these analogies is contained in my articles 'Aniccā - The Buddhist Theory of Impermanence' and 'Karma - The Ripening Fruit' (for the Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy, Wheel Nos 186/7 and 221-224). The latter has been reprinted in the *Pali Buddhist Review* 1,1 (London 1976).
- 3 Saṅgārava-suttam (M 100).

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DEVELOPING A SELF WITHOUT BOUNDARIES¹Peter Harvey

1. In this article I intend to show how an enlightened person is one who has both overcome the barriers imposed by the 'I am' conceit and ignorance, such that his *citta* (mind/heart) is without boundaries, and also is one who has a very self-reliant nature, being one who lives with 'self' as an 'island', with a 'great' and 'developed self' and who has perfected 'dwelling alone'.
2. We shall proceed, firstly, by outlining how the Buddha recommended his followers to develop a self-reliant, island-like *citta*-self (Paras 3-4), how the eightfold Path is "self-like" (Para.5), and how those on it have a 'great self' (Paras 6-7), culminating with the Arahant who is 'one of developed self' (Para.8). We shall then deal with the problem of how someone can have a *citta*-self which is both self-contained and without boundaries (Paras 9ff). To do this, we shall first describe how the Arahant is 'unsoiled' by anything, 'cut off' from all, dwelling completely 'alone' (Paras 10-12), and then show how he has broken the enclosing barriers of the 'I am' conceit, how he can 'merge' his mind with that of other Arahants, and how he has his mind 'made to be without boundaries' (Paras 13-15). This then enables us to harmonize the two apparently contradictory aspects of the Arahant's *citta* and show the nature of his self-less 'self' (Paras 16-17).

Living with *citta* as an 'island'

3. Firstly, we can see that the path which leads up to Arahantship is portrayed as one which builds up self-reliance and an inner centre of calm. Thus one finds the following said at D III 58 (cf. D II 100): 'Herein, monks, a monk fares along contemplating the body in the body, ardent, clearly conscious, mindful, so as to control covetousness and dejection with respect to the world; he fares along contemplating feelings in feelings...*citta* in *citta*...mental objects in mental objects....² Thus, monks, a monk lives with himself as an island, with himself as a refuge, with no other (person) as refuge, (he lives) with Dhamma as an island, with Dhamma as refuge, with no other (Dhamma) as refuge³ (*citta-dīpo viharati atta-saraṇo anaṅga-saraṇo, dhamma-dīpo dhamma-saraṇo anaṅga-saraṇo*). Keep to your own pastures (*gocare*), monks, range in your own native

beat (*soke pattike visayo*). Ranging there Māra will not get a chance (*otaram*), he will not get an opportunity (*ārammaṇam*) (for attack). It is thus by reason of undertaking skilful dhammas, monks, that this merit grows'.

4. S V 148-9 explains that what is 'not one's own pasture but another's native beat (*agocaro paravisayo*)' is the five kinds of objects exciting sense-desire (the *kāmaguṇas*), by which the evil Māra 'gets a chance' over one, and that one's 'own pasture' is the four *satipatthānas*, the foundations of mindfulness. We thus see that monks are recommended to keep aloof, by means of the four *satipatthānas*, from those things that excite sensual desire, this being what it is to live with oneself and the (taught and practised) Dhamma as 'island' and 'refuge'. One should live quietly over-seeing one's body and mind so that one's mind is unperturbed and not excited to desire. The 'attā' which one has as an 'island' is the mind, *citta*, which is a common meaning for 'attā'.⁴ That it is the meaning in the present context can be seen from the S V 148-9 passage. This speaks of a monkey who lives where only monkeys range, but is trapped by a hunter in the area where men also range. The hunter represents Māra, who 'gets a chance' over a person by means of the five *kāmaguṇas*. As the monkey is often used as a symbol for the mind, one can see that this is what should keep to its 'own range' and should be an 'island', so as to be out of Māra's reach. Indeed, at Dh 40 one reads:

'Realizing that this body is as fragile as a jar,
Establishing this mind (*cittamidam*) as a (fortified) city,
He should attack Māra with the weapon of wisdom,
He should guard his conquest and be without attachment
(*univesano*)'.

Developing a 'great self (*mahattā*)'

5. The *citta* of one on the Buddhist path, then, should not be at the mercy of outside stimuli, nor of its own moods etc. (the object of the third *satipatthāna*), but should be an island of calm, imbued with self-control, self-contained. It should no longer be scattered and diffused but should be more integrated and consistently directed towards one goal, Nibbāna. Indeed, at S V 5-6 it is said that a term for the ariyan eightfold Path is 'Dhamma-vehicle (*-yānam*)', with the meaning of this explained in verse:

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'Who has faith and wisdom, (these) yoked states ever lead him on,

Shame (*hiri*) is the pole, mind (*mano*) the yoke,

Mindfulness (*sati*) is the watchful charioteer.

The chariot is furnished with virtue (*sīla*-),

Jhāna its axle, energy (*-viriya*) its wheels,

Equanimity, *saṃādhi*, its shaft, desirelessness (*anīcchā*) its drapery,

Goodwill, harmlessness and seclusion (*viveko*) are his weapons,

Endurance is his leather coat of mail:

(This chariot) rolls on to attain rest from exertion (*yona-kkhemāya vattati*).

This is become self-like (*etad attaniyam bhūtam*).

It is the supreme Brahma-vehicle (*Brahmayānam*).

(Seated in it) the self-relying (*dhīrō*) leaves the world,

Certainly they win victory'.

Thus the components of the Path, integrated into a consistent whole, in a consistent mind-set (*citto*), can be called a Dhamma-vehicle which leads to Nibbāna ('rest from exertion') and which is 'self-like'. It cannot, of course, be a genuine *attā* as it is a composite, constructed entity - the *magga* is said to be the best of constructed (*saṅkhata*) dhammas (A II 34) - but it is characterised by self-like qualities.

6. The ariyan Path is also described as the way by which 'those with great selves' travel. Thus at It.28-9 (cf. A II 26), the Buddha says of the 'holy life (*brahmacariyam*)' which goes to Nibbāna: 'This is the Path by which those with great selves, great seers have fared (*Essa maggo mahattehi amūḍato mahesino*)...'.

This idea of a 'great self' is amplified at A I 240. Here the Buddha explains that the same small (evil) deed may take one sort of person to hell to experience its fruition (*vipāka*), while another sort of person will experience its fruition in the present life, and not beyond. The first sort of person is described as follows:

'A certain person is of undeveloped body, undeveloped virtue, undeveloped mind, undeveloped wisdom, he is limited, he has an insignificant self, he dwells insignificantly and miserable (*abhāvitakāyo hoti abhāvitasīlo abhāvita-citto abhāvitapaṇño paritto appātume appudukha-vihāri*)'.⁵

The second sort is described thus:

'A certain person is of developed body, developed virtue, developed mind, developed wisdom, he is not limited, he has a great self, he dwells immeasurable (*aparitto mahattā appamāṇa-vihārī*)'.

This situation is illustrated by saying that a grain of salt will make a cup of water undrinkable, but not the great mass of the river Ganges. As the person who has a 'great self' can still do a small evil action, which brings some kammic fruition, then he must be someone who is not yet an Arahant.⁶ As he is of developed virtue and does not experience a kammic fruition in hell, he is probably at least a Stream-enterer, however, one who has transcended bad rebirths. As for the 'self' which is 'great', this is no metaphysical self but the very 'self' which would have been 'insignificant' when the person in question had not yet developed his 'body', virtue, *citta* and wisdom: it must thus refer to these four qualities.⁷

7. What transforms a person's 'self' from being 'insignificant' to being 'great' can clearly be seen to be such practices as the development of lovingkindness (*mettā*) and mindfulness (*sati*). The relevance of the first of these can be seen from A V 299 where an ariyan disciple whose *citta*, through *mettā*, is grown great (*mahaggata*) and immeasurable (*appamāṇa*), knows that: 'Formerly this *citta* of mine was limited (*parittam*), but now my *citta* is immeasurable, well developed (*appamāṇam subhāvitam*)'. The wording of this shows its relevance to the A I 249 passage. As for the relevance of *sati*, this can be seen from M I 270, which says that one who feels no attraction or repugnance for any of the six sense-objects, and who has mindfulness of the body dwells 'with a mind that is immeasurable (*appamāṇaccetaso*)', in contrast to someone with the opposite qualities who dwells 'with a mind that is limited (*parittacetaso*)' (p.266).

'One of developed self (*bhāvitatto*)'

8. As the path towards Arahantship is building up a 'great self', and a personality that has 'become self-like', then it is no wonder that the Arahant is called 'one of developed self (*bhāvitatto*)', a title which differentiates him from a 'learner (*sekho*)' (It.79-80, cf. It.57 and 69). A long explanation of this term is found at Nd II 218-9, commenting on its application to the Buddha at Sn 1049. Summing up the various strands of this explanation, one can say that for one who is 'bhāvitatto':

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- (a) virtue, wisdom, the Path and the faculties (*indriyas*) are well 'developed (*bhāvita-*)'.
- (b) 'body' (*kāya*) is 'developed' and 'steadfast (*ṭhito*)'.
- (c) *citta* is 'developed', 'steadfast', 'well-released (*suviṃuttam*)' and without ill-will.
- (d) he is 'unlimited, great, deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom, with much treasure, arisen (like the) ocean (*aparitto mahanto gambhīro appameyyo dappariyoḍḍho bahuratanō saḡarūpanno*)' (cf. M I 486-7).
- (e) in the face of the six sense-objects, he has equanimity and is not confused; he sees only what is seen, hears only what is heard, etc., and has no desire-and-attachment for such sense-objects.
- (f) the six senses are 'controlled (*ḍantam*)' and 'guarded (*rakkhitam*)'.
- (g) he is 'self-controlled (*attadanto*)' and 'with a well-controlled self (*ḍṭṭanō sudantena*)'.

9. The above explanation of why someone - a Buddha or Arahant - is 'one of developed self' certainly shows that such a person has developed all the good aspects of their personality, but it also makes clear that such a person has two groups of qualities that might be seen as in opposition to each other:

- (a) he is self-controlled and has a *citta* that is not shaken by the input of the senses: he is self-contained.
- (b) he has a *citta* which has no limit or measure: he has no boundaries.

How can someone be self-contained, and yet have no boundaries? Before answering this, we will outline further aspects of (a) and (b), so as to provide a good background for an answer.

The Arahant as self-contained and 'dwelling alone'

10. The Arahant's self-contained nature is shown in many ways. For example, at A I 124 he is described as 'one with a mind like diamond (*vajirūpamacitto*)': his *citta* can 'cut' anything and is itself uncuttable - it cannot be affected by anything. Thus, at S II 274, Sāriputta says that he does not know anything from whose alteration he would be caused sorrow or *dukkha*, and at Thag 715-7 the Arahant Adhimutta shows complete equanimity when his life is threatened: the Arahant is not dismayed by anything. Again, the Arahant is 'unsoiled' by anything. At S III 140 it is said that a Tathāgata, like a lotus which 'stands unsoiled by the water (*ṭhāti anupalittam udakena*)' dwells 'unsoiled by the world

(*anupalitto lokena ti*)'.⁸ Similarly, at Thag 1180, Mahāoggallāna says of himself, 'he is not soiled (*nopalippati*) by conditioned things (*sāṅkharas*), as a lotus is not soiled by water'. Elsewhere, the image of the lotus or leaf being unsoiled by water is used to illustrate various qualities: 'Thus the sage (*muni*), speaking of peace, without greed, is unsoiled by sense-desire and the world (*kaṃe ca loka anupalitto*)' (Sn 845); 'lament and envy do not soil him (*taṃhiṃ vārievamaacharam...na lippati*)' (Sn 811); 'Thus the *muni* is not soiled (*nopalippati*) by what is seen, heard or sensed' (Sn 812, cf. Sn 178); 'so you are not soiled (*lippati*) by merit or evil or both' (Sn 547).

Similarly, there is reference to monks 'unsoiled by any material thing (*amisoṃ anupalittō*)' (M I 319), and to Arahants 'having put evils outside, unsoiled (*bāhitvā pāpāni anupalitto*)' (S I 141). Such passages show that an Arahant is 'unsoiled' by the world or *sāṅkharas* in the sense that he does not react to them with greed, lamentation etc., he has no attachment for them and is unaffected by them.

11. One can see, in fact, that the Arahant is, in a sense, cut off from the world of the six sense-objects. Thus, at M III 274-5, the Buddha outlines a simile: a butcher who cuts off the hide from a dead cow and then drapes it back over the carcass would be wrong to say that, 'This hide is conjoined with the cow as before'. Here, the carcass stands for the six internal *āyatanas* (the senses), the hide stands for the six external ones (the sense-objects) and the tendons and ligaments which are cut stand for 'delight and attachment (*nandirāgass*)'. As attachment is only fully got rid of by an Arahant, the simile surely is meant to apply to him. He is thus portrayed as being such that his senses are in no way tied or bound to their objects. He passes through the world without sticking to it. He is thus one who 'dwells alone (*ekavihārīti*)', even if he is in the midst of a crowd, for he has destroyed 'delight' and 'attachment' with respect to the six desirable sense-objects (S IV 36-7). Similarly, at S II 283-4, the Buddha tells a monk living alone that to perfect 'dwelling alone (*eka-vihāro*)' he should abandon the past, renounce the future and give up 'desire and attachment (*chandarāgo*)' for what is 'presently (his) personality (*paccuppannesu ca attabhāvapaṭilābhosu*)'.

He then gives a verse:

Who overcomes all, knows all (*sabbābhībhūṃ sabbaviduṃ*), very wise,
Unsoiled by any dhamma (*sabbesu dhammesu anupalittam*),
Who, letting go of all, is freed in the destruction of
craving (*sabbamjaham taṇhakkhaye vimuttam*),
That is the man of whom I say "he dwells alone (*ekavihārīti*)".

The Arahant thus dwells totally 'alone' as he has let go of everything, is not 'soiled' by anything. By ending attachment, he has 'abandoned' the *khandhas* (S III 27) and the 'home' which these constitute (S III 9-10).

12. This 'aloneness' seems to apply not only to the Arahant, but also to Nibbāna. 'Seclusion (*viveko*)' is a synonym for *virāga* and *nirodha* (e.g. at S IV 365-8) and as these are themselves synonyms for Nibbāna (e.g. It 88) Nibbāna can be seen as such a 'seclusion'. Thus Nd 1, 26-7, commenting on this word at Sn 772, says that it can be of three kinds:

- of body (*kāya*): physical seclusion in the form of forest-dwelling,
- of mind (*citta*): this refers to the *citta* of one in any of the eight *jhānas*, or in any of the four *ariyan* persons - such *cittas* are 'secluded' from various unskilled states,
- from substrate (*upadhi*): this refers to Nibbāna, which is 'seclusion' from 'substrate' in the form of defilements, *khandhas* and *kamma* formations.⁹

There is, indeed, considerable evidence (which cannot be dealt with here¹⁰), that Nibbāna is a *viññāna* (consciousness) which has transcended all objects and thus become objectless and unconditioned. As such, it is 'secluded' from all conditioning objects, and is totally 'alone'.

The Arahant's boundaryless *citta*

13. We now move to examining further aspects under point (b), at Para.9, that of the Arahant's *citta* lacking boundaries. The Arahant is in several places described in such a way as to suggest that he has broken down all barriers between 'himself' and 'others'. At M I 139 (and A III 84) he is said to have:

- 'lifted the barrier (*ukkhittapaligho*)', i.e. got rid of *avijjā* (ignorance),
- 'filled the moat (*sankhinaparikho*)', i.e. 'again-becoming and faring on on birth (*jātisamsāro*) is got rid of',

- (c) 'pulled up the pillar (*abūhesiko*)', i.e. got rid of craving,
 (d) 'withdrawn the bolt (*niraggalo*)', i.e. 'the five lower fetters binding him to the lower (shore) are got rid of',
 (e) become 'a pure one, the flag laid low, the burden dropped, without fetters (*ariyo pannaddhajo pannabhāro visamyutto*)', i.e. he has got rid of the 'I am conceit (*asminmāno*)'.

The Arahant can thus be seen as no longer waving the flag of 'I am' and so no longer has boundaries, as he no longer identifies with any particular group of phenomena such as his 'own' *khandhas*. There is no longer ignorance to act as a barrier. Thus the Buddha refers to himself as having broken the 'egg-shell of ignorance (*avijjandakosam*)' (A IV 176, cf. M I 357). In a similar, but more striking way, the Avadāna-sātaka says of the Arahant: 'he lost all attachment to the three worlds; gold and a clod of earth were the same to him; the sky and the palm of his hand were the same to his mind;...; he had torn the egg-shell (of ignorance) by his knowledge...; he obtained the knowledges, the *abhiññās*...' 11 Again, A II 166 compares the 'break-up (*-pabhedo*)' of ignorance to the 'breach of a dyke (*ālippathedo*)' which will occur in 'a village pond that has stood for countless years (*anekavassaganikā*)' when all the inlets are opened, the outlets blocked and it rains down steadily. Thus ignorance is like a 'barrier' to be lifted, an 'egg-shell' to be broken and the 'dyke' of an ancient pond, to be burst. The Arahant is one who has destroyed such an enclosing boundary.

14. The lack of boundaries to the Arahant's mind is perhaps well illustrated at M I 206-7 (cf. M III 156). Here, the Buddha approaches the monks Anuruddha, Nandiya and Kimbila, greeting them simply as 'Anuruddhas'. He then asks them:

'And how is it that you, Anuruddhas, are living all together on friendly terms and harmonious, as milk and water blend, regarding one another with the eye of affection?'

Anuruddha then replies that this is because he has developed *mectā*, with respect to acts of body, speech and mind, for his companions and thus had gone on to become such that:

'I, Lord, having surrendered my own mind (*sakam cittam nikkhipitvā*), am living only according to the mind of these venerable ones (*āyasmantānam cittassa vassena vattāmi*). Lord, we have diverse bodies (*nānā...kūyā*) but assuredly only one mind (*ekañ ca...cittan-ti*)'.

Anuruddha then explains that they help each other with various

chores and, at p.210, that he knows that his companions have attained all eight *jhānas* and *nirodha-samāpatti* and destroyed the cankers (*āsavas*) as he has read their minds. In this passage, one thus finds three Arahants being regarded as having one *citta* and being all called 'Anuruddha', even though this is the actual name of only one of them. This merging of *cittas* is motivated by *mectā*, a quality which when fully developed means that a person no longer has the barriers that make him prefer his own happiness over that of others 12, and, one must assume, such merging is enabled by the three monks being Arahants, whose *cittas* are no longer enclosed in an 'egg-shell' of ignorance and who no longer wave the flag of 'I am'.

15. The reason why the Arahant's *citta* has no boundaries, why he 'dwells with a *citta* made to be without boundaries (*vimariyādikatena cetasā viharati*)' is explained in a number of places. It is because he is 'escaped from, unfettered by, released from (*nissato visamyutto vippamutto*)' the *khandhas*, being like a lotus standing above the water, unsoiled by it (A V 152), because he feels no attraction or repugnance for the objects of the six senses and so is 'independent (*nissito*)', 'released, unfettered' (M III 30), and because he has fully understood the satisfaction of, misery of and 'leaving behind (*nissaranam*)' (i.e. Nibbāna, from Ud 80-1) of the *khandhas*, so as to be 'escaped, unfettered, released' (S III 31).

The Arahant's *anattā*, boundaryless, self-contained 'self'

16. The above, then, enables us to resolve the apparent tension outlined at Para.9. It is because an Arahant is so self-contained, having abandoned everything, being 'unsoiled' by anything, without attachment or repugnance for sense-objects, independent, 'dwelling alone', and having experienced Nibbāna, 'seclusion', that his *citta* has no boundaries. *Citta*, being completely 'alone' has no barriers or boundaries. When a person lets go of everything, such that 'his' identity shrinks to zero, then *citta* expands to infinity. Whatever one grasps at and identifies with as 'I am' limits one. As can be seen at Sn 1103 and S I 12, it allows Māra to 'follow' a person and devas and men to 'search' him out. The Arahant, however, does not invest anything with selfhood and so cannot be 'found' anywhere. Though he is completely 'alone', he 'is' no-one, he is a 'man of nothing (*akiñcano*)'. He has broken through the binding-energy of I-centred existence. Thus Sn 501 says of

the 'Brahmin', i.e. Arahant:

'Who fare in the world with self as an island (*attadīpā*),
Entirely released, men of nothing (*akīṭṭhā sabbadhi vippamuttā*)...

17. The Arahant dwells with 'self' (*citta*) as an island, but he knows that 'himself', 'others' and the world are all, equally, *anattā*, and that there is no real 'I am' anywhere: he has nothing on the island, so to speak. Thus Adhimutta was not afraid when his life was threatened as there was no 'I' there to feel threatened and afraid, only *dukkha dhammā* (Thag 715-7). Again, the Arahant's senses are 'cut off' from their objects (Para.11) not because he invests identity in his sentient body and shuns all else, but because he sees both, the inner and the outer, as equally *anattā*. He is undisturbed by the world not because he is protected from it by a barrier, but because he realizes that no such barrier exists, separating a 'self', an 'I', from 'others'. All is equally *anattā*, so there are no grounds for I-grasping to arise and give his *citta* limiting boundaries. Paradoxically, by realizing that all he had taken as *attā* and 'I' is really *anattā* and insusceptible to control (S III 66-7), the Arahant is no longer controlled by such things - they have no hold over him - and he is more able to control them - he has mastery over his mental processes. As Edward Conze says, one aware of things as *anattā* will see that 'possessions possess you, see their coercive power and that "I am theirs" is as true as "they are mine"'.¹³ Nyanaponika expresses a similar thought when he says, 'Detachment gives, with regard to its objects, mastery as well as freedom.'¹⁴

18. Summarising the findings of this article, we can thus say the following. The ariyan eightfold Path, when properly integrated into someone's personality, is regarded as 'become self-like' (Para.5) and those on the Path are such as to live with 'self' - *citta* - as an 'island', by means of the Foundations of Mindfulness (Paras 3-4). By such factors as mindfulness and lovingkindness (Para.7) the Path can be seen as developing the good qualities and strength of a person's personality such that Stream-enterers etc. are referred to as 'those with great selves' (Para.6). At the culmination of the Path stands the Arahant, 'one of developed self', who has carried the process of personal development and self-reliance to its perfection (Para.8). He is thus very self-contained and self-controlled (Para.9), with a 'diamond-

like *citta*, unperturbed and 'unsoiled' by anything (Para.10), with his senses not tied to their objects, one who has perfected 'dwelling alone' by letting go of everything (Para.11) such as the *khandhas*, with no attachment or repugnance, independent (Para.15). He has experienced Nibbāna, the ultimate 'seclusion' (Para.12), the 'leaving behind' of the conditioned world (Para.15). It is because of these self-contained qualities that the Arahant is one who has made his *citta* to be without boundaries (Para.16) and has broken the 'egg-shell', burst the ancient 'pond', of ignorance (Para.13) and is such that his *citta* can merge with that of other Arahants (Para.14). He is an independent 'man of nothing' who does not identify with anything as 'I', but who surveys everything, internal and external, as *anattā*, such that he (a) is completely 'alone' with 'self' as an island: he does not identify with anything, does not 'lean' on anything, is not influenced by anything, as nothing can excite attachment, repugnance or fear in him and (b) he has a boundaryless *citta*, not limited by attachment or I-identification, and immeasurable with such qualities as lovingkindness (Paras 16-17). He has, then, a developed, boundless 'self', this being, paradoxically, because he is completely devoid of any tendency to the conceit of 'I am', having realized that no metaphysical self can be found - that the thought of 'I am' can only arise with respect to factors (the *khandhas*) which cannot possibly give it genuine validity. As seen at Sn 19, he is one whose 'hut', i.e. *citta*, is open and whose 'fire', i.e. attachment, hatred and delusion, which are centred on the 'I am' conceit, is out.

Notes

- 1 This article is substantially the same as Chapter 13 of the author's Ph.D. dissertation, 'The Concept of the Person in Pāli Buddhist Literature' (University of Lancaster 1981).
- 2 This is the formula for the four Foundations of Mindfulness, e.g. at M I 56.
- 3 'Dhamma' is here used in the sense of 'teaching' (and its practice), rather than in the sense of 'Nibbāna'. It is only in this former sense that there can be an 'other Dhamma': from the Buddhist point of view, the 'Dhamma' in the sense of 'Nibbāna' is unique, but there can be different 'Dhammas' in the sense of 'teachings'. Thus, at M I 168, in persuading the Buddha to teach, Brahmā says, 'There has appeared in Magadhā before you an unclean Dhamma...'. i.e. a perverse teaching. Again, at A I 218, a layman praises Kanda's modesty

in teaching by saying, 'here there is no trumpeting of his own Dhamma (*sadhammakkamsanā*), no depreciating of another's Dhamma (*paradhammapasādanā*) but just teaching Dhamma (*dhammadesanā*) in its proper sphere'.

4 This can be seen from various parallel passages on *attā* and on *citta*. For example, Dhp 160 says, 'For with a well-controlled self (*attanā'va sudantena*), one gains a protector hard to gain', while Dhp 35 says, 'a controlled (*dantam*) *citta* is conducive to happiness'. Again, A II 32 talks of 'perfect application of self' (*atta-sammā-panidhi*) as one of the four things which lead to prosperity, while Dhp 43 sees 'a perfectly applied (*sammā-panihitam*)' *citta* as doing for one what no relative can do. That *citta* is not an *attā* in a metaphysical sense (i.e. it is *anattā*) can be seen from the fact that S V 184 sees it as dependent on *nāma-rūpa*, mind-and-body. A metaphysical *attā*, on the other hand, would be an independent, unconditioned entity.

5 *Atuma* is the archaic word for *attā*. Thus Nd I 69 says *ātuma vuccati attā*.

6 Although MA II 361 sees him as an Arahant, being without attachment, hatred and delusion, which are 'productive of the measurable', as seen at M I 298. M I 298, however, does not limit 'immeasurable' states to that of the Arahant's 'unshakeable *cetovimutti*' but says only that this is the 'chief' of these. Others it mentions are the four Brahmavihāras, and the Comy, MA II 354, adds the four *maggas* and the four *phalas* to the list.

7 *Kāya*, or 'body' here, may refer to the *nāma-kāya*, i.e. to the components of *nāma*, or to *nāma-rūpa* as a whole. A 'developed *kāya*' must be a person's 'body' of mental states or their 'sentient body' when developed by Buddhist practice.

8 Cf. A II 38-9.

9 Cf. Ps II 220 on five kinds of *viveka*, the last, again, being *Nibbāna*. Similarly, Nd II 251 explains the *vivekadhammā* of Sn 1065 as *Nibbāna*.

10 See Chapters 10 and 11 of author's dissertation (see Note 1).

11 As quoted and translated by Har Dayal in his *The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature* (London 1932; repr. Delhi 1978), p.15-16. On the *abhiññās* as overcoming various barriers, see A III 27-8.

12 See Vism 307-8 and Sn 368 and 705.

13 *Buddhist Thought in India* (London 1962), p.37.

14 *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation* (London 1969), p.68.

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AVANT-PROPOS (1)

PRESENTATION DU RECUEIL D'ĀGAMA (2)

Par le Śramaṇa (3) Che Tao Ngan (釋道安),
Dynastie des Ts'in (晉)

Traduit du Chinois par THÍCH HUYÊN-VI

Il existe quatre recueils d'Āgama (4). La définition de l'appellation "Āgama" a été exposée dans le deuxième recueil, le *Madhyamāgama* et il nous paraît inutile de la rappeler ici.

Précisons seulement la définition du terme "Ekottara". Littéralement il signifie "[dix] augmenté de un". Que veut dire "augmenté de un"? "Dix" représente l'énumération complète des sujets traités, complète dans leur nombre et dans leur classification par catégories, et la dizaine augmentée de l'unité symbolise la progression susceptible de s'étendre vers l'infini. Ainsi chaque règle édictée par l'enseignement progresse chaque jour, tendant vers la perfection. Pour cette raison, le présent Recueil des Règles de la Doctrine et des Rites servira pour toujours comme des mesures et des modèles en or et en jade pour le salut des êtres vivants.

A l'extérieur du continent indien, les quatre Recueils d'Āgama ont été accueillis avec respect par les habitants des agglomérations citadines ainsi que par les religieux retirés dans les bois et les montagnes.

Le vénérable Śramaṇa Dharmanandin (5), originaire de Takṣaśilā (6), était entré assez tard en religion. Il a consacré le reste de sa vie à étudier les Āgama et il en possédait parfaitement la lettre et l'esprit. Partout à l'étranger ses conférences étaient suivies avec enthousiasme.

En l'an 20 de l'ère Kien Yuan (建元) des Ts'in (秦), il arriva à la capitale Tch'ang Ngan et tous les habitants, aussi bien les natifs du pays que les résidents étrangers le louèrent pour ses explications des textes des Āgama. Le gouverneur militaire Tchao Wen Ye (趙文業) le pria de rendre la connaissance des Āgama accessible au peuple.

A l'entreprise gigantesque de transcription (en langue chinoise) participaient le vénérable Buddhasmṛti comme traducteur et le Śramaṇa Dharmanandin comme correcteur. Elle commença dès la retraite d'été de l'année Kia Chen (甲申) pour se terminer à la fin du printemps de l'année suivante. Le recueil [d'Āgama] a été réparti en quarante-et-un fascicules formant deux tomes. Le premier tome comptant vingt-six fascicules est complet par rapport aux textes originaux. Le deuxième tome de quinze fascicules est incomplet : il y manque les gāthā (courts poèmes résumant le contenu de chaque sūtra) (7).

Moi, Dharmanandin, j'ai participé à la correction avec d'autres religieux. Les vénérables Seng Lio (僧瑠) et Seng Meou (僧叟) ont pu reconstituer et traduire les parties

Trailokyavijayamaṇḍalopāyikā: Ānandagarbha's Śrītrailokyamaṇḍalopāyikā ārya-tattvasaṃgrahatantroddhṛtā (dpal khams gsum nam par rgyal ba'i dkyil 'khor gyi cho ga 'phags pa de kho na ñid bsdus pa'i rgyud las btus pa), Tibetan translation, Peking edition, vol. 74 (no. 3342), pp. 32c8-52b8.

Vajrasākharaṇṭra: Vajrasākharaṇṭra (sic), Tibetan Translation, Peking edition, vol. 5 (no. 113), pp. 1a1-56d7.
Vajrasākharaṇṭra, Tibetan Translation, Taipei edition, vol. 17 (no. 480), pp. 223d1-261a5.

Yamada 1981 Isshi Yamada (ed.), *Sarva-Tathāgata-Tattva-Saṃgraha-Nāma-Mahāyāna-Sūtra*, A crit. ed. based on a Sanskrit manuscript & Chinese & Tibetan transl. (Śata-Piṭaka Series 262), New Delhi 1981.

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TILMANN VETTER

Explanations of *dukkha*

The present contribution presents some philological observation: and a historical assumption concerning the First Noble Truth.

It is well-known to most buddhologists and many Buddhists that the explanations of the First Noble Truth in the First Sermon as found in the *Mahāvagga* of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* and in some other places conclude with a remark on the five *upādānakkhandhā*, literally: 'branches of appropriation'. This remark is commonly understood as a summary.

Practically unknown is the fact that in Hermann OLDENBERG's edition of the *Mahāvagga*¹ (= Vin I) this concluding remark contains the particle *pi*, like most of the preceding explanations of *dukkha*. The preceding explanations are: *jāti pi dukkhā*, *jarā pi dukkhā*, *vyādhi pi dukkhā*, *maranaṃ pi dukkhaṃ*, *appiyehi sampayogo dukkho*, *piyehi vippayogo dukkho*; *yaṃ p' icchaṃ na labhati tam² pi dukkhaṃ* (Vin I 10.26). Wherever *pi* here appears it obviously has the function of coordinating examples of events or processes that cause pain (not: are pain³): birth is causing pain, as well as decay, etc.⁴

1. *The Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*. Vol. 1, *The Mahāvagga*. London-Edinburgh 1879.
2. OLDENBERG's edition seems to reflect inconsistency of the manuscripts in sometimes considering combinations of *-ṃ* with the particle *pi* as a real sandhi and writing *-m pi*.
3. *dukkhā-* is an adjective here; it follows the gender of the preceding (pro)noun. Not so in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version in *The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅgha-bhedavastu*, ed. by R. Gnoli and T. Venkatacharya, Part 1, Roma 1977, 137: *jātir duḥkhaṃ*, *jarā duḥkhaṃ*, *vyādhir duḥkhaṃ*, *maranaṃ duḥkhaṃ*, *priyaviprayogo duḥkhaṃ*, *apriyasamprayogo duḥkhaṃ*, *yad apicchān paryeṣamāno na labhate tad api duḥkham*, *saṅksepataḥ pañca upādānaskandhā duḥkhaṃ*. Here only *yad apicchān paryeṣamāno na labhate tad api duḥkham* contains *api*.
4. In translating the noun *dukkha* as 'pain' (and correspondingly the adjective as 'causing pain' or 'painful') I follow K. R. NORMAN "The Four Noble Truths". in: *Indological and Buddhist Studies* (Festschrift J.W. de Jong) ed. A.L. Hercus et. al. Canberra 1982: 377-391, n.3 "without implying that this is necessarily the best translation".

At Vin I 10.29, the concluding remark runs as follows: *saṅkhittena pañc' upādānakkhandhā pi dukkhā*. No note on this *pi* is found in OLDENBERG's generally trustworthy apparatus criticus. So we may infer that the manuscripts consulted by OLDENBERG all contained this *pi*.

In the *Dhammakāya* CD-ROM [1.0, 1996], which, with some errors, represents the PTS editions, this *pi* is also found in other places where the concluding remark on *dukkha* appears, namely, DN II 305.5; 307.17-20; SN V 421.23; Patis I 37.28; II 147.26; Vibh 99.10; 101.15. 20. However in the Nālandā-Devanāgarī-Pāli-Series (=NDP) [1958, etc.] it is missing in all these places (including Vin I 10.29), while it is found in AN I 177.2, where it is lacking in the *Dhammakāya* CD-ROM. In MN I 48.34 and 185.6 it is found neither in the PTS edition [ed. V. Trenckner, 1888] nor in NDP⁶. But TRENCKNER remarks on p. 532 with regard to 48.34: "-kkhandhā pi M and all the Burmese authorities known to me, also Vin. 1.c. [=Vin I 10.29]." The CD-ROMs BudsiriV of Mahidol University [1994] and Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana from Dhammagiri [1.1, 1997] consistently omit *pi* in these places.

We can therefore state: 1) TRENCKNER, whose edition of MN I normally excels the average PTS editions, has chosen a reading against all Burmese manuscripts; 2) NDP and the CD-ROMs mentioned above, all depending on the Sixth Council, do not accept this *pi*⁷; 3) other editions show there was a manuscript tradition of employing *pi* in the concluding remark in the *Mahāvagga* as well as in *Sutta* and *Abhidhamma* texts.

How should we deal with these observations from a historical point of view? That TRENCKNER has made his choice against nearly all his witnesses is easily explained. On the third page of the Preface of his MN I edition he says: "Buddhaghosa's commentary has been of very great service. Whenever his readings, from his comments upon them, are unmistakable, they must, in my opinion, be adopted in spite of other authorities. His MSS. were at least fifteen centuries older than ours, and in a first edition we certainly cannot aim at anything higher than reproducing his text as far as possible (here he adds a footnote: 'Even if his readings may seem questionable, as [...]')".

5. OLDENBERG writes: *upādānakkhandhāpi*
6. Note that at MN I 48.34 in TRENCKNER's edition the passage *appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi vippayogo dukkho* of Vin I 10.29 is replaced by *sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā pi*, while in NDP it is preceded by this long compound, and *pi* also appears after *sampayāgo* and *vippayogo*.
7. The *pi* at NDP AN I 177.2 seems to have escaped attention.

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What does the commentary to MN I 48.34 say? It refers to the discussion of the four noble truths in [chapter XVI] of the *Visuddhimagga*. There (§ 57-60 ed. H.C. Warren and Dh. Kosambi, Cambridge Mass., 1950) we read *saṅkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā*, without *pi*. The Sixth Council (perhaps influenced by TRENCKNER's view) may have had a similar motive for leaving out *pi* at all places where the concluding remark on *dukkha* appears, but I have no information about this and can therefore only deal with TRENCKNER's statement.

In the main, I am in favour of considering the oldest commentaries as very likely preserving old readings. But such a reading, especially when the commentator himself lives centuries after the composition of a text, cannot be preferred to another, if he employs ideas that cannot be found in the old texts, whereas the other reading can be defended by referring to their contents. This is precisely the case in Buddhaghosa's explanation of the reading without *pi*.

At *Visuddhimagga* XVI § 57-60 we get the impression that Buddhaghosa (or a predecessor) had a text without *pi* before him (readings are not discussed) and made the best of it by explaining *saṅkhittena* as indicating a summary of the preceding statements⁸ and declaring that the remark on the five 'branches' of appropriation implies all other statements about pain, because actual pain does not occur without them.⁹

But to my knowledge, there is no single place in the Pāli *Vinaya*- and *Suttapiṭaka* where the often occurring statement that the five *upādānakkhandhā* are *dukkha* is understood in this way, while there are many places where their being *dukkha* is understood as derived from their impermanence, which implies that in this context *dukkha* does not mean 'causing actual pain', but 'eventually disappointing' or 'unsatisfactory'. Moreover, there is, as far as I know, at best one place in the *Vinaya*- and *Suttapiṭaka* where *saṅkhittena* seems to summarize what precedes: at the end of MN no. 38 (I 270.37); and this place is doubtful, because it could be an inadequate copy of what happens in MN no. 37, where *saṅkhittena*

8. He depends on a text that included *sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā* and *appiyehi sampayogo dukkho piyehi vippayogo dukkho*, not on the *Mahāvagga* passage.

9. The essence of the commentary is given in these verses:
Jātipabbhutikaṃ dukkhaṃ yaṃ vuttam idha tādinā
avuttaṃ yaṃ ca taṃ śabbhaṃ vinā ete na vijjati
Yasmā, tasmā upādānakkhandhā saṅkhepatō ime
dukkhā ti vuttā dukkhandesakena Mahesinā.

years at the start *and* at the end of the *sutta*. In all other cases I have checked, about 300, *sankhittena* announces an item that afterwards is, or could be, explained.

Given this state of things it seems unlikely that *pi* in the last remark on *dukkha* is an error of uncontrolled repetition of the *pi* in the preceding sentences, now fortunately removed by TRENCKNER and the Sixth uncial. It is much more probable that Buddhaghosa (or a predecessor) had a text where *pi* in the last remark had, accidentally or with some intention, been lost, and that he made the best of it, a nice interpretation that succeeds fairly well in maintaining an unequivocal meaning of *dukkha*, but is not important for the historian of *early* buddhism. For his historical purpose we have to accept the reading with *pi*, and to understand the last remark as another example of the usage of the adjective *dukkha*, though in a slightly different meaning, which points to an addition. *Sankhittena* means nothing than: this is a short remark that has to be explained to the neophyte who does not know what the five *ārdānakkhandhas* are and/or why they are called *dukkha*, though they do not always actually cause pain. The translation then is: "Also the five branches of appropriation, briefly said (*sankhittena*), are causing pain."

Let us, finally, return to OLDENBERG. In his famous *Buddha, sein Leben, seine Lehre, seine Gemeinde*¹⁰ we find a translation of the concluding remark on *dukkha* that also seems to depend on the *Visuddhimagga*, not on the *Mahāvagga*, the source OLDENBERG mentions in this connection: "kurz die fünflei Objekte des Ergreifens sind Leiden"¹¹. Perhaps he was inspired by TRENCKNER. But then one would expect a note referring to the reading established by himself in his edition of Vin I. I found no such note. Instead a note is attached to 'Objekte des Ergreifens' that gives German translations of the names of these five objects as they occur elsewhere, and moreover rejects, without any arguing, an assumption by KOEPPEN¹² said to be given without any

10. The fourth edition (Stuttgart-Berlin 1903) was the earliest available to me; see p. 146 and 293. I also checked the edition supervised by H. VON GLASENAPP (Stuttgart [1959?]) and saw that in this question nothing had changed; see p. 137 and 224 and note p. 426.

11. *dukkhā* is of course not 'Leiden', but 'leidvoll', if one depends on the Pāli sources, as OLDENBERG says he does.

12. Carl Friedrich KOEPPEN, *Die Religion des Buddha und ihre Entstehung*. I. Berlin 1857.

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arguing, namely that the concluding remark on *dukkha* might be "ein metaphysischer Zusatz"¹³.

Exit KOEPPEN, at least in this question, on the basis of an *ex cathedra* judgement. A questionable tradition of translating this remark in books that pretend to deal with the Buddha's teaching has been established here and is still flourishing. To arrive at his judgement against KOEPPEN, OLDENBERG had to forget (or to ignore) his own edition of the *Mahāvagga*. He showed moreover, that he had not the slightest inkling of the problem that *vedanā*, the second of these 'Objekte des Ergreifens', is often explained as consisting of pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feeling and that pleasant and neutral feeling cannot be characterized as 'Leiden' and only in a slightly different sense as 'leidvoll'.¹⁴

13. "Köppen (I, S.222, Anm.1) findet in diesen letzten Worten einen 'metaphysischen Zusatz' zum ursprünglichen Text der vier Wahrheiten, ohne allen Grund. So viel metaphysische Terminologie, wie in diesen Worten liegt, hat der Buddhismus von jeher besessen."

14. Already V.GLASENAPP, in his 'Nachwort' to OLDENBERG's *Buddha* [1959: 474] hinted at this problem, by pointing to the *Rahogutasutta* (SN no.36.11), though his approach is quite unhistorical. There, replying to a question, the Buddha admits (SN IV 216.20) he has taught both: there are three kinds of feelings, pleasant, unpleasant and neutral, and: whatever one feels belongs to the unpleasant (*yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ taṃ dukkhasmiṃ*). But "the [second] statement has been made by me having in mind that *sankhārā* as such are impermanent (*mayā sankhārānaṃ yeva aniccataṃ sandhāya bhāsitaṃ*)". See Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, "Zur buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leidhaftigkeit", *ZDMG* (Supplement III.2) 1977: 918-931.

SN 4
vedana

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The Advent of Theravāda Buddhism to Mainland South-east Asia

In the present paper I examine evidence for the school-affiliation of the early Buddhism of mainland South-east Asia, in the first millenium of the Common Era.¹ Is the evidence sufficient to establish that this school was the Theravāda, and, if so, when and from where did it arrive in the region?

For the Theravāda of Ceylon—or more precisely, for the Mahāvihāra school of the Theravāda—we have the history as presented in the two famous chronicles, the *Dīpavaṃsa* and *Mahāvāṃsa*. Information may also be gleaned from references to historical events embedded in the commentaries of Buddhaghosa and others, from inscriptions in Old Sinhala and Sanskrit, from archaeological and iconographical evidence, and from Chinese sources—in some cases first hand, such as that supplied by the redoubtable pilgrim Fa-hien. Altogether, we have at least in broad outline a continuous history of Theravāda in Ceylon from its inception up to the present day.

Outside of Ceylon, the history of Theravāda is obscure. For mainland India we have almost no information at all. There are some—but not many—references to Theravādin doctrines in the works of other schools,² but the historical information—such as that provided by inscriptions or by the Chinese pilgrims Hsüan-tsang and I-ching—is at best sketchy.

For the South-east Asia of the early period we do not have any historical records comparable to those of Ceylon: no indigenous chronicles,

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1. That is, I do not discuss the Buddhism of peninsular and insular South-east Asia, or that of Campā (the coastal regions of present-day central and southern Vietnam). In none of these areas is there any early evidence for Theravāda Buddhism.

2. See Skilling 1987, 1993a and b, and 1994 for some examples from Tibetan sources.

whether in Pāli, Sanskrit, or in vernaculars survive. The few extant historical inscriptions do not give us any continuous history, and Chinese reports tell us little about the type of Buddhism practised on the mainland.

Pāli Inscriptions from Burma and Siam

The main evidence for the school-affiliation of early Buddhism in South-east Asia comes from Pāli inscriptions. These are known from two main areas: the Pyu kingdom of Śrīkṣetra in the vicinity of Prome in the lower Irrawaddy valley of Burma, and the Mon kingdom of Dvāravatī in the Chao Phraya basin of Siam.³ The inscriptions from Burma are engraved on gold plates (fashioned in imitation of palm-leaf manuscripts), a silver reliquary (*stūpa*), terracotta tablets, and stone slabs. The inscriptions from Siam are engraved on stone *dharmacakkas*, octagonal pillars, stone slabs, and clay tablets and reliquaries. The script used in both cases is similar, and may be described as a variety of the South Indian Pallava script.⁴ The Śrīkṣetra inscriptions are dated to the 5th to 7th centuries CE, the Siamese inscriptions to the 6th to 8th centuries: that is, they are broadly contemporary.⁵

(1) Inscriptions from the region of Śrīkṣetra:⁶

- the *ye dhammā hetuppabhavā* verse (*Vinaya Mahāvagga*, I 40.28–29);
- the *iti pi so bhagavā* formula (cf. *Dhajagga-sutta*, SN I 219.31–33);
- the *svākkhāto bhagavatā dhammo* formula (cf. *Dhajagga-sutta*, SN I 220.1–2);

3. In this paper I set aside the historical questions (of, for example, chronology and geographical extent) attached to the names of these two kingdoms, and (with not a little reluctance) use the names as a conventional shorthand.

4. The script of the Pyu inscriptions has in the past been variously described as Kadamba, Telegu-Canara, or Grantha: for a welcome reappraisal see Stargardt 1995, 204.

5. For the dating of the former see Stargardt 1995, for the latter e. g. Bauer 1991 and Skilling forthcoming (a). It should be stressed that the inscriptions do not bear any dates, and that those assigned to them are tentative and approximate. A comprehensive comparative palaeographical analysis of the Śrīkṣetra with the Dvāravatī corpus remains a desideratum.

6. For details see Ray 1939, 41–52; Luce 1974, 125–27; and Stargardt 1995. Most of the texts are brought together in U Tha Myat 1963. Note that several of the passages are known from more than one inscription.

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- the formula of dependent arising (*paṭicca-samuppāda*: cf. *Vinaya Mahāvagga*, I 1.10–2.1);⁷
- stanzas sung by Sakka, Lord of the Gods, in praise of the Buddha entering Rājagaha (*Vinaya Mahāvagga*, I 38.15–23, 29–30);
- the *maggān' aṭṭhangiko seṭṭho* verse (*Dhammapada* 273);
- verses from three popular *paritta*-s: the *Maṅgala*-, *Ratana*-, and *Mora-sutta*-s;⁸
- the four confidences (*vesārajja*) of a Buddha (MN I 71.32; AN II 8, penult);
- the 37 factors conducive to awakening (*bodhipakkhiya-dhammā*);
- a list of miscellaneous numerically grouped items, in ascending order;
- a list of the 14 Buddha *nāna*-s (cf. *Paṭisambhidāmagga* I 133.19–30);
- a fragment of a commentary on *paṭiccasamuppāda* (cf. *Vibhaṅga* 144–45);
- the opening of the *mātikā*: *kusalā [dhammā aku]salā dhammā abyāka[tā] dhammā* (cf. *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* 1.4);
- a fragment giving two of the 24 conditions: [*adhi*] *patipaccayo anantarpaccayo*;

7. In addition to the *paṭiccasamuppāda* inscribed on gold plates from Śrīkṣetra, the *Vinaya Mahāvagga* version is known from a stone slab from Kunzeik, Shwegyin township, Pegu: see Aung Thaw 1978, 111. As far as I know this handsome and well-preserved inscription has not been published, but fortunately most of it can be described from the photograph at Aung Thaw p. 110. It opens (the readings here are preliminary) with the introductory [1] *t(e)na samayena buddho bhaga(vā) uruvelāyaṃ viharati na(j)(ā) (nerañja-rāya? unclear) [2] tīre (or tīre?) bodhirukkhamūle pathamābhisambuddho atha kho bhagavā . . .*, followed by the full *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula, both *anuloma* (lines 5–9) and *paṭiloma* (lines 9–14). The latter opens with the phrase *avijjāya tv eva asesavirāganirodhā*, characteristic of the Theravādin (Pāli) version only, and not known in versions of other schools, such as the (Mūla)Sārvāstivādins or Lokottaravādins, or from the Prakrit inscriptions from Devnīmori and Ratnagiri, all of which open with equivalents of *avijjā-nirodhā*. The *paṭiloma* is followed by the *yadā have pātubhavanti dhammā* verse (lines 15–18), known also from inscriptions from Siam. The last two lines continue with the prose text of the *Mahāvagga*—*atha kho (bhaga)vā r(attiya) maj(jh) imam (yā)maṃ paṭicca*—suggesting that the slab is part of a longer inscription. For the Devnīmori and Ratnagiri inscriptions see von Hinüber 1985; for a suggestion that the former might be Vātsīputriya or Sāmmaṭṭiya, see Skilling forthcoming (c).

8. For these see Skilling forthcoming (b).

—a list of seven of the eight *vipassanā nāṇa*-s (cf. *Visuddhimagga* XXI.1).

(2) Inscriptions from the Chao Phraya basin:⁹

- the *ye dhammā hetuppabhavā* verse;
- the formula of dependent arising (*paṭicca-samuppāda*);
- an enumeration of the four truths of the noble (*ariya-sacca*), the twelve links of dependent arising (*paṭicasamuppāda*), and the 37 factors conducive to awakening (*bodhipakkhiya-dhamma*), inscribed together on a rectangular stone bar from Nakhon Pathom;¹⁰
- extracts from the prose *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*, the “first sermon” spoken by the Buddha in the Deer Park at Sarnath, found on stone *dhammacakkas*;¹¹
- the three *yadā have pātubhavanti dhammā* verses (*Vinaya Mahāvagga*, I 2.3–26);
- the *anekajāṭisaṃsāraṃ* verses (*Dhammapada* 153–54);
- the *dukkhaṃ dukkhasamuppādaṃ* verse (*Dhammapada* 191);¹²
- the *abhiññeyyaṃ abhiññātaṃ* verse (*Suttanipāta* 558);
- fragments of the 16 senses (*aṭṭha*) of the four truths (cf. *Paṭisambhidāmagga* 19.31–20.6);¹³
- nābādhakaṃ yato dukkhaṃ . . .*, non-canonical verses on the four truths (cited at *Visuddhimagga* XVI.25);
- sacca-kicca-kata-nāṇaṃ . . .*, a non-canonical verse on the twelve aspects (*dvādasākāra*) of the four truths (cited in the *Paṭhamasambodhi* and *Sāratthasamuccaya*);
- three verses from the *Telakaṭṭha-gāthā*.¹⁴

The evidence of the inscriptions may be examined from two aspects: language and contents. The language of both the Śrīkṣetra and Dvāravatī palaeographs is Pāli. Is the use of Pāli sufficient to establish the presence of the Theravāda? Or could another Buddhist school have also transmitted

9. Most of the inscriptions may be found in Supaphan na Bangchang 2529 (1986), 15–40. As in the case of the Śrīkṣetra inscriptions, several of the passages are known from more than one inscription.

10. See Skilling 1992.

11. See Skilling forthcoming (a) for references.

12. See Skilling 1991 and 1992.

13. See Skilling forthcoming (a) for this and the two following passages.

14. See references below. The inscription is from Prachin Buri, and thus outside of the Chao Phraya valley proper.

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its sacred writ in Pāli, and have been responsible for the inscriptions? From an early date, Buddhist tradition recognized dialect as one of the key distinguishing features of the different schools (*nikāya*). In the second half of the first millennium of the Common Era, tradition spoke of four main schools, each transmitting its canon in a different Indic dialect: (Mūla)Sarvāstivādins, who used Sanskrit; Mahāsāṃghikas, who used an intermediate language; Sāmmatīyas, who used Apabhramśa; and Sthaviras (that is, Theras), who used Pāli.¹⁵ The tradition is confirmed by the distinctive and consistent linguistic features of available texts of the schools. On this evidence I conclude that it is unlikely that another school would have used Pāli, and that the use of that language in the inscriptions is a strong indication of Theravādin activity in the region.

What about the contents of the inscriptions? It is true that the canonical extracts—such as the various formulas, the *Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta*, and the verses—belong to the common heritage of Buddhism: but our epigraphs give them in their Theravādin recensions, and they agree very closely indeed with the received transmission that we know today.¹⁶ The “extracts” from the *Abhidhamma* and *Paṭisambhidāmagga* are rather more indicative. As far as is known, the seven books of the Theravādin *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* are unique to that school, and employ a unique system and technical vocabulary. The Śrīkṣetra inscriptions preserve fragments with counterparts in the *Mātikā*, the *Vibhaṅga*, and the list of 24 conditions (*paccaya*), all of which may be described as specifically Theravādin. Inscriptions from both Śrīkṣetra and Siam employ technical categories known from the *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (whether or not they are actual extracts is not clear), an ancient commentary transmitted in the *Khuddaka-nikāya* of the Pāli Canon, and unique to the Theravādin school.

The non-canonical inscriptions provide further convincing evidence for a Theravādin presence. The Śrīkṣetra list of seven *vipassanā nāṇa*-s has a parallel in the *Visuddhimagga*, and an inscribed octagonal pillar from U Tapao gives a set of verses on the four truths that are cited in that work and in other works of the school.¹⁷ The *Visuddhimagga* is, of course, one of the most representative and most authoritative texts of the Mahāvihāra

15. See Skilling forthcoming (c) for references. The Theravādins traditionally describe the language of their texts as Māgadhī, “the language of Magadha”: see von Hinüber 1994.

16. There are a very few orthographic variants, for which see e. g. Skilling 1992, 84—with reference to the work of von Hinüber—and forthcoming (a).

17. See Skilling forthcoming (a) for references.

Theravāda. An inscription found in association with a giant pair of *Bud-dhapāda* at Amphoc Si Maha Phot in Prachin Buri province gives three Pāli stanzas in homage to the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṃgha. The stanzas, in the *vasantatilaka* metre, are from the *Telakaṭāha-gāthā*, a work of unknown authorship believed to have been composed in Ceylon. According to the opening Khmer portion, the epigraph was set up by one Buddhasiri in CE 761.¹⁸ The *sacca-kicca-kata-nāṇam* verse is known only from late Theravādin texts: it is noteworthy that the Siamese inscriptions (the verse occurs several times) are much earlier than the known texts that give the verse.¹⁹

From the point of view of both language and contents, I conclude that the Pāli inscriptions of Burma and Siam give firm evidence for a Theravādin presence in the Irrawaddy and Chao Phraya basins, from about the 5th century CE onwards.²⁰ From the extent and richness of the evidence it seems that the Theravāda was the predominant school, and that it enjoyed the patronage of ruling and economic elites.²¹ But I do not mean to suggest that religious society was monolithic: other schools may well have been present, or have come and gone, and there is ample evidence for the practice of Mahāyāna and Brahmanism in the region.²²

18. See *Charuk nai prathet thai* 2529, I: 179–86 and Rohanadeera 1988. The *Telakaṭāha-gāthā* was edited by Edmund R. Goonaratne (1884).

19. See Skilling forthcoming (a) for references.

20. We must wait for a comprehensive study of Indic loan-words in early Mon inscriptions from Siam before we can determine the degree to which they use Sanskrit or Pāli. An example of the former is the word *puṇya*, ubiquitous in the epigraphs. A possible example of the latter is the term *upājḥāy*, derived more probably from Pāli *upajjhāya* (also *upajjha* and *upajjhā*) than Sanskrit *upādhyāya*, in an inscription from Lopburi: see Cœdès 1961, 8, II (1). Another form, from two ca. 9th century “votive tablets” is *pajhāy*: *Charuk nai prathet thai* 2529, II: 85–89, 90–94. (note that the word occurs side-by-side with *ācāryya*).

21. Stargardt (p. 200) remarks of the relic chamber of the “Khin Ba mound,” the source of a 20-leaf golden Pāli text: “although many other relic chambers were discovered at Śrī Kṣetra, this was the only one to survive intact, and its contents exceeded—in number, quality of workmanship, and concentration of precious metals and stones—even the relic chamber of the Bhaṭṭiprolu stūpa in Andhra.”

22. The practice of Mahāyāna is compatible with any of the Vinaya schools, including the Theravāda, and brahmins played (and continue to play) an active role in South-east Asian “Buddhist” societies, both court and common. The schools or religious groups should be regarded as interactive and complemen-

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The Question of Origins

The Theravādin *saṃgha* of Ceylon was divided into two main rival branches, the Mahāvihāravāsins and Abhayagirivāsins. After more than a thousand years of contention for legitimacy and patronage, the former won out, and absorbed the monks and monasteries of the latter. Most regrettably for our purposes, the literature of the Abhayagiri, which included a chronicle of the school, was allowed (or perhaps encouraged) to disappear, with the result that no undisputed Pāli text of the school survives.²³ The Theravāda that we know today is the Mahāvihāra tradition, as settled by the time of the prolific commentator Buddhaghosa in the 5th century. The later Pāli literature of the sub-commentaries (*ṭīkā*s) and manuals, although subject to further development and a variety of influences, also belongs to the Mahāvihāravāsin lineage.

Both schools maintained contacts with India: with Kāñcīpuram, Anchradeśa, and Magadha. Is there any evidence for the presence of either school in early South-east Asia? The canonical inscriptions—including the *Abhidhamma* “extracts”—could belong to either the Abhayagirivāsins or the Mahāvihāravāsins, since both are believed to have transmitted a similar canon in Pāli, and both held broadly similar tenets and used a similar technical vocabulary.²⁴ It seems that the Abhayagiri also transmitted the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, or at least a similar text, since passages cited in the *Vimuttimagga* (for which see below) have parallels in that work. The *nābādhakam yato dukkham* verses, known at present only from Mahāvihāra texts such as the *Visuddhimagga*, are given in citation, and are not original to the works in question: that is, they originate from an earlier text that may have been accepted by both schools.

The *Vimuttimagga*, a treatise associated with the Abhayagiri, was well-known outside of Ceylon (whether it was composed in that country or in India remains under debate). A comprehensive manual of practice and

tary rather than mutually exclusive. For Avalokiteśvara in South-east Asia see Chutiwongs 1984 (especially ch. 3 on Burma and ch. 4 on Central Thailand) and Chutiwongs and Leidy 1994; for brahmanism in the region see Dawee 1982.

23. See Skilling 1993a.

24. The canons of the two schools were not identical (and is it not historically and humanly improbable, rather impossible, that two canons transmitted for centuries from an early date—the Abhayagiri was founded in the 1st century BCE—at separate monastic centres should be so?): see the important references in von Hinüber 1995, 36–38.

theory, composed by Upatissa (Skt. Upaṭiṣya) perhaps by the 2nd century CE, it was translated into Chinese in 515. Interestingly, the translator, *Samghabhara, was a *bhikṣu* of Funan (an early South-east Asian polity known from Chinese sources, and located by the *savants* in the deltaic regions of Cambodia).²⁵ The manuscript of the *Vimuttimaggā*, along with the other texts translated by *Samghabhara, was brought to China in 503 by another monk of Funan, *Mandrasena.²⁶ Since none of the other texts brought from Funan are Theravādin, and some belong to the Mahāyāna,²⁷ the fact that the *Vimuttimaggā* was among them attests only to the availability of that text in Funan: it cannot be interpreted as evidence for a (non-Mahāvihāra) Theravādin presence.²⁸ Since *Samghabhara did some of his translation work in the "Funanese Pavilion,"²⁹ and enjoyed the patronage of the Emperor, it seems that Funanese Buddhism was accorded some esteem.

(For insular South-east Asia, we have one clear piece of evidence: the inscription from Ratu Baka in central Java, dated CE 792, which refers to an "Abhayagiri-vihāra built for the Sinhalese *saṃgha*." On the mainland, but outside of our period, there is mention of an Abhayagiri in the concluding Khmer portion of a Vajrayānist Sanskrit palaeograph, dated CE 1066, from the vicinity of Nakhon Ratchasima [Korat] in Central Siam.³⁰ The precise location of this Abhayagiri is unknown, and it is by no means certain that the toponym should be related to the Abhayagiri school: the inscription names only an "Abhaya Mountain" [*giri*: without the word *vihāra*], where images of "Buddhalokeśvara" and others were installed and later renovated.)

25. For the school-affiliation (and name of the translator and date of translation, about which there has been some confusion) see Skilling 1994.

26. *Li-tai san-pao chi*, T. no. 2034, 49.98c.6-7; *K'ai-yüan shih-chiao lu*, T. no. 2154, 55.537c.18-19. The *Annals of the Liang Dynasty* confirm that Funan was one of the countries that sent tribute in 503. I am grateful to Bhikṣuṇī Vinitā Tseng for checking the Chinese sources.

27. The works are listed in Nanjio 1975, II §§ 101, 102; Bagchi 1927, 414-18; *Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais*, Fascicule annexe du Höbögirin (1978) 267 (s. v. "Mandarasin"), 281 (s. v. "Sōgyabara").

28. The *Vimuttimaggā* was also known in North India: the chapter on the *dhutaṅga*-s was translated into Tibetan under the title *Dhutagaṇanirdeśa* around CE 800, and long sections were cited by Daśabalaśrīmitra, a North Indian scholar, probably in the 12th century, in a work preserved only in Tibetan translation: see Skilling 1987, 1993b, and 1994 for references.

29. Bagchi 1927, 416.

30. See Chirapat 1990, 12 (text line 32), 13 (tr.).

12 1/2 All told, there is no conclusive local evidence that the early Theravāda of South-east Asia was affiliated with either the Mahāvihāra or the Abhayagiri. We may also note the absence of references to South-east Asia of the period in the chronicles of Ceylon,³¹ and reflect that in the great period of reform that swept the region in the 14th and 15th centuries the new ordination lineage was distinguished by the name *Sihala-sāsana*. Might this not suggest that the old tradition did not associate itself with Ceylon?

It is therefore probably futile to try to trace the Theravāda of the period to either of the Ceylon schools. It is likely that Buddhism arrived in the area at an early date—perhaps even from the time of Soṇa and Uttara's mission to Suvannabhūmi during the reign of King Aśoka, as traditionally held. Whether this Buddhism belonged to the Theravādin lineage from the start, or whether that lineage asserted itself later, cannot be said (and what did the term Theravādin mean in the pre-Buddhaghosa period, and outside of Ceylon?)—but there is no doubt that it evolved independently of the Ceylon schools. Over the centuries it would have undergone multiple influences, as monks (and perhaps nuns) from different regions of India criss-crossed the region, and as local monks travelled throughout the region and to different parts of India.³² There is evidence for connections with Andhradeśa and the South, for example in the layout of early Pyu *stūpas* and *vihāras*, such as those from Beikthano.³³ There is also evi-

31. See here Ray 1939, 52. Sirisena (1978, 58) remarks that "Sri Lanka's close religious contacts with Burma started only from the eleventh century." His work offers a wealth of information—from chronicles, inscriptions—on the relations between Ceylon and South-east Asia but, as the title indicates, all from the later period.

32. If anything is clear from the time of our earliest records—the *Tripitaka* itself (e. g. the *Puṇṇovāda-sutta*, MN 145)—up to the present, it is that monks travelled, even in the face of adversity or danger. The subject is addressed by Vasubandhu, who in his *Vyākhyāyukti* gives in verse seven reasons why the Buddha travelled (note the technical term, known from the canon, *cārikāṃ carati*) and fifteen reasons why auditors (*śrāvaka*) did so (Peking edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka, vol. 113, cat. no. 5562, *sems tsam si*, 44b6 foll.). The verses are available in Sanskrit citation in Haribhadra 1960, 271.30 and 274.19.

33. See e. g. Stargardt 1995, 200, 205. It is intriguing that the *dukkhaṃ dukkhasamuppādaṃ* verse, inscribed at least twice in Siam, is also known (but in a lightly Sanskrit form) from an inscription from Andhra: see Skilling 1991 and 1992 for details. The use of the Pallava script cannot in itself be cited as evidence, since that script was employed from an early date throughout insu-

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dence for contacts with North India: the influence of Gupta idioms on Dvāravatī Buddha images, and the practice of enshrining the *ye dhammā* verse or the *paṭiccasamuppāda* formula in *stūpas*, which was widespread throughout the North, but rare in the South³⁴ and Ceylon.³⁵ The *Telakaṭāha* verses suggest contacts with the latter country, as does, perhaps, a short and enigmatic Old Mon inscription from the Narai or Khao Wong cave in Saraburi, dated to *circa* 12th century BE (CE 550–650), which refers to an Anurādhapura.³⁶ Whether the reference is to the ancient capital of Ceylon or to a local site cannot be said, although the latter seems more likely: the important point is that the toponym is otherwise known only from Ceylon.³⁷

lar, peninsular, and mainland South-east Asia, for secular and religious (both Brahmanical and Buddhist) records.

34. For some Southern examples in the Pallava script see Rea 1990, 149–80 and pls. 51–64 (and also Mitra 1980, 218–20). The inscriptions that I am able to decipher from the Stygian reproduction of the plates give the *ye dharmā* verse in Sanskrit. Rea describes the site as “one of the most remarkable groups of Buddhist remains in the Presidency” (then in Madras, the site is now in District Visakhapatnam of Andhra Pradesh). Further south, at Gummadiurru (District Krishna) were found “127 clay tablets of the size of an eight-anna piece and bearing the Buddhist creed in Nagari characters of the late mediæval period” (*Archæological Survey of India, Annual Report, 1926–27*, Rpr. Delhi: 1990, 155–56; see also Mitra 1980, 212).

35. That the practice was not unknown to the late Ceylon Theravāda may be seen from the *Sāratthadīpanī* (a text some centuries younger than our examples from the field), which defines a *dhamma-cetiya* as “[a *cetiya*] built after depositing a book inscribed with conditioned arising, etc.”: Mahāmakūṭa ed., vol. 1 (Bangkok), 2511 [1968], p. 263, ult *paṭiccasamuppādādilikhitapothakam nidahivā katam pana dhammacetiyaṃ nāma*. (I am grateful to the late U Bo Kay of Pagan for the reference.) We may compare the definition with Candragomin (6th–7th century CE?) as cited by Haribhadra (late 8th century) in his *Āloka* (BST 4, 361.15) *yatra hi nāma pudgalanairātmya-dyotikayā ye dharmā hetuprabhavā ity ādigāthayā adhiṣṭhito bhūbhāgaḥ stūpo mataḥ*. For some of the few *ye dharmā* inscriptions known from Ceylon, see Mudiyanse 1967, 29–30 (in Nāgarī, on images that Mudiyanse, with good reason, deems imported), 92–95 (in Sinhalese characters, possibly in Pāli), and 97. Ceylon is rich in deposited texts, but mostly in Sanskrit, and of *mantra*, *dhāraṇī*, or *Prajñāpāramitā*, rather than extracts from the Pāli canon: see Mudiyanse 1967, Schopen 1982, and von Hinüber 1984.

36. *Charuk nai prathet thai* 2529, II:42–47.

37. That is, no other references are given in Monier-Williams 1976, 37c, or in Malalasekera 1983, 83–85.

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We should not regard the establishment and development of Buddhism in the region as a mere mechanical process: it was rather a human, and hence unpredictable, progress in which decisions were made and acted upon by individuals and communities. A single charismatic monk could attract followers and sponsors of status to his school; a single ruler could, whether for political, economic, or purely religious reasons, decide to favour a particular *samgha*.³⁸ Changing trade routes or political alliances could bring new patterns of patronage.

Perhaps because of the absence of indigenous information—of contemporary chronicles or histories—the Buddhism of early South-east Asia is all too often portrayed as an inanimate cultural package that was passively received from abroad. All the evidence, however, is against this. The Buddhism of the Chao Phraya plain was not a simple copy from Ceylon or India: from the time of the very first evidence, it already has a unique face, implying an earlier evolution for which no records remain. The surviving artifacts are expressions of a mature and refined culture, with special features like the large and ornate stone *dhammacakkas*; the plan of the *stūpas* or *cāityas*, and the style of their stucco art; the style of the Buddha images; the rich terracotta art (the so-called votive tablets); and motifs that remain to be explained, such as the so-called Banaspati image. From this evidence we can only deduce that the Buddhism of the Chao Phraya valley is the flowering of a “local genius.” The same may be said of the Buddhism of the Pyu, which had its own architecture and terracotta art, and local practices such as the urn-burial of people of status. The two realms were flourishing centres of Buddhist culture in their own right, on an equal footing with contemporary centres like Anurādhapura.³⁹

To conclude, we may turn to Laos and Cambodia. Is there any evidence of early Theravādin activity in these countries? Very little information is available for Laos. In 1968 a standing stone Buddha in Dvāravatī style,

38. That a single monastic could make enormous and enduring contributions to a culture—in manifold aspects—may be seen from countries for which we have records. Aśīa and Bu ston spring to mind for Tibet, Kukai for Japan.

39. The situation was perhaps not much different from that of today, when the *Buddhisms* of the Mon, Burmese, Central Thai, Shan, Lanna Tai, Lao, and Khmer are each quite distinctive. We might also bear in mind that—from the point of view of Madhyadeśa—Ceylon, Andhra, and South-east Asia were equally foreign cultures, and that there is no valid reason to relegate the last-named to a lower rank. In a sense “local” and “foreign” are modern constructs: the South-east Asian cultures that adopted Indian cosmology did not hesitate to place themselves within Jambudīpa.

190 cm. in height, was found at Ban Thalât in Vientiane province. The image and the accompanying Mon inscription have been dated to the 7th–8th centuries.⁴⁰ The finds suggest that the Mon Buddhism of the right bank of the Mekhong River (the Mun and Chi valleys) also spread to the left bank, but much more research needs to be done into the nature of the Buddhism of the middle Mekhong valley before anything more can be said.

In Cambodia—which is rich in structural remains and lithographs—no ancient Pāli inscriptions have been found, and scriptural extracts of the type discussed above are unknown, with one exception. This is an epigraph of two lines, engraved in small “pre-Angkorian” letters on the back of a standing Buddha image (90 cm. in height) from Tuol Preah Theat in Kompong Speu province (now in the Musée Guimet).⁴¹ The text reads:⁴²

*ye dhammā hetuprabhavā tesam hetum tathāgato avaca
tesañ ca yo nirodho evaṃvādī mahāsamano.*

The verse differs from the Pāli of the *Mahāvagga* (*Vinaya* I 40) in giving *hetuprabhavā* for *hetupabbhavā* and *avaca* for *āha*, and cannot be cited as evidence for a Theravādin presence.⁴³ Otherwise, the earliest Pāli inscription dates from CE 1308—and thus belongs to the heyday of the “Theravādin renaissance” in Rāmaññadesa, Burma, Central Siam, the Lanna Kingdom, and other northern principalities.⁴⁴

40. Boun Souk 1971, 14 (with photograph); Vothu Tinh 1983, 42–43.

41. It is not without interest that the *ye dhammā* verse is also inscribed (in Pāli) on the back of a standing Dvāravatī-style Buddha image (196 cm. in height) from Ratchaburi, dated to ca. 12th century BE (CE 550–650): see *Charuk nai prathet thai* 2529, I:72–74. Another Dvāravatī Buddha image with a (fragmentary) Pāli *ye dhammā* inscription “en caractères pré-angkoriens peu soignés” is in the Korat Museum: “Inscription sur une statue de Buddha du Musée de Korat,” in *Cœdès* 1964, 162.

42. *Cœdès* 1964, 108. The image is illustrated in Dupont 1955, Pls. 45 B and 46 C.

43. Note that there are many examples of the *ye dharmā* verse in a mixed or Sanskritic Pāli from India, and that they have yet to be subjected to sustained linguistic and palæographic analysis.

44. *Cœdès* 1989, 282–89. The inscription is a royal record of a religious foundation, and not a scriptural extract.

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There is certainly evidence of the presence of Buddhism in the early period: stone, metal, and wooden images of the Buddha,⁴⁵ of Maitreya,⁴⁶ and of Avalokiteśvara,⁴⁷ and occasional mention in Sanskrit or Khmer dedicatory inscriptions. Chinese sources record that monks travelled back and forth between Funan and the Middle Kingdom, but say nothing about their school-affiliation. The *Vimuttimagga* and other Buddhist texts, including some of the Mahāyāna, were sent to China from Funan in the early 6th century. The opening verses of the *Telakaṭṭha-gāthā* are known from an 8th century inscription from Prachin Buri, which may be said to belong to the Khmer cultural sphere. Furthermore, some of the early Buddha images of Cambodia are stylistically affiliated to those of Dvāravatī. On the other hand, it is remarkable that in Cambodia there are no ruins of monumental brick *stūpas*, so common in Pyu and Mon areas, or even of smaller complexes of votive *stūpas*. Boisselier has noted that none of the ancient epigraphs refer to *stūpas*, and that none of the known *stūpa* remains are earlier than the 12th century.⁴⁸ Nor is there any evidence of a practice shared by Pyu and Mon Buddhists: the mass-production from moulds of clay “votive tablets.” Here too Boisselier remarks that these *praḥ patima* are not well-attested until the 12th century.⁴⁹ In sum, while Buddhists were certainly active in Cambodia during the early period, it seems that the dominant ideology remained that of the brahmins, and that Buddhism or Buddhist culture did not flourish among the Khmer to the degree that it did among the Pyu and the Mon.

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45. See Dupont 1955, 189–210.

46. See the examples in Chutiwongs and Leidy 1994, and Dupont 1955, pls. 29 A and 30 A.

47. For examples see Chutiwongs 1984 (chap. 5), Chutiwongs and Leidy 1994, and Dupont 1955, pls. 12 B, 22 AB, 28 A, 29 B, 30 B, and 31 A.

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THE ĀSAVA AND THE ARIYA-SĀVAKA

John D. Ireland

Frontispiece: the calligraphy in Sino-Vietnamese characters (Nôm) by Ven Thích Huyền-Vi reads:

"Having transcended all illusions,
in the end he [the Bodhisattva]
attains to Nirvāna."

The seals, engraved by Ven. Bhikkhu Dhamma-
vīro of Thailand, convey the same meaning as
the calligraphy.

An important purpose of the practice of the Buddhist Path, the discipline of *sīla*, the cultivation of self-control and mindfulness and so forth, is to discontinue the production of the *āsava*, the flow of defilements. It is these that dull the mind and prevent the arising of understanding, of insight. The *āsava* come to an end finally in the enlightenment of the arahant. The word *āsava* means 'influx' or 'an outflow' that overwhelms. It seems to mean both 'inflow' and 'outflow' of defilements¹ and is actually more nearly synonymous with *ogha* than is perhaps recognised. The *ogha* or 'flood' is that which bears one along in Saṃsāra, that 'overwhelms the sleeping village' (Dhp 47), that 'drowns in the ocean of Saṃsāra'. In the earlier suttas the term *ogha* occurs more frequently than *āsava*.

Āsava is connected with the burden of past kamma awaiting fruition in future lives². Thus the arahant, by destroying the *āsava* has destroyed the kamma that would otherwise produce its effect in future lives, or at least attenuate it. See, for

1 See I.B. Horner's *Middle Length Sayings* I, pxxiii, for the meaning of *āsava*.
2 That the Jains understood the term in this sense is evident from a passage in the Aṅguttara Nikāya, where the Jain disciple Vappa says, '... there may be, sir, a formerly done evil deed, its result not (yet) ripened, because of which influxes (*āsavā*) to be experienced as suffering would flow in upon (*assaveyyum*) a man in a future life' (A II, p.196). It is possible the Buddhists adopted the term from the Jains. OR THAT IT IS EVEN OLDER

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example, Aṅgulimāla's suffering three blows to the head and the Buddha's remarks about it in M 86, that he should endure it as he is experiencing the results of kamma that would otherwise have resulted in him being born in hell. It is the *āsava*-flow that impels one on into future births (*punabbhava*): the flow of sensuality (*kāma*), ignorance (*avijjā*) and being (*bhava*). There is also a fourth, (wrong) views (*diṭṭhi*), that was added to the *āsava*, but this ought perhaps to be covered by *avijjā*. It should be noted that *avijjā* is not merely the absence of knowledge or ignorance, but means false or wrong understanding resulting in wrong views and speculative knowledge. The negative prefix 'a-' has six different meanings of which absence is only one. The 'a' in *avijjā* has the same function as in *adhamma* which is recognised as not merely meaning the absence of 'righteousness', but positive 'wickedness' as applied, for instance, to the behaviour of Devadatta³. *Adharmah* is the example given in Sanskrit grammar for this use of the prefix 'a-'.

The arahant, the *khīnāsavo* — 'he in whom the *āsava* are destroyed' — by realising that the *āsava* are no more, can truly affirm, 'Finished is birth . . . ' *khīnajāti*, etc., i.e. the kamma that would otherwise lead to another birth and keep it in being is no more. Thus the realisation that the *āsava* are destroyed is the same as realising that rebirth will no longer occur, the necessary reason or conditions for the future birth no longer exist. If the destruction is not complete, the alternative is *anāgāmitāya*, non-returning.

It is because the *anāgāmin* still has some *bhavāsava* that he continues to 'become' and arises in the Brahma-world of the Pure Abodes. As the *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmin* are not rid of

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the *āsava* (specifically the *kāmāsava*) they will continue to be born among devas and men in the *Kāmaloka*. However, much of their past kamma has been destroyed so they will not continue in *Samsāra* for long and are completely excluded from the lower realms, the *apāya*. It is, apparently, at the moment of stepping onto the Path, the *ariya-magga*, that a large amount of the burden of past kamma awaiting fruition is destroyed, altered or becomes inoperative. And therefore, it is at this moment also that it is decided whether or not the *āsava*-flow will dry up in that lifetime or will continue to flow for a little longer, but not longer than another seven births, according to the Buddha. As it is connected with past kamma which is so complex and varied for each individual and as a deed already done cannot be undone, a person has no choice in the matter of whether he becomes a *sotāpanna*, *sakadāgāmin*, *aṅgāmin* or arahant. All this leads to the startling conclusion that, at the time of the Buddha, contrary to what came to be believed in later times, an individual did not progress from *sotāpanna*, etc., through to arahant, but that the four paths and fruits were originally considered to be alternative attainments. By definition the arahant attains the fruition of the path, *arhatta-phala*, and extinction (*parinibbāna*) 'here and now' in this present life. The *anāgāmin*, however, cannot do this, he has missed the opportunity and must continue on to the Pure Abodes and attain extinction 'there', being unable to return 'here' to this life again. For the *sotāpanna* and *sakadāgāmin* it is not stated how they will attain *Parinibbāna*, so it is uncertain as to their fate. It is possible they will attain it at the moment of death at the end of their last birth. 1205A

The simile is given in the suttas (e.g. M 105) of a man struck with a poisoned arrow. A surgeon is obtained who extracts the arrow, drains the poison and cleans up the wound.

3 See Itivuttaka, sutta 89.

He advises the patient to look after the wound, anoint it and wash it from time to time, cover it and keep it clean so that it will heal completely. As the patient follows this advice the wound soon heals. In another case, although the wound was not completely drained of the poison, this does not matter. By following the surgeon's advice of looking after the wound, it does heal as in the first case, although it might possibly take a little longer to do so. However, the situation exists where someone else is treated by the surgeon and the arrow extracted, but he ignores the advice given to look after the wound. The poison that is left behind does its work and, being contaminated by dust and dirt, the wound festers and discharges causing the death of the patient.

The surgeon, of course, is the Buddha. The poisoned arrow is craving, the cause of suffering or the state of needing treatment. By extracting the arrow and draining the poison the Buddha is showing what is 'health' or Nibbāna. Thereafter, it is up to the person concerned to attend to his own wound, that is, to tread the Path so that complete health or Parinibbāna is finally attained. The first case is that of the arahant, the next in which a variable amount of poison (ignorance, *avijjāsava*) still remains behind are those on the three lower paths. Finally, there is the person who ignores the advice of the Buddha, does not enter the Path or goes off on a wrong path (see M 107). He, presumably, by not stepping onto the Path does not become an *ariya-puggala* and his *āsava* continue to be produced and increase and accumulate. Reverting or falling away, 'giving up the training', is called 'death' elsewhere in the suttas.

That the sotāpanna is said to be born only up to seven

more times at the most should probably not be taken literally.⁴ The number seven merely means a few times and is not intended to be precise. In the *Abhisamaya Saṃyutta* (S II, p.136) is given the simile of the seven balls of clay set beside the great earth, meaning an infinitesimal small amount. Thus, for the *ariya-sāvaka* the past kamma awaiting fruition, the huge burden carried from birth to birth, has all been wiped out and only a minute quantity is left.

The arahant is called an *asekha*, one who has finished the training, but the sotāpanna, etc., are called *sekha* who still have work to be done to realise their goal. In the case of the anāgāmin it is minimal and originally it seems there was only a technical difference between the anāgāmin and the arahant; both were assumed to have attained their goal. However, the sotāpanna and the sakadāgāmin have to be trained in cultivating the Eightfold Path, and especially the last three factors. They lack the experience of meditation practice, of *jhāna* and *samādhi*, that is needed to realise the fruition of the Path and the further factors of Right Knowledge and Deliverance possessed by the arahant.

4 Note the seven years reduced to seven days at the end of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta*; the number seven is again probably used as a figure of speech not to be taken literally. However, the mention elsewhere of being born a brahmin back through seven generations means a large number, although again still an indefinite and arbitrary figure.

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**THERĪGĀTHĀ : ON FEMINISM, AESTHETICISM AND
RELIGIOSITY IN AN EARLY BUDDHIST VERSE
ANTHOLOGY (Part I)**

Vijitha Rajapakse

I

The ancient Buddhist verse anthology known as the Therīgāthā (Thig) attracted the attention of some of the earliest Western Pāli scholars¹ and actually became the focus of many admiring comments from a very notable woman among them, Caroline Rhys Davids (who also rendered the anthology into metrical English²). Enquirers into the status of women within the Thera-

1 Therīgāthā, a gathering of 73 versified religious articulations in canonical Pāli, and attributed to women members of the Buddhist Order (theris or bhikkhunis) are traditionally juxtaposed to a much larger companion collection authored by their male counterparts, the Theragāthā (Thag). These two anthologies (which date back to the earliest period of Buddhist history, though committed to writing perhaps only around 80 BCE), were first printed in the West late in the 19th century in versions edited by R. Pischel and H. Oldenberg respectively. Their conjoint edition revised with appendices by K.R. Norman and L. Alsdorf (*The Thera and Therī Gāthā*, PTS 1966) remains the standard text, and as such will be the source of our references hereafter.

2 Mrs Rhys Davids published her translation of Thig as *Psalms of the Sisters* (1909) and that of Thag as *Psalms of the Brothers* (1913), incorporating into each commentarial elucidations taken from Dhammapāla's Paramatthadīpanī. This particular order (which reverses the traditional one) is still retained in the single volume edition of the two translations now available as *Psalms of the Early Buddhists* (PTS 1980). Although English prose versions of the two anthologies have been brought out (cf. K.R. Norman, tr., *Elders' Verses* (PTS 1969-71), this article will use the Rhys Davids translation. In citations hereafter (both in the text and footnotes), *Psalms of the Sisters* is abbreviated to PsS; *Psalms of the Brethren* as PsB. It should be noted that in her Introduction to PsS Mrs Rhys Davids went to some lengths in highlighting the uniqueness and

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* * * * *

akkharam ekamekam ca buddharūpasamaṃ siyā |
tasmā hi paṇḍito poso rakkheyya piṭakatayaṃ |

caturāsiti saḥassāni sambuddhā parimāṇakā |
ṭhiṭā nāma bhavissanti tiṭṭhante piṭakattaye |

Every single letter of the Dhamma is equal to an image of the Buddha:
Therefore a wise person should preserve the Tipiṭaka.

In the Dhamma of the Buddha there are 84,000 teachings,
Therefore, where there is a Tipiṭaka there are 84,000 Buddhas.

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SĪHANĀDA — THE LION'S ROAR
OR WHAT THE BUDDHA WAS SUPPOSED
TO BE WILLING TO DEFEND IN DEBATE¹

Joy Manné

In the *Dīgha* (D), *Majjhima* (M), *Saṃyutta* (S) and *Ānguttara* (A) *Nikāyas* the Buddha is frequently compared to a lion, and like a lion is said to roar. His roar takes place under conditions which the texts relate to the debate situation. His roar has content. His monks, although not compared to lions, may also utter a lion's roar. They are encouraged to roar on one particular subject specified by the Buddha. They may also roar on their own initiative, although it is only of Sariputta's 'lion's roar' that the texts contain a record. Suttas may themselves have the term *sīhanāda*, 'lion's roar', in their titles. An examination of the notion of the 'lion's roar' shows the imaginative and creative way its reciters (*bhāṇakas*) treated the Buddha's message within the context of their society, relating it to its customs and traditions.

1. *The Buddha's 'lion's roar'*.

The simile in which the Buddha is compared to a lion occurs frequently in the Sutta Piṭaka. Occasionally the comparison is simple — the Buddha simply is a lion:

¹ These investigations were supported by the Foundation for Research in the field of Theology and the Science of Religions in the Netherlands, which is subsidised by the Netherlands Organization for the Advancement of Pure Research (Z.W.O.), and in part constitutes Chapter V of my doctoral dissertation, 'Debates and Case Histories in the Pali Canon' (Utrecht 1991).

- (1) 'Like a lion lonely faring . . .².

'Lo, what a lion is the worshipful recluse Gotama! 'Tis by his lion's nature that he endures, mindful and discerning, the pains that have arisen in his body, keen and sharp, acute, distressing and unwelcome, and that he is not cast down³.

'You are a lion . . .⁴.

'He is the Lord Buddha — he is an incomparable lion . . .⁵.

In these simple comparisons the Buddha is referred to by the epithet 'Buddha' or 'Samaṇa Gotama'.

The comparison between the Buddha and a lion, however, is most usually expressed in the formula:

- (2) 'The lion, monks, the king of the beasts, comes out of his lair in the evening. After coming out of his lair, he yawns. After yawning, he surveys the four quarters. After surveying the four quarters, he roars his lion's roar three times. After roaring his lion's roar three times, he goes hunting⁶.

The simile is explained in this way,

- (3) "'Lion", monks, is a metaphorical expression for the Tathāgata, the Arahant, the Fully Enlightened One. And it is in his lion's roar that the Tathāgata teaches Dhamma in the assembly⁷.

In this simile the Buddha is invariably referred to by the epithet 'Tathāgata'. The emphasis in this formula is on the utterance that

the lion/Tathāgata makes. The simile (formula 3) continues:

- (3A) 'Just so, monks, when a Tathāgata arises in the world, an Arahant, a Perfectly Enlightened One, One who has knowledge and (right) conduct, One who has attained bliss, One who knows the world, the unsurpassed Trainer of men, Teacher of devas and mankind, a Buddha, an Exalted One. He teaches Dhamma: . . .⁸.

On one occasion it is the way that the Buddha teaches that is emphasised: the carefulness with which the Buddha teaches Dhamma is compared to the carefulness with which the lion strikes his blow while hunting⁹. On a different occasion it is the effect of the Buddha's Teaching that is emphasised: the effect that the Buddha's Teaching has on devas is compared with the effect that the sound of the lion's roar has on brute creatures: in both cases causing fear, agitation and trembling¹⁰. Most usually, however, what is emphasised is what the Buddha, the Tathāgata, roars. The Tathāgata's lion's roar has content, and its content varies in the different suttas that contain the simile.

There are two particular formulas that introduce the content. One of these is that of formula (3A) above where the Buddha is simply said to teach Dhamma. The other is,

- (4) 'There are these [ten] Tathāgata-[powers] that belong to the Tathāgata. Endowed with these [powers], the Tathāgata claims as his own¹¹ the bull's place (the position of the leader); he roars his lion's roar in the assemblies; he sets in

2 S I 16; tr. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Kindred Sayings* (KS) I 25.

3 S I 28; tr. *ibid.*, I 38.

4 Sutta Nipāta (Sn) 546 = 572.

5 It. 123.

6 A II 33 = III 121 = V 32 = S II 84.

7 A III 122 = V 33.

8 A II 33, etc. This formula exists also independently of the lion simile (formula 3).

9 A III 121.

10 A II 33.

11 Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit Dictionary*, s.v. *prajā*.

motion the wheel of Dhamma¹².

The words I have placed in square brackets change according to the context¹³.

The emphasis in the formula, as in (3) above, is that the Tathāgata's lion's roar is uttered in assemblies. When the Tathāgata does this, he takes the position of leader, like a bull. By uttering his lion's roar in assemblies the Tathāgata propagates his Teaching and sets in motion the wheel of Dhamma.

Various groups of assemblies are referred to in this literature. The Mahā-Sīhanāda Sutta (M 12) refers to eight assemblies: the assembly of nobles, of brahmins, of householders, of recluses, the retainers of the four great regents, the gods of the Thirty-three, the Māras and the Brahmās¹⁴. As it is a *sīhanāda* sutta we may perhaps infer from it that these are the assemblies intended in the 'lion's roar' situation. In any case we may deduce from this that the 'lion's roar' is a particular type of utterance to be proclaimed in public where particular prestigious groups gather, and indeed the Kassapa-Sīhanāda Sutta¹⁵ confirms that this is the case. From the rules that this sutta provides for satisfying the assembly it is clear that a 'lion's roar' is a challenge. In a sudden insert in this sutta, which gives no indication why the Buddha felt called upon to vindicate himself at that particular moment and in that particular situation, the Buddha enumerates and refutes potential criticisms that he suggests might be made against him by recluses

12 A III 9, V 33; Vibhāṣa (Vhb) 318.

13 The subjects of confidence (*vesarajjāni*) of formula (11) are introduced by this formula.

14 M I 72.

15 D 8 [I 175]. Suttas with *sīhanāda* in their titles are discussed in section 3 below.

of divers schools. These potential criticisms are that, although he utters his lions' roar, i.e. issues his challenge¹⁶:

- (5) 1. 'he does this in empty places, and not in public'¹⁷ ;
 2. 'he issues his challenge in assemblies, but he does it without confidence'¹⁸ ;
 3. 'he challenges with confidence . . . but people do not ask him questions'¹⁹ ;
 4. 'people ask him questions, but he does not answer'²⁰ ;
 5. 'he answers their question, . . . but he does not win over their minds with his exposition'²¹ ;
 6. 'he wins over their minds with his exposition, . . .but they do not find him worth hearing'²² ;
 7. 'they find him worth hearing but after they have heard him they are not convinced'²³ ;
 8. 'having heard him, they are convinced, . . . but the faithful make no sign of their belief'²⁴ ;

16 *sīha-nādaṃ nadati*, 'utters his lion's roar', 'makes his assertion', 'issues his challenge'. See Nathan Katz, *Buddhist Images of Human Perfection: The Arahant of the Sutta Piṭaka compared with the Bodhisattva and the Mahā-siddha* (Delhi 1982) 29ff, for further usages of this expression.

17 D I 175.

18 *Ibid.*

19 *Ibid.*

20 *Ibid.*

21 *Ibid.*

22 *Ibid.*

23 *sotabbam c'assa maññanti . . . na ca kho sutvā pasīdanti*, *ibid.* *Pasīdati* 'a mental attitude which unites deep feeling, intellectual appreciation and satisfied clarification of thought and attraction towards the teacher'. K.N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (London 1963, New Delhi 1989) § 655.

24 *Ibid.* Presumably this means that they utter no acceptance formula, provide no meals for the bhikkhus, etc.

9. 'the faithful give the sign of their belief, . . . but they do not follow the path to the Truth (Nibbāna)²⁵ ;
10. 'they follow the Path, . . . but they do not succeed'²⁶.

These are clearly important accusations and the Buddha's refutation of them is categorical. He asserts that in fact exactly the opposite is the case.

The Buddha refutes further potential accusations regarding his conduct when challenged in a different debate sutta (A I 187). Sarabha, a wanderer, who had recently stopped being a follower of the Buddha is claiming that he left the Buddha's teaching for the very reason that he understood it²⁷. This controversial utterance is reported to the Buddha who seeks out Sarabha and challenges him. The Buddha asks Sarabha whether the report is true, and how Sarabha has understood the Dhamma²⁸. Sarabha remains silent throughout this inquisition 'confused, dejected, hanging his head, downcast, cowed down'²⁹. The Buddha then makes three assertions about himself. He asserts that anyone challenging him with regard to the following: (1) his claim to be fully enlightened³⁰, (2) his claim to be free of intoxicants³¹, and (3)

25 *Ibid.*

26 *Ibid.*

27 A I 185.

28 The second question is put twice. The situation here is very similar to that described by M. Witzel in 'The case of the shattered head' (*Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 13-14, 1987), pp. 363-415, although it does not include this threat. This may be because the challenge is directed against a *paribbājaka*. It is worth noting that in the Buddhist texts this threat is directed solely against brahmins.

29 A I 186.

30 *sammāsambuddha*.

31 *khināsava*.

his claim that his Teaching leads a practitioner to the complete destruction of suffering³², would end up in the same pitiable condition as Sarabha. The sutta continues, 'Then the Exalted One, having thrice uttered his lion's roar . . . departed . . .'³³.

The situations discussed above show that the context in which the Tathāgata utters his lion's roar is a debate³⁴. They also show that it is as Tathāgata that Gotama makes the claims upon which he is willing to be challenged in public³⁵. The Tathāgata's lion's roar is a particular type of challenge. It is an assertion that the Buddha is willing to defend in public and this also accounts for the fact that it is uttered three times³⁶.

What are those points that the Buddha was willing to defend in public? Three of them are given above: (1) that he was fully enlightened, (2) that he was free from intoxicants, and (3) that his Teaching leads a practitioner to the complete destruction of suffering³⁷.

32 A I 187.

33 *Ibid.*, tr. Woodward, *Gradual Sayings* (GS) I 169f.

34 See Joy Manné, 'Categories of Sutta in the Pāli Nikāyas and their implications for our appreciation of the Buddhist Teaching and Literature', *Journal of the Pali Text Society* XV, 1990, 29-87. See also Witzel, *op. cit.*

35 Further, the study of debate techniques in Joy Manné, 'The Dīgha Nikāya: Debates: debating practices at the time of the Buddha' (*Buddhist Studies Review* 9, 2, 1992, pp. 117-36) shows that the Buddha regularly used his Tathāgata status to support his arguments in debates.

36 M. Hara, in his article 'Mittabi' ['Three Times'], *Bukkyo kyori no kenkyū Tamura Yoshida hakase kanreki kinen ronshū* (Tokyo 1982, pp.527-43), shows that in Indian philosophy and literature 'doing an action three times means that it must be intentional and that one is therefore held responsible for the action'. I am extremely grateful to Dr Tom Tillemans for providing a translation of this article, from which this quotation is taken.

37 A I 187.

We have already met the two formulas that introduce the contents of the Tathāgata's lion's roar, (3 and 3A) together, and (4). Each of these formulas introduces a different type of content. The contents of (3 and 3A) comprise the Teaching that the Tathāgata roars; the contents of (4) comprise the Tathāgata's qualities. Of these two formulas (the combination of (3 and 3A) is the least frequently used.

The aspects of the Teaching that are placed within (3 and 3A) are:

(6) 'This is the body, this is the arising of the body, this is the ceasing of the body'³⁸. This is feeling . . . , perception . . . , creative acts³⁹ . . . , this is consciousness, this is the arising of consciousness, this is the ceasing of consciousness⁴⁰.

and

(7) 'This is individuality: this is the origin of individuality, this is the cessation of individuality, this is the path leading to the cessation of individuality'⁴¹.

The ensuing remarks by the devas, identical in each of these suttas, show that they understand this to be a Teaching about impermanence: ' . . . We know, indeed, sirs, that we are impermanent, changing, not to last, taken in by individuality'⁴².

38 See Rune Johansson, *The Dynamic Psychology of Early Buddhism*, London and Malmö 1979, pp.29-34.

39 Johansson's translation of *saṅkhārā*, *ibid.*, pp. 125ff.

40 S III 85.

41 *iti sakkāyo iti sakkāyasamudayo iti sakkāyanirodho iti sakkāyanirodhagāmini paṭipādā ti*. A II 33. *sakkāya* is defined to be the five 'groups of grasping' *pañca upādānakkhandhā*, which are *rūpa*, *vedānā*, *saññā*, *saṅkhāra*, *viññāṇa*. M I 299.

42 S III 85; tr. Woodward, KS III 71.

The qualities of the Tathāgata that warrant a lion's roar are comprised either in a statement about the Tathāgata's powers (*balāni*) or in a statement about the subject concerning which he has complete confidence in himself (*vesārajāni*) introduced as in formula (4).

The powers the Tathāgata is willing to claim for himself in the assemblies are enumerated variously as ten, six or five. The ten powers are:

- (8) i. 'that the Tathagāta knows, as it really is, causal occasion (of a thing) as such, and what is not causal occasion as such'⁴³,
- ii. 'the fruit of actions past, future and present, both in their causal occasion and the conditions'⁴⁴,
- iii. 'the directions whatsoever of each practice'⁴⁵,
- iv. 'the world as it really is, in its divers shapes and forms'⁴⁶,
- v. 'the divers characters of beings'⁴⁷,
- vi. 'the state of the faculties of other beings'⁴⁸,
- vii. 'the defilement, the purification, and the emergence of attainments in meditation (*jhāna*), liberation (*vin.okha*) and concentration (*samādhi*)'⁴⁹,
- viii. 'The Tathāgata can recall his many states of existence, thus: One birth, two births, three births and so on . . . up to an hundred thousand births; likewise many evolutions

43 A V 33; tr. Woodward, GS V 24. Explained at Dhammasaṅgaṇi (Dhs) 1337.

44 *Ibid.*; tr. *ibid.* Cf. *Middle Length Sayings* (MLS) I 93f.

45 *Ibid.*; tr. *ibid.*

46 *anekadhātunādhātu-lokaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānati*. A V 33f; tr. *ibid.*

47 A V 34; tr. *ibid.*

48 *parasattānaṃ parapuggalānaṃ indriyaparopariyattaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānati*. *Ibid.*; tr. *ibid.*

49 A V 34.

- of aeons, many dissolutions of aeons, many evolutions and dissolutions of aeons, (remembering): At that time I had such a name, was of such a family, of such complexion, was thus supported, thus and thus experienced pleasure and suffering, had such and such a lifespan. Passing away from that existence, I arose in another state of existence. And there, I had such a name, was of such a family. . . Passing away from that existence, I arose here⁵⁰,
- ix. 'The Tathāgata with divine vision, purified and surpassing that of men, sees the deceasing and rising up again of beings, both low and exalted, beautiful or ugly, gone to a state of bliss or a bad state according to their deeds. He knows beings thus: these beings, sirs, who are given to the practice of wrong conduct in body, word and thought, who criticise the noble ones, who are of wrong view and who acquire for themselves the fruits of their wrong view, having passed away arise after death in a state of loss, a bad state, a state of lower existence, a state of destruction, those beings, sirs, who are given to the practice of right conduct in body, word and thought, who do not criticise the noble ones, who are of right view and who acquire for themselves the fruits of their right view, having passed away arise after death in a state of bliss, in the heavenly world⁵¹,
- x. 'The Tathāgata, through destroying the intoxicants, having seen for himself in this very lifetime, through his own higher knowledge, the release of the mind and the release through wisdom that is free from intoxicants,

50 A V 34f.

51 A V 35f.

remains in that attainment⁵².

This list of ten is supported in the Vibhaṅga where it occurs in identical form with the exception of the ninth *bala* which is expressed simply:

- (9) ix. '[The Tathāgata] knows as it really is the rebecoming of beings⁵³.

In the commentarial section that follows this list, however, the exposition comprises the full text of the ninth *bala* as given in the list of ten above⁵⁴. When six powers are enumerated these are Nos 1, 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the list of ten⁵⁵. The five powers are made up of a quite different list:

- (10) 'The powers of faith, modesty, conscience (shrinking back from doing wrong), energy and wisdom⁵⁶.

The four subjects of confidence (*vesārajāni*) that the Tathāgata is willing to proclaim in the assemblies are expressed in the form of a denial. The Buddha says, 'I do not behold the ground on which a recluse or a brahmin or a deva or a Māra or Brahmā or anyone in the world will legitimately reprove me⁵⁷. These potential charges are:

- (11) i. 'These dhammas are not enlightened in you, although you claim to be fully enlightened⁵⁸,

52 A V 36. The reference for the whole attestation is A V 32-6; cf. M 12 [I 69-71]. Translation taken from Woodward, GS V 23ff as indicated. Otherwise I have used my own.

53 Vbh 318.

54 Vbh 343.

55 A III 417ff.

56 *saddhā-balaṃ, hiri, ottappa, viriya, paññābalaṃ*. A II 9.57 *Ibid.*

58 A II 9.

- ii. 'These intoxicants are not destroyed in you, although you claim to be free from intoxicants'⁵⁹,
- iii. 'There is no impediment for one who follows the dhammas that you have called the dhammas that cause impediment'⁶⁰,
- iv. 'The Dhamma that you teach purportedly for this reason does not lead to the complete destruction of all suffering for the practitioner'⁶¹.

Because the Tathāgata sees no legitimate ground upon which he may be reproved, he is peaceful, fearless, convinced⁶² concerning potential charges that may be made against him.

Two suttas in S (II 27 = Nos. 21, 28 = No.22) open with the formula (4), adapting it so as to include both the ten powers (*balāni*) and the four confidences (*vesārajjāni*). Instead, however, of listing these as we have seen them above, these suttas follow the opening formula with the Dependent Origination (*paṭicca-samuppāda*). These suttas begin with (4) above⁶³, and continue:

- (12) 'Thus, "this" being, "that" becomes, from the arising of this, that arises; this not being; that becomes not; from the ceasing of this, that ceases. That is to say, conditioned by ignorance, activities come to pass, conditioned by activities consciousness comes to pass, and so on: such is the uprising of this entire mass of Ill. But from the utter fading out and cessation of ignorance, activities cease, from the ceasing of activities consciousness ceases, and so on: such is the ceasing

59 *Ibid.*

60 *Ibid.*

61 *Ibid.* (A II 8f = M I 71f).

62 A II 8f = M I 71f.

63 In full in No.21, indicated in brief in No.22.

of this entire mass of Ill'⁶⁴.

It is difficult to see how the phrases quoted in these suttas comprised of (4) and (12) above contain ten powers (*balāni*) and four confidences (*vesārajjāni*). This indicates some confusion in the handing down of the tradition.

The above suggests that there were a number of points that the Buddha was willing to defend in public. (There was also a list of questions he refused to defend either in public or in private, the well-known unexplained (*avyākata*) questions.) The question is whether these points have some particular importance in the Buddha's Teaching and should be regarded as its most important features, or alternatively, whether these points are more relevant to the debate procedures, topics and requirements of the time, being permissible or required subjects in the context of the discussion between contemporary religious movements⁶⁵. With regard to their importance as aspects of the Teaching, the problem is that records remaining to us in this literature of topics that come within the category of 'lion's roar' subjects are so meagre that it is difficult to have any confidence in them, comprising as they do only the arising and ceasing of the five *khandhas*, formula (6) and the arising and ceasing of 'individuality' (*sakkāya*), formula (7). With regard to the qualities of the Tathāgata, on the other hand, there are relatively many examples of lists of these, even though they are not always mutually consistent. This evidence suggests that it was primarily those qualities and capacities that the Buddha claimed for himself personally as Tathāgata, and that he would defend in public, that comprised the content of the Buddha's lion's roar, and that the

64 S II 27f.

65 See Witzel, *op. cit.*

inclusion of the elements of the Teaching as material for a lion's roar is spurious.

2. The monks' 'lion's roar'.

The debate suttas, reflecting the debate tradition, show how important the requirement was to assert and defend one's religious knowledge. Two suttas suggest that it was so important that the Buddha instructed his monks regarding which aspects of his Teaching they were rightly (*sammā*) allowed to proclaim in the form of a lion's roar, and also how to defend them. In the Cūḷasihanāda Sutta⁶⁶ and in A II 238, § 239, the Buddha specifically permits the monks to make a certain claim in the form of a lion's roar:

- (13) 'In this teaching, monks, the recluse is to be found, also the second, third and fourth (class) of recluse. Void of such recluses are the systems of those who teach contrary views. Thus, monks, do ye rightly roar the lion's roar. . .⁶⁷

In M II he teaches them the argument for its defence.

Although these two suttas have this assertion in common they differ completely with regard to content. The A sutta defines the four *samaṇas* in its subsequent verses as the 'Stream-Enterer' (*sotāpanna*), the 'Once-Returner' (*sakadāgāmin*), the 'Non-Returner' (*opapātika*, lit. 'born by spontaneous generation'), and 'one who, having destroyed the intoxicants, lives in the attainment of having experienced for himself through his own higher knowledge in this very life the release of the mind, the release through wisdom that is free from intoxicants'⁶⁸. The M sutta, which may

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be categorised as a sermon, teaches the monks how to refute, in debate, practitioners who hold various contrary views⁶⁹. The points made in this sutta have no relation to the definitions with which it starts out and which it has in common with the A sutta. The points on which others making the same claim may be refuted are divided into two: one concerns aspects of the Teaching, the other concerns lines of attack against the position of the opponents. The first point is that the Buddhist monks make this claim having seen for themselves four things: that they have (i) confidence in their Teacher and (ii) in their Dhamma, (iii) that they fulfil the moral requirements (*sīla*), and (iv) that they have good relations with their fellow monks and their lay supporters. The second, a line of attack to be used in case the opponents should make exactly the same claims about their relationship with their leader and co-practitioners, comprises various challenges regarding the nature of their goal. After these first two paragraphs the sutta becomes a debate with potential opponents⁷⁰ against the views of becoming and annihilation⁷¹, and the four kinds of grasping (*upādāna*)⁷². The Buddha sums up by saying that the holders of wrong views cannot fulfil the first group of conditions above, because they are wrongly taught by a teacher who is not completely enlightened. The sutta contains various expositions of the Teaching rather than instructions in refutation.

It is difficult to see how these points support the challenge, the *sihanāda*, at the beginning of this sutta. In fact the common beginning and separate development of this pair of suttas suggests

66 M II. See below, section 3, for a discussion of suttas called *sihanāda*.

67 A II 238, § 238 = M II, I 63; tr. Woodward, GS II 242.

68 The text omits *paññavinuttim* which belongs in this formula.

69 See Manné (1990): 23.

70 See *ibid.*: 23.

71 M I 64.

72 M I 66.

that in the M sutta the Buddha's original defence of his position either never existed or has been lost. There is no evidence that a monk ever defended this aspect of the Teaching in a debate, but then the suttas are primarily about the Buddha and only occasionally about individual monks.

The right to utter a lion's roar is not limited to the Tathāgata, or to those situations where the Buddha permits his monks to proclaim certain subjects in this way. A monk may also utter a 'lion's roar' on his own initiative. In the Nikāyas this monk is always Sāriputta.

In an upsurge of faith, Sāriputta proclaims to the Buddha, 'Lord, such is the faith I have in the Exalted One — *Bhagavā*, that (I know) there has not been, will not be and is not found today any *samaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa* who is better than the Exalted One, or has more higher knowledge with respect to the Highest Enlightenment'⁷³. The Buddha acknowledges Sāriputta's remark, 'This speech you have uttered, Sāriputta, is noble, bull-like. A lion's roar, seized with certainty, is uttered'⁷⁴. Thus the Buddha himself categorises this utterance as a 'lion's roar'. The Buddha immediately challenges Sāriputta on his capacity to make such a remark, forcing him to admit that he has not known all past Buddhas, does not know all future Buddhas, and does not even know the present Buddha to the required extent to be able to support his claim. Sāriputta, however, is not daunted. He asserts that he can support his claim, which he has made because he has

seen in accordance with Dhamma⁷⁵, arguing through the use of a simile that he has seen what is important.

The content of Sāriputta's defence of his lion's roar is a lengthy itemisation of what all the Buddhas, past, present and future, have achieved. The details, in as brief a form as possible, are:

- (14) i. 'That all Buddhas, "after they have abandoned the five hindrances and after they have weakened corruptions of the mind by means of wisdom, being possessed (then) of hearts well established in the four exercises for setting up mindfulness and having thoroughly developed the seven constituents of knowledge, have wholly awakened (or will wholly awaken) to the uttermost awakening"⁷⁶.
- ii. 'That on one occasion when he came to the Buddha to hear Dhamma, the Buddha taught it in such a way that Sāriputta attained perfection in one particular dhamma, namely, faith in the Teacher⁷⁷.
- iii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the skilful dhammas is unsurpassable by any *samaṇa* or *brāhmaṇa*, these skilful dhammas being the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, the Four Right Exertions, the Four Bases of Psychic Power, the Five Controlling Principles, the Five Powers, the Seven Constituents of Knowledge, and the Noble Eightfold Path. In this connection, a bhikkhu, having destroyed the intoxicants, lives in the attainment of having experienced for himself through his own higher knowledge in this very life the release of the mind, the

73 D 28, III 99. Cf. D II 82f = S V 159, both of which only include (14) below. S V 159 includes the Buddha's final injunction (see below) that this text should regularly be recited to converts (monks, nuns and lay-followers).

74 D III 95; tr. T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha* (DB) III 95.

75 *dhammanvayo vidito*. D III 100.

76 D III 101.

77 D III 102.

- release through wisdom that is free from intoxicants⁷⁸.
- iv. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the description of the sphere of perception⁷⁹ is unsurpassable.
- v. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to conception⁸⁰ (gestation and birth) is unsurpassable. (The text here shows that conception, gestation and the quality of the birth of the foetus are meant.)
- vi. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the ability of mind-reading⁸¹ is unsurpassable.
- vii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the attainment of seeing⁸² is unsurpassable. (The text here describes four levels of attainment with regard to meditation on the body.)
- viii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the typology of people⁸³ is unsurpassable. (The text here describes seven characteristic ways of attaining release, *vimutti*).
- ix. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the (qualities of) concentration of the mind⁸⁴ is unsurpassable. (The text here describes the seven constituents of knowledge, *satta bojjhaṅgā*).
- x. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to modes of progress⁸⁵ is unsurpassable.
- xi. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to conduct in conversation⁸⁶ is unsurpassable.

78 *Ibid.*79 *āyatana-paññatti*, D III 102.80 *gabbāvakkanti*, *ibid.*81 *ādesana-vidhā*, D III 103.82 *dasana-samāpatti*, D III 104.83 *puggala-paññatti*, D III 105.84 *padhāna*, D III 106.85 *patipadā*, *ibid.*

- xii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the ethical conduct of man⁸⁷ is unsurpassable.
- xiii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the variety (of the results) of instruction⁸⁸ is unsurpassable. (The text here describes the Buddha's knowledge with regard to the stage an individual will reach on receiving a particular (form of) instruction.)
- xiv. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to knowledge concerning the (stage of) release of other people⁸⁹ is unsurpassable.
- xv. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to eternalism⁹⁰ is unsurpassable.
- xvi. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the knowledge that enables the remembrance of former life-times⁹¹ is unsurpassable.
- xvii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to the knowledge regarding the decease and rebirth of beings⁹² is unsurpassable.
- xviii. 'That the Buddha's teaching with regard to varieties of supernormal power⁹³ (i.e. the noble and the ignoble) is unsurpassable.
- xix. 'That with regard to the varieties of supernormal power⁹⁴

86 *bhassa-samācāra*, *ibid.*87 *purisa-sīla-samācāra*, *ibid.*88 *anusāsana-vidhā*, D III 107.89 *para-puggala-vimutti-nāna*, D III 108.90 *sassāta-vādesu*, *ibid.*91 *pubbe-nivāsānussati-nāna*, D III 110.92 *sattānaṃ cutūpapāta-nāna*, D III 111.93 *iddhi-vidhā*, D III 112.94 *iddhi-vidhā*, D III 113.

the Buddha is unsurpassable. There is nothing he does not know⁹⁵, and no other samāṇa or brāhmaṇa knows it better.

- xx. That the Buddha has achieved whatever can be achieved by a faithful clansman who is steadfast and has aroused his energies, by a man's capacity to bear burdens, (his) endeavour, energy and steadfastness⁹⁶ — The text here specifies that the Buddha is not attached to what is low nor to asceticism, and that he can attain the four *jhānas* at will.

Sāriputta concludes his argument by saying that he has heard from the Buddha himself that there have been equal Buddhas in former times and that there will again be Buddhas equal to himself, but that it is impossible for two equal Buddhas to exist at the same time.

The qualities attributed to the Buddha as *Bhagavā* in Sāriputta's lion's roar bear remarkably little resemblance to the points claimed by the Buddha, in the name of *Tathāgata*, to be his powers and confidences. Only in points (xiv), (xvi) and (xvii) of quote (14) is there any correspondance and this is with the list of quote (8) above, regarding points (vii), (viii) and (ix) respectively.

I have argued⁹⁷ that the collection of suttas now known as *Dīgha Nikāya* was originally a collection of suttas grouped together through their effectiveness in gaining converts and lay support (and that for that reason it is entertaining). The ending of this sutta shows clearly its propaganda purposes. After Sāriputta has finished, a monk, Udāyin, remarks that the *Tathāgata* will not proclaim himself, although any other ascetic who had even one of those qualities would boast about it. The Buddha, also speaking

95 *asesaṃ abhijānāti*. *ibid.*

96 *Ibid.*

97 Manné (1990): 4.

about himself as *Tathāgata*, agrees with this rather emphatically, and then instructs Sāriputta to give this discourse frequently to those among the followers, monks, nuns, lay-men and -women, who feel doubt and hesitation concerning the *Tathāgata*⁹⁸. In this way the Buddha specifically approved this as a list of his qualities which may be taught to followers. I think it is significant that he imposes this limit, i.e. that he does not acknowledge this as a list which is to be defended before a general public⁹⁹.

There is another occasion when Sāriputta roars his lion's roar¹⁰⁰. Here a monk goes to the Buddha and accuses Sāriputta of an offence. The Buddha sends for Sāriputta. Ānanda and Mahā Moggalāna immediately call all the monks, telling them to come because 'Sāriputta is about to roar his lion's roar in the presence of the Buddha'¹⁰¹. Clearly they expect a theatrical occasion. Sāriputta defends himself against the accusation. He agrees that someone who is not mindful of the body's action¹⁰² might have done such a thing, but as for himself, 'his heart is like the earth, abundant, extensive, boundless, without hatred, doing no harm'¹⁰³ and, moreover, he is 'filled with horror, loathing and disgust at his foul body'¹⁰⁴, and he carries it around like a dripping bowl of fat¹⁰⁵. The accusing monk immediately begs Sāriputta's pardon. The Buddha reprimands him, and then says to Sāriputta, 'Forgive this

98 D III 115f = S V 161.

99 Cf. by comparison A II 238, (13) above.

100 A IV 238.

101 A IV 374.

102 *Ibid.*

103 A IV 375.

104 A IV 377; tr. Woodward, GS IV 251.

105 A IV 377.

foolish man, before his head splits into seven pieces¹⁰⁶.

A further lion's roar is attributed to Sāriputta in the Saṃyutta Nikaya¹⁰⁷. Here a monk reports to the Buddha that Sāriputta has claimed arahantship. The Buddha summons Sāriputta and challenges him. Sāriputta is able to answer all the Buddha's questions satisfactorily and the Buddha leaves the scene. Sāriputta then proclaims to the bhikkhu that, although it took him a while to find his answer to the Buddha's first challenge, once he had found his wits, he could have gone on answering for several nights¹⁰⁸. This proclamation is reported to the Buddha by one of the monks, Kaṭṭhāra, who as his name shows is a noble (*khattiya*), and who may therefore have had some knowledge of debate conventions. It is this monk who gives the utterance the designation 'Sāriputta's lion's roar'¹⁰⁹ although the expression 'lion's roar' itself does not appear in Sāriputta's utterance. The Buddha supports Sāriputta's claim, using the same terms as Sāriputta did in his proclamation: 'If I were to question Sāriputta on this matter differently, with different words (or) differently according to a different method, Sāriputta would explain this matter to me, differently, with different words (or) differently according to a different method'¹¹⁰.

This so-called 'lion's roar' is qualitatively different from Sāri-

106 *khama Sāriputta imassa moghapurisassa, purāssa tatth' eva sattadhā muddhā phalissati'ti*. A IV 378. See Witzel, *op. cit.*, regarding this threat. The threat is surprising here as the accusing monk was neither questioning nor being questioned by Sāriputta although he may be taken to have challenged him, albeit behind his back.

107 S II 50-5.

108 S II 54.

109 S II 55, § 46.

110 S II 56.

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putta's previous one in several important ways. In the first place it is not a proclamation of the Buddha's qualities: it is Sāriputta's demonstration of his own understanding of the Teaching. Secondly, and most importantly, this utterance is not termed a 'lion's roar' by the Buddha, but only by a monk. The monk uses this terminology in his report to the Buddha and the latter uses different terminology in his answer. On the previous occasion it was the Buddha who gave the name 'lion's roar' to Sāriputta's utterance. Here the text specifically attributes different terminology to him. In this literature prone to repetition, the absence of repetition where it could be expected must be regarded as significant. Instead of the repetition, the Buddha describes Sāriputta as someone who has 'well-mastered the sphere of religion'¹¹¹.

Sāriputta is attributed with three different types of lions' roar. Two of these can be regarded as genuine, the criterion for genuineness being that the texts have the Buddha himself so designate the utterance. These are (i) when the 'lion's roar' took place in debate circumstances in praise of the Buddha (D 28), and (ii) when the 'lion's roar' took place in defence of, and asserting the quality of his own mental state (A IV 238). The third, i.e. the final example in this section cannot be accepted as a true 'lion's roar' as, according to the text, the Buddha did not give it this title. In none of these is the location a public assembly, but rather these are private lion's roars made only before the Sangha of monks.

There is one occasion in each of the Thera- and Therī-gāthā when a monk utters his 'lion's roar',

111 *Ibid.*

- (15) 175. 'Come, Nandaka, let us go into the presence of the preceptor. We shall roar the lion's roar face to face with the best of the Buddhas.
176. We have now attained that goal for which, with compassion for us, the sage made us go forth — the annihilation of all fetters'¹¹².
- (16) 331. '... The Buddha's teaching has been done.
332. Allow me, noble lady; I wish to go to Sāvatti: I shall roar a lion's roar in the presence of the excellent Buddha'¹¹³.

The reason for these 'lion's roars', as the texts show, is that the disciple has attained the final goal and wishes to announce this to, and perhaps have it confirmed by, the Buddha. This may be evidence of a custom or a tendency to proclaim this degree of personal attainment publicly in the presence of the Buddha. As, however, only two examples are attested, one in Theragāthā, one in Therīgāthā, it is impossible to be certain of this. These instances could be also be cases of poetic licence

A monk might also be described as a 'lion's roarer'. In a list that gives the highest qualities of various monks, the monk Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja is called chief of the disciples who are lion's roarers¹¹⁴. There is no sutta passage which tells us what he roared¹¹⁵.

Whereas the Buddha's lion's roar is a public event governed by what we may imagine were the debate rules of the time, the monk's lion's roars, insofar as we can tell from the small number

112 Tr. K.R. Norman, *Elders Verses* (EV) 12.

113 Tr. Norman, EV II.34.

114 A I 23.

115 G.P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pāli Proper Names*, s.v. Piṇḍola-Bhāradvāja.

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that remain to us in this literature, were private events, assertions in front of the Teacher and the Sangha and not open to public challenge.

3. *Suttas with sīhanāda* in their titles.

There are three suttas with *sīhanāda* in their title, i.e. *sīhanāda* suttas, in D: Kassapa-sīhanāda Sutta (No.8), Udumbarikā-sīhanāda Sutta (No.25), and Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta (No.26); two in M: Cūḷa-sīhanāda Sutta (No.11) and Mahā-sīhanāda Sutta (No.12), which gives this name to the vagga¹¹⁶, and a Sīhanāda Vagga in A IV 373-96.

The M *sīhanāda* suttas are both suttas with debate elements. The Cūḷa-sīhanāda Sutta is a sermon in which the Buddha teaches his monks debate techniques; in the Mahā-sīhanāda Sutta he refutes a challenge Sunakkhatta is reported to have made against him. The D *sīhanāda* suttas are more diverse. Two concern challenges: in the Kassapa-sīhanāda Sutta, Kassapa challenges the Buddha on the theme of asceticism, and the Buddha refutes this challenge, while the Udumbarikā-sīhanāda Sutta concerns a challenge made against the Buddha by Nigrodha in Queen Udumbarikā's Park. It is, however, hard to see what the common element is in the shared name regarding the third, the Cakkavatti-sīhanāda Sutta, which is a tale about good rulership. The Sīhanāda Vagga of the A gets its name from its first sutta, which is the lion's roar by Sāriputta in which he proclaims his own attainments.

In their diversity the relationship between the names of *sīhanāda* suttas and their content reflects that of the contents of the various *sīhanādas*. Both challenges and proclamations of

116 See I.B. Horner, *Middle Length Sayings* (MLS) I xiv.

attainments are found. Probably the Cakkavatti-sihanāda Sutta should be regarded as falling into the latter category. It is the proclamation of the attainments and qualities of the best ruler.

4. *The 'lion's roar' and the debate tradition*

In the Pāli Nikāyas the term *sihanāda* — 'the lion's roar' — is used for various types of expressions. When the Tathāgata's lion's roar is referred to we are close to the Vedic religious speech contest or Debate which Witzel has described in his article. When the 'lion's roar' is attributed to a disciple, we find that it is his own claim to attainments. Both the Tathāgata's 'lion's roar' and that of a disciple are utterances which the speaker is willing to defend in public, the former in front of a large public of the world, the latter in front of the smaller public of the monks. It seems then that the Buddhists have adapted the Vedic tradition of challenges in debate to their own purposes, using their own terminology — *sihanāda* — and generalising it to include a monk's public assertion of his achievements. Suttas with *sihanāda* in their title generally confirm this usage. As we do not usually know how and when a sutta got its title, only limited weight can be attached to this last point.

5. *Conclusions.*

I said in the introduction that a study of the notion of the 'lion's roar' showed the inventive and creative way the reciters conveyed the Buddha's message, relating its content to the customs and traditions of their society. In fact it provides a variety of examples of their way of going about their task.

First a word about the reciters.

Recounting those aspects of daily life one had shared with the Buddha to one's fellow practitioners, passing on to them the content of the discourses one had heard — that is to say, one's

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own understanding of his Teaching, telling what one had seen, heard and experienced while one was with the Teacher, all that certainly began as early as Buddhism itself did. The first converts and earliest monks would obviously talk to each other about the Buddha and the Teaching, and keep each other informed about what had happened during, for example, an absence due to an almsround or a meditation retreat. What had happened would include what had been taught, who the Buddha had talked to in particular, who came to see him, what advice he gave, and so forth. As the community grew and spread this was essentially its way to keep in touch and up to date. Some people love to recount, to narrate stories, to share their experiences, to tell. Probably those who told about the Buddha and the Teaching especially well were invited to do so again and again and became known as good reciters. Telling skilfully requires invention and the texts are indeed full of literary inventions created by very skilful raconteurs.

The early reciters told about true events, events in which they had participated as observers and witnesses. Although we cannot know whether the accounts of the debates in D contain any actual words that the Buddha spoke, the style of debating they attribute to him is consistent and differentiated from that attributed to other debaters, and they are true to the Vedic debate tradition¹⁷. The early reciters also passed on the experiences of others that had been told to them. In telling a tale there are always modifications depending on the character and interests of the teller.

The early reciters created similes. A simile that compares the Buddha to a lion is hardly surprising. The comparison between a

117 See Manné (1990) and (1992).

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4. *The 'lion's roar' and the debate tradition*

In the Pāli Nikāyas the term *sihanāda* — 'the lion's roar' — is used for various types of expressions. When the Tathāgata's lion's roar is referred to we are close to the Vedic religious speech contest or Debate which Witzel has described in his article. When the 'lion's roar' is attributed to a disciple, we find that it is his own claim to attainments. Both the Tathāgata's 'lion's roar' and that of a disciple are utterances which the speaker is willing to defend in public, the former in front of a large public of the world, the latter in front of the smaller public of the monks. It seems then that the Buddhists have adapted the Vedic tradition of challenges in debate to their own purposes, using their own terminology — *sihanāda* — and generalising it to include a monk's public assertion of his achievements. Suttas with *sihanāda* in their title generally confirm this usage. As we do not usually know how and when a sutta got its title, only limited weight can be attached to this last point.

5. *Conclusions.*

I said in the introduction that a study of the notion of the 'lion's roar' showed the inventive and creative way the reciters conveyed the Buddha's message, relating its content to the customs and traditions of their society. In fact it provides a variety of examples of their way of going about their task.

First a word about the reciters.

Recounting those aspects of daily life one had shared with the Buddha to one's fellow practitioners, passing on to them the content of the discourses one had heard — that is to say, one's

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own understanding of his Teaching, telling what one had seen, heard and experienced while one was with the Teacher, all that certainly began as early as Buddhism itself did. The first converts and earliest monks would obviously talk to each other about the Buddha and the Teaching, and keep each other informed about what had happened during, for example, an absence due to an almsround or a meditation retreat. What had happened would include what had been taught, who the Buddha had talked to in particular, who came to see him, what advice he gave, and so forth. As the community grew and spread this was essentially its way to keep in touch and up to date. Some people love to recount, to narrate stories, to share their experiences, to tell. Probably those who told about the Buddha and the Teaching especially well were invited to do so again and again and became known as good reciters. Telling skilfully requires invention and the texts are indeed full of literary inventions created by very skilful raconteurs.

The early reciters told about true events, events in which they had participated as observers and witnesses. Although we cannot know whether the accounts of the debates in D contain any actual words that the Buddha spoke, the style of debating they attribute to him is consistent and differentiated from that attributed to other debaters, and they are true to the Vedic debate tradition¹⁷. The early reciters also passed on the experiences of others that had been told to them. In telling a tale there are always modifications depending on the character and interests of the teller.

The early reciters created similes. A simile that compares the Buddha to a lion is hardly surprising. The comparison between a

117 See Manné (1990) and (1992).

great man and a lion exists in other Indian texts¹¹⁸. It exists too in our language¹¹⁹, and doubtless in many other languages which have inherited the idea that the lion is the king of the beasts. Lions roar, so the Buddha roars too. The early reciters attributed the epithet 'lion' to the Buddha, expanded the comparison to describe the likenesses and included the detail of the (lion's) 'roar'. The evidence (to be considered in detail below) suggests that it was the existence of this simile which inspired the reciters to attribute a content to, or to invent a content for the Buddha's lion's roar.

Having set the scene, so to speak, with regard to the early reciters, we can now show how our investigation of the texts about the lion's roar supports these ideas.

First of all there is the invention of situating the Buddha's lion's roar within a tradition of debate. The term 'lion's roar' is not connected with the Vedic debate tradition. It occurs neither in the Upaniṣads nor in the Brāhmaṇas. As the Buddhist texts can be so faithful and so accurate in their representation of the Vedic tradition¹²⁰, we can conclude from this that the term 'lion's roar' for a challenge is an invention of the Buddhist reciters. We can further conclude that it was part of this invention fictitiously to situate the lion's roar challenge within the debate tradition. Some details placed within the Buddha's lion's roar probably authentically belong to the Vedic debate tradition: the Buddha's refutation of a potential challenge to his capacities as a debater may be among these¹²¹, though I specify that I mean that these

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I have argued that the early reciters spontaneously created similes, and with them, in this example of the lion's roar, frameworks within which they could present their accounts. With regard to the aspects of the Teaching that come within the 'lion's roar' and the powers and confidences of the Tathāgata, I think that here we see redactors using such a framework inventively. The framework is that of the simile that compares the Buddha to a lion and attributes content to his roar. The existence of this framework, and the illogicality (why these particular aspects?) of the examples that remain to us of the Teachings placed within it, suggest the likelihood that many other aspects of the Teaching were also placed within it but those cited here are the only ones that have come down to us in these texts. With regard to the qualities of the Tathāgata that are placed within this framework, these are not particularly coherent, those in quote (8) comprising adaptations of other formulas, especially that of paras. 40-94 of the Sāmaññaphala Sutta, those in quote (11) perhaps based upon a challenge that was once made against the Buddha and of which no record remains in these texts.

Having invented the attribution of a lion's roar to the Buddha, the redactors generalised this invention to include monks as well. With regard to the monk's lion's roars, the permission to the monks to make a 'lion's roar' about the four types of samāṇa is an example of textual muddle¹²². Probably Sāriputta's great im-

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A simile is invented, a lion's roar is created for the Buddha, and then for the monks. The next step is to impose this invention on suttas (the inclusion of the term *sīhanāda* in their titles may reflect late ideas in which suttas were particularly important). Thus is tradition created!

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DEATH AS MEDITATION SUBJECT IN THE THERAVĀDA TRADITION

Mathieu Boisvert

In 1986, headlines such as 'U.S. Buddhist monk meditates on decaying corpses'¹ and 'Corpses remind me of nature of Samsara'² were on the front page of Sinhalese newspapers. The articles were describing the peculiar meditation practice of an American monk named Alokadhamma. Three years after his ordination, Bhikkhu Alokadhamma had become famous throughout the island of Sri Lanka because he resided in a cave in the company of two decomposing bodies placed in a glass cage, with four other bodies laid outside. These reports became the impetus for the attempt to answer the question that this paper is revolving around: what is the place and the role of the meditation on death within the contemporary Theravāda Buddhist tradition?

Alokadhamma's practice was most probably derived from the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, where the Buddha describes the nine types of charnel-ground meditation. In order to clarify this unusual practice, however, the position as put forth in Theravāda literature first needs to be investigated. This will clarify the boundaries of the two major meditation practices centred on death, i.e. *asubha-bhāvanā* and *marāṇasati*. Secondly, in an attempt to conceptualise the contemporary practice, I will allude to eleven qualitative interviews that I conducted with Buddhist monks and with a *dasa sil mātāvo* in Sri Lanka during May 1993; it is important to em-

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phasise that all the interviewees belonged to hermitages (*āraṇ-
ṇaka*) where meditation is given priority. The two-fold procedure
of textual and contemporary analyses will allow us further to
understand the theoretical and modern expressions of these
practices.

Bhikkhu Alokadhamma's meditation on death seems to stem
from the description of the nine charnel-ground meditations men-
tioned in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. This discourse, traditionally
considered the theoretical base for meditation practice, is divided
into four main sections: meditation on the body (*kāyānupassanā*),
on the sensations (*vedanānupassanā*), on the mind (*cittānupassa-
nā*) and on the mental contents (*dhammānupassanā*). The section
concerned with the body is often regarded as the most eclectic of
the four since it adumbrates different types of meditation. It
discusses successively 1) *ānāpānasati*, mindfulness of the breath,
2) mindfulness of the four postures (walking, standing, sitting and
lying down), 3) mindfulness of whatever activities one is involved
in, 4) mindfulness of the repulsiveness by reviewing the thirty-one³

3 These 31 parts of the body, along with the brain, are the 32 subjects of
meditation (*kammaṭṭhāna*) that Buddhaghosa includes in *kāyagatāsati*. (...*dvat-
tiṃsākāraṇaṃmaṭṭhānaṃ*: — *idam idha kāyagatā sūtī ti adhippetam*. Vism 240).
We must point to the fact, however, that *kāyagatāsati* is not restricted to these
32 parts of the body in the Sutta literature, for it includes all the practices des-
cribed in the *kāyānupassanā* of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (see *Kāyagatāsati Sutta*, M
III 89). We must also remark that although this portion of the Satipaṭṭhāna is
commonly known as the meditation on *asubha* (the 'not-beautiful'), the term
asubha is neither employed within the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta itself nor in commen-
tarial literature referring to this passage; in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, Buddhaghosa
uses the term *paṭikkūla* (or *paṭikkūla*), meaning 'disgust'. Yet the two practices
seem to be analogous, for the *Girimānanda Sutta* (A V 108) defines *asubha-
saññā* as the awareness of these 31 parts of the body. Although a slight nuance
may be introduced between *asubha* and *asubhasaññā* we will, for the sake of

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parts of the body, 5) mindfulness of the four elements and finally,
the practice that interests us, 6) the nine charnel-ground medi-
tations (*nāva sīvathikapabbāni*)⁴. For each of these nine types of
contemplation, a standard formula is used throughout. The only
nuance lies in the degree of decomposition of the body (or what
is left of it) from the body that died the same day, to the rotten
bones that have started transforming into dust. The formula runs
like this: 'as if a monk were to see a corpse thrown aside in the
charnel-ground [either dead since only one day, or since many
months depending on the type of charnel-ground meditation one
is involved in], he focuses on this [meaning *his*] body thus: "this
body has the same nature, it will become the same as that body;

simplicity, adopt the common interpretation and refer to this practice as one
belonging to *asubha* meditation.

4 However, these six different types of meditation within the section on the
body (*kāyānupassanā*) may not be as eclectic as it seems if considered from a
particular perspective. Since this portion of the Satipaṭṭhāna deals with the body,
it might be possible that the Buddha classified the six meditations related to the
body temporarily, i.e. in the same order as the evolution of the body. The first
bodily activity to take place after birth is breathing (*ānāpāna*) and the baby re-
mains in the position he was laid (more or less); later the child learns to sit,
stand and walk (the four postures); subsequently, the child becomes aware of his
own person, his separate existence and activities on which he can reflect (mind-
fulness of whatever activities one is involved in); when the child reaches his
teens, passion emerges and therefore mindfulness of the repulsiveness by review-
ing the 31 parts of the body becomes appropriate; when the individual's intellec-
tual capacity is at its peak, the more introspective practice of the four elements
might be more appropriate; at the very end of life, when the body returns to
ashes, we find the nine charnel-ground meditations (*nāva sīvathikapabbāni*). This
hypothetical scheme demands further investigation and does not imply that a
specific practice ought to be undertaken exclusively during a particular period
of life.

it cannot escape it"⁵. The recurring aspect of this formula stresses that the monk must establish a parallel with his own body by reflecting on the fact that it possesses the same nature (*evam-dhammo*) and that it will eventually reach the same state as that decaying body (*evam-bhāvī*).

We may raise the question of whether this particular passage prescribes the actual contemplation of corpses, for the only explicit prescription is to reflect on the fact that one's own body will eventually be similar to those lying in charnel-grounds. The text does not necessarily require that the practitioner observe a corpse⁶. According to this passage, therefore, it does not seem imperative for someone practising the nine charnel-ground contemplations actually to observe corpses at that moment; it is only said that this person must reflect on the fact that his own body is possessed of the same nature as that of the bodies at different stages of decay.

However, in the sixth chapter of the Visuddhimagga (*Asubhakammaṭṭhānaniddeśa*), Buddhaghosa elaborates on the method of pursuing such a practice and describes the observation of corpses at one of the ten different stages of decomposition. In this chapter ten stages are enumerated as *asubhakammaṭṭhāna* (object of meditation for the practice of the non-beautiful): the bloated, the livid, the festering, the cut up, the gnawed, the scattered, the hacked and scattered, the bleeding, the worm-infested and the skeleton. These are basically the same as those nine described in

5 *punu ca param bhikkhavo bhikkhu seyyathā pi passeyya sarīraṃ sivathikāya chaddītaṃ ekāmatam vā dvīhamatam vā līhamatam vā uddhumatākam vinīlakam vipubbakājūtam, so imam eva kāyam upasaṃharanti: 'Ayaṃ pi kho kāyo evam-dhammo evam-bhāvī etaṃ ti'. D II 295.*

6 The verb of the subordinate clause (*passeyya*) is in the optative tense (*sattami*) and is preceded by an adverb (*seyyathā*) meaning 'just as'.

the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, the primary difference being that in the latter, the classification is arranged according to the period of decay, while in the former it is according to the qualitative state of the corpses. Elaborate training and preparation are prescribed prior to the culmination of practice — the actual contemplation of decaying bodies⁷. The commentator also explains the different approaches one ought to take during the actual contemplation⁸ and also warns the reader that one should not use the body of the opposite sex for this practice. As Kevin Trainor has remarked⁹, Buddhaghosa does not seem to take into consideration the section

7 A monk must intensively prepare himself before setting forth to the charnel-ground (or a similar place). According to Buddhaghosa (*Vism* 180), the practitioner must first find a teacher to supervise him; one cannot undertake this discipline without guidance. Only after having learned everything from him, should the disciple find a proper dwelling (this 'proper dwelling' is described in Ch.IV of *Vism*, §§1-20) and abide meditating (investigating; *pariyesantena*) on the subject that was given to him. Later, if he hears that a corpse is lying at the root of a tree, a village gate, a charnel-ground, etc., he must first inform his superior before setting forth and undertaking his contemplation, the reason being that if he does not return due to lions, tigers, robbers, or others (. . .), the superior could send some younger monk to rescue him. Then only, the text says, can he proceed 'as happy as a warrior longing to witness an inauguration'. Buddhaghosa also says that the yogi ought to go alone (*eko adutiyo gacchati*) and should not approach the charnel-ground against the wind (*paṭivāta*), for his own body might react to the smell and he might repent having undertaken this project.

8 The yogi ought to apprehend the sign (*nimitta*) (of the bloated, . . .) by 1) its colour, 2) its mark (the three phases of life), 3) its shape, 4) its direction, 5) its location, 6) its limitations, (*Vism* 184), 7) its joints, 8) its openings, 9) its concavities, 10) its convexities, and 11) all round (*Vism* 185). The last five approaches are only recommended if the practitioner has not grasped the sign.

9 Trainor, Kevin, 'In the Eye of the Beholder; Nonattachment and the Body in Subhā's Verse (Therīgāthā 71)', *JAAR* LXI/1, note 35, pp.68-9. The verses referred to are Therīgāthā 393-8.

of the Theragāthā where an arahant is portrayed as contemplating a woman's corpse in a charnel-ground.

In this chapter, although the objects of meditation are cadavers, the concept of death itself is totally absent. The chief aim of this practice is to develop *asubha* towards our own body and that of others, in order to eradicate any kind of lust or passion that may arise¹⁰. The purpose of this meditation was not to develop an awareness of death itself, but rather to stimulate some sense of repulsion. Buddhaghosa further characterises these ten meditations as belonging to *asubhabhāvanā*, and he perceives them as distinct from the meditation on death (*maraṇānussati*), for he devotes a full chapter to this type of meditation, to which we will soon return. Buddhaghosa explains that the meditation on *asubha* particularly fits the greedy temperament (*rāgacarita*), and he further elaborates by correlating each of the ten degrees of decay to a specific greed¹¹.

Although this correlation with the ten expressions of greed is probably the construct of the commentator, the Sutta literature —

and especially the older sections — establishes an explicit link between the practice of *asubha* meditation and the greedy temperament. The Theragāthā, for example, depicts the story of Sīṅgālapitā who got rid of greed towards sensual desire through the contemplation of a skeleton (or at least the idea, *saññā*, of a skeleton)¹². However, the two most explicit passages correlating the awareness of *asubha* with the diminution of lust are found in the Saṃyutta Nikāya and Aṅguttara Nikāya where it is clearly stated that *asubha* should be developed in order to rid oneself of lust¹³. Moreover, the various classifications of the qualities necessary for the eradication of lust always include *asubha* or *asubhasaññā*¹⁴. Other passages in the Sutta literature indicate that these qualities do not eradicate lust, but lead to the deathless, a term often equated with Nibbāna¹⁵. More precisely, the Saṃyutta Nikāya indicates that properly cultivating the recognition (*saññā*) of any of five types of cadavers (the skeleton, the worm-eaten, the discoloured, the fissured and the inflated corpse)¹⁶ can induce arahanthood or the state of non-return¹⁷. From what we have

10 'This filthy body stinks outright / Like ordure, like a privy's site / This body men that have insight / Condemn, is object of a fool's delight / A tumour where nine holes abide / Wrapped in a coat of clammy hide / And trickling filth on every side / Polluting the air with stench far and wide / If it perchance should come about / That what is inside came out / Surely a man would need a knout / With which to put the crows and dogs to rout.' (Vism VI 93, translation taken from *The Path of Purification*, p.203). It is interesting to note that in the Vism, the meaning of the term *asubha* is very similar to that of *patikkūla*, i.e. repulsiveness.

11 Vism, p.193 ff: Abhidhamma and commentarial literature classifies personalities into six types of temperament (*cārita*): greedy (*rāga*), hating (*dosa*), deluded (*moha*), faithful (*saddhā*), intelligent (*buddhi*) and speculative (*vitakka*). On these, see Vism, p.101 ff.

12 Thag, p.4 (18).

13 *Asubhāya cittaṃ bhāvehi*. A I 118; *asubhā bhāvetabbā rāgassa pahānāya*. A IV 358.

14 In a list of 10, see A V 309-10; in a list of 9, A IV 465; in a list of 7, A IV 148; in a list of 5, A IV 276.

15 In a list of 9, at A IV 387; in a list of 7, A IV 46.

16 *Atthika*, *puḷavaka*, *vinīlaka*, *vicchiddaka*, *uddumūṭaka*. These 5 are members of Buddhaghosa's ten-fold list of *asubhakkammaṭṭhāna* referred to previously.

17 S V 129-31. The Vism exemplifies this statement by presenting the story of Mahātissa Thera: upon seeing the teeth (*dantūṭhika*: the bones of the teeth). The author stresses that it is the bones (*atthika*) that Mahātissa perceives, for they are part of the skeleton and fall into the *asubhakkammaṭṭhāna* of a woman running away from her husband. Mahātissa acquired *asubhasaññā* and attained Nibbāna. When her husband, seeking his wife, asked him whether he had seen a woman

seen so far, the place ascribed to *asubha* within canonical Pāli literature is unequivocal: its cultivation can lead to Nibbāna, or at least to great benefits such as the eradication of passion¹⁸.

This type of meditation is dependent, to a certain extent, upon death, for in many instances it uses death as an object. We use the term *object* in the sense that there is something visible or tangible that can be observed. In these cases, the practitioner contemplates cadavers. Although death as an object is not necessary to practise *asubha* meditation, as with the contemplation of the thirty-one parts of the body, it is often considered a crucial requirement. It has already been noted that Buddhaghosa's ten objects of meditation for the cultivation of *asubha* are corpses at different stages of decay. Although Buddhaghosa's emphasis on contemplation of corpses is not accentuated in the Sutta literature, I have found passages referring to it. There is, however, another type of meditation on death, known as *marāṇasati*, which is

pass by. Mahātissa replied with the verses which later became famous in the Theravāda tradition: Whether it was a man or a woman / That went by I noticed not / But only that on this high road / There goes a group of bones. (Vism, p.21. Translation quoted from *The Path of Purification*, p.22).

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Very few allusions to *marāṇasati* are made in the canonical literature¹⁹, yet this practice seems central to the tradition. Most Buddhist traditions share the myth that before Gotama decided to leave the householder's life to become a recluse, he came in contact with four sights: sickness, old age, death and asceticism. It is these four sights that triggered Gotama's desire to go forth. It is interesting to note that the middle two sights are elements belonging to the *paṭiccasamuppāda*, a doctrine central to the tradition. Old age and death cannot be avoided and, on account of them, a whole mass of suffering arises in the future²⁰. Facing the continuous presence of suffering, as well as the inevitability of death which may be sensed through ageing and old age, Gotama sought release from this ongoing cycle of life and death. Quests triggered by a similar realisation were also undertaken by other characters in the Canon, especially in the Jātaka literature²¹. All

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of the Theragāthā where an arahant is portrayed as contemplating a woman's corpse in a charnel-ground.

In this chapter, although the objects of meditation are cadavers, the concept of death itself is totally absent. The chief aim of this practice is to develop *asubha* towards our own body and that of others, in order to eradicate any kind of lust or passion that may arise¹⁰. The purpose of this meditation was not to develop an awareness of death itself, but rather to stimulate some sense of repulsion. Buddhaghosa further characterises these ten meditations as belonging to *asubhabhāvanā*, and he perceives them as distinct from the meditation on death (*marañānussati*), for he devotes a full chapter to this type of meditation, to which we will soon return. Buddhaghosa explains that the meditation on *asubha* particularly fits the greedy temperament (*rāgacarita*), and he further elaborates by correlating each of the ten degrees of decay to a specific greed¹¹.

Although this correlation with the ten expressions of greed is probably the construct of the commentator, the Sutta literature —

10 'This filthy body stinks outright / Like ordure, like a privy's site / This body men that have insight / Condemn, is object of a fool's delight / A tumour where nine holes abide / Wrapped in a coat of clammy hide / And trickling filth on every side / Polluting the air with stench far and wide / If it perchance should come about / That what is inside came out / Surely a man would need a knout / With which to put the crows and dogs to rout'. (Vism VI 93, translation taken from *The Path of Purification*, p.203). It is interesting to note that in the Vism, the meaning of the term *asubha* is very similar to that of *paṭikkūla*, i.e. repulsiveness.

11 Vism, p.193 ff: Abhidhamma and commentarial literature classifies personalities into six types of temperament (*cārita*): greedy (*rāga*), hating (*dosa*), deluded (*moḥa*), faithful (*saddhā*), intelligent (*buddhi*) and speculative (*vitakka*). On these, see Vism, p.101 ff.

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and especially the older sections — establishes an explicit link between the practice of *asubha* meditation and the greedy temperament. The Theragāthā, for example, depicts the story of Sīṅgālapitā who got rid of greed towards sensual desire through the contemplation of a skeleton (or at least the idea, *saññā*, of a skeleton)¹². However, the two most explicit passages correlating the awareness of *asubha* with the diminution of lust are found in the Saṃyutta Nikāya and Aṅguttara Nikāya where it is clearly stated that *asubha* should be developed in order to rid oneself of lust¹³. Moreover, the various classifications of the qualities necessary for the eradication of lust always include *asubha* or *asubhasaññā*¹⁴. Other passages in the Sutta literature indicate that these qualities do not eradicate lust, but lead to the deathless, a term often equated with Nibbāna¹⁵. More precisely, the Saṃyutta Nikāya indicates that properly cultivating the recognition (*saññā*) of any of five types of cadavers (the skeleton, the worm-eaten, the discoloured, the fissured and the inflated corpse)¹⁶ can induce arahant-hood or the state of non-return¹⁷. From what we have

12 Thag, p.4 (18).

13 *Asubhāya cittaṃ bhāvehi*. A I 118; *asubhā bhāvetabbā rāgassa pahānāya*. A IV 358.

14 In a list of 10, see A V 309-10; in a list of 9, A IV 465; in a list of 7, A IV 148; in a list of 5, A IV 276.

15 In a list of 9, at A IV 387; in a list of 7, A IV 46.

16 *Aṭṭhika*, *puḷavaka*, *vinīḷaka*, *vicchiddaka*, *uddumūṭaka*. These 5 are members of Buddhaghosa's ten-fold list of *asubhakkammaṭṭhāna* referred to previously.

17 S V 129-31. The Vism exemplifies this statement by presenting the story of Mahātissa Thera: upon seeing the teeth (*dantāṭṭhika*: the bones of the teeth. The author stresses that it is the bones [*ṭṭhika*] that Mahātissa perceives, for they are part of the skeleton and fall into the *asubhakkammaṭṭhāna*) of a woman running away from her husband, Mahātissa acquired *asubhasaññā* and attained Nibbāna. When her husband, seeking his wife, asked him whether he had seen a woman

seen so far, the place ascribed to *asubha* within canonical Pāli literature is unequivocal: its cultivation can lead to Nibbāna, or at least to great benefits such as the eradication of passion¹⁸.

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So mindfulness of death is the remembering of death, in other words, of the interruption of the life faculty. One who wants to develop this should go into solitary retreat and exercise attention wisely in this way: 'Death will take place; the life faculty will be interrupted' or 'Death, death'²³.

According to the commentator, this exercise ought to generate mindfulness (*sati*), the sense of urgency (*saṃvega*) and knowledge (*ñāṇa*)²⁴. If it is not successful, the practitioner should recollect death in eight different ways: 1) as a murderer (who appears sud-

mere fact of realising that we are not immune to old age. King Makhādeva, for example, uttered the following verse upon noticing one single grey hair on his head: 'These grey hairs that appear on my head are death's own messengers that come to rob my life. Now is the time that I renounce the worldly life' (J I 138. The Susīma Jātaka [J II 237], Cullasutasoma Jātaka [J V 91] and Nimi Jātaka [J VI 53] are of the same character).

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denly and takes away life), 2) as the ruin of success (for death is the ruining of life's success), 3) by comparison ((i.e. by comparing oneself to others who have died), 4) as to the sharing of the body with many (kinds of worms and creatures), 5) as to the fragility of life, 6) as signless (in the sense of unpredictable), 7) as to the limit of the extent, and 8) as to the brevity of the moment (in the sense that one is alive only for the duration of one's consciousness). This last perspective on death contradicts the definition that the commentator himself had set at the beginning of the chapter. Death, in this context, ought to be seen as the termination of the life faculty and does not include the constant dissolution of the aggregates — what is technically termed *momentary death* (*khaṇikamarāṇaṇi*). Yet, having excluded momentary death at the outset, Buddhaghosa reintegrates it with the eighth perspective.

In modern Sri Lanka, where Buddhaghosa lived some 1,500 years ago, charnel-grounds are basically non-existent. Bodies are either burned, when the financial situation of a family allows it, or buried. Monks wishing to practise *asubhabhāvanā*, as described by Buddhaghosa, have to find alternatives. Since one of the ten stages of decomposition of corpses is known as 'cut up' (*vicchiddakam*) a possible option for monks wishing to follow Buddhaghosa's prescription is to attend sessions where bodies are actually cut up: postmortem examinations are the ideal modern alternative. Although Buddhaghosa originally suggested locations such as battlefields, forests infested with robbers or charnel-grounds where kings have thieves cut up²⁵, the autopsy room seems a viable compromise.

25 *Vicchiddakam yaddhamāṇḍale vā carūṭaviyaṃ vā susūne vā, yattha rājāno core chindāpentī, araṇṇā vā pana sīhavyaggehi chinnapurisatthāne labbhati.* *Vism* 190.

During my research, I had the opportunity to observe one monk who attended an autopsy at the Colombo General Hospital²⁶. I interviewed a monk of British origin who mentioned that he was planning to attend an autopsy a few days later. He invited me to accompany him. On that day, I met him at the hospital temple around 9.30 am and proceeded directly to the room where postmortems were performed. When we entered, two cadavers were already being autopsied, with a third one laid on the ground waiting its turn. All were males. Since the monk had not enquired as to the sex of the bodies, it did not seem that Buddhaghosa's restriction carried much weight.

The smell was paradoxically vivid. The monk approached one of the bodies. Two men were working on the abdomen, emptying it of its contents. The monk remained beside the body for approximately five minutes, then walked around, keeping his eyes on the object of his meditation. He asked me how I was coping with the situation three times. The two technicians were now working on the head, cutting it open with a saw. The monk approached to have a closer view of the process. Two minutes later, he moved to the other body, whose autopsy was already completed. He looked at all the internal organs (lungs, heart, liver, . . .) lying on the table, took the hand of the dead man in his, and asked me: 'you can feel death, do you want to touch?'²⁷. I politely

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Immediately following the autopsies, when asked how he felt, the monk answered that he still had a feeling of 'unease' and that disgust was still pre-eminent in his mind. By witnessing an autopsy, he continued, one is able to investigate at a deeper level the nature of the body, that is, the foulness inherent in the body we often perceive as attractive. It is also crucial, he stressed, to couple this particular practice with *vipassanā* meditation. The emotions, sensations and images that arise when one witnesses an autopsy need to be dealt with. In order to transform this experience into a meditative process, one has to develop constant and objective awareness of these sensations and emotions. This enables the practitioner to cultivate an understanding of the reality as it is, without generating hatred or disgust towards individuals themselves.

After reflecting on the extreme nature of this particular practice, I questioned the monk as to its relation to one of the central teachings of the Buddha — what is known as the middle-path (*majjhimaṭṭipadā*). He explained that what is meant by 'middle-path' is not moderation, but rather the capacity to develop a stable state of mind, a sort of indifference — or rather equanimity — regardless of the situation. The middle-path is avoiding

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extremes in the sense that the mind remains aloof from pleasure and pain; the mind simply becomes a detached observer of the situations being experienced. However, he admitted that this was an extreme and occasional situation that he decided to place himself into in order to observe the reactions that would arise. During the seven years that he has been a monk, this was only the second time he witnessed an autopsy. His own specific practice is grounded in an interest in understanding how the mind manufactures emotions and how these are related to thoughts. To achieve this comprehension, he practises the more traditionally accepted form of meditation, i.e. *vipassanā*.

I also interviewed ten other members of the Sangha²⁸, most of whom had practised this postmortem-meditation at least once. When asked to explain how they understood *marāṇasati*, all agreed with Buddhaghosa's interpretation that *marāṇasati* requires the practitioners to remind themselves constantly of the proximity of death. From the subsequent analyses of the interviews, I noticed that two other practices had also been classified as *marāṇasati*. Without ever challenging Buddhaghosa's definition, eight of the eleven interviewees suggested that *marāṇasati* was broader than this mere awareness of the potentiality of death. First, they considered meditation on *asubha*, as described by Buddhaghosa (i.e. the ten types of charnel-ground contemplations or their modern expression in the autopsy room) as belonging to *marāṇasati* as long as the yogis perceived and constantly contemplated the fragility of life. This falls in line with the Sati-

patthāna's suggestion that practitioners must reflect on the fact that their body possesses the same nature. In fact, many monks in Sri Lanka have witnessed autopsies in order to cultivate *asubha* and/or *marāṇasati*. Moreover, photographs of autopsies are broadly available for the Thai monastic community and these are widely circulated in Sri Lanka. Most of the hermitages where the interviews were conducted had at least a few of these photographs and/or partial or complete skeletons used for meditation purposes. All the monks using these tools, however, strongly emphasised that without reflecting on their own body, the charnel-ground contemplations (or the contemplation of the photographs or the skeletons) remain solely at the *asubha* level.

These same eight monastics perceived *marāṇasati* as the natural result of their daily meditation. As the abbot in charge of a major meditation centre in Colombo remarked, 'death itself is merely a concept which is totally devoid of substance. For this reason, it is impossible to focus on it'. He further explained that what we conventionally call death does not exist, for the simple reason that in order for something/someone to die, it needs to possess an independent existence which Buddhist doctrine denies with the theories of *anicca*, *anatta* and *paṭiccasamuppāda*. A person does not merely die at the end of one's existence for, at the deepest level, this person never existed. What we normally term 'person' is an amalgam of five aggregates which are constantly changing. Every moment, each of these aggregates arises and passes away (*upajjhivā, nirujjhanti*). Therefore, *marāṇasati*, viewed from this angle, cannot be separated from the normal practice of *vipassanā* meditation which aims, as the tradition claims, at seeing things as they really are. Practitioners of *vipassanā* who simply observe their own mind and body soon notice the transitory character of existence. Eventually, they become aware that birth and death happen at every single mo-

28 The status of the *dasa sil mātāvo* is the object of a controversy among the Sinhalese monastic community. [For more information on the subject, see Tessa Bartholmeusz, *Women under the Bo Tree*, Buddhist Nuns in Sri Lanka, Cambridge 1994]

ment. Material particles arise and vanish: death is present throughout the life-process. Such an awareness helps, on the one hand, to cope with what we conventionally call death. By becoming increasingly aware of the presence of death, at the experiential level, practitioners are no more intimidated when the final moment comes. Death is nothing but the culmination of successive deaths which one had gradually learned to deal with. On the other hand, this same process helps them live a less egocentric, more detached, equanimous and compassionate life, for they have come to understand that nothing is worth clinging to, and that human suffering is directly related to the cultivation of the awareness of impermanence, the core of Theravāda Buddhist meditation. In fact, when one practises one of these two thoroughly, the other is also automatically practised, whether consciously or not.

The view that *marāṇasati* is intimately linked with *vipassanā* is also corroborated by the fact that the former is one of the four protections (*caturarakkhā*). Members of the Sangha as well as lay-meditators in intensive training are encouraged to recite daily the verses of protections. By recollecting the qualities of the Buddha, promoting loving-kindness, restraining sexual desires through *asubha* and promoting the awareness of death, the practitioners' ability to deepen their meditation is supposed to increase. It is also noteworthy that lay people going to the temple in order to pay respect to the Buddha often recite a standard verse similar to those found in the four protections: I pay respect to the Buddha; may I obtain some merit. This body [of mine] will be destroyed just as these flowers will fade²⁹. This indicates that

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It is clear from these eight interviews that the practice of *marāṇasati* not only includes a constant remembrance of the finitude of life, but also incorporates *asubhabhāvanā* and the awareness of *anicca*. This perception of *marāṇasati* differs radically from Buddhaghosa's, for the latter only considered the aware-

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extremes in the sense that the mind remains aloof from pleasure and pain; the mind simply becomes a detached observer of the situations being experienced. However, he admitted that this was an extreme and occasional situation that he decided to place himself into in order to observe the reactions that would arise. During the seven years that he has been a monk, this was only the second time he witnessed an autopsy. His own specific practice is grounded in an interest in understanding how the mind manufactures emotions and how these are related to thoughts. To achieve this comprehension, he practises the more traditionally accepted form of meditation, i.e. *vipassanā*.

I also interviewed ten other members of the Sangha²⁸, most of whom had practised this postmortem-meditation at least once. When asked to explain how they understood *maraṇasati*, all agreed with Buddhaghosa's interpretation that *maraṇasati* requires the practitioners to remind themselves constantly of the proximity of death. From the subsequent analyses of the interviews, I noticed that two other practices had also been classified as *maraṇasati*. Without ever challenging Buddhaghosa's definition, eight of the eleven interviewees suggested that *maraṇasati* was broader than this mere awareness of the potentiality of death. First, they considered meditation on *asubha*, as described by Buddhaghosa (i.e. the ten types of charnel-ground contemplations or their modern expression in the autopsy room) as belonging to *maraṇasati* as long as the yogis perceived and constantly contemplated the fragility of life. This falls in line with the Sati-

patthāna's suggestion that practitioners must reflect on the fact that their body possesses the same nature. In fact, many monks in Sri Lanka have witnessed autopsies in order to cultivate *asubha* and/or *maraṇasati*. Moreover, photographs of autopsies are broadly available for the Thai monastic community and these are widely circulated in Sri Lanka. Most of the hermitages where the interviews were conducted had at least a few of these photographs and/or partial or complete skeletons used for meditation purposes. All the monks using these tools, however, strongly emphasised that without reflecting on their own body, the charnel-ground contemplations (or the contemplation of the photographs or the skeletons) remain solely at the *asubha* level.

These same eight monastics perceived *maraṇasati* as the natural result of their daily meditation. As the abbot in charge of a major meditation centre in Colombo remarked, 'death itself is merely a concept which is totally devoid of substance. For this reason, it is impossible to focus on it'. He further explained that what we conventionally call death does not exist, for the simple reason that in order for something/someone to die, it needs to possess an independent existence which Buddhist doctrine denies with the theories of *anicca*, *anatta* and *paṭiccasamuppāda*. A person does not merely die at the end of one's existence for, at the deepest level, this person never existed. What we normally term 'person' is an amalgam of five aggregates which are constantly changing. Every moment, each of these aggregates arises and passes away (*upajjhivā, nirujjhanti*). Therefore, *maraṇasati*, viewed from this angle, cannot be separated from the normal practice of *vipassanā* meditation which aims, as the tradition claims, at seeing things as they really are. Practitioners of *vipassanā* who simply observe their own mind and body soon notice the transitory character of existence. Eventually, they become aware that birth and death happen at every single mo-

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ness of death as the essence of this practice. I must stress, however, that three other monastics categorically stated that *marāṇasati* was solely the awareness of death, and that the nine charnel-ground meditations belonged exclusively to the realm of *asubhabhāvanā*.

I would like to conclude by summarising the divergences of interpretation that have been alluded to in this paper — that is, divergences between canonical literature, the Visuddhimagga and contemporary practice. The description of *marāṇasati* in canonical literature is sparse and limited to the awareness of ageing and the proximity of death. Two simple methods for developing this awareness are described in the Aṅguttara³⁰, while many passages of, the Jātakas and Thera- Therīgāthā praise this awareness by offering numerous examples of persons who, having realised the inexorability of their fate, either decided to renounce worldly life or attained enlightenment. Buddhaghosa, however, built an eight-fold method for developing this awareness, a systematised method that is absent in earlier Pāli literature. Yet contemporary practice shows a much wider interpretation which, according to the majority of the monastics interviewed, includes *asubhabhāvanā* and the awareness of *anicca*.

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30 The first thing is constantly to remind oneself that death could happen at any moment: after one day, one night, a meal, a single bite [A III 303 and also at A IV 316]. The other being the different reasons for dying such as being bitten by a centipede, a snake or a scorpion, or falling, choking . . . [A III 307, and also at A IV 320]

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EKOTTARĀGAMA (XX)

Translated from the Chinese Version by
Thich Huyèn-Vi and Bhikkhu Pāsādika
in collaboration with Sara Boin-Webb

Ninth Fascicle
Part 18
(Shame and Remorse)

6. 'Thus have I heard. At one time the Buddha was staying in Śrāvastī, at the Jeta Grove, in Anāthapiṇḍada's Park. Then Venerable Nanda donned exquisite robes, and with eye-shadow he brightened up his eye[lids], wearing slippers ornamented with gold. Again, he rubbed² the cosmetic off his eye[lids] and, holding in his hands his alms-bowl, he was about to enter the city of Śrāvastī.

From afar many bhikṣus saw Venerable Nanda [on the point of] entering the city to beg for alms-food, while he was wearing exquisite robes. Now those bhikṣus went to the whereabouts of the Exalted One, bowing down their heads at his feet, and sat down at one side. Hardly had [they taken their seats] when they stood up [again], saying to the Exalted One: As far as Bhikṣu Nanda is concerned, he has donned exquisite robes and brightened up his eye[lids] with eye-shadow and is [thus] entering the city of

1 See T 2, 591a8 ff; Hayashi, p.153 ff.

2 For 按 Hayashi reads 按 (to compare; to criticise; to oppose), which does not seem appropriate.

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NOTES

1. For details of these developments, see D. D. Kosambi, *The Culture and Civilization of Ancient India* (London, 1965), pp. 103 ff.; a more recent development of this theme is offered by Jaimal Rai in his *The Rural-Urban Economy and Social Changes in Ancient India* (Delhi, 1974), pp. 165 ff.
2. On the chronology of these texts, see M. Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature* (New York 1971), II, pp. 17 ff.; for the dates of the Buddha and Asoka, see B. G. Gokhale, *Asoka Maurya* (New York, 1971), pp. 35, 63; also see B. G. Gokhale, *Buddhism in Maharashtra*, (Bombay, 1976), pp. 23 ff.; on these "elite" groups, see B. G. Gokhale, "The Early Buddhist Elite," *Journal of Indian History*, XLIII/II (August 1965), pp. 391-402.
3. J. Kashyap (ed.), *The Cullavagga* (Nalanda, 1956), pp. 406-409.
4. See G. P. Malalasekera, *Dictionary of Pali Proper Names* (London, 1960), II, pp. 1126-1127; hereafter referred to as *DPPN*.
5. *DPPN*, II, pp. 1126-1127; B. N. Chaudhury, *Buddhist Centres in Ancient India* (Calcutta, 1969), pp. 71-74 (hereafter abbreviated as *BCAI*); Balram Srivastava, *Trade and Commerce in Ancient India* (Varanasi, 1968), pp. 75-76.
6. *BCAI*, pp. 99-105; *DPPN*, II, pp. 721-724.
7. *BCAI*, pp. 43-45; *DPPN*, I, pp. 516-520; B. G. Gokhale, *Asoka Maurya* (New York, 1966), pp. 75, 164.
8. *BCAI*, pp. 56-60; *DPPN*, II, p. 940-943; J. Kashyap (ed.), *The Digha Nikāya* (Nalanda, 1958), II, pp. 92-93.
9. *BCAI*, pp. 85-87; *DPPN*, I, pp. 692-695; Gokhale, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
10. *BCAI*, pp. 182-184; *DPPN*, I, pp. 344-345; also see B. C. Law, *Ujjayini in Ancient India* (Gwalior, 1944), pp. 2-4, 13-15, 32-33; J. Kashyap (ed.), *The Mahāvagga* (Nalanda, 1956), pp. 214-217; T. W. Rhys Davids and H. Oldenberg (trans.), *Vinaya Texts* (Delhi, 1965), pp. 32-40.
11. *BCAI*, pp. 122-123; *DPPN*, I, pp. 855-856; J. Kashyap (ed.), *The Mahāvagga*, pp. 327 ff.
12. For the term *nigama*, see Jaimal Rai, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-161.
13. For the *Brāhmanagamas*, see B. G. Gokhale, "Brahmanas in Early Buddhist Literature," in *Journal of Indian History*, XLVIII/1, pp. 51-61.
14. See C.S.P. Misra, *The Age of Vinaya* (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 249-260; also see Balram Srivastava, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-283.
15. For the reemergence of "villagism" see D. D. Kosambi, *op. cit.*, pp. 103 ff.
16. For the Buddha and the "caste" system of his times see B. G. Gokhale, *Buddhism in Maharashtra*, pp. 26 ff.
17. *DPPN*, II, p. 27.
18. See B. G. Gokhale, *op. cit.*, p. 162; for inscriptional evidence of the Śunga-Kān... see H. Luders, *Appendix to Epigraphia Indica* (Calcutta, 1912), X, Nos. 248, 299, 367.

Pilgrimage and the Structure of Sinhalese Buddhism

by John C. Folt

Probably from JIABS or BSR

Throughout the history of Buddhism in South and Southeast Asia, Buddhists have undertaken religious pilgrimages to sacred places where, according to tradition, bodily relics of the Buddha are enshrined. This "cult of traces"¹ has been so widespread and powerful that at least one scholar has suggested that in the formative period of Theravāda Buddhism in Sri Lanka, it provided the primary focal point of spiritual orientation for much of the lay tradition.² As the monastic community focused its cultic activities upon the study, recitation and interpretation of the Buddha's teachings (*dhammakāya*), the laity propitiated the Buddha through venerating the remains of his physical body (*rūpakāya*). These two orientations represent the means by which the monastic and lay segments of the early Buddhist community sustained the legacy of the Buddha's life and teachings. The origins of this division of spiritual labor may be found in texts that are as ancient as the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* of the *Digha Nikāya*, articulated perhaps within one hundred years of the death of the Buddha.

However, pilgrimage to sacred places where relics of the Buddha are enshrined is more than a matter of commemorating the great master. The Buddha's relics were popularly believed to be latent manifestations of miraculous power. Pious political rulers assumed that possession of the Buddha's relics legitimated and strengthened their abilities to rule.³ From the time of the Indian emperor Asoka in the third century B.C., relics were closely associated with temporal power.

In modern Sri Lanka, kingship is now a matter of past history. Yet pilgrimage to sacred places associated with the Bud-

dha's relics continues to be a widespread religious practice. One of the holiest shrines in Sri Lanka is the Daḷadā Māligāwa (Temple of the Tooth) in Kandy. At all times during the year, especially during the annual Āsaḷa Perahāra festival in July-August, thousands of traditional-minded Buddhists make a pilgrimage in order to honor the Buddha's relic. This is a brief study of pilgrimage to Kandy and its wider significance within the structure of Sinhalese Buddhism.

1. The Symbolism of the Relic and its Ritual Importance

Of the several reasons for the *daḷadā's* (tooth-relic's) continuous charismatic appeal for traditional Buddhists, one of the most important is its past association with the power of Sinhalese Buddhist kings.

The Daḥavanṣa—written by Dhammakitti in the twelfth century A.D. and purportedly based upon an ancient Sinhalese poem, the *Daḷadāvanṣa*—contains a mythic account⁴ of how the relic remained in Dantapura⁵ under the patronage of a long line of righteous kings. According to this account, in the fourth century A.D. an Indian king, Guhasiva, converted to Buddhism, thereby angering the brāhmanical priests of his court. War followed when the priests complained to the Pāṇḍu king at Pāṭalipūtra. To insure the continued safety of the relic, Guhasiva gave it to his daughter and son-in-law and told them to take it to Ceylon. When they arrived with the relic, the Sinhalese king paid it great homage and placed it in a shrine known as the *Dhammacakka*. From that time, Buddhist kings protected the tooth-relic as if its well-being constituted one of their primary responsibilities.

The *Daḥavanṣa's* account contains a number of significant motifs familiar to the traditional chronicles of Sri Lanka. In the first instance, off-spring of a converted Indian Buddhist monarch are sent on a royal mission to take relics to Sri Lanka. This parallels the *Mahāvanṣa's* account of how the alms-bowl Relic and scion of the Bodhi Tree were brought to Sri Lanka by Mahinda and Saṅghamitta during Asoka's kingship.⁶ Second, its placement by the Sinhalese king in the *Dhamma-cakka* shrine explicitly identifies the relic with the king's duty to "rule by

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righteousness."⁷ Third, the legend helps to sustain a national belief that the future well-being of the Buddha's religion is in the hands of the Sinhalese people.⁸

An earlier account of the relic's importance is given by the Chinese pilgrim Fa-Hien, who traveled in Ceylon during the 5th century. By the time of Fa-Hien's account, venerating the tooth-relic had become an auspicious means for the king and the laity to "amass merit for themselves."⁹ Ten days before the king sponsored a grand procession of the relic from his palace to the Abhyagiri monastery in Anurādhapura, a royal announcement containing a description of the Buddha's career as a bodhisattva was issued. The description, reminiscent of the *Vessantara Jātaka*, emphasizes how the Buddha sacrificed his entire kingdom out of compassion for the well-being of the world and implies that the bodhisattva career of the Buddha had already become an ideal model for Buddhist kings to emulate. Thus, by the fifth century, the tooth relic seems already to have become the king's own personal talisman and "palladium of the Sinhalese people."¹⁰

Bardwell Smith writes that the tooth relic continued to be of immense symbolic importance to Buddhist kings during the early medieval Polonnaruva period: "The regalia needed by monarchs to authenticate their sovereignty included the Tooth Relic and the Alms-Bowl Relic. The suspicion or dubious lineage that their absence implied spelled the promise of dire consequences. When taken, they were to be retrieved at any cost."¹¹ The symbolic importance of the tooth relic for the legitimacy of Buddhist kingship was not lost upon the people of the kingdom. The king's close association with the relic underscored the popular belief that the king was actually a "Buddha-in-the-making," the most pious religious layman of the realm.¹² His possession of the relic gave him access to sacral power which, ideally, he would use for the general well-being and security of his people. In this way, "royal power was regarded as an instrument of cosmic power."¹³

The king's relationship to this cosmic power was graphically illustrated in the ritual life of the city, a ritual life in which the tooth relic played an important role. The capital seems to have functioned as a sacred center, an *axis mundi*, from which righteous power through ritual performance was thought to be

magically radiated to the outlying provinces to insure stability and order. The king, thus, occupied a mediating position between cosmic power and his people. Rituals and relics were magical conduits of power enabling the king to meet his prescribed royal duties.

During the Kandyan period, the king's relationships to cosmic power and to his people were brought into unparalleled high relief with the inauguration of the annual Āsaḷa Perahāra procession. In the middle of the eighteenth century, King Kīrti Śrī Rājāsīṃha initiated sweeping religious and political reforms that he hoped would legitimate his South Indian Nayakkar dynasty in the eyes of the Sinhalese people.¹⁴ Early in his reign, he reestablished orthodox lines of monastic ordination for the Asgiriya and Malwatta *nikāyas* (monastic chapters) in Kandy. Since the saṅgha was also a traditional source of legitimation for Buddhist kings, the importation of Siamese monks to confer *upasampadā* (ordination) upon aspiring Sinhalese aristocratic monks constituted a calculated move to strengthen his rule. But the move almost backfired. The Siamese became grievously offended when they witnessed the king promoting a *perahāra* (procession) in which Hindu gods were publically venerated and dignified to the exclusion of the Buddha.¹⁵ Kīrti Śrī reacted to the monks' condemnation with discretion: "A new *daḷadā* (tooth relic) *perahāra* was introduced into the general ritual complex and was given primacy over all other *perahāras*. The *perahāra* in this form reestablished the primacy of Buddhism within the Sinhalese religious system."¹⁶

In so doing, the king wittingly or unwittingly fused together two powerful and ancient ritual traditions. Before the inclusion of the tooth relic into the ritual proceedings of the Āsaḷa Perahāra, the ceremony consisted chiefly in the propitiation of deities who were petitioned by Hindu priests to insure the fertility and prosperity of the realm. Although the inclusion of the *daḷadā* in the ritual proceedings may have reestablished the primacy of Buddhism, the gods were by no means banished from the annual rites. Today, one of the major events of the Āsaḷa festival is a ritual circumambulation of four wooden *kapa* (poles), which symbolizes the king's former petitions to the gods for the kingdom's fertility and prosperity.¹⁷ This ritual tradition complements the second rite of circumambulation, which

was introduced to accommodate the importance of the *daḷadā*. In that second circumambulation, the king, with the *daḷadā* caparisoned on a royal elephant, led a procession around the boundaries of Kandy in a symbolic "capture" or "righteous conquest." Together, the two circumambulation rites represent a dramatic theatrical enactment of what numerous scholars refer to as "the doctrine of the exemplary center."¹⁸ More specifically, these rites represent an ontogeny of the king's power, which was rooted in ritually currying favor with the gods and invoking the power of the Buddha. The former insured prosperity, the latter righteous political order.

When the British seized the relic during their takeover of Kandy in 1815, some Buddhists openly worried about the future of Buddhism, while others (including the British)¹⁹ believed that possession of the *daḷadā* would guarantee colonial hegemony. But since 1847 (when the British, under severe pressure from Christian groups in Britain as well as in Ceylon, turned over custody of the relic to the Asgiriya and Malwatta monasteries), the *daḷadā* has officially been regarded as a religious object only. Thus, Wilhelm Geiger has written:

At the present the Daḷadā is no longer a symbol of political power, but is the revered centre of worship for all pious Buddhists living in Ceylon and for many thousands of pilgrims who come from abroad each year to profess their veneration and devotion for that holy relic of the Great Master of the World.²⁰

Although Geiger's statement is formally correct, it cannot be denied that the relic's continued popularity is due in part to a resurgence in "civil religion" among Sinhalese Buddhists in the 19th and 20th centuries.²¹ That is, the relic continues to symbolize the traditional cultural and social values of Sinhalese culture. Government tourism officials actively promote the Āsaḷa Perahāra at home and abroad as a national holiday celebrating indigenous customs and cultural identity. The relic's continued political symbolism is recognized by modern-day Sinhalese politicians, who find it expedient to participate in the *daḷadā*'s ritual procession or conspicuously to visit the Daḷadā Māligāva.²² It is also evident that the Āsaḷa Perahāra procession continues to depict symbolically the social structure of Kandyan

society.²³ What these social and political facts reflect is that the *daḷadā* is a public symbol which expresses the continuing close association between religion and politics in this contemporary Asian society.²⁴

Therefore, pilgrimage to Kandy constitutes both a religious and political act, especially in these times when Tamil separatism appears to be regaining some momentum in Sri Lanka. While it is clear that many traditional Buddhists undertake the pilgrimage to Kandy for purely religious reasons, and that their religious behavior exhibits a personal devotion to the Buddha resembling that of Hindu bhakti, the entire pilgrimage complex retains something of its medieval ethos. From its participants, it commands a reverential "civitas." Even the three daily prayers offered by officiating bhikkhus at the Daḷadā Māligāva represent petitions to the Buddha for the continued moral order and prosperity of the realm.²⁵ H. L. Seneviratne, whose studies of ritual life in Kandy are especially definitive, has referred to the public *Āsaḷa Perahāra* performances and ritual life in the temple as part of a "creative and selective process" by which a traditional culture is asserting its indigenous systems of value and power in response to changes brought about by modernity.²⁶ That is, while significant numbers of traditional Sinhalese have remained separated from new forms of culture and social, economic and political power, pilgrimage to Kandy remains a means to assert and maintain beliefs in indigenous concepts of power and cultural legitimation. Or, pilgrimage to Kandy is a religious act affirming traditional modes of power used to maintain order and prosperity.

II. Pilgrimage to Kandy and the Structure of Sinhalese Buddhism

The comparative study of pilgrimage has much in common with the comparative study of religion in general. Pilgrimage patterns are cross-cultural, historically archaic, and persistently popular. Within these patterns both cognitive and affective formulations of spiritual piety may be significant for both the personal and social orientations of existence. Also, while pilgrimage, like religion, can be defined in relatively simplistic terms, there is no single body of critical theory that can serve as a

wholly adequate framework for its definitive interpretation. Like religion in general, pilgrimage seems to resist facile reductions. It is no doubt true that the pilgrimage process in general, especially from an existential perspective, manifests a uniform structure. Turner is largely correct in identifying that process in terms of separation, liminality and re-aggregation.²⁷ Moreover, it is equally clear that pilgrimage, as a devotional act, can result in a transformation or regeneration of social and religious identities. However, differing types of religious behavior observable at various sacred places of pilgrimage also indicate that pilgrimage may not necessarily climax in "exterior mysticism," or in an anti-structural, convivial, egalitarian "communitas."²⁸ Rather, a comparative study of religious behavior at various pilgrimage sites indicates that certain sacred places are settings for specific types of religious behaviors, not all of which conform to Turner's notion. In the case of Kandy, I have characterized this behavior as reverential "civitas." I will now determine the significance of pilgrimage to Kandy first within the context of Sinhalese Buddhist religion and then within a cross-cultural comparative context.

While pilgrimage to Kandy sustains the ethos of the public civil religion formerly administered and symbolized by the presence of the king, other sacred places in Sri Lanka and India express other dominant spiritual orientations of great importance to the Sinhalese. Bodh Gayā in India, the seat of Gotama's enlightenment, and Sarnāth, the place of the Buddha's first sermon, have been for centuries the destinations of pious Buddhist pilgrims, especially Theravāda bhikkhus. Gunawardana has pointed out that pilgrimage to sacred places in India associated with the most important events in the life of Gotama continuously resulted in the cross-fertilization of Theravāda Buddhist traditions during the medieval periods of Sinhalese history.²⁹ Then, as now, Sarnāth and, especially, Bodh Gayā, are centers of Buddhist cultural integration.

More importantly, however, observable religious behavior at Bodh Gayā and Sarnāth has very little in common with the ritual life carried out in Kandy. At Bodh Gayā, except for the remnants of an Asokan gateway, signs of kingship and civil religion are totally absent. There are no public pageants or processions celebrating ethnicity or nationalism. Here, the fo-

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cus is upon the mythic events surrounding the enlightenment of the Buddha. Buddhist pilgrims, escorted either by Tibetan, Japanese, Burmese, Thai or Sinhalese monks, visit seven holy sites within the boundaries of the Mahābodhi shrine that commemorate the Buddha's activities before, during and after his enlightenment. The emphasis, in all forms of ritual behavior at Bodh Gayā, is upon the paradigmatic spirituality of the Buddha, a spirituality which can be and has been emulated for centuries by Buddhist religious virtuosos. In each of the national temples representing the various strands of Buddhist tradition, the life of the Buddha is depicted either in mural paintings or in a series of framed pictures. Thus, at Bodh Gayā, what is venerated is not the "this-worldly" power of the Buddha and the means by which that power can be utilized to sustain the moral order and prosperity of a nation, realm of kingdom. Rather, what is quietly celebrated, in meditation and commemoration, is the path to nibbāna through enlightenment, of which the life of the Buddha is a model. Therefore, in reference to a frequently employed metaphor for describing the structure of Theravāda Buddhism (the "two wheels of Dhamma"³⁰), pilgrimage to Bodh Gayā constitutes a cultic affirmation of the religious quest for an "other-worldly" nibbāna. That is, in contrast to Kandy, where "this-worldly" Buddhist power is symbolized by the tooth-relic and its association with Sinhalese Buddhist ethnicity or nationhood, Bodh Gayā is a place of pilgrimage celebrating spiritual transcendence of the social and temporal world, the path which leads beyond conditioned, saṃsāric existence. To put it another way, Kandy is an *axis mundi* for the establishment of orderly power in this world while Bodh Gayā symbolizes the Buddhist quest for liberation beyond all forms of order. Unlike pilgrims to Kandy, most pilgrims to Bodh Gayā, at least until modern times, have been bhikkhus. In the life of the Buddha and in the Bodhi Tree that symbolizes the Buddha's enlightenment, bhikkhus envisaged the possibility of their own spiritual emancipations. In the Buddha's life they find a personal model which inspires emulation. Here, the pilgrimage experience is one of commemorating the spiritual paradigm of the master.

But the social "this-worldly" and personal "other-worldly" orientations represented by pilgrimage to Kandy on the one

hand and pilgrimage to Bodh Gayā on the other do not exhaust all dimensions of Sinhalese Buddhist spirituality. Neither the Buddha nor the power symbolized by his relics can come to the direct aid of those faithful experiencing an immediate personal crisis. In times of physical affliction or mental anxiety, many Buddhist laity undertake pilgrimages to the shrines of deities who, although occupying subordinate positions in relation to the Buddha within the Sinhalese hierarchical pantheon, are believed to have the power and disposition to respond to the fervent pleas of their faithful. In modern-day Sri Lanka, increasing numbers of Sinhalese Buddhists make pilgrimages to the shrine of Skanda, the son of Śiva, also known as Murugan, or more popularly, as Kataragama. Although Kataragama is the god par excellence of the Ceylon Tamils of the Jaffna peninsula, many Sinhalese Buddhists participate in Kataragama's annual *perahāra* festival, which recalls the god's mythic love affair with a *Vedda* maiden and his establishment of a shrine where he responds to the needs of his devotees. Here, religious experience and religious behavior cannot be characterized in terms of reverential "civitas" or commemoration of the Buddha's paradigmatic spirituality. Rather, the cult of Kataragama involves an astonishing array of ascetic and exotic forms of ritual behavior, all engaged in out of either intense emotional gratitude to Kataragama for healing various afflictions, or as a means of persuading him to intervene on the devotee's behalf. The cultic ambience at Kataragama is utterly bhakti. That is, it is decidedly emotional and devotional in tone and frequently culminates in states of intense ecstasy.³¹ Furthermore, worship here is highly personal, emphasizing the intimacy between the devotee and his god.

While Bodh Gayā represents the nibbānic orientation or model of spiritual quest ideally emulated by the Theravāda bhikkhu, and while Kandy represents the public civil religion legitimated by the presence of the tooth-relic and its past association with traditional power, Kataragama is a sacred place where individuals can appeal to perceived active divine power to intercede on their behalf. Kataragama is not a Buddha who has transcended saṃsāra, nor is he a protector of the nation-state. He represents a form of sacral power that is immediately accessible to the common person in times of great personal

need. Ecstatic and petitionary devotionism at Kataragama is thus quite different from the spirituality of the bhikkhus, whose religious quests are based upon rigorous self-effort or spiritual discipline. Kataragama represents "other-power" manifest in "this-world." Although the power of the tooth-relic in Kandy might also be described in this way, its power was (and is) traditionally appropriated for the general well-being of the king and thus the nation, while the power of the god Kataragama is enlisted for the benefit of any individual devotee who is willing to undertake austerities of self-mortification to express deep faith.

By comparing pilgrimage to Bodh Gayā and Kataragama with pilgrimage to Kandy, we see beginning to emerge a structure reflective of Sinhalese Buddhist religion in general, a religion replete with varying modalities of religious experience and religious expression. That is, none of the pilgrimages can be singled out as embodying a root metaphor characteristic of the general spiritual quest of all Sinhalese Buddhists. Rather, what this comparison suggests is that there are at least three major orientations within Sinhalese religion: 1) Bodh Gayā, a pilgrimage site commemorating the enlightenment experience of the paradigmatic Gotama, represents the spiritual orientation of the Theravāda bhikkhu quest for nibbāna through enlightenment; 2) Kataragama, a pilgrimage site where access to transformative "this-worldly" sacral power is sought, represents the orientation of the faithful lay devotee for whom the enlightenment quest of the bhikkhu is but a distant future possibility; and 3) Kandy, a pilgrimage site where religion legitimates a people's religious, cultural and political past and present through civil ceremony, represents an orientation shared by bhikkhu and layman alike: a national quest to preserve and promote the religion of the Buddha and consequently to maintain prosperity and moral order in society as a whole.

These three religious orientations, which are evident from this consideration of types of pilgrimage within Sinhalese religion, are not, however, entirely unrelated. What all three pilgrimages have in common is functional in nature: the need to cope with various manifestations of *dukkha* (suffering, unsatisfactoriness), the basic problem of human existence as perceived from within the Buddhist world view.³² Thus, Sinhalese reli-

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gious beliefs and practices, as they can be ascertained through a study of pilgrimages, represent complementary modes of response to specific aspects of the human condition. While *dukkha* is specified in particular fashion by individuals on the basis of their own personal experiences, types of response are in part determined by religious role (lay or monastic). From this perspective, pilgrimage to Kandy is ritual participation in public ceremonies traditionally designed to avert civil, ethnic, or national disintegration. That is, within the total field of Sinhalese religion, mass pilgrimage to Kandy represents continued affirmation of the sacralizing power of the Buddha to meet the collective material and social needs of the people. The "emotional response"³³ of thousands of peasants to the tooth-relic's annual procession attests to its continuing perceived efficacy as sacral power. Or finally, to phrase this another way, pilgrimage to Kandy is an act of collective allegiance to the traditional religious way of life upon which the indigenous order of social and economic existence has been based.

III. Cross-cultural Comparisons to the Kandyan Pilgrimage

In his recent book on pilgrimage and Christian culture, Victor Turner has identified Kandy as a "prototypical" pilgrimage. By "prototypical," he means "those pilgrimages which, on the authority of documentary or widespread traditional evidence, were established by the founder of a historical religion, by his first disciples, or by important national evangelists . . ." He continues: "Such pilgrimages, though sometimes founded on ancient sites, dramatically manifest—in their symbolism, charter narratives, ecclesiastical structure, and general international repute—the orthodoxy of the faith from which they have sprung, and remain consistent with root paradigms." He goes on to cite as examples Jerusalem and Rome for Christianity, Mecca for Islam, Benares and Mt. Kailas for Hinduism and Kandy for Buddhism. Syncretic or archaic pilgrimages, which constitute his second type, are distinguished from "prototypical" pilgrimages in that they manifest "quite evident traces of syncretism with older religious beliefs and symbols." Finally, limiting the third and fourth types of pilgrimages to examples

taken only from the Christian tradition, he distinguishes between "medieval" pilgrimages "which take their tone from the theological and philosophical emphasis of that epoch," and "modern" pilgrimages which "are characterized by a highly devotional tone and the fervent personal piety of their adherents." With further regard to modern pilgrimages, he states that they "form an important part of the system of apologetics deployed against the advancing secularization of the post-Darwinian world."³⁴

The great strength of Turner's interpretive model and his typological schema is that it attempts to ascertain the intimate nature of relations which might exist between metaphor and ritual, belief and practice, or spiritual and social experiences. By appealing to cognitive structures (myth, beliefs and their metaphorical expressions) on the one hand, and their idiomatic ritual expression within historical and social contexts on the other, Turner has advanced a theoretical *tour de force* that is especially relevant to diachronic frames of reference.

Yet, it does not necessarily follow that his classification schema, developed to interpret the significance of pilgrimage in Christian culture, is easily portable.

In attempting to confirm Turner's classification of Kandy as a "prototypical" pilgrimage, I have encountered a variety of problems. For instance, Kandy seems to meet all of the criteria Turner cites as indicative of his last three types of pilgrimage: it is highly syncretic (veneration of Hindu gods forms an important part of the ritual proceedings), it is late medieval (having been established by Kirti Sri in the middle of the eighteenth century), and, as Seneviratne argues, it is an indigenous cultural response to modernity. With reference to its being "prototypical," while it is true that Kandy is regarded, especially within Sri Lanka, as a center of orthodoxy (given the presence of two prestigious monastic chapters), one wonders about the orthodoxy of the "root paradigm" to which it is "faithful." What ritual life at Kandy *does* depict is the intimate relationship established in Sri Lanka between spiritual and temporal power, or between religion and politics and the structure of society. Perhaps this may be regarded as a "root paradigm" for a traditional public structure, but it does not really reflect a spiritual paradigm to be emulated personally by individual Buddhists.

Bodh Gayā on the other hand, does, and Kataragama and other shrines provide a complementary personal orientation for the laity. I do not mean to ignore the private orientation of pilgrimage to Kandy; but even when one takes into account that individual pilgrims petition the power of the relic for their own personal reasons, one is still left with the problem of reconciling this kind of religious behavior to the "root paradigm" of the Buddha's quest of enlightenment through self-effort. These considerations lead me to call into question the comparison of Kandy to other such "prototypical" pilgrimages.

Kandy is not a "Mecca" of the Buddhist world. While Angarika Dharmapala once referred to Bodh Gayā as "the Buddhist Jerusalem"³⁵ during his fight to return Buddhist sacred places in India to Buddhist hands, nowhere does one find references within the tradition that make such grandiose claims about Kandy. More accurately, Kandy represents simultaneously a sacred place of pilgrimage and the traditional-center of Sinhalese highland ethnicity. Kandy is not a "center out there," in the peripheral sense in which Turner coined the phrase. Rather, it has more in common with regional cultural centers in India that are also accorded sacrality due the prominent presence of a ritual symbol that evokes recurrent sentiments of religio-ethnic heritage and autonomy legitimated by sacral power. In considering comparable sacred places, Kandy has more in common with the Sikh center of Amritsar in the Punjab with its Golden Temple, within which is housed the *Guru Granth Sahib*, a symbol of God's continuing providence. Or again, Kandy is somewhat similar to Santa Fe, New Mexico, and the associated symbol of Our Lady of Conquest.³⁶ In both of these examples, ritual proceedings, either in the form of annual processions or in individual acts of devotion which take place at specific shrines within the precincts of a sacred center, celebrate the special past relationship enjoyed between a people and the divine, however the divine is perceived. That is, sacred places like Kandy are sustained in popularity because they affirm the unique religio-cultural identity of a given people. Thus, the attractive power of Kandy as a sacred place of pilgrimage is due less to pan-Buddhist associations than to a particular people's understanding of its special, historical relationship to sacral power, which in the past insured their continued

collective legitimated existence in the face of the ambiguities of life, understood traditionally by them as *dukkha*.

I have attempted to construct a new typology for pilgrimages, which I believe is more relevant to the inherent structures of Sinhalese religion. Rather than basing this typology upon historical origins, as Turner has done in his own work, I have concluded that a typology based upon types of religious experiences and religious behavior is more fitting. Pilgrimages in Sri Lanka reflect the three-fold orientation of Sinhalese religion: the paradigmatic spirituality of the Buddha, the civil religion of the Sinhalese people, and, as Obeyesekere has recently characterized it, "the rising tide of bhakti religiosity in Buddhist Sri Lanka."³⁷ By understanding the significance of pilgrimage within these three orientations, we can gain a more accurate awareness of how a people of central importance to the history and maintenance of the Buddhist tradition have articulated the various dimensions of their own spirituality through a recognizable modality of religious expression that is culturally ubiquitous.

NOTES

1. Nancy Falk uses this phrase to designate the tradition "in which the Buddha is said to have authorized both the familiar pilgrims' visits to the great sites associated with his life and the practices associated with his relics and *stūpas*." See Nancy Falk, "To Gaze on the Sacred Traces," *History of Religions* 16 (May, 1977), p. 285, n. 15; for the canonical version of the origins of relic veneration, see *Mahāparinibbāna Suttānta* in *Dīgha Nikāya (Dialogues of the Buddha)*, trans. and ed. by T. W. Rhys Davids in *Sacred Books of the Buddhists*, Vol. 3 (London: Pali Text Society, 1977; first published in 1910): pp. 154-57 and pp. 185-91.

2. See further discussion and relevant bibliography in Frank Reynolds, "The Several Bodies of Buddha: Reflections on a Neglected Aspect of Theravāda Tradition," *History of Religions* 16 (May, 1977): pp. 374-89.

3. Even before the arrival of the tooth relic in the 4th century C. E., relics assumed major importance in the ritual life and symbolism of Sinhalese royalty. For a summary, see Tilak Hetiarachy, *History of Kingship in Ceylon up to the Fourth Century A. D.* (Colombo: Lakehouse Investments, 1972), pp. 25-29 *passim*; for another excellent study of the prominence of relics in relation to royal imagery, see Alice Greenwald, "The Relic on the Spear: Historiography and the Saga of Duṭṭhagāmaṇi," in Bardwell Smith, ed., *Religion and the Legiti-*

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mation of Power in Sri Lanka (Chambersburg, PA: Anima Books, 1978), pp. 13-35.

4. A detailed summary of the legend may be found in G. P. Malalasekera, *The Pali Literature of Ceylon* (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena and Co., 1928), pp. 65-68; and A. M. Hocart, *The Temple of the Tooth in Kandy*, *Memoirs of the Archeological Survey of Ceylon*, Vol. IV (London: Luzac and Co., 1931), pp. 1-5.

5. Walpola Rahula notes that according to the *Dāḥavaṃsa*, Dantapura was located in Kalinga. Cf. *A History of Buddhism in Ceylon* (Colombo: M. D. Gunasena, 1956), p. 97. He further cites Percy Brown's *Indian Architecture*, wherein Brown identifies Dantapura with Pūri or Bhuvaneshwar. Brown believes that the Jagganāth Temple "occupies the site of some still more ancient monument, not improbably the shrine of the Buddha's tooth at Dantapura."

6. *Mahāvamsa*, Wilhelm Geiger, ed. and trans. (London: Luzac and Co., 1964; originally published in 1912), pp. 89-96. The *Dāḥavaṃsa* account was no doubt intended to establish the same degree of authenticity for the *daḥadā* as the *Mahāvamsa* account had done for the Alms-Bowl Relic.

7. The language of "righteousness" consistently applied to ritual and ethical acts of the king is rooted in conceptions of Buddhist kingship modelled after the ideal cakravartin ("turner of the wheel" of righteousness). For scriptural accounts of the cakravartin ideal in the Theravāda canon, see the *Cakkavatti-Sihanāda* and *Aggañña suttas* in the *Dīgha Nikāya* 4, 59-76 and 77-94. For detailed interpretations see S. J. Tambiah, *World Conqueror, World Renouncer* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976), pp. 32-72; B. Smith, "The Ideal Social Order as Portrayed in the Chronicles of Ceylon," in Smith, ed., *The Two Wheels of Dhamma* (Chambersburg, PA: American Academy of Religion, 1972), pp. 31-57; B. G. Gokhale, "Early Buddhist Kingship," *Journal of Asian Studies* 26 (1966), pp. 15-22; and especially E. Sarkisyanz, *Buddhist Back-grounds of the Burmese Revolution* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), pp. 10-97; Joseph Kitagawa's brief article "Buddhism and Asian Politics," *Asian Survey* 2 (1962), contains a brief overview of the theme.

8. This belief, set forth in the opening pages of the *Mahāvamsa*, is examined in detail by Regina Clifford, "The Dhammadīpa Tradition of Sri Lanka: Three Models within the Sinhalese Chronicles," in Smith, ed., *Religion and Legitimation*, pp. 36-47.

9. Fā-Hien, *A Record of Buddhistic Kingdoms*, trans. by James Legge (London: Oxford University Press, 1886; reprint ed., New York: Dover Publications, 1965), pp. 104-07.

10. Malalasekera, p. 66; cf. G. C. Mendis, *The Early History of Ceylon* (Calcutta: YMCA Publishing House, 1954), pp. 58-59; Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 180 n. 18, compares it to the crown of St. Stephen in Hungary. Other scholars have compared it to Constantine's Labarum and Thailand's Holy Emerald Buddha.

11. Bardwell Smith, "Polonnaruwa as a Ceremonial Complex: Sinhalese Cultural Identity and the Dilemmas of Pluralism," in A. K. Narain, ed., *Studies*

in *History of Buddhism* (New Delhi: B. R. Publishing Corporation, 1980), p. 310.

12. Tambiah, *World Conqueror*, p. 96, cites a tenth century inscription which reads: "The king is a Bodhisattva on whom the Sangha bestows kingship . . ."

13. Bardwell Smith, "The Ideal Social Order," p. 50.

14. On the manner in which Kīrti Śrī strengthened his reign in the eyes of the Kandyan aristocracy by means of the numerous reforms he introduced, see L. S. Dewaraja, *The Kandyan Kingdom of Ceylon, 1707-1760* (Colombo: Lake House Investments, 1972, esp. pp. 94-118).

15. Sir Richard Alunhare, *The Kandy Esala Perahara* (Colombo: Ceylon Daily News, 1952), p. 2.

16. Kitsiri Malalgoda, *Buddhism in Sinhalese Society 1750-1900*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), p. 64.

17. H. L. Seneviratne, *Rituals of the Kandyan State* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 71-72 writes that the *kapa* symbolize the sacred center or *axis mundi* of the kingdom.

18. The phrase belongs to Clifford Geertz, who defines it as "the theory that the court-and-capital is at once a microcosm of the supernatural order—an image of the universe on a smaller scale—and the material embodiment of the political order. It is not just the nucleus or the engine, or the pivot of the state, it is the state. The equation of the seat of rule with the dominion of rule is more than an accidental metaphor; it is a settlement of a controlling political idea—namely, that by the mere act of providing a model, a paragon, a faultless image of civilized existence, the court shapes the world around it into at least a rough approximation of its own excellence. The ritual life of the court, and in fact, the life of the court generally, is thus paradigmatic, not merely reflective, of social order. What it is reflective of, the priests declare, is a supernatural order, 'the timeless Indian world' of the gods upon which men should, in strict proportion for their status, seek to pattern their lives." In *Negara: The Theatre-State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 13. Tambiah applies the "doctrine of the exemplary center" to medieval Thai polity in *World Conqueror*, p. 123; Smith—citing Paul Wheatley's *Pivot of the Four Quarters* (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1971), Robert Redfield's and Milton Singer's "The Cultural Role of Cities," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3 (1954): 53-72 and Robert Heine-Geldern's classic "Conceptions of State and Kingship in Southeast Asia," Data Paper, Number 18, Southeast Asia Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1956), pp. 1-3—applies the model to ritual life in Polonnaruwa, in "Sinhalese Cultural Identity," pp. 295 and 308-10. Its application to Kandy is self-evident.

19. Malalgoda, pp. 118, quotes a British official upon the relic's seizure: "We have this day obtained the surest proof of the confidence of the Kandyan nation and their acquiescence in the Dominion of British Government."

20. *Culture of Ceylon in Medieval Times*, Heinz Bechert, ed., (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960), p. 215.

21. Seneviratne, pp. 137-46.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

23. *Ibid.*, pp. 112-14; cf., Nur Yalman, *Under the Bo Tree: Studies in Caste, Kinship and Marriage in the Interior of Ceylon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 58.

24. For an excellent assessment of Buddhism's political participation in recent Sinhalese politics, see Wriggins, *Dilemmas*, pp. 169-210; for a study of modern Buddhist political thought in Sri Lanka, see Bruce Matthews, "The Sinhalese Buddhist Attitude Toward Parliamentary Democracy," *Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies* 6 (July-Dec., 1976), pp. 34-47; and Urmila Phadnis, *Religion and Politics in Sri Lanka* (New Delhi: Manohar Book Service, 1976).

25.

*Kāyena vācā cūtena
Pamādena mayā kataṇ
Accayaṇ khama me bhante
Bhūripañña Tathāgata.*

*Devo vassatu kālena
Sassasam patthihevā ca;
Pīto bhavatu loko ca;
Rājā bhavatu dhammiko.*

*Akasaṭṭhā ca bhummatthā
Devā yāgā Mahiddhikā
Punnān taṇ anumoditvā
Ciraṇ rakkhantu lokasaṇaṇaṇ.*

Cited in Hocart, p. 27.

26. Seneviratne, p. 120.

27. Victor Turner, "The Center out there: Pilgrim's Goal," *History of Religions* 12 (February, 1973), 213-15.

28. *Ibid.*, p. 193. *Passim*.

29. R. A. L. H. Gunawardana, *Robe and Plough: Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979; Association for Asian Studies Monograph Series, No. XXXV), pp. 260-62.

30. Reynolds, "The Two Wheels of Dhamma: A Study of Early Buddhism," in Smith, *Two Wheels*, pp. 6-30.

31. For descriptions of cultic life at Kataragama, see Paul Wirz, *Kataragama: The Holiest Place in Ceylon*, translated from the German by Doris B. Pralle (Colombo: Lake House, 1966); Ganamath Obeyesekere, "The Fire Walkers of Kataragama: The Rise of *Bhakti* Religiosity in Buddhist Sri Lanka," *Journal of Asian Studies* 37 (May, 1978), pp. 457-78; and Bryan Pfaffenberger, "The Kataragama Pilgrimage: Hindu-Buddhist Interaction and Its Significance in Sri Lanka's Polyethnic Social System," *Journal of Asian Studies* 38 (February, 1979), pp. 253-70.

32. Cf. John Halverson, "Religion and Psycho-social Development in Sinhalese Buddhism," *Journal of Asian Studies* 37 (February, 1978), pp. 221-32.

33. Seneviratne, p. 147.
34. Turner, *Image and Pilgrimage in Christian Culture* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), pp. 17-19.
35. Malalgoda, p. 255.
36. See the treatment of public symbols and civil religion in Ronald Grimes, *Symbol and Conquest: Public and Ritual Drama in Santa Fe, New Mexico* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1976).
37. Obeyesekere, "Fire-Walkers," p. 457.

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A New Approach to the Intra-Mādhyamika Confrontation over the Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Methods of Refutation

by Shohei Ichimura

There is good reason to believe that the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (*Vigraha*, hereafter), one of the definitive works of Nāgārjuna, was not only the starting point of controversy between Naiyāyika logicians and Mādhyamika dialecticians, but also the fountainhead of the intra-Buddhist controversy which divided the Mādhyamika into two camps: the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika schools. While the intensity of Hindu-Buddhist confrontation exhibited in classical and medieval India is understandable in view of their doctrinal differences, the intensity of the intra-Mādhyamika confrontation is somewhat surprising, as the two camps held the same doctrine, i.e., universal emptiness (*sūnyatā*), differing only in their methods of demonstrating it. The Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika, respectively, relied on the syllogistic and dialectic¹ forms of argument, both of which, in fact, were given by Nāgārjuna in the *Vigraha*. The intra-Mādhyamika dispute, though no doubt contributing to the cause of methodological refinement, seems at times to have lost sight of the middle course. In this respect, I am inclined to think that the two methods should be given equal analysis, for the sake of a clearer understanding of their common doctrinal insight and method of demonstration. The purpose of this paper is to open the way to a more balanced analysis of the contesting methods in terms of the logical principle of *anvaya-vyatireka*.²

eventually decides the case, asks (and not states, as translated previously): "Indeed, has the Buddha prescribed somewhere a *pārājika* with regard to a penny (*māsaka*) or even less than a penny?" The answer to this question is of course "no": *āpatti thullaccayassa ... atirekamāsako vā ūnapaṇcamāsako vā*, Vin III 54, 22, cf. III 47, 3 "it is a grave offence (but no *pārājika*), [if the stolen goods are worth] more than a *māsaka* or less than five *māsaka*." Thus Godha reverts the earlier verdict that there had been a theft, and rightly so.

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UTE HÜSKEN

The Application of the *Vinaya* Term *nāsanā*¹

The first section in the book of Buddhist monastic discipline (*Vinaya-piṭaka*) is known as *pārājika*. The significance of these rules is emphasized by the fact that out of the list of 220 prescriptions which are recited fortnightly (*pāṭimokkha*) only these four rules are announced to a newly ordained monk immediately after full ordination (*upasampaiḍā*; Vin I 96.20-97.18)². The transgression of one of the *pārājika* rules leads to the monk's or nun's permanent and irreversible loss of status as a fully ordained member of the order.

Buddhist law as specified in the *Vinaya-piṭaka* is generally based on the concept that an offence is established only after the offender pleads guilty.³ Consequently, if an offender is aware of his *pārājika* offence and leaves the order on his own initiative, the *Vinaya* describes no concrete act of expulsion by the Saṃgha. Rather the actual status of a person guilty of such a transgression is rendered by the words *ayam pi pārājiko hoti asaṃvāso*, "This one has committed a *pārājika* and (therefore) is without (any) communion" (e.g. Vin III 46.20**; cf. Vin IV 213.37**-38**)⁴.

There are, however, a few instances in the *Vinaya-piṭaka* where another term is applied to express that a person has to leave the order, namely *nāsanā*, *nāseti* etc. This state of affairs led Isaline Blew HORNÉ in her English translation of the *Vinaya-piṭaka* to the conclusion that the verb

1. I wish herewith to express my gratitude to Prof. Oskar VON HINÜBER, who kindly sent me material on the term *nāsanā* which he had collected, and provided very helpful suggestions. Additionally, I wish to draw the reader's attention to an article written by Édith NOLOT, which is published in the *Journal of the Pali Text Society XXIII* ("Studies in Vinaya Technical Terms VI"). There NOLOT provides an extremely useful systematic collection of the material on *nāsanā* in the Pali and Sanskrit sources.
2. Nuns have to observe eight *pārājika* rules which are announced to them after full ordination (Vin II 274. 23-24).
3. Cf. VON HINÜBER, "Buddhist Law", p. 11.
4. In the casuistries the expression is *āpattiṃ tvaṃ bhikkhu āpanno pārājikaṃ*, "You, monk, have committed a *pārājika* offence" (e.g. Vin III 57. 14-15).

nāseti in the *Suttavibhaṅga* generally refers to the expulsion of members of the order who have committed a *pārājika* offence (BD I, p. xxvii). This statement will be qualified in this paper.

In the eldest stratum of the *Vinaya*, the *Pāṭimokkha*, *nāsanā* with respect to monks or nuns is used in only one instance, that is *Pārājika 2* of the *Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga* (Vin IV 216.31** - 217.3**).⁵ This rule forbids nuns to keep quiet about the *pārājika* offence of a fellow nun.⁶ "Has been expelled" (*nāsitā*) in this rule is listed in a series of verbs expressing that the nun guilty of a *pārājika* offence has not left the order in the usual way, but rather that she kept quiet about her misdeed for a certain period before finally leaving the order for another reason. Indeed, both the forced and the voluntary leaving of the order are clearly contrasted here by the use of the terms *nāsitā* and *avasaṭā* (Vin IV 216.33** - 34** and 217.13-15). Thus *Pārājika 2* of the *Bhikkhunīvibhaṅga* indicates that the expulsion *nāsanā* of nuns (and monks) comes about when they, after committing a *pārājika*, keep their deed quiet and as a result fail to leave the order on their own initiative. In this case the Saṃgha is apparently forced to take an active role in the expulsion of the offender. The procedure of expulsion, however, is not described in the *Vinaya*.

Another reference in the *Vinaya* also uses *nāsanā* in connection with a *pārājika* offence (Vin I 173.20-22): A monk, who is accused of a *pārājika* offence during the *pavāraṇā* ceremony at the end of the rainy

5. In another passage of the *pāṭimokkha*, *nāsanā* does not refer to fully ordained individuals but to novices (*sāmaṇera*) (see below, p. 99).

6. The text of this rule in OLDENBERG's edition (Vin IV 216.31 - 217.3) is not correct. The text of the Burmese, Sinhalese, and Thai editions is: *yā pana bhikkhuni jānaṃ pārājikam dhammaṃ ajjhāpannaṃ bhikkhuniṃ n' ev' attanā paṭicodēyya na gaṇassa āroceyya yadā ca sā thitā vā assa cutā vā nāsitā vā avasaṭā vā sā pacchā evaṃ vadeyya: pubbevāhaṃ ayye aññasiṃ etaṃ bhikkhuniṃ evarūpā ca evarūpā ca sā bhaginīti, no ca kho attanā paṭicodessam na gaṇassa āroccesan [Vin: paṭicodēyyaṃ na gaṇassa āroceyyaṃ] ti, ayam pi pārājikā hoti asaṃvāsā vajjapaṭicchādikā 'ti. HORNER's translation of this rule (BD III, p. 166) has to be corrected accordingly: "Whatever nun, knowing that a nun has fallen into a matter involving defeat, should neither herself reprove her, nor speak to a group, but when she may be remaining or deceased or expelled or withdrawn, should afterwards speak thus: 'Ladies, before I knew this nun, she was a sister like this and like that, (but I thought:) 'I will neither myself reprove her nor speak to a group [BD III, p. 166: and should neither herself reprove her nor should speak to a group]', she also becomes one who is defeated, she is not in communion, she is one who conceals a fault."*

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season⁷, admits to having committed it. The Saṃgha then performs *pavāraṇā* only after having expelled him (*nāsetvā*). In this particular case the expulsion of the offender may be necessitated by the Saṃgha's desire to perform an ecclesiastical act, the validity of which requires the order to be both "complete" (*samagga*) and "pure" (*parisuddha*), that is, without offence at that very moment. When one of the participants is found to be not "pure" the ecclesiastical act loses validity. Thus a monk guilty of a *pārājika* offence has to be removed perhaps even physically⁸ by the Saṃgha. He must remain outside the spatial boundary (*simā*) stipulated for this ecclesiastical act within which only "pure" monks can be present. Thus in this particular case the reason for the use of the term *nāsanā* might once again be the necessity for an active role of the Saṃgha in the expulsion. This supposition seems more likely if one remembers that the offender evidently failed to confess his offence immediately after having committed it but rather only after having been placed under investigation during the ecclesiastical act of *pavāraṇā*.

In other passages of the *Suttavibhaṅga* the term *nāsanā* instead of *pārājika* is used. Some of these references are to be found in the casuistry of *Pārājika 1* of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*, that is, the rule prescribing celibacy. There the following cases are mentioned (Vin III 33.24-28): A monk, who is guilty of having raped a sleeping co-monk or novice, should be expelled (*nāsetabbo*). In the event that the victim wakes up and consents to the behaviour of the monk, both participants have to be expelled (*nāsetabbā*). The same rule applies in the case of a novice raping a sleeping monk or fellow-novice (Vin III 33.28-31), and in the case of a monk who is forced to rape a nun, a female probationer (*sikkhamānā*), or a female novice (Vin III 39.37-40.6): Both participants are found not guilty if they do not consent, but otherwise have to be expelled (*nāsetabbā*). The same goes for a monk who is forced to rape a lay-woman, a homosexual⁹, or another monk (Vin III 40.5-13).

7. On this ecclesiastical act see Jin-Il CHUNG, *Pravāraṇāvastu im Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādin*, Göttingen, 1997 (SWTF, Beiheft 7) (in press).

8. There is at least one instance of a physical expulsion of a monk found to be not "pure" (Vin II 237.8-10: *atha kho Mahāmogallāno taṃ puggalaṃ bhāyayaṃ gahetvā bahi dvārakoṭṭhakā nikkhāmetvā sūciḥaṭṭikaṃ datvā ...*).

9. For an interpretation of the term *paṇḍaka* see Leonard ZWILLING, "Homosexuality as Seen in Indian Buddhist Texts", *Buddhism, Sexuality, and Gender*, ed. José Ignacio CABEZÓN, Albany, 1992 (Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series, 113), pp. 203-214.

In all these cases the term *pārājika* is not applied even though the respective offenders are apparently guilty of a *pārājika* offence. It may be that in the *Vinaya* for these instances the term *nāsetabba* is used instead of *pārājika*, once again because an expulsion performed by the Saṃgha is thought necessary.¹⁰

Another instance of rape is mentioned in the introductory story of the rule *Samghādisesa* 8 in the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*: Two monks feel that they have been treated unfairly by the monk Dabba. Therefore, they persuade the nun Mettiyā to accuse Dabba of having raped her in order to have Dabba expelled (*nāsūpeyya*; Vin III 162.14-27).¹¹ Thus this passage also pertains to the instances of the casuistry of *Pārājika* 1 mentioned above. It is quite possible that the two malicious monks aimed to have Dabba expelled by the Saṃgha, as implied by the application of the verb *nāsūpeyya*. However, according to the story, the Buddha asked Dabba whether the nun's accusations were true (Vin III 162.30-31), and the *pāṭimokkha* rule views the case as an example of a consciously false accusation of a *pārājika* offence (Vin III 163.22**).¹² Since Dabba pleaded innocent to having raped Mettiyā, the Buddha ordered Mettiyā to be expelled (Vin III 162.38-163.1: *tena hi bhikkhave Mettiyaṃ bhikkhuniṃ nāsetha*).¹³ This procedure, however, is not based on any fixed rule of the *Vinaya*, since until then there existed no regulation prohibiting monks or nuns from accusing another of having committed a *pārājika* offence. In the *Vinaya* a person having caused the formulation

10. This could be the case because a rape is viewed as a very grave transgression of both Buddhist monastic and Brahmanical law. Rape in the *Vinaya*, particularly the rape of a nun, is frequently mentioned as one of the most serious infringements of Buddhist monastic law (cf. Vin I 85.24; 89.2-3 and 11-12; 121.7; 135.3; 168.10; 320.13 etc.); for some examples in the Brahmanical law see Ganganatha JITA, *Hindu Law in its Sources*, Vol. I, Allahabad, 1930, pp. 481-484.

11. In the *Cullavagga* (Vin II 74.24-79.37) the introductory story of *Samghādisesa* 8 is repeated almost word for word. Here Mettiyā is also expelled, and the story introduces the ecclesiastical act of the giving of a *sativinaya*, "a verdict of innocence" (Vin II 79.37-80.31). By means of this ecclesiastical act it is officially agreed that the Saṃgha trusts the accused person (cf. NOLOT, SVTT II, pp. 99, 109).

12. However, the focus of this rule is not on the behaviour of the nun Mettiyā but on the behaviour of the monks who caused Mettiyā to utter the wrong accusation.

13. Vin III 162.38-163.3. After that the malicious monks were remorseful and begged the other monks not to expel Mettiyā for she had not committed any offence (Vin III 163.3-6).

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of a *pāṭimokkha* rule is exempted from any punishment, since Buddhist monastic law is a case-law following the principle *nulla poena sine lege*.¹⁴ In any case, even if Mettiyā had been found guilty of an offence, she would have had to undergo the punishment for a *samghādisesa* offence, that is a 14 days probation (*mānatta*)¹⁵, rather than an expulsion from the order, as was the case according to the introductory story of *Samghādisesa* 8. Until this point in the text the only cause for the application of *nāsanā* mentioned in the *Vinaya* is rape or the concealment of a *pārājika* offence. However in this case, Mettiyā neither concealed a *pārājika* offence nor did she rape anybody, but rather accused another of having raped her. Therefore, her expulsion must be regarded as an exception, made possible through the personal intervention of the Buddha.¹⁶ In addition, it is worth noting that according to the introductory story and the *pāṭimokkha* rule it was not Mettiyā's behaviour which gave rise to the formulation of the rule but rather the behaviour of the two monks who caused Mettiyā to make the unfounded accusation.¹⁷ In any case, in this passage the term *nāsanā* is not used as a technical term of Buddhist monastic law. The same holds true for one passage of the *Suttapiṭaka*, namely an account in the *Kāraṇḍavasutta* of the *Mettāvagga* in the *Aṅguttaranikāya*. Here a monk accused of having committed an offence changes the subject and talks about other things (AN IV 168.24-27). This leads the Buddha himself to demand his expulsion (AN IV 169.1-2: *dhamath' ... niddhamath' ...*, AN IV 169.10: *tam enaṃ ... bahiddhā nāseti*). This procedure is not based on any fixed rule of the *Vinaya* but, on the contrary, contradicts the regulations of Buddhist monastic law: According to *Pācittiya* 12 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga* the evasion of an accusation is a *pācittiya* offence, the conse-

14. Cf. VON HINÜBER, "Buddhist Law", p. 7; cf. Hellmuth HECKER, "Allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze in der buddhistischen Ordensverfassung (*Vinaya*)", *Verfassung und Recht in Übersee* 10/1, ed. Herbert KRÜGER (1977), pp. 89-115; p. 96.

15. For *mānatta* see NOLOT, SVTT III, pp. 117-122.

16. Thus this reference does not confirm C. S. UPASAK's opinion that *nāsanā* generally is applied as a term for the expulsion of nuns (*Dictionary of Early Buddhist Monastic Terms [Based on Pali Literature]*, Varanasi 1975; s.v. *Nāsanā*).

17. This issue is extensively discussed in the commentary and is dealt with again here below (p. 103).

quence of which is confession but not expulsion.¹⁸ Thus it is possible that the introductory story of *Samghādisesa* 8 and the just mentioned account in the *Suttapiṭaka* belong to the eldest stratum of the canonical texts, being formulated before the term *nāsanā* was used with a "juridical" meaning.

In another passage of the *Mahāvagga* the term *nāsanā* is applied for the expulsion of fully ordained members of the order (Vin I 85.27-90.9). There it is stated that certain individuals are not entitled to full ordination (*upasampadā*) and, if ordination already has been bestowed on them, they have to be expelled (*nāsetabbo*). The eleven types of individuals concerned apparently did not receive *upasampadā* legitimately, having committed a grave offence in the time of household-life, or simply because they were considered physically unfit for full membership in the order.¹⁹ The individuals concerned include homosexuals (*paṇḍaka*; Vin I 86:7-9)²⁰, fake monks, persons converted to another

18. On the other hand, this account in the *Ānguttaranikāya* may well have served as a basis for *Pācittiya* 12 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga* (Vin IV 36.37**). According to the introductory story of this rule a monk also evaded an accusation (Vin IV 35.26-29). Since the *Manorathapūraṇī* (Mp IV 74.11-13), the commentary on the *Ānguttaranikāya*, links the canonical passage commented upon with an ecclesiastical act introduced and described in the *Cullavagga* (Vin II 101.4-102.10: *tassapāpiyyasikāmma*) by rendering "he evades" (*aññen' aññaṃ paṭicarati*) with "he conceals (his offence)" (*paṭicchādeti*), this passage of the *Cullavagga* may also have been inspired by the above-mentioned passage of the *Ānguttaranikāya*. For some more examples of passages of the *Suttapiṭaka* which contain rather old *Vinaya* material, cf. VON HINÜBER, *Handbook*, §§ 67, 74, 80; cf. the references given in VON HINÜBER, "Buddhist Law", note 5.

19. One passage in the *Parivāra* (Vin V 140.14-15) refers to this passage in the *Mahāvagga* without adding anything new. According to the *Samantapāsādikā* (Sp 1391.26-27) in another passage of the *Parivāra* (Vin V 216.32) the term *nāsita* refers to the eleven types of individuals mentioned above as well.

20. The *Vajirabuddhiṭikā* (Vjb 114.24-115.31) provides several additional explanations of the casuistry of *Pārājika* 1 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*. In the canonical text a monk or a nun changes sex. The *Vajirabuddhiṭikā* has a discussion about what age the individuals received full ordination, since married women are allowed to enter the order at the age of twelve, whereas men can only receive full ordination at the age of twenty. It is explicitly stated in this passage of the subcommentaries that during the sex change process the individuals are not considered to be *paṇḍakas* (in this case *paṇḍaka* probably means "without outer signs of sex") and thus do not have to be expelled because of Vin I 85.27-86.9 (Vjb 115.10-12; cf. Sp-1 III 256.19-22).

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religion (*theyyasaṃvāsaka*, *tittiyapakkantaka*; Vin I 86.31-35)²¹, animals (*tiracchānagata*; Vin I 88.1-3), matricides (*mātughātaka*; Vin I 88.20-21), patricides (*pitughātaka*; Vin I 88.24-26), those who have killed an Arhat (*arahantaghātaka*; Vin I 89.4-6), raped a nun, or caused a split within the order, as well as persons who have caused bloodshed (*bhikkhunīdūsaka*, *saṃghabhedaka*, *lohituppādaka*; Vin I 89.11-16)²², and hermaphrodites (*ubhatovjañjanaka*; Vin I 89.19-21). Although these persons committed no offence during monkhood, the expulsion *nāsanā* has to be performed by the Saṃgha, since it was the Saṃgha which acted improperly (though unknowingly) by bestowing ordination in these cases. Therefore the Saṃgha is forced to restore a lawful state by explicitly cancelling the ecclesiastical act of ordination. In the *Parivāra* one additional piece of information referring to the expulsion of these eleven persons is provided: The ecclesiastical act of ordination in these cases is referred to as *vattuvipatti*, i.e. "defect in material" (Vin V 222.6-14: ... *vattuvipannaṃ adhammakammaṃ* ...). This is confirmed by the commentary upon the *Pāṭimokkha*, the *Kaṅkhāvitarāṇī*, stating that these eleven cases are *avattukā*, meaning that they are "not potential material" for an ordination procedure (Kkh 17.27-29 and 19.3-5). Therefore, if the ordination ceremony (*upasampadākamma*) has indeed been performed notwithstanding the *avattuka* status of these persons, then the ecclesiastical act itself is considered invalid and has to be openly annulled by the Saṃgha.

Unlike the monks novices are not subject to Buddhist monastic discipline, but have to observe ten specified rules. The expulsion of novices is also called *nāsanā* in the *Vinaya*. According to *Pācittiya* 70 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga* (Vin IV 139.18**-34**) a novice (*samañuddesa*) who upholds a view specified as false about the utterances of the Buddha has to be expelled (Vin IV 139.32**): ... *tathā nāsitaṃ samañuddesaṃ*. This is the only passage describing the actual procedure of *nāsanā* in the *Vinaya*.²³ If a novice ignores one admonition he is to be sent away with

21. According to the *Samantapāsādikā* (Sp 1017.10-12) a *theyyasaṃvāsaka* may not obtain even a lower ordination (*pabbajjā*).

22. With regard to the individuals who have caused a split within the order and the ones who have converted to another religion, the refusal to ordain clearly refers to their second ordination, since they have both previously been members of the order.

23. This procedure is described in the introductory story, in the rule, and in the canonical commentary (*padabhājanīya*) of *Pācittiya* 70 (Vin IV 138.32-139.4).

the following words: "From this day onwards, dear friend Samañuddesa, this Lord is not to be viewed as your teacher anymore; the privileges given to other Samañuddesas, namely sleeping two or three nights in one room with the monks, these are not (given) to you anymore; go, leave!" This suggests that the expulsion of novices is not an ecclesiastical act but rather an informal – though to some extent formalized – request made to the novice. In addition we know from the *anāpatti* formula that this expulsion can later be amended (Vin IV 140.30-31).²⁴ According to the rule's introductory story, the novice Kaṇṭaka advocated the false view given in the rule itself (Vin IV 138.20-24). There his misconduct is referred to as "slandering" of the Lord (*mā bhagavantam abbhācikkhi, na hi sādhu bhagavato abbhākkhānam*; cf. Vin IV 134.14-15). According to the *Cullavagga* (Vin II 25.10-27.18) similar behaviour by a monk leads to his suspension (*ukkhepanā*)²⁵, whereas in the case of a novice expulsion (*nāsanā*) is called for. This mutual proximity of suspension (*ukkhepanā*) of a fully ordained member of the order and expulsion (*nāsanā*) of a novice is implied in one passage of the *Parivāra* as well (Vin V 115.23-24).

The misbehaviour of the novice Kaṇṭaka, however, is one of the ten general reasons for *nāsanā* for novices. These ten reasons are listed in the *Mahāvagga* (Vin I 85.19-26):²⁶

I prescribe, monks, the expelling of a novice possessing the following ten characteristics: If he destroys living beings, takes things not given, adheres to an impure moral code, if he lies, drinks alcoholic drinks, speaks ill of the Buddha, speaks ill of the Saṃgha, speaks ill of the Dhamma, holds false views, or is a rapist of nuns.

Five of these ten characteristics are in violation of the first five of the ten training rules set forth for novices²⁷ and the remaining five are other

24. The focus of the rule *Pācittiya* 70 is, of course, on the behaviour of the monks, who are not allowed to keep regular contact with a Samañuddesa expelled in this manner.
25. In *Pācittiya* 68 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga* the same behaviour as Kaṇṭaka's is attributed to the monk Ariṭṭha. There it results in a *pācittiya* offence. However, the introductory story of *Pācittiya* 68 (Vin IV 133.32-135.5) is repeated word for word in the *Cullavagga* (Vin II 25.10-26.33). There the suspension (*ukkhepanā*) of the monk Ariṭṭha who did not give up his false view is described.
26. *Parivāra* VI.10 (Vin V 138.16-17) refers to this passage without making any additions.
27. Consequently it is stated in the *Samantapāsādikā* that the violation of the first five training rules is punished by *nāsanā*. To complement the content of the

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examples of incorrect behaviour. The expulsion of the novice Kaṇṭaka in *Pācittiya* 70 fits into either the sixth or the ninth of these ten situations. Kaṇṭaka either "speaks ill of the Buddha" (*buddhassa avaṇṇam bhāsati*) or could be said to "hold a false view" (*micchādīṭṭhiko*), as can be seen from the introductory story of *Pācittiya* 70 (see above). Additionally, one can conjecture from the *anāpatti*-formula of *Pācittiya* 70 that the expulsion of novices in any of these cases can later be amended.

In the canonical references discussed above three concepts of the use of the term *nāsanā* can be distinguished. Firstly, Mettiyā and the monk in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* are expelled not because of any violation of a *pāṭimokkha* rule but because of the personal intervention of the Buddha. Secondly, as a technical term of Buddhist monastic law as laid down in the *Vinayapiṭaka*, *nāsanā* stands for the expulsion of a member of the order performed by the Saṃgha. This expulsion seems to be irreversible, since with regard to monks and nuns it is frequently applied in the case of a *pārājika* offence.²⁸ In these cases *nāsanā* is used either because the committed offence is considered to be a very grave one (rape), or because the respective person did not admit to his offence immediately after having committed it, but rather only after a certain period of concealment, as illustrated by *Pārājika* 2 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga* and by the expulsion of a monk during the ecclesiastical act of *pavāraṇā*.²⁹

canonical text the same commentary informs us that the violation of rules 6-10 of the *Sāmañeras'* is to be punished by a *daṇḍakamma* (Sp 1012.32-1013.1 and 1015.2-4; cf. Sp-ṭ III 255.8-9).

28. On the other hand, one passage found in the *Parivāra* fails to conform the supposition that *nāsanā* in the *Vinaya* generally refers to the Saṃgha's expulsion of a monk or nun who has committed a *pārājika* offence. In Vin V 137.5-7 *nāsanā* is used only with regard to the eighth *pārājika* rule for nuns, but not with regard to any of the other seven *pārājikas*. It is unclear why the term *nāsanā* is employed in only this instance.
29. In addition to the information gathered from the canonical text, the commentaries *Samantapāsādikā* and *Sumaṅgalavilāsini* also mention *nāsanā* in connection with a previous concealment of a *pārājika* offence, while commenting upon the potential ways of settling the four kinds of "legal matters" (*adhikaraṇa*). In the *Cullavagga* (Vin II 101.4-102.10) a monk is accused of having committed a weighty offence, that is to say, a *pārājika* or another, "similar offence" (Vin II 101.8-11; according to *Samantapāsādikā* [Sp 1199.1-3] this means a *dukkata* or *thullaccaya*, according to the *Papañcasūdanī* [Ps IV 48.3-10] *pārājika-sāmantam* here is a "heavy offence", that is a Saṃghādisesa). The accused monk pretends for a while not to recall the particular incident referred to, after which he then admits to having committed another, less significant offence (*appamuttikam*

Additionally, in the *Vinayaṭṭakā nāsanā* is applied for the expulsion of persons who should not have received full ordination at all. In this case it was the Saṃgha's mistake to bestow ordination on the unsuitable individuals. For this reason the Saṃgha is forced to act by revoking the ecclesiastical act by the expulsion *nāsanā*. Thirdly, *nāsanā* is applied to the expulsion of novices, which may become necessary because of the ten reasons listed in the *Mahāvagga*. One of these reasons is referred to in a *pāṭimokkha* rule (*Pācittiya* 70). This specific expulsion of novices evidently corresponds to the temporary suspension (*ukkhepanā*) of monks and may be cancelled.

The only canonical trace of a more explicit classification of the application of the term *nāsanā* is to be found in the *Parivāra*, the most recent section of the *Vinayaṭṭakā*. There "three expelled (persons)" (*nāsitakā tayo*; Vin V 211.13-17) are mentioned. This specific tripartition marks the transition to the much more elaborate definition as formulated in the commentaries. The commentary *Samantapāsādikā*, which was compiled more than half a millenium after the completion of the *Vinayaṭṭakā*, comments upon this passage of the *Parivāra* (Sp 1383.36-1384.4). There a short explanation is given, and a more detailed definition in an earlier passage of the same commentary is referred to. There (Sp 582.19-26), in the commentary on the introductory story of *Samghādisesa* 8 mentioned above, the tripartition of *nāsanā* is explained in detail:

There are three (kinds of) *nāsanā*: *liṅganāsanā*, *saṃvāsanāsanā* and *daṇḍakammanāsanā*. Of these 'A rapist has to be expelled' is a *liṅganāsanā*. If

āpattiṃ), before finally pleading guilty to the offence he is actually accused of. In such a case the ecclesiastical act known as *tassapāpiyasikā-kamma* is applied, whereby the accused monk is deprived of some of his rights until his rehabilitation (see NOLOT, SVTT II, p. 110). In the commentary on this passage of the *Cullavagga* in the *Samantapāsādikā* the term *nāsanā* is used: The accused monk evades the accusation because he fears expulsion (*nāsanā*) once having admitted to the offence (Sp 1199.6-7). Similar explanations are to be found in the *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, in the commentary on the *Saṅgītisutta* in the *Dīghanikāya* (DN III 254.10-18). The canonical text commented upon briefly mentions the same situation as described in the *Cullavagga*. According to the *Sumaṅgalavilāsini*, the accused monk will be expelled if he has committed a *pārājika* offence (*ayaṃ ev' assa nāsanā bhavissati ti*). If he has committed a less serious offence, the so-called *tassapāpiyasikā-kamma* is performed and he can, after a period of good behaviour, regain his status as a regular monk (Sv III 1042.20-24). Evidently the expulsion following the concealment of a *pārājika* offence in these cases is referred to by the term *nāsanā*.

(monks) perform an ecclesiastical act of suspension (*ukkhepaniyakamma*) because of the non-recognition of or the not making amends for an offence or because of the not giving up of a wrong view, it is a *saṃvāsanāsanā*. If (monks) perform an ecclesiastical act of punishment (*daṇḍakamma*) (by saying): 'Go, leave!', that is a *daṇḍakammanāsanā*. In this case, however, with reference to *liṅganāsanā*, the wording is: 'Expel the nun Mettiyā!'

Following this definition a controversy between the Abhayagirivāsins and the Mahāvihāravāsins is reported in the *Samantapāsādikā*.³⁰ This controversy evidently is the result of the *Samantapāsādikā*'s interpretation of an earlier passage in the *Vinaya* containing the term *nāsanā*. In the commentary on the casuistry of *Pārājika* 1, which demands expulsion (*nāsanā*) for a rapist (*dūsaka*) (see above, p. 95), the *Samantapāsādikā* seems to be in need of an explanation as to why in this case the culprit is expelled by *nāsanā*. The commentary thus claims that no evidence from the side of the culprit is necessary in case of rape. A rapist (*dūsaka*) is thus expelled without having given his own view (Sp 269.9-12):³¹

'Both have to be expelled' is: both have to be expelled by a *liṅganāsanā*. In this case no evidence from the rapist is required. The victim has to be expelled if he – after having been asked – gave evidence (that he consented to the rape). If he did not consent, (the victim) does not have to be expelled. The same goes for a *Sāmaṇera*.³²

The controversy between Abhayagirivāsins and Mahāvihāravāsins now focuses on the question of what the actual reason was for the expulsion of Mettiyā. Oskar VON HINÜBER ("Buddhist Law", p. 37) states "in the commentary the problem is discussed at some length, whether the nun

30. Oskar VON HINÜBER ("Buddhist Law", pp. 37f.) emphasizes the importance of this passage, since this is the only instance in the *Vinayaṭṭakā* where two existing versions of the *Vinaya* are given.

31. This is in contradiction with the statement of the *Samantapāsādikā* as to why the Buddha asked Dabba, whether the nun Mettiyā's accusation was true (Sp 581.15-19): "[The Buddha said to Dabba:] 'If it is done by you, (say) 'It is done' means: what does he show by this (word)? He shows that (the accused person) has to speak out himself whether or not he has done it, since it is not possible using the (monks') assembly's authority or favouritism to find a person, who is in fact innocent, to be guilty or vice versa.'" Cf. also Sp 582.16-19: "'For this reason, monks, expel the nun Mettiyā!'" means: the words of Dabba and (the words of) the (nun) do not conform. Therefore it is said: 'Expel the nun Mettiyā!'"

32. This last statement probably refers to the tenth of the ten reasons for *nāsanā* of a novice, which are listed in the *Mahāvagga* (see above, p. 100).

was expelled with the consent (*paṭiññāya*) of Dabba Mallaputta or not". According to the *Sāratthadīpanī*³³ *paṭiññāya* apparently does not mean "having consented" but rather "having given her view", which refers to Mettiyā. Thus the discussion of the two factions in the *Samantapāsādikā* is about whether the expulsion of Mettiyā was because of her (false) statement (Abhayagiri view) or for another reason (Mahāvihāra view).³⁴ The *Samantapāsādikā* enlightens us that an expert then intervened who decided that the Mahāvihāravāsins were right (Sp 583.14-15)³⁵. However, even then it remained unclear which offence Mettiyā was accused of. This question is extensively discussed in the subsequent passage of the *Samantapāsādikā*. There it is stated that Mettiyā did not commit a *saṃghādisesa* offence since the rule *Samghādisesa* 8 of the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga* applies only to nuns with respect to other nuns or to monks with respect to other monks, but not to nuns with respect to monks (Sp 583.15-17 and 28; Sp 584.3-5).³⁶ This suggests that Mettiyā had com-

33. Sp-ṭ II 346.8-11: *ayyenamhi dāsītāti paṭiññātattā tāya paṭiññāya yadi nāsītā thero kārako hoti saddoso ti attho. akārako hotīti tāya katapaṭiññāṇi anapekkhivā yadi bhagavati pakatidussilabhāvaṃ yeva sandhāya sā nāsītā thero akārako hotīti adhippāyo.*

34. It is not doubted at all that she had made this statement: Vin III 162.21-22 and 27: *ayyena 'mhi Dabbena Mallaputtana dāsītā 'ti*. In the above-mentioned commentary in the *Samantapāsādikā* and the subcommentary on this passage it is not clear what person *thero* stands for, and what action is referred to by *kārako*. If *thera* refers to Dabba, then *kārako* means that he was thought to actually have raped Mettiyā. This is not true, as we know from the introductory story of *Samghādisesa* 8. Additionally, if Dabba was a rapist – why should Mettiyā have been expelled because of her accusation? Therefore it is quite probable that *kārako thero* stands for the monk who performed the expulsion of nun Mettiyā. If he did so because Mettiyā had made her (false) statement, then he evidently doubted the truthfulness of her evidence. However, a rape is believed to have actually happened as soon as a person claims to have been raped (Vmv I 282.1-2). Therefore, if the monk in spite of Mettiyā's evidence performed her expulsion, then he is a *kārako thero* and is said to be "with fault" (*sadosa*). If, on the other hand, the monk entrusted with Mettiyā's expulsion expelled her for another reason, then he is thought to be not instrumental in the performance of the wrong punishment (*akārako thero*) and is consequently "without fault" (*niddosa*).

35. Cf. Sp 584.5-9; cf. Vmv I 282.9-10; cf. Sp-ṭ II 346.8-13.

36. See also Sp-ṭ II 346.21 and Sp-ṭ II 347.2-3. Additionally, according to the *Cullavagga* (Vin II 276.9-18) a monk may not be accused by a nun. For the difficulty of applying to nuns the rules given only in the *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*, see Ute HÜSKEN, *Die Regeln für die buddhistische Nonnengemeinde im Vinaya-*

mitted either a *dukkaṭa* or a *pācittiya*. However, the outcome of both offences is not the expulsion of the culprit but a simple confession (Sp 584.5-7).³⁷ The commentator solves this discrepancy by stating that Mettiyā herself was aware of her bad conduct and was because of this expelled by the Buddha (Sp 584.7-9). However, we have to remember the fact that there is no hint of Mettiyā's self-awareness in the *Vinaya*. This explanation thus seems to be a provisional solution by the author of the *Samantapāsādikā*, who otherwise would have had to admit that the Buddha ordered the monks to act against the *Vinaya*.

The *dūsaka* in *Pārājika* 1 (*Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*) and Mettiyā are expelled by a *liṅganāsanā* according to the passages of the *Samantapāsādikā* discussed above. The same source provides the additional information that the actual expulsion of the nun Mettiyā involves her disrobing (Sp 584.11-13)³⁸. Disrobing is therefore called *liṅganāsanā*. Since the expulsion of fully ordained persons is called *liṅganāsanā* also in the cases of the monk admitting during *pavāraṇā* to having committed a *pārājika* offence (see above, p.94; Sp 1078.9), and in the case of the erroneously ordained eleven kinds of individuals in the *Mahāvagga* (see above, p.98; Sp 1016.15-16), it is probably, in each of these cases, also performed by disrobing the guilty party. In all these instances the expulsion seems to be irreversible.

Once again, as in the commentary on *Samghādisesa* 8, in the commentary on the passage of the *pāṭimokkha* about the expulsion of the novice Kaṇṭhaka (*Pācittiya* 70, see above, p.99) the "three kinds of *nāsanā*" are listed in the *Samantapāsādikā* (Sp 870.34 - 871.6):³⁹

"Expel him" means: here we are faced with a threefold *nāsanā*: *saṃvāsanāsanā*, *liṅganāsanā* and *daṇḍakammanāsanā*. Thus the suspension because of the refusal to see an offence etc. is called *saṃvāsanāsanā*. "A rapist has to be expelled" (and) "Expel nun Mettiyā!" is called *liṅganāsanā*. "From this day on, Venerable Samaṇudesa, this Lord is not to be perceived as your teacher anymore!", this is *daṇḍakammanāsanā*: this is valid here. Therefore he said: "And thus, monks, he should be expelled: '... leave!'"

Piṭaka der Theravādin (Monographien zur Indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie, 11), in press, § 1.1.1.

37. Cf. Sp-ṭ II 347.11-13 and Vjb 196.15-17.

38. See also Sp 591.26; 592.1; and Sp-ṭ II 345.27: "'Expel her' means: give her white clothes and reduce her to lay status."

39. Cf. Kkh 127.39 - 128.6.

It follows, according to this interpretation, that the expulsion of Kaṇṭaka in *Pācittiya* 70 is a *daṇḍakammanāsanā*. According to the information of the canonical text (see above, p. 99) the novice is sent away and is thus excluded from membership in the order, since he may no longer view the Buddha as his teacher. However, he may later regain his status as a novice.

Contrary to the *Samantapāsādikā*, in the *Vinaya* the term *daṇḍakammanāsanā* is unknown, but *daṇḍakamma* and *nāsanā* are treated in different sections of *Mahāvagga* and *Cullavagga*. An ecclesiastical act of punishment (*daṇḍakamma*) can be performed by monks or nuns. The *Vinaya* gives accounts of *daṇḍakammas* being performed by monks regarding novices or nuns, and by nuns regarding monks, but not by monks regarding monks or by nuns regarding nuns. In the *Mahāvagga* (Vin I 84.11-15) five particular situations are enumerated which result in the performance of a *daṇḍakamma* by monks with respect to novices. The result of this *daṇḍakamma* is not preordained. The severity of the punishment is, to a large extent, determined by the particular monks performing the *daṇḍakamma*. However, according to the *Mahāvagga* (Vin I 84.22-25) the punishment may not include prohibiting entry into the whole area of an Ārāma (Vin I 84.15-25).⁴⁰

The outcome of *nāsanā* for novices is not defined in the *Vinaya*, but is discussed in the *Samantapāsādikā* (Sp 1014.8-12; cf. Sp-ṭ III 255.6-7). There the expulsion of a novice due to any of the ten-characteristics listed in Vin I 85.19-26 is called *liṅganāsanā*. That means that his "taking of refuge", his choice of a preceptor (*upajjhāya*), and his right to occupy a lodging no longer has any relevance for him. For the time being only "the outer sign" (*liṅga*) is retained by him. If in future he does not conform to correct conduct he should then definitely be excluded (Sp 1014.16-19; cf. Sp-ṭ III 256.3-5). If, however, he recognizes his mistake, the offence is not within the scope of *liṅganāsanā* and the guilty novice can reestablish integration within the order (Sp 1014.19-30). At the same time, it is certain that the conscious transgression of any one of the first five of the rules of Sāmaṇeras is tantamount to a *pārājika* for the monks (Sp 1014.30-1015.2). In the *Samantapāsādikā* a passage of the *Kurundī* is cited. This source informs

40. The introductory sentences state that Sāmaṇeras, who were prohibited from entering an Ārāma, departed, left the order, and converted to other religious groups (Vin I 84.19-21).

us that if a novice transgresses the rules 6-9 mentioned in the *nāsanā* chapter of the *Mahāvagga*, he will be expelled "in the same way as Kaṇṭaka" in *Pācittiya* 70, that is, by means of a *daṇḍakammanāsanā* (Sp 1015.7-15),⁴¹ only after he is admonished up to three times. On the other hand, according to the *Mahā-aṭṭhakathā* and the *Samantapāsādikā*, even a successful admonition and the subsequent admission of the offence fail to release the novice from a *daṇḍakamma*. At the same time, an unsuccessful admonition definitely results in a *liṅganāsanā* (Sp 1015.15-20),⁴² whereas a novice who has raped a nun can never receive lower ordination (*pabbajjā*) again, even if he should promise to refrain from such behaviour in future (Sp 1015.23-29).

Thus, although *daṇḍakamma* and *nāsanā* in the *Vinaya* itself differ considerably, the author of the *Samantapāsādikā* links both terms by distinguishing between different kinds of *nāsanā* to be applied to novices. Moreover, in the *Samantapāsādikā* it is stated that on occasion monks performed *daṇḍakammas* with regard to novices with a view to preventing them from being expelled or from leaving the order (Sp 1013.23-27). These explanations are evidently an attempt to differentiate the general term *nāsanā*. The variation between *daṇḍakammanāsanā* and *liṅganāsanā* in the case of novices may have become necessary once the ten reasons for *nāsanā* listed in Vin I 85.19-26 were seen to have various degrees of seriousness. Despite the fact that each case concerns *nāsanā*, only an infringement of the first five training rules of the Sāmaṇeras, which is not later regretted, leads to the expulsion known as *liṅganāsanā*, the result of which appears irreversible. However, only after three unsuccessful admonitions does the violation of rules 6-9 lead to the expulsion of a novice known as *daṇḍakammanāsanā*, which can be cancelled, as noted above.⁴³

41. It is interesting that in the *Vinaya* only one admonition of Kaṇṭaka is mentioned, although the procedure of a threefold admonition is well known in the *pāṭimokkha*, as we can see from the *yāvattiyaka saṃghādisesa* rules.

42. A similar description is given in the *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇiporaṇāṭikā* (Kkh-pt 100.16-101.2; see also Sp-ṭ II 345.30-346.1).

43. Both execution and reversal of *daṇḍakammanāsanā* are described at length in the *Samantapāsādikā*. However, there the expulsion is known as *nissaraṇā* (Sp 1402.22-28; cf. Kkh 131.31-33), although the wording of the formula suggests that *Pācittiya* 70 and Vin I 85.19-26 (reasons 6-9) are being referred to (Sp 1402.28-35). The reversal of the measure is known as *osāraṇā* (Sp 1403.3-13; cf. Kkh 131.33-34). According to the same text expulsion as well as revocation are ecclesiastical acts (*apalokanakkamma*; Sp 1402.22-28 and 1403.3-13).

The last of the three types of *nāsanā* frequently mentioned in the *Samantapāsādikā* is the *saṃvāsanāsanā*, which is not described in the *Vinaya*. *Samvāsa* in the *Vinaya* is a general term encompassing all the rights and duties of a monk or nun within their respective community.⁴⁴ The term is consistently defined in the *Vinaya* as *ekakammaṃ ekuddeso samasikkhātā*, "one common ecclesiastical act, a common recitation, and one and the same training" (c.g. Vin IV 214.31-33).⁴⁵ Even in the *Vinaya* the term *saṃvāsa* is qualified more specifically: *asaṃvāsa* means "without (any) communion", *samānasamvāsaka* means "belonging to the same communion", and *nānasamvāsaka* means "belonging to a different communion". As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the term "without (any) communion" (*asaṃvāsa*) refers to a monk or nun who has transgressed one of the *pārājika* rules. The offender has lost his status as member of the Buddhist order and may never be ordained again. According to the *Mahāvagga* (Vin I 339.6-340.38) a suspended monk (*ukkhitta bhikkhu*) is not excluded from membership in the Buddhist order as a whole, but no longer belongs to the same communion (*samānasamvāsaka*) as the suspending monks (*ukkhepakā bhikkhū*). He is not prevented from founding or attaching himself to another communion. Therefore he is called "belonging to another communion" (*nānasamvāsaka*).

In the *Samantapāsādikā*, *saṃvāsanāsanā* is defined concisely as the suspension of a monk due to the refusal to see or for not making amends for an offence, or because of the refusal to give up a false view (Sp

VAJIRANĀVARORASA views the expulsion of novices in a different way. According to him it is stated in the *Aṭṭhakathās* that a novice's rights and privileges are lost completely, leaving only the status (*Entrance* III, p. 243). However, he does not tell us to what extent and in what respect the status is retained. In his opinion the *nāsanā* mentioned with regard to the Sāmaṇera Kaṇṭaka implies that the status is not in fact relinquished but instead that the culprit is simply excluded from the *āvāsa*. Because of this, he renames this particular expulsion *sambhoga-nāsanā*, "depriving of sharing", a term not to be found in the *Vinaya* or even in the commentaries.

44. This definition only touches on the relationship between monks and monks or between nuns and nuns. Consequently, novices in this legal sense are not "in communion" with anyone.
45. *Samvāsanāsanā* in the *Sāratthadīpanī* is explicitly defined with reference to this definition in the *Vinaya* (Sp-1 II 345.29-30).

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582.21-23; Sp-870.36-871.1).⁴⁶ This definition implies that *saṃvāsanāsanā* generally means "expulsion from the (same) communion" (**samānasamvāsanāsanā*). However, as noted above, *nāsanā* may refer to monks who have broken a *pārājika* rule, who have concealed the offence, but who in the end have admitted to the transgression. In cases of *saṃvāsanāsanā* one could therefore think of a monk who has broken a *pārājika* rule but who does not wish to recognize his offence and, consequently, who does not wish to leave the order. The only means of getting rid of such a monk mentioned in the *Vinaya* to my knowledge is the performance of the ecclesiastical act of suspension (*ukkhepaniyakamma*). It is quite possible that this particular case is called *saṃvāsanāsanā*, too. *Samvāsanāsanā* may thus implicitly include the suspension of a member of the order who has committed a *pārājika* but does not wish to admit to his wrongdoing. Thus two types of suspension, which are similar in procedure but different in effect are called *saṃvāsanāsanā*: A monk, who has committed either a *saṃghādisesa* or a lesser offence, can be restored once he submits to the decision of the Saṃgha regarding his offence. However, a suspension due to the non-acknowledgement of a *pārājika* offence does not include the possibility of restoration.⁴⁷

46. However, despite the fact that the commentary on two passages in the *Parivāra* (Vin V 115.23-24 and 211.14-17) mentions only Mettiyā, the *dāsaka*, and the novice Kaṇṭaka, all three kinds of *nāsanā* are listed (Sp 1320.31-34 and Sp 1383.36-1384.4). The common connection of *saṃvāsa-nāsanā* and suspension is thus missing in these instances. These two passages may be considered as evidence of multiple authorship of the *Samantapāsādikā*, as suggested by VON HINÖBER, *Handbook*, § 220.

47. Prompted by the fact that the restitution of a suspended (*ukkhitta*) monk is generally possible, VAJIRANĀVARORASA states that *saṃvāsa-nāsanā* is an inaccurate term used in the *Aṭṭhakathās* (*Entrance* III, pp. 243.245). On the other hand, he claims that a monk who commits a *pārājika* (*antimavattlu*) and who does not leave the order, is then excluded by *saṃvāsa-nāsanā*: "the Saṃgha prohibits *saṃvāsa* absolutely and does not receive him again." According to him, there is no example to be found in the texts even though this is the way such cases are dealt with on a practical level up to the present day. He apparently overlooked the link of the above-mentioned particular ecclesiastical act of suspension (*ukkhepaniyakamma*) because of the non-admission of a *pārājika* offence with the "absolute prohibition of *saṃvāsa*".

In conclusion, it is possible to summarize the application of the term *nāsanā* and to trace the development of the use of this term and its derivations in the *Vinaya* and in the commentarial literature. The combined texts referred to above suggest the following historical development. In the *Kāraṇḍavasutta* in the *Anguttaranikāya* and in the introductory story of *Samghādisesa* 8 the term *nāsanā* is a very general term for "expulsion". As the juridical terminology in the *Vinaya* developed, a distinction between *pārājika* and *nāsanā* was made, *nāsanā* then designated the expulsion to be performed by the Saṃgha. The circumstances under which such an expulsion was thought to be necessary vary considerably: For example due to an invalid ordination, initial concealment of a *pārājika*, or committing a serious offence such as rape. Additionally, the expulsion of novices is also called *nāsanā*.

The *Parivāra* contains the first indication of a classification into three different types of *nāsanā*. This categorization, however, is elaborate only in the commentaries, which were compiled more than a half millennium later.⁴⁸ There we find the terminological distinction of three kinds of *nāsanā*. *Liṅganāsanā* here is the name for the irreversible expulsion of monk, nun, or novice. *Daṇḍakammanāsanā* entails a less harsh type of expulsion of novices since it can later be revoked. This expulsion equates to *saṃvāsanāsanā* for monks, since *saṃvāsanāsanā* determines the suspension of individuals who until their restoration are not allowed to live in the same communion (*samānasamvāsa*) with the suspending monks. Additionally, *saṃvāsanāsanā* probably designates the special case of the suspension of a monk due to non-recognition of his *pārājika* offence. In this case no restoration is possible.

48. Similar observations could be made by Oskar VON HINÜBER regarding the treatment of the *samuṭṭhānas* of the different offences of the *Pāṭimokkha* ("The arising of an offence: *āpattisamuṭṭhāna*. A note on the structure and history of the Theravāda-Vinaya", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* 16 [1992], pp: 55-69; pp. 58f., 61, 68).

Abbreviations:

- AN = *Anguttaranikāya*, ed. R. MORRIS, E. HARDY, 5 Vols., London, 1885-1900 (Pali Text Society); Vol. 6 (Indexes, by M. HUNT and C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS), London, 1910 (Pali Text Society).
- BD = Isaline Blew HORNER, *The Book of the Discipline (Vinaya Pitaka)*, 6 Vols., London, 1938-1966 (Sacred Books of the Buddhists Series, 10, 11, 13, 14, 20, 25).
- DN = *Dīghanikāya*, ed. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS, J. E. CARPENTER, 3 Vols., London, 1890-1911 (Pali Text Society).
- VON HINÜBER, "Buddhist Law" = Oskar VON HINÜBER, "Buddhist Law according to the Theravāda-Vinaya. A Survey of Theory and Practice", *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 18.1 (1995), pp. 7-45.
- VON HINÜBER, *Handbook* = Oskar VON HINÜBER, *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, Berlin 1996 (Indian Philology and South Asian Studies, 2).
- Kkh = Buddhaghosa, *Kankhāvitaraṇī nāma Mātikaṭṭhakathā*, ed. DOROTHY MASKELL, London, 1956 (Pali Text Society).
- Kkh-pī = Buddhāṅga, *Kankhāvitaraṇīporāṇāṭikā*, Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition, publ. Buddha Sasana Council, Rankun, 1965.
- Mj = Buddhaghosa, *Manorathapūrāṇī. Anguttaranikāya-aṭṭhakathā*, ed. M. WALLESER, H. KOPP, 5 Vols., London, 1924-1956 (Pali Text Society).
- NOLOT, SVTT II = Édith NOLOT, "Studies in Vinaya Technical Terms, I-III", *Journal of the Pali Text Society* XXII (1996), 73-150.
- Ps = Buddhaghosa, *Papañcasūdanī*, Vol. I (1922) and II (1928) ed. by J. WOODS and D. KOSAMBI; Vol. III (1933), Vol. IV (1937) and Vol. V (1938) ed. by I. B. HORNER; London (Pali Text Society).
- Sp = Buddhaghosa (?), *Samantapāsādikā, Vinaya-aṭṭhakathā*, ed. J. TAKAKUSU, M. NAGAI (and K. MIZUNO Vols. 5 and 7), 7 Vols., London, 1924-1947 (Pali Text Society). [Index Vol. by H. KOPP, London, 1977 (Pali Text Society)].
- Sp-ī = Sāriputta, *Sāratthadīpanī*, Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition, publ. Buddha Sasana Council, Rankun, 3 Vols.; Vol. I: 1961, Vol. II: 1960, Vol. III: 1960.
- Sv = Buddhaghosa, *Sumaṅgalavūlāsini, Dīghanikāya-aṭṭhakathā*, ed. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS, J. E. CARPENTER, W. STEDE, 3 Vols., London, 1886-1932 (Pali Text Society).
- VAJIRANĀNAVARORASA, *Entrance* = SOMDETH PHRA MAHĀ SAMANA CHAO KROM PHRAYĀ VAJIRANĀNAVARORASA, *The Entrance to the Vinaya. Vinayamukha*, 3 Vols., Bangkok; 1969, 1973, 1983.
- Vin = *Vinayapīṭaka*, ed. Hermann OLDENBERG, 5 Vols., London, 1879-1883.
- Vjb = *Vajirabuddhiṭikā*, Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition, publ. Buddha Sasana Council, Rankun, 1962.
- Vmv = *Vimativinodaniṭikā*, 2 Vols., Chaṭṭhasaṅgāyana edition, publ. Buddha Sasana Council, Rankun, 1960.

number of extrinsically motivated applicants for membership which led to a need to withdraw and cultivate the purity of the Saṃgha.

This mechanism presupposes an Indian setting where the status of the renouncer is high and where there is a general belief in rebirth and *karma* and a need for merit-making among common people. I have shown that this process is expressed in the early Buddhist literature. However, the dynamic is not restricted to ancient times. In the introduction I referred to similar features in medieval and modern Sri Lanka and modern Burma reflected in the research of M. CARRITHERS, M. SPIRO and R.A.L.H. GUNAWARDENA.

I have suggested an explanation of the relationship between the Buddhist Saṃgha and the laity which emphasizes the unintended consequences of the behaviour of the members of the Saṃgha. Extrinsic motivation among the members and potential members of the Saṃgha leads to introversionism. Introversionism leads to more support from the laity. Support from the laity leads to extrinsic motivation. Thus, we have a self-enforcing mechanism. It is a good circle, and in the historical periods when the Saṃgha has been able to maintain the balance, it has led to a certain degree of stability in Buddhist societies. The structure of Theravāda Buddhist societies are the best example of this built-in conservatism. The crucial point in the circle is the introversionism, the constant need to bar out the wrong people and to purify the Saṃgha by getting rid of lax and greedy monks. When the Saṃgha fails on this point, the mechanism turns around, and we end up with an evil circle. The Saṃgha is seen as impure and lax, support from the laity fails, and the Saṃgha becomes less able to restore its purity.⁵⁴

54. This mechanism has been mentioned in R. GOMBRICH, *op. cit.*

Some Remarks on the Rise of the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* and on the Ordination Ceremony for *bhikṣuṇīs* according to the Dharmaguptaka *Vinaya*

The present article is based on the *Dharmaguptakavinaya* or *Caturvargavinaya* (四分律), one of the five *Vinayas* that survived in its Chinese translation (*Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, Vol.22, No.1428, translated by Buddhayaśas in the beginning of the fifth century AD)¹, and the most widely spread and most influential *Vinaya* in China. T.1428 consists of three parts: (1) a twofold detailed explanation of the rules of the *Prātimokṣa*² (*Bhikṣuvibhaṅga* and *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*), (2) twenty *skandhaka*s (chapter, section) that regulate the monastic life in detail, and (3) some appendices including historic information. Throughout the article, the findings of T.1428 have been compared with the other Chinese *Vinayas*, with the Pali *Vinaya*, and with the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School.

Although it is evident from the present studies of the *Vinaya* literature, that the orders of monks and nuns (*bhikṣu-* and *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*) are highly structuralized communities, possessing many rules to be kept and formal acts to be performed; and that these organizations gradually came into being (first the *bhikṣusaṃgha*, and later the *bhikṣuṇī-*

1. The other *Vinayas* are: *Mahīśāsakavinaya* T.1421, *Mahāsāṃghikavinaya* T.1425, *Sarvāstivādavinaya* T.1435, *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* T.1442 up to and including T.1459 (because of its size, the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya* was not edited into one work, but consists of a number of different works). Of the latter *Vinaya*, also a Tibetan translation exists.

Closely related to the *Mahāsāṃghikavinaya*, is the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School*, a text written in a transitional language between Prakrit and Sanskrit (ROTH, G., 1970, pp. lv-lvi). Apart from these texts, the *Vinaya* transmitted by the Theravāda School survived in the original Pali language. Finally, many Sanskrit fragments have been found. An excellent survey of the *Vinaya* literature is given by YUYAMA, A., 1979.

* Hereafter M.-L.

2. The *prātimokṣa* is a list of offenses against the prescriptions of the order with an indication of the punishment to be meted out to those who commit them. There is a list of prescriptions for monks and one for nuns. For the Dharmaguptaka School, the *prātimokṣa* for monks is to be found in T.1429 (a compilation from T.1428 by Huai-su (634-707 AD)** and in T.1430 (a translation of a Sanskrit original by Buddhayaśas, to be dated in the beginning of the fifth century AD)**; the *prātimokṣa* for nuns is to be found in T.1431 (compiled from T.1428 by Huai-su (634-707 AD)**.

** Cf. YUYAMA, A., 1979, pp. 33-34.

saṃgha), careful reading of T.1428, compared with the other extant *Vinayas* – Chinese, Pali and Sanskrit³ – has revealed the exact ‘theoretical’ career of a nun, and has given us evidence concerning the exact position of a novice (*śrāmaṇerī*), a probationer (*śikṣamāṇā*) and a nun (*bhikṣuṇī*) in the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*, concerning the origin of the *śikṣamāṇā* period, and concerning the age of a married woman to become a probationer and a nun, and has also enabled us to add some new elements in solving the problems of the five robes of a nun, the *mānatva* period for *bhikṣuṇīs*, and the interpretation of the Chinese term 度 in the sense of ‘to admit’.

1. The rise of the order of *bhikṣuṇīs* and the organization of the ordination ceremony

The chapter concerning the *bhikṣuṇīs* (*Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*) in T.1428⁴ informs us how the order of *bhikṣuṇīs* came into being, and how an ordination into the new order has to be organized (the “ordination ceremony”).

1) The eight rules that may not be transgressed

The *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*^{4*} starts with the well-known story of Mahā-prajāpatī Gautamī, Buddha’s stepmother, who, together with five hundred Śākya women asks the Buddha for permission to go forth into the homeless state and to follow the law proclaimed by the Buddha. At first, Buddha refuses, because the presence of women threatens to destroy the law. Later, Mahāprajāpatī, her hair cut off and wearing the *kaṣāya* clothes⁵, goes to see the Buddha again, and, together with five hundred Śākya women, she weeps outside the monastery where Buddha remains. When the disciple Ānanda sees them, he decides to help them to convince Buddha. At first Buddha refuses again. However, when Ānanda asks whether women have the capacities to become an *arhat*, He answers in the affirmative and, after Ānanda again asked Him to let the women go forth; He finally accepts them to become nuns, provided that

3. We use ‘Sanskrit’ to refer to the transitional language used in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School: cf. ROTH, G., 1970, pp. iv-lvi.
4. T.1428, pp. 922c6-930c5: 比丘尼犍度, *bhikṣuṇīskandha(ka)* (cf. NAKAMURA, H., *BGD*, p. 327: 犍度, chien-tu, and 犍度, chien-tu, as a phonetic rendering of the Skt. *skandha(ka)*, chapter).
5. *Kaṣāya* (MONIER-WILLIAMS, M., *SED*, p. 265: “red, dull red, yellowish red”) refers to the color of the garments of a monk or a nun. Hence it also was used to indicate the garments themselves. Concerning the color of the garments: see HEIRMAN, A., 1995: 11-13.

they accept eight rules⁶ that will make the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* dependent upon the monks. These eight rules that may never be transgressed⁷ are:

(1) Even though a *bhikṣuṇī* has been ordained for one hundred years, she has to rise when she meets a *bhikṣu* who has been newly ordained, she has to pay obeisance to him and has to offer him a place to sit.⁸

6. Pali *garudhamma* (OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol. II, p. 256ff.); *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School: *gurudharma* (ROTH, G., 1970, p. 16, §12).
7. See T.1428, p. 923a27: “八盡形壽不可過法”, eight rules that may not be transgressed during the whole lifetime. They are explained from p. 923a28 up to and including p. 923b18.

These eight rules differ slightly from *Vinaya* to *Vinaya*. The most important differences with T.1428 (*D*) are: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol. II, p. 255: the eight rules coincide with the rules in *D*; the only difference is that, according to the Pali *Vinaya*, the nuns should not only ask the monks for instruction every half month, but should also ask for the date of the *uposatha* ceremony (see *D*, rule 6); T.1421, p. 185c20-29: the eight rules coincide with the rules in *D*; the only difference is that, according to T.1421, a nun who has committed a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense, not only has to undergo the *mānatva* discipline in the two orders (*bhikṣusaṃgha* and *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*), but also has to be rehabilitated in the two orders (see *D*, rule 5); T.1425, pp. 471b1-476b11: the third rule of *D* is not to be found; the *Vinaya* has another rule, that is only to be found in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and not in any other *Vinaya*: a nun should not receive donations before these donations have been presented to a monk; the other rules essentially coincide with the rules in *D*, the only differences are that, according to T.1425, a nun not only has to undergo the *mānatva* penance after having committed a *saṃghātiśeṣa* offense, but also after having transgressed a *gurudharma* (see *D*, rule 5), and that the nuns should not only ask the monks for instruction every half month, but should also ask for the date of the *poṣadha* ceremony (see *D*, rule 6); *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 16-72, §§12-110: the third rule of *D* is not to be found; the *Vinaya* has another rule that is only to be found in T.1425, and not in any other *Vinaya*: a nun should not receive donations, before these donations have been presented to a monk; the other rules essentially coincide with the rules in *D*; T.1435, p. 345c8-18: the third rule of *D* is not to be found; the *Vinaya* has another rule: the nuns must ask the monks for instruction in the *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma*; the other rules coincide with the rules in *D*. It is to be noted, however, that the sixth rule in T.1435 explicitly says that the nuns have to ask for instruction in the eight *gurudharmas*. The latter coincides with the sixth rule in *D*; T.1451, p. 351a1-25: the eight rules coincide with the rules in *D*; the only difference is that, according to T.1451, the nuns not only have to perform the ordination ceremony in both the orders, but also the ceremony of the going forth has to be performed in both the orders (see *D*, rule 4).

8. See T.1428, p. 923a28-b2:

(2) A *bhikṣuṇī* may not scold or slander a *bhikṣu* by saying that he has broken the precepts (*śīla*), the right views (*drṣṭi*), or the right behavior (*ācāra*).⁹

(3) A *bhikṣuṇī* may not punish a *bhikṣu*, nor prevent him to join in the ceremonies of the order (such as the *poṣadha*¹⁰ or the *pravāraṇa*¹¹). A *bhikṣuṇī* may not admonish a *bhikṣu*, whereas a *bhikṣu* may admonish a *bhikṣuṇī*.¹²

(4) After having been trained in the six rules¹³ for two years as a probationer (*śikṣamāṇā*¹⁴), the ordination ceremony of a *bhikṣuṇī* has to be carried out in both *saṃghas* (i.e. first in the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* and then in the *bhikṣusaṃgha*).¹⁵

9. See T.1428, p. 923b2-4.

10. This is a ceremony held every half-month by the Buddhist community in order to recite the *prātimokṣa*: see note 2. For the history of the *poṣadha* ceremony see: FRAUWALLNER, E., 1956, pp. 78-82.

11. The 'Invitation' (*pravāraṇā*) is a ceremony held by the Buddhist community at the end of the rainy season. On this occasion, every monk (and nun) is expected to invite his (her) fellow-monks (nuns) to point out his (her) wrongs, if any, whether seen, or heard or suspected. See also HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol. IV, p. 211, note 2: "*pavāretum*, a technical term used for a monk to 'invite' others at the end of the rains to tell him if he has been seen or heard or suspected to have committed any offences."

12. See T.1428, p. 923b4-8.

13. These are the six rules that have to be particularly taken into account by a probationer (*śikṣamāṇā*). See further pp. 45-47.

14. 式又摩那 [shih-ch'a-mo-na], a phonetic rendering of the Sanskrit *śikṣamāṇā*: this is the present participle (fem.) of the verb *śikṣ*, *ātmanepada*, training oneself. This term is used to indicate a woman who, during two years, is undergoing a probationary course of training in order to become a nun.

15. See T.1428, p. 923b8-10.

(5) When a *bhikṣuṇī* commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense¹⁶, she has to undergo the *mānatva*¹⁷ in both orders (i.e. *bhikṣusaṃgha* and *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*) during half a month.¹⁸

Concerning this rule, the chapter concerning the ordination¹⁹ informs us that when a monk commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense, there are four formal acts (*karman*) which can, each time by means of a *jñāpticaturthakarman*²⁰, be performed by the *saṃghā*²¹: (a) a *parivāsa* penance²²,

16. Skt. *saṃghāvaśeṣa*, Pali *saṃghādisesa*, M.-L. School: *saṃghātiśeṣa*, 'remainder in the order'. These offenses lead to a temporary exclusion from the order. They include such offenses as acting as a go-between, slandering, conferring the ordination to a thief, remaining without the company of other *bhikṣuṇīs*, staying together with a man, creating disputes, and so on.

17. This is a kind of penance: EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 429: "... ; it thus appears that, according to both northern and southern tradition, this penance consisted in, or at least involved, some kind of ceremonial homage paid by the culprit to the general community of monks. This can be interpreted as supporting the apparent etym., *māna-tva*, condition of (paying) respect." In T.1428 the *mānatva* penance is explained on pp. 896b25-906a8. For references concerning the other *Vinayas*, see FRAUWALLNER, E., 1956, pp. 109-111.

18. See T.1428, p. 923b10-12.

19. T.1428, pp. 779a6-816c4 (受戒制度).

20. This is a formal act in which the motion is fourfold (cf. LAMOTTE, É, 1988, p. 56). It is one of the formal acts that can be performed by the *saṃgha* in taking decisions. These acts can be a *jñāptikarman*, a *jñāptidvītyakarman*, or a *jñāpticaturthakarman*: EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 244, s.v. *jñāpti*: "... ; there are three forms in which the motion may be made, (1) isolated, simple motion, not followed by a separate question as to whether the monks (or nuns) present approve, (2) accompanied (followed) by a single such formal question, called *jñāpti-dvītyam*, (3) accompanied by three such questions, called *jñāpti-caturtha*."

21. See T.1428, p. 801a4-7: 若應與波利婆沙當與波利婆沙應與本日治當與本日治應與摩那埵當與摩那埵應與出罪當與出罪: if one has to give the *parivāsa* (波利婆沙 [po-li-p'o-sha], see note 22), then one ought to give the *parivāsa*. If one has to give 'the correcting from the beginning' (本日治, Pali *mulāya paṭikassana*, see note 23), then one ought to give 'the correcting from the beginning'. If one has to give the *mānatva* (摩那埵 [mo-na-to], see note 17), then one ought to give the *mānatva*. If one has to give the rehabilitation (出罪, *ābarhaṇa*, see note 24), then one ought to give the rehabilitation.

22. EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 329: "(Skt., period of residence; Pali id. in technical sense) period of probation to which certain monks are subjected, as a disciplinary measure, for concealment of a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense." In T.1428 the *parivāsa* is explained on pp. 896b25-906a8. For references concerning the other *Vinayas*, see FRAUWALLNER, E., 1956, pp. 109-111.

(b) 'a correcting from the beginning'²³, (c) a *mānatva* penance^{17*}, (d) 'a taking away the offense' (= rehabilitation)²⁴. Further information on these *karmans* is found in two chapters of T.1428: the chapter concerning persons²⁵ and the chapter concerning probation²⁶. In case of a *parivāsa* penance (a), a *bhikṣu* has to ask the *bhikṣusamgha* three times to impose upon him this penance, which is then given to him by the *bhikṣusamgha*, by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*.²⁷ The period of the *parivāsa* penance corresponds to the period during which the *bhikṣu* concealed the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense. During this period, many restrictions are imposed upon the monk. The most important of these are: he cannot participate in the formal acts leading to *parivāsa*, *mānatva* or rehabilitation; he cannot confer the ordination or give guidance to a newly ordained monk; he cannot take care of a novice; he cannot give instruction to the *bhikṣuṇīs*; he cannot punish *bhikṣus*; and he may not be honored by the other *bhikṣus*. Every half-month, a *bhikṣu* who undergoes a *parivāsa* penance, has to remind the *bhikṣusamgha* that he is in such a condition.²⁸ If, during the *parivāsa* period, the *bhikṣu* commits another *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense, he has to be told to start again from the beginning of the *parivāsa* period. In case of such 'a correcting from the beginning' (b), the *bhikṣu* has, again, to ask the *bhikṣusamgha* three times to impose upon him this penance, which is then given to him by the *bhikṣusamgha*, by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*.²⁹ When a *bhikṣu* has completed the *parivāsa* period, the *saṃgha* imposes upon him the *mānatva* period (c), which lasts for six nights. Again, this penance is

23. Pali: *mulāya paṭikassana*; RHYS DAVIDS, T.W. and STEDE, W., *PED*, p.392, s.v. *paṭikassana*: "drawing back, in phrase *mūlaya p.* "throwing back to the beginning, causing to begin over & over again"."

24. Cf. NAKAMURA, H., *BGD*, p.672: 出罪, the rehabilitation of a *bhikṣu*, Pali *abbhāna*; WOGIARA, U., *BW*, p.199: *ābarhaṇa* [Pali *abbhāna*], with as Chinese rendering: 出却.

25. T.1428, pp.896b25-903c19 (人健度): this chapter entirely concerns the regulations concerning the four formal acts that can be performed when a *bhikṣu* commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense.

26. T.1428, pp.904a6-906a8 (覆藏健度): this chapter concerns the restrictions imposed upon a *bhikṣu* who is undergoing the *parivāsa* or the *mānatva* penances.

27. See T.1428, p.896b26-c17.

28. See T.1428, pp.904a7-906a1.

29. See T.1428, pp.896c17-897a14.

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given to him by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*, after the *bhikṣu* asked it three times to the *saṃgha*.³⁰ The restrictions imposed upon the *bhikṣu* during this *mānatva* period are the same as those during the *parivāsa* period. The only difference is that the *bhikṣu* now daily has to inform the *bhikṣusamgha* that he is undergoing the *mānatva* penance.³¹ Finally, the order can readmit the *bhikṣu* by a rehabilitation. This rehabilitation (d) is conferred to him by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*, after the *bhikṣu* asked for this three times.³²

In case a *bhikṣu* did not conceal the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense, he does not have to undergo a *parivāsa* period, but the *mānatva* penance is immediately imposed upon him. When he commits another *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense during this *mānatva* period, he has to start again from the beginning. After this period, the *saṃgha* can rehabilitate the *bhikṣu*.³³

In these chapters concerning persons and concerning probation, no indications are given whether or not this also applies to *bhikṣuṇīs*. It is only from the fifth rule (*gurudharma*) for *bhikṣuṇīs*, mentioned in the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*^{4*} of T.1428, that we can deduce that a *bhikṣuṇī* has to undergo the *mānatva* penance in both the *saṃghas* during half a month, and not during six nights as this is the case for the *bhikṣus*. The *karmavācānā*³⁴ for *bhikṣuṇīs* of the Dharmaguptaka School, T.1434, pp.1068b14-1069a1, however, clearly mentions this period of half a month, and gives further details concerning this point: the latter text adds that a *bhikṣuṇī* has to undergo this penance even after having concealed the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense, and that she has to present herself daily before both the *saṃghas*.

Also, since the *parivāsa* penance is closely related to the *mānatva* penance, it is striking that in the eight rules for *bhikṣuṇīs* in T.1428, there is no mentioning of this *parivāsa* penance, while there is a special rule for the *mānatva* penance. This is also the case in the other *Vinayas*.³⁵

30. See T.1428, p.897a14-b16.

31. See T.1428, p.906a2-8.

32. See T.1428, p.897b16-c24.

33. See T.1428, pp.897c25-898c7.

34. *Karmavācānā* is the name of a text containing a list of acts and ceremonies to be performed in the order.

35. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.II, p.255, rule 5; Sanskrit* *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, p.63, §93, rule 5 (apart from mentioning *mānatva*, it is further said that a *bhikṣuṇī* has to ask for rehabilitation

In the Pali *Vinaya*, information concerning the *mānatva* penance is to be found in two different chapters. 1) In the chapter concerning the nuns³⁶, the eight rules (P. *garudhamma*) to be followed by the nuns are enumerated. The fifth of these *garudhammas* says that a nun who has committed a *saṃghādisesa*³⁷ offense, has to undergo a *mānatta*³⁸ penance lasting for a fortnight in both the orders. 2) In the chapter concerning the *saṃghādisesa* offenses for nuns³⁹, the technical term *saṃghādisesa* is explained as follows: "the Order inflicts the *mānatta* discipline on account of her offence, it sends back to the beginning, it rehabilitates; ..." ⁴⁰. In the chapter concerning the *saṃghādisesa* offenses for monks, however, the same technical term is explained as follows: "the Order places him on probation [= *parivāsa*] on account of the offence, it sends him back to the beginning, it inflicts the *mānatta* discipline, it rehabilitates; ..." ⁴¹. Moreover, the Pali *Vinaya* concludes the chapter on the *saṃghādisesa* offenses for nuns⁴² by saying that a nun who has committed a *saṃghādisesa* offense, has to undergo a *mānatta* penance lasting for a fortnight in both the orders, after which she can be rehabilitated. Thus, in both the above mentioned chapters of the Pali *Vinaya*, there is no mentioning of a *parivāsa* period imposed upon a nun. From this, UPASAK, C.S., *DEBMT*, p. 183, concludes that there is no *parivāsa* penance for nuns.

in both the orders); Chinese *Vinayas*: T.1421, p. 185c26-28 (also here it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* has to ask for rehabilitation in both the orders); T.1425, p. 475a8-13, rule 5 (here it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* who transgresses a *gurudharma*, has to undergo the *mānatva* in both the *saṃghas*); T.1435, p. 345c10-12, rule 3; T.1451, p. 351a20-22, rule 7.

* See note 3.

36. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.II, *Cullavagga* X, pp. 253-283.
 37. This is the Pali for the Skt. *saṃghāvāseṣa*. See also NOLOT, É., 1991, pp. 401-405.
 38. This is the Pali for the Skt. *mānatva*.
 39. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*, pp. 223-242.
 40. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, p. 225, translated by HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.III, p. 180.
 41. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.III, p. 112, translated by HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.I, p. 196.
 42. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, p. 242.

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Taking into consideration the indications given in other *Vinaya* texts and in T.1434, it seems safe to state that UPASAK's conclusion concerning the Pali *Vinaya*, is equally valid for the other *Vinaya* texts.

(6) Every fortnight, the *bhikṣuṇīs* have to ask the *bhikṣus* for instruction (*avavāda*⁴³).⁴⁴

Concerning this rule, *pācittika*⁴⁵ 141⁴⁶ of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, informs us how a *bhikṣuṇī*, by means of a *jñaptidvityakarman*^{20*}, has to be appointed to go to the *bhikṣusamgha* to ask for instruction. For her safety, she must take two or three *bhikṣuṇīs* with her. After her arrival in the *bhikṣusamgha*, she should ask the *bhikṣus* three times for instruction. Since she has to ask for instruction the same day the *poṣadha* ceremony^{10*} is held by the *bhikṣusamgha*, it might be too long to wait till the end of the recitation, and that is why Buddha permits her to ask only one important *bhikṣu* for instruction, after which demand, she may leave. Afterwards, the *bhikṣusamgha* has to appoint a *bhikṣu* to go to the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* to give instruction.

It is in *pācittika* 21⁴⁷ of the *Bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, that we read how the *bhikṣu* who is to give the instruction to the *bhikṣuṇīs* has to be appointed by means of a *jñaptidvityakarman*⁴⁸, after which he has to go to the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*. The instruction he has to give concerns the eight rules imposed upon *bhikṣuṇīs*.⁴⁹

(7) The *bhikṣuṇīs* cannot spend the rainy season in a residence where there are no *bhikṣus*.⁵⁰

43. WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 145.

44. See T.1428, p. 923b12-14.

45. Pali *pācittiya*, Skt. *pātayantikā*, *pāyantikā*, Dharmaguptaka School: *pācittika* (Waldschmidt, E. (ed.), 1965, pp. 297-298, No.656), M.-L. School: *pācattika* (for alternative forms see EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 340)*. The original form and meaning of the word cannot be confidently reconstructed. According to HIRAKAWA, A., 1982, p. 191, note 1, it probably means 'expiation'. The *pācittika* rules are a class of precepts concerning minor offenses. Committing such an offense requires a confession.

* Hereafter all Pāc.

46. See T.1428, p. 765a11-c13.

47. See T.1422, pp. 647b9-649c3.

48. See T.1428, p. 648b20-27.

49. See T.1428, p. 649a1-2.

50. See T.1428, p. 923b14-15.

(8) At the end of the rainy season, the *bhikṣuṇīs* have to perform the *pravāraṇa* ceremony⁵¹ in the *bhikṣusaṃgha*.⁵¹

In respect to this rule, the chapter concerning the *pravāraṇa*⁵², informs us how, at the *pravāraṇa* ceremony, a monk asks the order three times to tell him whether he has been seen or heard or is suspected to have committed any offenses so that he can make amends for it.⁵³ It has to be noted, however, that any offense committed by any monk has to be punished before the start of the *pravāraṇa* ceremony, and that no such ceremony can start before discussions on any offense have been settled. This means that, in practice, no new offense could be brought out during the *pravāraṇa* ceremony.⁵⁴

In *pācittika* 142⁵⁵ of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, it is said that the *bhikṣuṇīs*, by means of a *jñaptidvītyakarman*^{20*}, have to delegate a *bhikṣuṇī* to go to the *bhikṣusaṃgha* in order to perform the *pravāraṇa*.⁵⁶ She has to ask whether the *bhikṣusaṃgha* has any remarks concerning an offense that a *bhikṣuṇī* is seen or heard or is suspected to have committed. For her safety, this *bhikṣuṇī* must take two or three other *bhikṣuṇīs* with her. It is further said that the *bhikṣus* have to perform the *pravāraṇa* ceremony the fourteenth day of the month, whereas the *bhikṣuṇīs* have to go to the *bhikṣusaṃgha* on the fifteenth day.⁵⁷

The exposition of these eight rules for *bhikṣuṇīs* in the *Bhikṣuṇī-kandhaka* is followed by the statement that for Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the five hundred Śākya women, accepting these rules is of the same value as an ordination.⁵⁸ Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the five hundred Śākya women thus became fully ordained nuns by accepting these rules. Also from T.1428, it is thus clear that, although Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the five hundred Śākya women accepted the eight rules, these rules cannot have been applied to the first Buddhist nuns, since they are not ordained before both orders, nor did they have to go through a proba-

51. See T.1428, p. 923b15-17.

52. T.1428, pp.837c19-843b10 (白恣健度).

53. See T.1428, p. 837a4-7.

54. See T.1428, pp. 839a15-840a19.

55. See T.1428, pp. 765c14-766b9.

56. See T.1428, p. 766a6-18.

57. See T.1428, p. 766a24-25.

58. See T.1428, p. 923b21.

tionary period of two years as a *śikṣamāṇā*^{14*} (rule 4). This is due to the simple fact that there was no *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* at that moment yet.⁵⁹ The eight rules were to become operative only after the rise of this new order of *bhikṣuṇīs*. Although Buddha agreed to the creation of this *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*, he was not happy with it and predicts that, because of this, the law will only last for five hundred years.⁶⁰

2) The ordination of a new *bhikṣuṇī*

In order to become a fully ordained nun, one has to pass through three stages: (a) the going forth (出家, *pravrajyā*), (b) a probationary period of two years as a *śikṣamāṇā*^{14*}, and (c) the full ordination (受大戒, *upasampadā*).

a. the going forth

In the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*^{4*}, T.1428 explains how this ceremony is to be carried out⁶²:

First, the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* has to be asked, by means of a *jñaptikarman*^{20*}, for permission to cut the hair (*muṇḍayati*⁶³) of the candidate⁶⁴, after which the hair is cut. Next, the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* has to be asked, by mean. of a *jñaptikarman*, for permission to hold the ceremony

59. See also HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.V, p. 354, note 3: "... She would not therefore have to pass two years as a probationer, and this practice will no doubt have been introduced later, after an order of nuns had been in being for some time."

60. See T.1428, p. 923c10-11.

In his *Les moniales bouddhistes*, pp. 28-32, M. WIJAYARATNA tries to explain this statement of the Buddha. According to M. WIJAYARATNA, the statement of Buddha has to be seen in the historical context of the creation of the order of nuns. This creation was socially very difficult, since women were expected to serve men and not to organize themselves in an independent order. Since Buddha agrees that women can become *arhats*, He accepts the creation of an order for *bhikṣuṇīs*, not, however, without warning the Buddhist community of the risks involved. In order not to let the law socially degrade by the presence of women, He proclaims the eight rules for *bhikṣuṇīs*.

61. Many other Chinese terms are used in the *Vinayas*: cf. WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 274.

62. See T.1428, pp. 923c16-924a16. A similar exposition is found in the *Bhikṣuṇī-vibhaṅga*, Pāc. 121, p. 755b4-c5.

63. WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 1049.

64. See T.1428, p. 923c18-20.

to confer the going forth (*pravrajyā*) to the candidate⁶⁵, after which the *pravrajyā* is conferred.

The actual *pravrajyā* ceremony has to be organized in the following way:

The candidate, her hair cut off and wearing the *kaṣāya* clothes⁶⁶, has to inform the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* that she is taking refuge in the Buddha, that she is taking refuge in the law, and that she is taking refuge in the order. At this occasion, she has to ask the *saṃgha* for permission to go forth, guided by her teacher (*upādhyāyini*)⁶⁶. Thus she has to speak three times. By subsequently informing the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* that she has taken refuge in the Buddha, in the law, and in the order, and that she has gone forth guided by her *upādhyāyini*⁶⁷, she becomes a novice (*śrāmaṇerī*). The *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* then confers the ten precepts (十戒, *daśa śikṣā-pādāni*) that particularly have to be taken into account by novices to the new *śrāmaṇerī*⁶⁸:

(1) she may not kill, (2) she may not steal, (3) she may not have an unchaste (*maithuna*) behavior, (4) she may not lie, (5) she may not drink alcohol, (6) she may not wear flowers, perfume or jewelry, (7) she may not sing, dance, or make music, or go to see singing, dancing and music, (8) she may not use a high, large, and big bed, (9) she may not eat at the wrong time, i.e. after noon, (10) she may not possess gold, silver, or money.

65. See T.1428, p. 923c22-24.

66. This is a *bhikṣuṇī* who, as a teacher, guides and instructs new candidates. She ought to help these new candidates from the moment they ask for the *pravrajyā* till two years after the ordination (see *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.128, p. 760a8-b14).

67. This is the version of the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*, pp. 923c25-924a2. In the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 121, p. 755b12-19, the candidate first informs the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* that she is taking refuge in the Buddha, in the Law, and in the Order, and, at the same occasion, she asks for permission to go forth, guided by her *upādhyāyini*. Next, she informs the *saṃgha* that she has taken refuge in the Buddha, in the law, and in the order; and, at the same occasion, she again asks for the permission to go forth, guided by her *upādhyāyini*.

68. See T.1428, p. 924a2-16.

These ten precepts (for Buddhist novices, male and female) are essentially the same in the other *Vinayas*: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. I, pp. 83-84; T.1421, pp. 11c26-117a4; T.1435, p. 150a19-b8; T.1453, p. 456b25-28. In T.1425 and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, an exposition of the ten precepts lacks.

b. the probationary period as a *śikṣamāṇā*

In the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*⁶⁹, T.1428 explains how the ceremony through which one becomes a probationer (*śikṣamāṇā*^{14*}) is to be carried out⁶⁹:

When she is eighteen years old, the *śrāmaṇerī* three times humbly has to ask the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* to let her study the precepts for two years as a probationer. For married women, an exception is made regarding the age of eighteen years: a married woman can receive the agreement to study the precepts for two years, when she is only ten years old.⁷⁰

After the request to become a probationer, the *śrāmaṇerī* has to be led to a place from where she can see the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*, but cannot hear it. A *bhikṣuṇī* who is capable of performing a formal act (*karman*) has to be appointed by the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*. This appointed *bhikṣuṇī* then has to perform a formal act in which the motion is fourfold (i.e. a *jñapticatur-thakarman*^{20*}) in order to ask the *bhikṣuṇīs* whether they agree to confer to the *śrāmaṇerī* a training for two years in the precepts, under guidance of her *upādhyāyini*^{66*}. In case they agree, the matter is hereby settled.

Subsequently, one has to explain the six rules (六法)⁷¹ particularly to be taken into account by a *śikṣamāṇā* to this newly accepted *śikṣamāṇā*.

69. See T.1428, p. 924a16-c4. A similar exposition (with the exception of the explanation on the six rules to be particularly taken into account by a *śikṣamāṇā*) is found in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 121, p. 755c5-24.

70. See T.1428, p. 924a17-19. I will discuss this further on pp. 62ff.

71. These six rules differ from *Vinaya* to *Vinaya*:

The Pali *Vinaya* has the same rules as T.1428 (OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, p. 319). T.1421, p. 46a2, says that there are six rules, without, however, explaining them. T.1425, p. 471c2-15 gives eighteen rules: HIRAKAWA, A., 1982, pp. 54-55: "(1) (The *śikṣamāṇā*) should take her seat (in a position) below all the *bhikṣuṇīs* and above all the *śrāmaṇerikās* (female novices). (2) Something that is an offence for a *śikṣamāṇā* (need) not to be an offence for a *bhikṣuṇī*. (3) Something that is an offence for a *bhikṣuṇī* is also an offence for a *śikṣamāṇā*. (4) A *bhikṣuṇī* may stay with a *śikṣamāṇā* (in a cell) for three consecutive days. (5) A *śikṣamāṇā* may stay with a *śrāmaṇerikā* (in a cell) for three consecutive days. (6) A *śikṣamāṇā* may give some food to a *bhikṣuṇī*. (7) A *śikṣamāṇā* may be given any food by a *śrāmaṇerikā*, but she may not boil the five kinds of vegetables, nor receive gold, silver and coins. (8) (A *śikṣamāṇā*) should not point out to a *bhikṣuṇī* any of the *bhikṣuṇī*'s offences from the *pārājika* down to the *vinayātikrama*. (9) (A *śikṣamāṇā*) may not speak (to a *bhikṣuṇī*) concerning (matters of) not committing sexual intercourse, not stealing, not killing, not lying. (10, 11) (10) (A *śikṣamāṇā*) may not attend the *Posadha* meeting of the *bhikṣuṇī* Order, (11) not attend the *pravāraṇā* meeting of the *bhikṣuṇī* Order). On the *Posadha* day and on the *pravāraṇā* day, before the Order's meeting, putting her

palms together. She (sic) should say 'I am so-and-so, pure and unsullied. May the Order remember that I have followed (the eighteen rules for a *śikṣamāṇā*).' She should repeat it three times, then go out. (12) If a *śikṣamāṇā* has committed one of the last four of the eight *pārājikas*, she must begin the *śikṣamāṇā*'s two year course over again, and ought to start learning the disciplinary rules again on that very day. (13) If the offence (that a *śikṣamāṇā* has committed) is one of the nineteen which constitute a *saṃghātīśeṣa* offence, or any other offence (down to the *Vinayātikrama* (sic)), she ought to make a *duṣkṛta* confession for each of the offences which she has committed. (14-18) If she violates (any of) the next five precepts, then her time as a *śikṣamāṇā* will be extended for as many days as she has broken the precepts. What are these five? They are: (14) taking a meal at an improper time, (15) taking food which was left over from the previous days, (16) accepting gold, silver and money, (17) drinking liquor, and (18) decorating herself with wreaths of flowers or incense." The *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 26-28, §§26-27, gives eighteen rules that agree to a large extent with the eighteen rules given in T.1425: NOLOT, É., 1991, pp. 15-17: "Quelles sont ses obligations? [1] Vis-à-vis de toutes les nonnes, elle est nouvelle; vis-à-vis de toutes les novices, elle est ancienne; elle doit se contenter du siège inférieur. [2] Elle doit se contenter de la nourriture inférieure. [3] Elle doit se contenter du gruaud inférieur. [4] Les biens matériels illicites pour elle sont des biens matériels licites pour les nonnes. [5] Les biens matériels licites pour les nonnes sont des biens matériels illicites pour elle. [6] Les nonnes ne doivent pas dormir tournées de son côté; [7] elle-même ne doit pas dormir tournée du côté des novices. [8] Les nonnes peuvent la charger de recevoir [des dons], excepté l'*agnikalpa**, [9] l'or et l'argent; [10] elle-même peut charger les novices de recevoir [des dons]. [11] Il ne convient pas qu'elle assiste au *Posadha*. [12] ni à la *Pravāraṇā*. Mais, quand a lieu le *Posadha* ou la *Pravāraṇā*, montant jusqu'au rang des anciennes puis accomplissant l'*añjali* debout devant elles, elle doit dire: "Je salue. Ô Āryā, considérez-moi comme pure" – et une deuxième, une troisième fois. Quand elle a dit trois fois "Je salue. Ô Āryā, considérez[-moi] comme pure", elle doit partir. [13] Il ne convient pas de lui faire entendre le *Prātimokṣasūtra*. Au contraire, il faut lui faire apprendre tout ce qu'elle peut apprendre avec une *padaphalakā***; il faut [lui] dire: [14] "Il ne convient pas d'enfreindre la chasteté; [15] il ne convient pas de prendre ce qui n'est pas donné; [16] il ne convient pas d'ôter la vie, de sa propre main, à un être humain; [17] il ne convient pas de prétendre mensongèrement à un pouvoir surnaturel" – ainsi doit-on lui faire apprendre tout ce qu'elle peut apprendre avec une *padaphalakā*. [18] Les infractions aux cinq préceptes [sont]: manger hors du temps prescrit; manger des aliments mis en réserve; accepter l'or et l'argent; porter des parfums, des guirlandes, des fards, boire des liqueurs, de l'alcool, des boissons fortes."

* NOLOT, É., 1991, p. 16, note 34: "[...] Le composé signifie litt. "préparé au feu" ou "rendu licite par le feu"; [...]. Il n'est pas impossible a priori qu'*agnikalpa* désigne les cinq céréales bouillies ou grillées du régime monastique [...]. La proximité de *jātarīparajata* [gold and silver] indique peut-être qu'il s'agit d'une substance précieuse."

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The first four of these six rules coincide with the first four *pārājika* offenses⁷²: (1) sexual intercourse, (2) stealing (anything with a value of five coins⁷³, or more), (3) taking human life and (4) lying about one's spiritual achievements. The other two rules are: (5) a *śikṣamāṇā* may not eat at the wrong time, i.e. after noon, and (6) she may not drink alcohol. The disciplinary measures that are to be taken against a *śikṣamāṇā* who transgresses one of these six rules are explained in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *pācittika* 123⁷⁴ of T.1428: the four *pārājika* offenses lead to a definitive

** NOLOT, É., 1991, p.17, note 36: "[...] le sens apparent est 'planchette, feuille ou écorce [...]' [pour écrire des] mots ou phrases. Mais [...] le terme pourrait désigner une nonne spécialisée dans l'instruction des probationnaires."

T.1435, p.327a7-c2, gives six rules: (1) she may not have an unchaste behavior, (2) she may not steal, (3) she may not kill, (4) she may not lie, (5) she may not let herself be touched by a man with impure thoughts from below her hair till her wrist and her knee, (6) she may not do eight wrong things together with a man with impure thoughts (to allow that the man touches her hand, that he touches her clothes, that they stand together, speak together, make appointments, or go to a secret place, to wait for a man, and to offer her body).

T.1443, p.1005a3-19, gives six rules and six additional rules. The six rules are: she may not (1) walk alone, (2) cross a river alone, (3) touch a man on purpose, (4) spend a night together with a man, (5) act as a go-between, and (6) conceal a *pārājika* offense of a *bhikṣuṇī*. The six additional rules are: she may not (1) touch silver or gold, (2) shave her pubic hair, (3) dig in the ground, (4) cut grass or fell a tree, (5) eat food that has not been given, and (6) eat food that has been left over.

As said by HIRAKAWA, A., 1982, p.54, note 17, the six rules of the Pali *Vinaya* and T.1428 are probably the oldest.

72. A *pārājika* is an offense that leads to a permanent, lifetime exclusion from the order. There are four offenses for monks and eight offenses for nuns: sexual intercourse, stealing, taking human life and lying about one's spiritual achievements; and, only for nuns: having physical contact below the armpit and above the knee, being together with a man and doing eight wrong things (According to T.1428, p. 716a24-27: touching the hand, touching the clothes, going to a secret place together, being in a secret place, talking together, walking together, leaning against one another, and making appointments. The eight wrong things differ slightly from *Vinaya* to *Vinaya*), concealing a grave offense of another *bhikṣuṇī* (in all *Vinayas* stated to be a *pārājika*, and in T.1435, p. 304a28-29, also stated to be a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*), and persisting in accompanying a suspended *bhikṣu*.

73. *māsaka*: see RHYS DAVIDS, T.W. and STEDE, W., *PED*, p. 531, s.v. *māsaka*: "lit. a small bean, used as a standard of weight & value; hence a small coin of very low value. Of copper, wood & lac."

74. See T.1428, p. 756b18-c25.

expulsion from the order; the two other offenses and offenses closely linked to the four *pārājika* offenses lead to an extension of the two-year training.

T.1428 also mentions that, apart from these six rules particularly to be taken into account by a *śikṣamāṇā*, a *śikṣamāṇā* also should study all the precepts for *bhikṣuṇīs*, except for the precept on offering and accepting food with one's own hands⁷⁵.

The latter regulation for the *śikṣamāṇā* is difficult to understand, since no precept in the *Prātimokṣa*^{2*} for *bhikṣuṇīs* concerning offering and accepting food with one's own hands is to be found. The first *pratideśaniya*⁷⁶ offense in the *Bhikṣuvibhaṅga*⁷⁷ might give a clue to a solution. Here, a *bhikṣuṇī* offers her own food to a *bhikṣu*. However, when she, because of this, becomes very weak and ill, Buddha says that a *bhikṣu* may not, with his own hands, accept food of a *bhikṣuṇī*, except when he is ill or when the *bhikṣuṇī* is related to him. If he does accept food, he commits a *pratideśaniya* offense. T.1428⁷⁸ also says – by means of a standardized formula – that in case a *bhikṣuṇī* accepts food, she commits a *duṣkṛta*⁷⁹, and that, in the same case, also a *śikṣamāṇā*, a *śrāmaṇera*, and a *śrāmaṇerī* (i.e. a probationer, a male, and a female novice) commit a *duṣkṛta*. This implies that they too cannot accept food from a *bhikṣuṇī*.

In the Pali *Vinaya*, *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*, *Pāṭidesaniya* 1⁸⁰, we find the interesting remark that, although a monk cannot accept food from a nun with his own hands, he may accept food from a *sikkhamānā* or from a *sāmaṇerī*.

75. See T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*, p. 924c2-4 (particularly, p. 924c3-4: 除為比丘尼過食自取食食, exception made for giving food to a *bhikṣuṇī* and personally taking food to eat); *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.121, p. 755c23-24 (particularly: 除自手取食授食與他, exception made for taking food with one's own hands and offering food to someone else).

76. These minor offenses concern the acceptance and the consumption of inappropriate food. These offenses have to be confessed.

77. T.1428, pp. 695c17-696b13. This offense is also found in the Pali and the other Chinese *Vinayas*: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp. 175-177, *pāṭidesaniya* 1; T.1421, pp. 71c7-72b6, *pratideśaniya* 1; T.1425, pp. 397a14-398a1, *pratideśanika* 2; T.1435, p. 131a6-b18, *pratideśaniya* 1; T.1442, pp. 897a22-899b18, *pratideśaniya* 1.

78. See T.1428, p. 696b7-8.

79. This literally means 'a bad action' and indicates a very light offense.

80. See note 77.

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Furthermore, the ninth rule for the *śikṣamāṇās* in T.1425⁸¹ says that a *śikṣamāṇā* can give some food to a *bhikṣuṇī*.

Considering the above mentioned facts, we can state that a *bhikṣu* and, as mentioned in T.1428, a *bhikṣuṇī*, may not accept food from a *bhikṣuṇī* with their own hands. This also implies that a *bhikṣuṇī* cannot give food into the hands of a *bhikṣu* or a *bhikṣuṇī*. This might be the precept for *bhikṣuṇīs* referred to in the above mentioned passage concerning the precepts to be followed by a *śikṣamāṇā*.

In case the latter precept is the precept for *bhikṣuṇīs* referred to in the passage concerning the precepts to be followed by a *śikṣamāṇā*, then we are confronted with a contradiction in T.1428:

I. On the one hand, in the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka* of T.1428, it is said that a *śikṣamāṇā* should follow all the precepts for *bhikṣuṇīs*, except for the one precept on offering and accepting food with one's own hands, a precept that we have identified as being equivalent to the first *pratideśaniya* in the *Bhikṣuvibhaṅga*. Unlike a *bhikṣuṇī*, a *śikṣamāṇā* can offer food to a *bhikṣu* or to a *bhikṣuṇī* with her own hands, and can receive food from a *bhikṣuṇī*. The above is congruous with the Pali *Vinaya*, *Bhikkhuvibhaṅga*, *Pāṭidesaniya* 1^{80*}, where it is said that a monk can always accept food from a *sikkhamānā* or from a *sāmaṇerī*, which implies that a *sikkhamānā* or a *sāmaṇerī* also can give food to a monk, and also coincides with the ninth rule to be taken into account by a *śikṣamāṇā* of T.1425^{81*}, according to which a *śikṣamāṇā* may give food to a *bhikṣuṇī*.

II. On the other hand, in the *Bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, *Pratideśaniya* 1 of T.1428, it is said that a *bhikṣu* cannot receive food from a *bhikṣuṇī* and that this also applies to a *bhikṣuṇī*, a *śikṣamāṇā*, a *śrāmaṇera* and a *śrāmaṇerī*. These, equally, cannot receive food from a *bhikṣuṇī*. This is in direct conflict with the above mentioned (I.). A possible explanation for this contradiction in T.1428 may be that, in the *Bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, *Pratideśaniya* 1, T.1428 uses a standardized formula⁸², to be found in many other precepts, as a result of which, probably, no attention was paid to the particular position of the *śikṣamāṇā* (and, possibly, as mentioned in the Pali *Vinaya*, of the *śrāmaṇerī*).

81. See note 71.

82. T.1423, *pratideśaniya* 1, p. 696b7-8: 比丘尼突吉羅式叉摩那沙彌沙彌尼突吉羅, a *bhikṣuṇī* is with a *duṣkṛta*. A *śikṣamāṇā*, a *śrāmaṇera* and a *śrāmaṇerī* are with a *duṣkṛta*.

The difference between a *śrāmaṇerī* and a *śikṣamāṇā* appears to be only formal. As we can see from the above, the admission ceremony, by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*, of a *śikṣamāṇā*, is a lot more elaborated than the one of a *śrāmaṇerī*, for whom no formal act has to be performed. Except for this formal element, of which it might be expected that it leads to a different status of the two members, there appears to be no essential difference as to their role, or duties in the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*.

In this way, having a closer look at the ten precepts (十戒) imposed upon a *śrāmaṇerī* and on the six rules (六法) to be particularly taken into account by a *śikṣamāṇā*, we see that the six rules of the *śikṣamāṇā* coincide with six of the ten precepts imposed on a *śrāmaṇerī*. This does not mean that a *śikṣamāṇā* does not have to follow the other four precepts, precepts saying that a *śrāmaṇerī* may not wear flowers, perfume or jewelry, that she may not sing, dance, or make music, or go to see singing, dancing and music, that she may not use a high, large, and big bed, and that she may not possess gold, silver, or money. Since it is also said that a *śikṣamāṇā* has to keep all the precepts that apply to *bhikṣuṇīs*, except for one (i.e. the precept on offering and accepting food), this implies that a *śikṣamāṇā* necessarily also has to follow the four remaining precepts for a *śrāmaṇerī*, these latter precepts belonging to the set of precepts for *bhikṣuṇīs*⁸³.

This could still lead to the wrong conclusion that a *śrāmaṇerī* has to follow ten precepts only, while a *śikṣamāṇā* has to keep up all the precepts for *bhikṣuṇīs*, except for one, hereby particularly taking into account six rules. Since in these cases where the commentary on these precepts for *bhikṣuṇīs* (of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*) is also applicable to *śikṣamāṇās* and to *śrāmaṇerīs*, there always is an indication of the offense committed by the latter two members of the community, it is evident that also the latter two members of the community have to keep up the precepts concerned, be it that – exception made for the case they commit one of the first four *pārājika* offenses⁸⁴ – *śikṣamāṇās* and *śrāmaṇerīs* are not punished in the same way as *bhikṣuṇīs* are.

83. A *bhikṣuṇī* may not embellish herself (*Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *Pācittika* 157). A *bhikṣuṇī* may not go to see singing, dancing and music (*Pācittika* 79). A *bhikṣuṇī* must follow strict rules concerning the bedding she uses (*Pācittikas* 68 and 69). A *bhikṣuṇī* may not possess gold, silver or money (*Nihsargikapācittika* 9).

84. Of these four *pārājika* offenses, the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* only mentions the essentials. Exception made for some additional commentary on the first *pārājika* offense, the commentary is to be found in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*. In the com-

Hence, we have to conclude that for a *śikṣamāṇā* or a *śrāmaṇerī*, the offenses that are mentioned and the measures that are taken are the same.

Finally, it is interesting to note that all the formal acts and all the ceremonies performed by the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha* can only be done by the *bhikṣuṇīs* themselves, whereas both the *śrāmaṇerīs* and the *śikṣamāṇās* cannot participate in them.

We thus have to conclude that, since the precepts to be followed by and the measures that can be taken against a *śrāmaṇerī* and a *śikṣamāṇā* are the same, and since both do not participate in the ceremonies and the formal acts in the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*, there is no essential difference between the position of a *śrāmaṇerī* and the one of a *śikṣamāṇā*, except probably for the social rank in the community, given the importance attached to the admittance ceremony of a *śikṣamāṇā*.

c. the ordination ceremony

When a *śikṣamāṇā* has concluded the two-year training, she is ready to become a *bhikṣuṇī*, provided that she did not act against one of the six rules (六法) that she particularly has to take into account.

In the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*^{4*}, T.1428 explains how this ceremony is to be carried out⁸⁵:

Although the candidate to the ordination, as a *śrāmaṇerī* and as a *śikṣamāṇā*, has been guided by an *upādhyāyini*^{86*}, she now must officially ask a *bhikṣuṇī* to become her *upādhyāyini*. After this request, repeated three times, that *bhikṣuṇī* consents to become her *upādhyāyini*.⁸⁶

Next, the candidate has to be led to a place from where she can see the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*, but cannot hear it. The *karman* master⁸⁷ then performs

mentary on the first four *pārājika* offenses, the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* mentions that in case a *śrāmaṇera*, a *śrāmaṇerī* or a *śikṣamāṇā* commit such an offense, they commit a *duṣkṛta* and they have to be sent away definitively. Although a *śrāmaṇera*, a *śrāmaṇerī* and a *śikṣamāṇā* are not said to have committed the same offense as a *bhikṣu* (or a *bhikṣuṇī*), they are punished in the same way.

85. See T.1428, pp. 924c4-926a26. A similar exposition is found in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.124, pp. 756c26-758c28.

86. See T.1428, p. 924c4-7.

87. 戒師, *karmakāraka* (?) (f. *karmakārikū*): cf. WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 323, s.v. *karmakāraka*: 作行師, 作作者; 作者業, 作者作業; EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 170, s.v. *karmakāraka*: "the presiding officer at an assembly of monks and nuns before which a *jñapti*, q.v., is presented; he or she presents the *jñapti*, and the following *karmavācānā*, q.v. (if any)." 戒師 possibly also may render the

a *jñaptikarman*^{20*}, in order to appoint an instructress⁸⁸ in the *bhikṣuṇī-saṃgha*.⁸⁹ Hereafter, that instructress goes to the candidate and asks her whether she possesses the five required robes (i.e. the *antarvāsa*, the *uttarāsaṅga*, the *saṃghāṭī*, the *saṃkaksikā*, and the robe that covers the shoulder⁹⁰) as well as the alms bowl (*pātra*), after which the instructress

Skt. term *karmācārya** (f. *karmācāryā*)*: cf. NAKAMURA, II., BGD, p. 164, s.v. 戒師: Pali *kamma-ācariya*.

88. 教授師, *anusāsikā*: cf. WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 68, s.v. *anusāsaka*: 教師. Apart from the *upādhyāyini* and the *karmakārikā*, the *anusāsikā* is the third person to be present during an ordination ceremony. In addition to these three, seven witnesses are required (cf. T.1428, p. 886a22-28, in the chapter concerning an intervention of Buddha in Campā, where he explains, among other things, which kind of assemblies have to carry out community proceedings).

89. See T.1428, p. 924c10-12.

90. See T.1428, p. 924c13-14.

These are the five robes that are to be possessed by a *bhikṣuṇī*. The first three correspond to the three robes of a monk: an *antarvāsa*, i.e. an inner robe, an *uttarāsaṅga*, i.e. an upper robe, and a *saṃghāṭī*, i.e. an outer cloak: see HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol. II, p. 1, note 2: "The *antarvāsaka* is put on at the waist, and hangs down to just above the ankles, being tied with the *kāyabandhana*, a strip of cloth made into a belt or girdle [...]. The *uttarāsaṅga* is the upper robe worn when a monk is in residence. It covers him from neck to ankle, leaving one shoulder bare [...]. The *saṃghāṭī* is put on over this when the monk goes out. It may be exactly the same size as the *uttarāsaṅga*, but it consists of double cloth, since to make it two robes are woven together. [...] All these three robes are made in the patchwork fashion."

The two additional robes are 僧羯支 ([seng-chieh-chih]), a phonetic rendering of the Skt. *saṃkaksikā*) and 覆肩衣, a robe that covers the shoulder.

By comparing several texts and dictionaries, VON HINÜBER, O., 1975, pp. 133-139, concluded that a *saṃkaksikā* is a small band worn to support the breasts, so that they do not catch the eye. This is also the reason why according to T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 160, a *saṃkaksikā* should be worn by a *bhikṣuṇī*. Still according to O. VON HINÜBER, another garment should be worn over the *saṃkaksikā*: a *gaṇḍapratīcchādana* (*paṭa*), lit. a robe to hide the rounding (of the breasts). This latter statement is based upon information given in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School (ROTH, G., 1970, *bhikṣuṇīprakīrṇaka* (miscellaneous matters), p. 313, §277). The Skt. term *gaṇḍapratīcchādana* (*paṭa*) corresponds to the Chinese term 覆肩衣 in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Chinese *Vinaya* of the Mahāsāṃghika School (T.1425, p. 546b28). This makes it clear that the purpose of wearing 覆肩衣 is to cover the rounding of the breasts. Probably this robe also covered the shoulder left bare by the *uttarāsaṅga*.

These two additional robes of the *bhikṣuṇīs* are not the same in all the *Vinayas*. In passages where the five robes are enumerated in the *Vinayas*, we find the following two additional robes:

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OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol. II, p. 272: (1) *saṃkacchika*, (2) *udakaṣāṭikā*, i.e. a bathing-cloth. This *Vinaya* does not mention a cloth worn over the *saṃkacchika*.

T.1421, p. 187c19-20: (1) 覆肩衣: a robe that covers the shoulder, (2) 水浴衣: a bathing-cloth. Apart from this, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 181, p. 98a11-17, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* should wear a *saṃkaksikā* (僧羯支 [seng-ch'i-chih]).

T.1425, p. 472b21-22 and p. 521a25-26: (1) 覆肩衣: a robe that covers the shoulder, (2) 雨衣 (p. 472b22) 雨浴衣 (p. 521a26): a bathing-cloth. Apart from this, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *prakīrṇaka* 23, p. 546b25-c2, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* should wear a 覆肩衣 over the *saṃkaksikā* (僧羯支 [seng-ch'i-chih]).

In the Skt. *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, we find the same information: ROTH, G., 1970, p. 146, §165: (1) *kaṇṭhapratīcchādana*** a robe that covers the rounding (of the breasts), (2) *udakaṣāṭikā*: a bathing-cloth. Apart from this, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *prakīrṇaka* 24, p. 313, §277, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* should wear a *gaṇḍapratīcchādana* (*paṭa*) over the *saṃkaksikā*.

* See note 3.

** According to NOLOT, É., 1991, p. 136, note 174, this should be *gaṇḍapratīcchādana*.

T.1428, p. 924c13-14: (1) 僧羯支: *saṃkaksikā*, (2) 覆肩衣: a robe that covers the shoulder. Apart from this, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 102, p. 749a19-b16, a bathing-cloth (浴衣) to be worn by a *bhikṣuṇī* is mentioned.

T.1435, p. 335b28: (1) 覆肩衣: a robe that covers the shoulder, (2) 俱修羅 [chū-heiu-lo]: this is a phonetic rendering of the Skt. *kusūlaka*. There are different opinions about what exactly a *kusūlaka* is: according to NAKAMURA, H., *BGD*, p. 269, it is an undergarment, also called (bamboo basket), because of its resemblance with such a basket. According to EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 189, s.v. *kusūlaka*, there are two different garments called *kusūlaka*: a) "a woman's breast-covering" (= *kusūlaka*); b) "a man's garment". The first interpretation is based on the *Mahāvīyūtpatti*, No. 9000 ("復乳 (1覆乳?)"). To our opinion, since in T.1435 a *kusūlaka* is mentioned together with a "robe that covers the shoulder", it could well have the same use as a *saṃkaksikā* in T.1428, i.e. a garment to support the breasts, worn under another garment that hides the rounding of the breasts and covers the shoulder. EDGERTON's second interpretation, a man's garment, is also to be found in T.1435, p. 347b14-17: what man's garment, in this passage, a *kusūlaka* exactly is, is difficult to know. It is likely to be an undergarment. The term *saṃkaksikā* (僧羯支 [seng-ch'i-chih]) is mentioned only once in the *Vinaya*, namely as part of a series of robes that can be used by a monk (p. 466a23). It is clear that the original sense of *saṃkaksikā* has been lost here. Besides this, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 128, p. 335a1-25, a bathing-cloth (浴衣) to be worn by a *bhikṣuṇī* is mentioned.

T.1443, p. 944b8-9: (1) 俱蘇洛迦 [chū-su-lo-chia]: *kusūlaka*, (2) 僧脚崎 [seng-chiao-ch'i], which according to our opinion, is a phonetic rendering of the Skt. term *saṃkaksikā*. What, in this *Vinaya*, exactly is meant by a *kusūlaka* or by a *saṃkaksikā*, and what the difference between these two is, is impossible to say. Apart from the above two clothes, T.1443, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 139, p. 1011a3-9, mentions a bathing-cloth (洗群) to be worn by a *bhikṣuṇī*.

questions her in order to find out if there are any stumbling blocks (*antarāya*) to her ordination.⁹¹ She asks after her name and her *upādhyāyini*. She then asks whether she is twenty years old, whether she has all the robes and the alms bowl, whether she has the permission of her parents and the permission of her husband, whether she has any debts, whether she is not a slave, and whether she is a woman. Finally, the instructress questions the candidate concerning such diseases as leprosy, boils, eczema, tuberculosis, epilepsy, bisexuality, or the disease that the two tracts come together⁹², and asks her whether she is able to hold up urine, excrements, mucus and saliva.

In case the answer is satisfactory, the instructress brings the candidate back to the other *bhikṣuṇīs* and positions her within her reach. Hereafter, the instructress performs a *jñaptikarman* in order to ask the *bhikṣuṇī-saṅgha* for permission to let the candidate return among the *bhikṣuṇīs*. In case the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* consents, the instructress tells the candidate to come nearer.⁹³ The instructress then has to hold the robes and the alms bowl of the candidate and has to instruct her to humbly ask the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* three times to confer her the ordination.⁹⁴

After this request, the *karman* master performs a *jñaptikarman* to ask permission to interrogate the candidate in order to find out whether there are any stumbling blocks to the ordination.⁹⁵ The *karman* master then asks the same questions as the instructress. This time, however, the interrogation is public.⁹⁶ In case the answer is satisfactory, the ordination is finally carried out by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*.⁹⁷

We can conclude that the three robes common for monks and nuns (*antarvāsa*, *uttarāsāṅga*, and *saṅghāṇī*) are always the same. Furthermore, exception made for the Pali *Vinaya*, every *Vinaya* mentions a bathing-cloth and two garments to cover the breasts to be worn by a *bhikṣuṇī*. Of these three robes, two are added to the three common robes, in this way making a series of five robes that should always be possessed by a *bhikṣuṇī*, and that a *śikṣamāṇā* should possess at her ordination ceremony.

91. See T.1428, p. 924c15-21.

92. This is further explained in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, p. 774b7: it means that the tracts of urine and excrements are not separated.

93. See T.1428, p. 924c22-27.

94. See T.1428, pp. 924c27-925a3.

95. See T.1428, p. 925a3-6.

96. See T.1428, p. 925a6-13.

97. See T.1428, p. 925a13-25.

After the ordination ceremony in the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*, the candidate has to be led to the *bhikṣusamgha*. She humbly asks the *bhikṣusamgha* three times to confer her the ordination.⁹⁸ After this triple request, the *karman* master of the *bhikṣus* interrogates her on possible stumbling blocks, as this had been done before in the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*. The *karman* master further asks the candidate whether she has studied the precepts and whether she is pure⁹⁹. In case her answer is satisfactory, he asks the other *bhikṣuṇīs* whether the candidate has studied the precepts and whether she is pure. In case the answer, again, is satisfactory, the ordination is conferred to her by means of a *jñapticaturthakarman*.¹⁰⁰

Before the ordination ceremony is finally concluded, two important instructions are given to the newly ordained *bhikṣuṇī*. One first explains the eight *pārājika* offenses which would exclude her definitively from the order of *bhikṣuṇīs*: i.e. sexual intercourse, stealing, taking human life and lying about one's spiritual achievements, having physical contact below the armpit and above the knee, being together with a man and doing eight wrong things (according to T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, p. 716a24-27: touching the hand, touching the clothes, going to a secret place together, being in a secret place, talking together, walking together, leaning against one another, and making appointments), concealing a grave offense (i.e. a *pārājika*) of another *bhikṣuṇī*, and persisting in accompanying a suspended *bhikṣu*. The newly ordained *bhikṣuṇī* has to profess that she is able to take on these interdictions.¹⁰¹ Secondly, four supports (*nīśraya*) are taught to her. These four supports are: (1) she should dress in refuse rags¹⁰², (2) she should only rely on alms food¹⁰³, (3) she should dwell at the root of a tree¹⁰⁴, and (4) she has to use medicine made of putrid elements¹⁰⁵. These supports are the

98. See T.1428, p. 925a25-b1.

99. *parisuddha*, without stumbling blocks.

100. See T.1428, p. 925b1-17.

101. See T.1428, pp. 925b17-926a5.

102. *pāṇisukāla* (WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 770; EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 307).

103. *piṇḍapāta* (WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 784; EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 307).

104. *vrkṣamūla* (WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 1265; EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 307).

105. 腐爛藥, medicine made of putrid elements: *pūtimuktabhaiṣajya* (WOGIHARA, U., *BW*, p. 802; EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 307). See RHYS DAVIDS, T.W. and STEDE, W., *PED*, p. 470, s.v. *pūtimutta*, "strong-smelling urine, usually urine of

minimum requirements for a life as a *bhikṣu* or as a *bhikṣuṇī*; it is, however, allowed to receive more and better than what is stipulated in these four supports, provided one does not ask for it. Because the candidate may not be able to endure such an austere life, these supports are explained to her before the conclusion of the ordination ceremony, and the candidate is asked whether she will obey them.¹⁰⁶

Ultimately, the ordination ceremony is officially concluded.¹⁰⁷

As we have said before, Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the five hundred Śākya women did not receive this official ordination: they became *bhikṣuṇīs* by accepting the eight rules (*gurudharmas*) for *bhikṣuṇīs*. When some *bhikṣuṇīs* suggested that the ordination of Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the five hundred Śākya women was not valid, Buddha again said that both ordinations have the same value, and that Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī and the five hundred Śākya women received the precepts too.¹⁰⁸

The *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka* of T.1428 then adds some special conditions that can occur during the ordination ceremony. The most important addition is that, after having been ordained in the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*, a candidate can receive the ordination in the *bhikṣusamgha* by a proxy, in case it is too dangerous for her to go to the monastery of the *bhikṣus*. This proxy has to be appointed by means of a *jñaptidvīṭṭiyakarman*. For her safety, the proxy must take two or three *bhikṣuṇīs* with her.

It is thus to be seen that the ordination ceremony is a well organized, highly formalized ceremony, focusing on the control exercised by the full members of the community in order to prevent a newcomer to damage this community. After ordination, the newly ordained *bhikṣuṇī* becomes a full member of the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*. This allows her to take

cattle used as medicine by the *bhikkhu*.”; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, p. 40, §51: “*pūtimūtram*”. According to NAKAMURA, H., *BGD*, p. 969, the Skt. term refers to urine and excrements of cows used as medicine. On this, EDGERTON, F., *BHSD*, p. 350, s.v. *pūtimukta*, says: “([...] = *pūtimukta*, interpreted even by Pali comms. as containing *mutta* = Skt. *mūtra*, urine; this is prob. a late and secondary interpretation, suggested by *pūti* [...]), a medicinal decoction.”

106. See T.1428, p. 926a5-19.

107. See T.1428, p. 926a19-26.

108. See T.1428, p. 926a27-b3.

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part in all the formal acts and the ceremonies that are performed by the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*. On the other hand, all the precepts for *bhikṣuṇīs* and the measures they include, now all apply to her. Many offenses against the rules of this ordination ceremony can be committed.

II. Offenses against the ordination rules according to the *Dharmaguptaka Vinaya*

Below, all offenses against the ordination rules appearing in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of T.1428 are enumerated, and each of them is compared with the corresponding offenses in the other *Vinayas*. In this comparison, we restrict ourselves to the essentials.

In all the *Vinayas*¹⁰⁹, all the offenses committed against the rules of the ordination ceremony, are found among the *pācittika* offenses^{45*}, except for one offense that, in all the *Vinayas*, is classified as a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense^{16*}, and two offenses that only in T.1425 and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsaṃghika-Lokottaravāda School are classified in a different category¹¹⁰.

All offenses focus either on the candidate, or on the *upādhyāyini*^{76*}, or on the ordination procedure. Moreover, T.1428 adds two offenses that concern the period immediately following the ordination ceremony.

1) The candidate

a. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *Samghāvaśeṣa* 5 (pp. 719b7-720a5, particularly, p. 719c15-18)¹¹¹:

“If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows in advance that a woman thief¹¹² has to be put to

109. See note 1.

110. T.1428, Pāc. 134 ≡ T.1425, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, *Samghātiśeṣa* 7.

T.1428, Pāc. 137 ≡ T.1425, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, *nihsargika-pācattika* 18.

111. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, pp. 225-227, *Samghādiseṣa* 2; T.1421, p. 79b6-c24, *Samghāvaśeṣa* 4; T.1425, pp. 519c6-520b14, *Samghātiśeṣa* 8; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 138-141, §§160-162, *Samghātiśeṣa* 8; T.1435, pp. 309c14-310b18, *Samghāvaśeṣa* 8; T.1443, pp. 935c11-936b2, *Samghāvaśeṣa* 10.

112. This coincides with the precepts in the Pali *Vinaya* and in T.1435. In the precepts of T.1421, of T.1425, and of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, it is a woman who committed a crime (in T.1421, this is explained as adultery or theft); in the precept of T.1443, it is a woman who betrayed her husband (this is also

death¹¹³ and that people know this¹¹⁴, and yet, without asking the king or the ministers, and without asking the clan¹¹⁵, admits¹¹⁶ her into the

mentioned in the introductory stories in the Pali *Vinaya*, in T.1421, in T.1425, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and in T.1435).

113. In T.1421, in T.1425, and in T.1443, this is said in the introductory story to the precept and not in the precept itself.

114. This is not found in the Pali *Vinaya*, in T.1421, in T.1425, and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School.

115. Pali *Vinaya*: without asking the king, the order of nuns, a group* or a guild** or a company***; T.1421: without asking her husband (who, as it is said in the introductory story to the precept, is supported by the laws laid down by the king); this is not found in T.1425 and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School; T.1435: without asking the king or the *ksatriyas*; T.1443: without the permission of her husband and the king.

* See HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.III, p.183, note 7: "Va. 910 [TAKAKUSU, J., NAGAI, M., *Samantapāsādikā*, Vol.IV, p.910] makes out that this means a group of wrestlers and so on. But, preceded by *saṃgha*, it might have the usual Vin. meaning of a group (of two to four monks or nuns). On the other hand, it is followed by two words that have no religious significance, and which denote associations of people 'in the world'."

** See HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.III, p.183, note 8: "*pūga* = *dhammapūga*, "a guild under *dhamma*" (?). VA. 910 [TAKAKUSU, J. and NAGAI, M., *Samantapāsādikā*, Vol.IV, p.910]. Probably a guild governed by some rule or law."

*** See HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.III, p.183, note 9: "*seṇi*, a corporation, company or guild of artisans or traders following the same business or dealing in the same articles."

116. All the Chinese *Vinayas* use the term 度, which originally meant "to bring (her) into the order (= the first steps into the order)" (NAKAMURA, H., *BGD*, p.997, s.v. 度 ⊕). As we can see in some Chinese *Vinayas*, later the meaning "to confer the ordination" was added to this original meaning. In this precept of T.1428, however, 度 is used in the original meaning, i.e. the first of three actions (1) to admit her (度), (2) to let her go forth, and (3) to confer her the ordination. In the precept of T.1421, only the term 度 appears; from the commentary on the precept, however, it is clear that also the third of the above three actions (i.e. to confer her the ordination) is understood. Also in the precept of T.1425, only the term 度 appears; from the commentary on the precept, it is, again, clear that the ordination is to be understood, while to let her go forth and to let her become a *śikṣamānā* constitute minor offenses. In the precept of T.1435, the term 度作弟子, to admit her as a disciple, appears. From the introductory story to this precept, we know that the *bhikṣuṇī* lets a woman go forth; the ordination, however, is not mentioned. In the precept of T.1443, the term 度 appears, followed by the term 令出家; the ordination is not mentioned. Here 度 has its original meaning.

The Pali *Vinaya* uses the verb *vuṭṭhahati*, in the causative *vuṭṭhāpeti*. On this term HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.III, p. xlvii says: "To 'receive' or to 'accept' into

order, lets her go forth and confers her the ordination, then this *bhikṣuṇī* commits an immediate¹¹⁷ *saṃghāvaśeṣa* that has to be given up¹¹⁸."

Since this offense is found among the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offenses, it is clear that it is a major transgression of the rules. Not only is the crime, committed by the admitted woman, considered as a serious crime, the avoidance of the punishment, moreover, leads to friction between the order and the king and his ministers, whose support is essential to the Buddhist order. The precepts in the other *Vinayas* mention equally serious problems¹¹⁹, and except for T.1425 and for the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School, the other *Vinayas* all say that, without the permission of the king to admit the woman into the order, a major transgression, i.e. a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* is committed.¹²⁰

We thus can say that it are the seriousness of the crime committed by the admitted woman and the problems that arise from this admission that justify the classification of this offense among the *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offenses.

Comparing this *saṃghāvaśeṣa* precept with the corresponding precepts in the other *Vinayas*, it is to be noticed that no *Vinaya*, except for T.1425 and for the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottara-

an order is perhaps the nearest rendering for which there is any justification ...". In the introductory story to this precept in the Pali *Vinaya*, the nun Thullanandā lets the woman thief go forth. The ordination is mentioned in the commentary on the precept.

In the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, the verb *upa-vsthā* (in the causative) appears. It is explained in the commentary on the precept as 'to let go forth' and 'to confer the ordination'. To let her go forth and to let her become a *śikṣamānā* constitute minor offenses.

117. The *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offenses are divided in two categories: 1) the immediate (*prathama*) offenses; 2) the offenses on the third (admonition) (*yāvattṛīyaka*). Whereas, in the first category, the *bhikṣuṇī* immediately commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense, in the second category, she first is admonished three times. Only if she does not give up her bad behavior, she commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense.

118. T.1421, T.1425; and the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School mention the following exception: the *bhikṣuṇī* commits no offense when the woman she admits has already gone forth in a non-Buddhist community. The Pali *Vinaya* says that there is no offense if the woman has already gone forth in a non-Buddhist community or if other nuns have already conferred her the ordination.

119. See note 112.

120. See note 115.

vāda School¹²¹, mentions the *śikṣamāṇā* period in respect to this offense. Moreover, the introductory story to this precept in T.1428, T.1421, T.1425 and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāśāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School, all relate the story of either a woman thief or a woman who has committed a crime and who has to be put to death. This punishment will be executed by the king or by the woman's family. The woman, however, escapes and is admitted in the order of the Buddhist *bhikṣuṇīs* who confer her the ordination. When, later, the king or the woman's family find out where the woman took refuge, they can no longer punish her, because she now is a member of the *bhikṣuṇīsaṃgha*. Since it is unlikely that the king or the family needed two years (i.e. the length of a *śikṣamāṇā* period) to discover where the woman fled to, these stories seem to indicate a rapid ordination of the woman thief or of the woman who committed a crime. The other *Vinayas*, i.e. the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1435 and T.1443, only tell how the woman took refuge among the nuns, who let her go forth. The precepts mention no further steps, i.e. a *śikṣamāṇā* period or an ordination.

We thus have to conclude that this *saṃghāvaśeṣa* precept indicates that, at the time the precept was issued, the *śikṣamāṇā* period did not exist or was not taken into account. As we will see further, also other precepts lead to a similar conclusion.

b. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.^{45*}119 (p. 754b12-c15, particularly, p. 754c2-3)¹²²:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that a woman is pregnant, and she admits her and confers her the ordination¹²³, then it is a *pācittika*."

121. These *Vinayas* mention the *śikṣamāṇā* period in the commentary on the precept: if a *bhikṣuṇī* confers the two-year instruction of a *śikṣamāṇā* to a woman who has committed a crime, she does not commit a *saṃghātīśeṣa* offense, but a *sīhīlātāyaya*, a serious offense (this term is used to indicate an offense that is very close to a *pārājika* or a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense).

122. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, pp. 317-318, Pāc. 61; T.1421, p. 92a24-b6, Pāc. 116*; T.1443, pp. 1005c25-1006a5, Pāc. 111.

* As the enumeration of the *pācittika* offenses is unclear in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of T.1421, we follow the enumeration of the *bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa* of the same school (T.1423).

123. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya* and T.1421. T.1443 says that the *bhikṣuṇī* gives her the going forth...

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In the introductory story to this precept, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* admits a pregnant woman who gives birth after she has been ordained. In this precept, there is no mention of the *śikṣamāṇā* period.

Since T.1428 says that a *bhikṣuṇī* admits 度¹²⁴ a pregnant woman and confers her the ordination, after which she gives birth, this ordination was apparently given to her without a two-year instruction. The woman was pregnant before she went forth, she received the ordination during her pregnancy, after which she gave birth to a child. A *śikṣamāṇā* period would have avoided such a situation. The precepts of the Pali *Vinaya* and of T.1421 only say – without mentioning any earlier stage – that a nun may not ordain a pregnant woman, while T.1443 only says that a *bhikṣuṇī* may not let a pregnant woman go forth.

Since no *Vinaya* mentions the important probation period, and since in T.1428, a *bhikṣuṇī* admits a pregnant woman who gives birth after her ordination, it is clear that, at time this precept was issued, the *śikṣamāṇā* period did not exist or was not taken into account.

c. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 120 (pp. 754c16-755a19, particularly, p. 755a5-6)¹²⁵:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that a woman is breast-feeding a child, and she confers her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

Only three *Vinayas* mention this precept^{125*}. In none of these three, there is any reference to the two-year probation period during which the woman, logically, would have given birth to the child she is now breast-feeding. The introductory story to this precept in T.1428 says that a *bhikṣuṇī* admitted (度)^{124*} a woman who was breast-feeding a child.

Again, it seems safe to say that, at the time this precept was issued, the *śikṣamāṇā* period did not exist or was not taken into account.

d. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc. 121 (pp. 755a20-756a15, particularly, p. 756a4-5)¹²⁶:

124. Compare note 116.

125. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, p. 318, Pāc. 62; T.1421, p. 92b7-12, Pāc. 117.

T.1435 contains a somehow different precept that says that a nun may not admit into the order a woman whose children necessarily have to follow her into the order (because no-one else can take care of them) (p. 329a15-b2, Pāc. 119).

126. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, p. 327, Pāc. 71; T.1425, p. 534b2-c11, Pāc. 96; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School. ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 238-

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that she [i.e. the woman candidate] is not fully twenty years old, and she confers her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

The introductory story to this precept in T.1428 gives a survey of the stages that precede the ordination, i.e. the going forth (*pravrajyā*) and the probation (*śikṣamāṇā*) period.

e. T.1428. *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.125 (pp.758c29-759b2, particularly, p.759a22-24)¹²⁷:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* admits a married woman of ten, and she gives her the two-year instruction in the precepts, then she may confer her the ordination when she is fully twelve years old. If she confers her the ordination¹²⁸ when she is younger than twelve, then it is a *pācittika*."

The above precept (a) and the corresponding precepts in the other *Vinayas*^{127*} led to the discussion whether the ordination (T.1435: the admission into the community; T.1443: the going forth) can be conferred to a married woman aged twelve, or to a woman married for twelve years. This discussion is caused by the use, in the Chinese *Vinayas*, as well as in the Pali and the Sanskrit texts, of an ambiguous structure to indicate both the age and the duration (of the marriage). Moreover, the same structure is used in another precept (b) that says that a *bhikṣuṇī* who [has been ordained for] less than twelve years, may not confer the ordination: Pali *Vinaya*, OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, (a) p.322; Pāc.65: *ūnadvādasavassam*; (b) p.329, Pāc.74: *ūnadvādasavassā*; T.1421, (a) p.91a18-19, Pāc.104: 未滿十二歲; (b)

240, §210, Pāc.96: T.1435, p.328b27-c11, Pāc.116 (T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (畜為眾)); T.1443, p.1006b25-c10, Pāc.115.

T.1421 does not contain this precept, but a precept that is linked to it: Pāc.106: "If a *bhikṣuṇī* confers the study of the precepts [i.e. the *śikṣamāṇā* period] to a girl who is less than eighteen years old, then it is a *pācittika*."

127. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol. IV, pp.321-322, Pāc.65; T.1421, p.91a15-21, Pāc.104; T.1425, pp.535c19-536a1, Pāc.100; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, p.245, §214, Pāc.100; T.1435, p.325c11-24, Pāc.108; T.1443, pp.1004b28-1005a29, Pāc.108.

128. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1421, T.1425, and the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School. T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (畜作眾), while T.1443 states that she gives her the going forth.

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p.90c15, Pāc.102: 不滿十二歲; T.1425, (a) p.535c26, Pāc.100: 減十二兩; (b) p.533a29-b1, Pāc.92: 減十二兩); *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahā-sāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School, ROTH, G., 1970, (a) p.245, §214, Pāc.100: *ūna-dvādaśa-varṣām*; (b) p.232, §206, Pāc.92: *ūnadvādaśa-varṣā*; T.1428, (a) p.759a24, Pāc.125: 減十二; (b) p.761c5, Pāc.131: 年未滿十二歲; T.1435, (a) p.325c21, Pāc.108: 未滿十二歲; (b) p.325b12-13, Pāc.106: 不滿十二歲; T.1443, (a) p.1005a25, Pāc.108: 年未滿十二; (b) p.1004a18, Pāc.106: 未滿十二歲).

As we can see, the above mentioned structures do not permit to decide whether the age of the candidate or the years she has been married are indicated.

The usual age to receive the ordination is twenty. If a *bhikṣuṇī* ordains a younger woman, she commits a *pācittika* offense (i.e. Pāc.121, see before). In the latter precept, no difference between a single girl or a married woman is mentioned. It is, however, interesting to note that in all the *Vinayas*¹²⁹ two different terms to indicate the woman candidate appear: in the precept that says that a woman should be twenty years old to receive the ordination, the terms used to indicate the woman are the Chinese 童女 (girl), the Pali *kumāribhūtā* (girl), and the Sanskrit^{13*} *kumāribhūtā* (girl), while in the precept concerning the married woman candidate the terms to indicate the woman are the Chinese 嫁婦女 (T.1428), 嫁女 (T.1421, T.1435, T.1443), 婦 (T.1425), the Pali *gihi-gatā*, and the Sanskrit^{13*} *grhicaritā*. Although the use of these different terms in the two precepts clearly indicate that a single girl and a married woman are to be distinguished at the moment they want to become a member of the order, the question whether for the married woman the age of the candidate or the years she has been married are indicated still remains.

Some introductory stories to this precept, however, clearly indicate that the age of the candidate is to be understood: the introductory stories preceding the precept in T.1425 and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahā-sāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School relate how the nuns notice that

129. Except for T.1421, all the *Vinayas* contain the precept concerning the minimum age of twenty of the woman candidate (see note 126), and all the *Vinayas* also contain the precept concerning the married woman candidate (see note 127). Although T.1421 does not contain the former precept, it contains a precept that is linked to it: Pāc.106: "If a *bhikṣuṇī* confers the study of the precepts [i.e. the *śikṣamāṇā* period] to a girl who is less than eighteen years old, then it is a *pācittika*."

married women, accepted into the order, are able to endure hard work and seem to be very smart. Therefore, the nuns ask if it is permissible to confer the ordination to married women who are less than twenty years old (i.e. the usual age for an ordination).¹³⁰ After Buddha has given the permission, the nuns confer the ordination to young married women who are only eight or nine years old. These women, however, are too small and feeble to endure hard work. Buddha then says that the ordination cannot be conferred to a married woman who is less than twelve years old.

The introductory story to this precept in T.1443¹³¹ clearly says that married women of the age of twelve have the same capacities as single women of the age of eighteen, and that the two-year instruction of the *śikṣamāṇā* can be conferred to them.

The introductory stories to this precept in the three above mentioned *Vinayas* indicate, without any doubt, that the real age of the married woman is to be understood in the precept they introduce, and not the duration of the marriage. The introductory stories to this precept in the other *Vinayas*, however, give no information that enables us to decide between these two possibilities: the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1421, and T.1428 only say that married women younger than twelve – or married for less than twelve years – do not possess the necessary capacities to become a nun, whereas T.1435 gives no information at all.

130. T.1425, p. 535c21-22: 減二十[十]; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, RGTI Ci., 1970, p.245, §214: *ūna-viṃśati-varṣāṃ*. The only way to interpret these structures is 'less than twenty years old', the age of twenty years being the normal age to receive the ordination. Since married women appear to be very capable, the nuns ask to allow an exception for these women so that they can be ordained before they are twenty years old.

Another, theoretical, interpretation of the request of the nuns would be: is it permissible to confer the ordination to a woman who has been married for less than twenty years? If this request is not granted, it would imply that married women necessarily have to be older than twenty years at the time of their ordination, and that for some reason their ordination has to be postponed and cannot be conferred at the usual age of twenty years. Since the introductory story to the precept tells us how these married women are smart and capable to endure hard work – which means that they possess the capacities to become a nun – it is clear that this brings the nuns to the idea to ask for an exception for these married women so that they can confer them the ordination at an earlier (and not at a later) age than the usual one.

See also NOLOT, É., 1991, pp. 392-393.

131. T.1443, p. 1004c1-10.

In this way, the question whether the interpretation of T.1425, of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School, and of T.1443 also applies to the other *Vinayas* remains. The answer to this question cannot be found in the *Vinayas* themselves. More information is to be found in some commentaries:

In T. 1804¹³², p. 155a5-7, Tao-hsüan (596-667 AD) seems to indicate that, in T.1428, the real age of the married woman is to be understood: 四分十八童女應二歲學戒又云小年曾嫁年十歲者與六法, i.e. "In the *Vinaya* in Four Parts, a young girl, aged eighteen, ought to study the precepts for two years [i.e. the *śikṣamāṇā* period]. It further says that a young married woman, aged ten, [ought] to be given the six rules [to be particularly taken into account by a *śikṣamāṇā*]"'. Since the text calls the married woman, a young (小年) married woman, we opt for the interpretation 'a young married woman, aged ten'.

Also Buddhaghosa's (fifth century AD) commentary on the Pali *Vinaya* says that, after having given a married girl of ten the agreement to study, the ordination may be conferred to her when she has completed twelve years of age (TAKAKUSU, J. and NAGAI, M., *Samantapāsādikā*, Vol. IV, p.941: *Chattṭhe, dasavassāya gihīgatāya sikkhāsammūtiṃ datvā paripuṇṇadvādasavassāṃ upasampādetuṃ vaṭṭati*). Since the text does not inform us that "*paripuṇṇadvādasavassāṃ*" has to be related to the duration of the marriage, we opt for the interpretation 'when she has completed twelve years of age'.

Finally, the commentary written by Guṇaprabha¹³³ related to the Mūlasarvāstivāda tradition¹³⁴, clearly indicates that the real age of the married woman is to be understood: BAPAT, P.V. and GOKHALE, V.V., *Vinayasūtra*, p.52 (the transcription is based on NOLOT, É., 1991, p.393):

upasaṃpat-kālasāyādih | sa dvi[vi]dho 'syāh | kumārikāyāḥ viṃśati-varṣatvaṃ grhoṣitāyāḥ dvādaśa-varṣatvaṃ ...; grantho 'tra bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅge yā grhoṣitā daśa-varṣā kumārikā-bhūtā vā aṣṭādaśa-varṣā | tasyāḥ dve varṣe śikṣāsaṃvṛtir deyā ti |

132. T.1804 is a commentary written by Tao-hsüan (596-667 AD). It focuses on T.1428, but also gives commentary on the other Chinese *Vinayas* (T.1421, T.1425, and T.1435).

133. According to NAKAMURA, H., 1980, p. 147, king Harṣa adored Guṇaprabha as a spiritual teacher. The reign of king Harṣa can be situated in the beginning of the seventh century (RENOU, L. et FILLIOZAT, J., 1985, Tome Premier, p. 266).

134. Cf. BAPAT, P.V. and GOKHALE, V.V., 1982, p. xvii.

Translated in NOLOT, É. op. cit., p.393:

Terminus a quo pour l'ordination – il est de deux sortes pour une [femme]: pour une jeune fille, il consiste à avoir vingt ans; pour une femme mariée, il consiste à avoir douze ans ...; le libellé s'en trouve dans le Bh°: "Quand une femme mariée a dix ans, ou quand une jeune fille a dix-huit ans, on peut lui donner l'agrément pour l'instruction durant deux ans".

We can thus conclude that the three above mentioned commentaries all seem to indicate that the real age of the candidate is to be understood, and not the duration of the marriage.

As we have said before, T.1443 states that the *śikṣamānā* period can be conferred to a married woman aged twelve, while the commentary of Guṇaprabha says that a married woman can become a *śikṣamānā* at the age of ten, and can be ordained when she is twelve years old. This latter statement coincides with the other *Vinayas* (providing we accept that all the *Vinayas* indicate the real age of the married candidate).

On the other hand, some modern authors defend the theory that a married woman should be married for twelve years before she can receive the ordination. Among the most important defenders of this theory are WALDSCHMIDT, E., 1926, p.138, ROTH, G., 1970, p.245, note 3, and HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.III, pp.1-11¹³⁵. G. ROTH gives no arguments for his statement. E. WALDSCHMIDT bases his statement on a sentence in a Sanskrit fragment of a Buddhist ordination ceremony discovered and edited by C. BENDALL¹³⁶. C. BENDALL regards the text as probably earlier than the Christian era, and attributes it to the Mūla-sarvāstivāda School. On the ordination of a married woman, the text says: *strī dvādaśavarṣagrhayuktā*, "a woman must be married for twelve years". However, C. BENDALL himself considers the *yuktā* in this sentence as being a doubtful reading, and, later, NOLOT, É., 1991, p.392, notes that it probably has to be *vustā* instead of *yuktā*. Consequently, this sentence cannot be used to support the theory that a married woman only can receive the ordination after twelve years of marriage. Finally, I.B. HORNER, refers to the above mentioned WALDSCHMIDT, E., 1926, p.138 for her statement. She further states that since a girl is often married at eight, she attains the age of twenty after twelve years of marriage, which is the usual age to receive the ordination. Only at this

135. In an earlier work, however, I.B. HORNER stated that the real age of the woman is to be understood, and that, consequently, a married woman can receive the ordination at twelve (HORNER, I.B., 1930, p.27).

136. BENDALL, C., 1903, pp.373-376.

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age, women are able to endure the hard life of the nuns. This calculation is certainly true. However, a girl can also be married at a different age, which, after twelve years of marriage, consequently would lead to a different and unusual age for the ordination. Moreover, if she is married at an age later than eight, she would, after twelve years of marriage, be older than twenty, but she still would have to wait till she has been married for twelve years to be able to become a nun. This seems very illogical. A married woman, older than twenty, certainly is as able to endure hardships as other women of twenty. It thus seems more logical to say that a married woman, because of her married life, is able to endure hardships at an earlier age than a single woman, who has not the same duties to fulfill.

We thus have to conclude that, since the introductory stories to this precept in T.1425, in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the Mahāsāṃghika-Lokottaravāda School and in T.1443 clearly indicate that in the above mentioned precept concerning the married woman candidate, the real age of the candidate, i.e. twelve years, has to be understood and not the duration of the marriage, and since, moreover, three important commentaries, i.e. the commentaries by Tao-hsüan, Buddhaghosa and Guṇaprabha, all appear to understand the precept in this way, and since, finally, as far as our knowledge goes, no text contradicts this statement – whereas this is the case for the inverse statement – , an exception is allowed for the age on which a married woman can receive the ordination: while a single woman has to be twenty years old to receive the ordination, a married woman can receive it at the age of twelve.

f. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.127 (pp.759c7-760a7, particularly, p.759c26-27)¹³⁷:

137. T.1421, pp.91c28-92a5, Pāc.112; T.1443, p.1014 a8-20, Pāc.160.

T.1435, p.328b11-26, has a somehow different precept. It says that if a *bhikṣuṇī* admits a prostitute into the order, she should withdraw her to a distance of five or six *yojanas** (Pāc.115).

* MONIER-WILLIAMS, M., *SED*, p.858: "esp. a partic. measure of distance, sometimes regarded as equal to 4 or 5 English miles, but more correctly = 4 Krośas or about 9 miles; according to other calculations = 2½ English miles, and according to some = 8 Krośas."

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that she is such a person [= prostitute¹³⁸], and she confers her the ordination¹³⁹, then it is a *pācittika*."

g. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.135 (pp.762c17-763a26, particularly, p.763a13-15)¹⁴⁰:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that a woman makes love to a boy or to a man and that she is a sad and angry woman, and she admits her into the order, lets her go forth and confers her the ordination¹⁴¹, then it is a *pācittika*."

h. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.165 (p.773b20-c20, particularly, p.773c11-12):

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that a woman cannot hold up urine and excrements and that mucus and saliva often run out, and she admits her into the order and confers her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

i. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.166 (pp.773c21-774a17, particularly, p.774a8-9)¹⁴²:

138. Both in the introductory story to the precept (p.759c8 ff.) and in the commentary on the precept (p.759c27), 'such a person' is explained as 'a prostitute'.

139. This coincides with T.1421. In the precept itself, the *Vinaya* only says that a *bhikṣuṇī* admits (度) a prostitute. From the commentary to the precept, however, it is clear that also the ordination has to be understood. T.1443 says that a *bhikṣuṇī* lets a prostitute go forth.

140. This precept only coincides with a precept in the Pali *Vinaya*: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp.333-334, Pāc.79.

Other *Vinayas* have closely connected precepts:

T.1425 and the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School say that a *bhikṣuṇī* may not ordain a probationer who stays with a man (T.1425, p.534a12-b2, Pāc.95; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, p.237, §209, Pāc.95).

Both T.1435 and T.1443 contain two precepts that refer to the character of the candidate: T.1435, pp.328c28-329a14, Pāc.118, says that a nun may not admit into the order (畜為眾) a woman who is mourning; T.1435, p.329b3-15, Pāc.120 says that a nun may not admit into the order (畜為眾) a woman who has a bad character. T.1443, pp.1006c21-1007a14, Pāc.117, says that a nun may not confer the going forth and the ordination to a woman who has a bad character; T.1443, p.1007a15-29, Pāc.118, says that a nun may not confer the going forth to a sad and mourning woman.

141. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*. See also note 140.

142. T.1421, p.97c1-7, Pāc.176.

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"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that a woman is a hermaphrodite and she confers her the ordination¹⁴³, then it is a *pācittika*."

j. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.167 (p.774a18-b16, particularly, p.774b1-2)¹⁴⁴:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* confers the ordination to someone whose two tracts are united¹⁴⁵, then it is a *pācittika*."

k. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.168 (p.774b17-c20, particularly, p.774c9-10)¹⁴⁶:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* knows that someone has difficulties because of debts, or difficulties because of an illness, and she confers her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

2) The *upādhyāyini*

a. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.131 (p.761b11-c12, particularly, p.761c4-6)¹⁴⁷:

143. In the precept of T.1421, it is said that if a nun admits (度) a hermaphrodite, her act constitutes a Pāc. offense. From the commentary to the precept, it is clear that 'to admit' should be understood as 'to be her *upādhyāyini*', and that the *bhikṣuṇī*, as an *upādhyāyini*, commits a *pācittika* offense when she confers the ordination.

144. T.1421, p.97c8-12, Pāc.177.

145. In the precept of T.1421, it is said that if a nun admits (度) a woman whose two tracts are united, her act constitutes a Pāc. offense. The commentary to this precept refers to the commentary to the preceding precepts, which means that 'to admit' should be understood as 'to be her *upādhyāyini*' (see note 143). The commentary to the parallel precept in T.1428 (p.774b7) explains that 'the two tracts are united' means that the tracts of urine and excrements are not separated.

146. T.1421 contains two precepts that are closely connected with this precept of T.1428: Pāc.125 (p.93a6-11) says that if a nun admits a woman who has been ill for a long time, her act constitutes a Pāc. offense; Pāc.127 (p.93a17-21) says that if a nun admits a woman who has debts, her act constitutes a Pāc. offense. The commentaries on the precepts refer to the commentary on preceding precepts, from the latter we know that 'to admit' should be understood as 'to be her *upādhyāyini*' (see note 143).

147. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, p.329, Pāc.74; T.1421, p.90c 1-18, Pāc.102; T.1425, p.533a20-b20, Pāc.92; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.232-233, §206, Pāc.92; T.1435, p.325b2-16, Pāc.106; T.1443, p.1004a10-21, Pāc.106.

"If a *bh'ksuṇī* who has not been [a *bhikṣuṇī*] for fully twelve years yet, confers someone the ordination¹⁴⁸, then it is a *pācittika*."

b. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.133 (p.762a15-b20, particularly, p.762b7-9)¹⁴⁹:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, not having been given the permission by the order to confer someone the ordination¹⁵⁰, says: 'The *saṅgha* has desire, has hatred, has fear and has foolishness¹⁵¹. What it wants to agree to, it agrees to. What it does not want to agree to, it does not agree to.', then it is a *pācittika*."

148. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya* and T.1443.

In T.1421, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* who has not been a *bhikṣuṇī* for fully twelve years yet, may not accept disciples. The commentary to this precept adds that 'to accept disciples' should be understood as 'to be their *upādhyāyini*' (see note 143). This coincides with T.1425 and with the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School.

T.1435 only says that the *bhikṣuṇī* who has not been a *bhikṣuṇī* for fully twelve years yet, may not admit someone into the order (畜眾).

149. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, p. 331, Pāc.76; T.1421, p. 91c4-12, Pāc.109; T.1425, p. 537b8-24, Pāc.109; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 254-255, §223, Pāc.109.

All the above mentioned precepts have in common that the order does not give the permission to a nun (either the permission to confer the ordination or the permission to take on disciples), after which the nun criticizes this decision.

T.1435 contains a somehow different precept saying that, if a *bhikṣuṇī*, although the order told her to stop [to admit someone into the order], admits someone into the order (畜眾), she commits a Pāc. offense (p.326a12-b3, Pāc.110). This latter precept is closely connected with a precept in T.1443, saying that, if a *bhikṣuṇī* accepts a lot of disciples although the order did not give her the permission to accept as many disciples as she wanted, she commits a Pāc. offense (p.1005b10-c24, Pāc.110). From the commentary to this precept, it is clear that 'to accept disciples' is to be understood as 'to confer them the going forth and the ordination'.

150. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*.

151. These reproaches are also to be found in the commentary on the precepts of the Pali *Vinaya* and of T.1421.

3) *The ordination procedure*

a. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.122 (p.756a16-b17, particularly, p.756b7-9) and b. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.123 (p.756b18-c25, particularly, p.756c8-9)¹⁵²:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, when a girl is eighteen, does not give her the two-year instruction in the precepts, but, when she is fully twenty years old confers her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

This precept clearly states that a woman cannot be ordained without a two-year probation period.

"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, when a girl is eighteen, gives her the two-year instruction in the precepts, but does not give her the six rules, and, when she is fully twenty [years] old, she then confers her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

152. To T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.122 correspond: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp.327-328, Pāc.72; T.1425, pp.534c12-535a16, Pāc.97; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.240-242, §211, Pāc.97; T.1435, p.329b16-c4, Pāc.121 (T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (畜為眾)); T.1443, p.1006c11-20, Pāc.116.

The Pali *Vinaya*, T.1435, and T.1443 specify that, during this two-year probation period, the woman probationer has to study the rules that she particularly has to take into account (see note 71):

To T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.123 correspond: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp.318-320, Pāc.63; T.1421, p.92a18-23, Pāc.115; T.1435, pp.326b5-327c21, Pāc.111 (T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (畜為眾)); T.1443, p.1007b1-12, Pāc.119.

There is, however, a small difference between the precept in T.1428 and the precepts in the other *Vinayas*. Whereas the precept in T.1428 says that the *bhikṣuṇī* did not give the six rules to the candidate, the precepts in the other *Vinayas* say that the candidate herself does not study the rules she has to follow.

Closely connected to the latter precept, T.1421, T.1425, and the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School have another precept saying that if a *bhikṣuṇī* ordains a *śikṣamāṇā* who has not completed the two-year instruction in the precepts, she commits a Pāc. offense: T.1421, p.92a6-11, Pāc.113; T.1425, p.535a17-b8, Pāc.98; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.242-243, §212, Pāc.98. The latter two *Vinayas* explain that 'not to have completed the probationary period' means that the *śikṣamāṇā* did not study the rules she particularly has to take into account. This links the precept in these two *Vinayas* to the above mentioned Pāc.123 of T.1428.

This precept states that a woman candidate, even when she has done a two-year probation period, cannot be ordained if, during this probation period, she did not study the six rules (六法)¹⁵³.

c. T.1428; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.124 (pp. 756c26-758c28, particularly, p. 758c18-20)¹⁵⁴:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, when a girl is eighteen, gives her the two-year instruction in the precepts and gives her the six rules, and, when she is fully twenty [years] old, she then confers her the ordination without the permission of the *saṅgha*, then it is a *pācittika*."

d. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.126 (p. 759b3-c6, particularly, p. 759b 25-27)¹⁵⁵:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* admits a young married woman and gives her the two-year instruction in the precepts, and, when she is fully twelve years old she then confers her the ordination without the permission of the *saṅgha*, then it is a *pācittika*."

153. See note 71.

154. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp. 320-321, Pāc.64 and pp. 328-329, Pāc.73. These two precepts are closely connected: in Pāc.64, it is said that, without the permission of the order, a nun may not ordain a probationer who has studied the precepts for two years, while in Pāc.73, it is said that without the permission of the order, a nun may not ordain a twenty-year old girl, who has studied the precepts for two years.

T.1421, p. 92a12-17, Pāc.114. T.1425, p. 535b9-c10, Pāc.99. *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 243-245, §213, Pāc. 99. T.1435, pp. 327c22-328a9, Pāc.112, p. 328c12-27, Pāc.117, and p. 329c5-22, Pāc.122. These three precepts are closely connected: in Pāc.112, it is said that without the permission of the order, a nun may not admit a disciple who has studied the precepts for two years into the order; in Pāc.117, it is said that, without the permission of the order, a nun may not admit a twenty-year old girl into the order; in Pāc.122, it is said that, without the permission of the order, a nun may not admit a twenty-year old girl who has studied the precepts for two years into the order.

155. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp. 323-324, Pāc.67; T.1421, p. 91a22-b5, Pāc.105; T.1425, p. 536a29-b8, Pāc.103; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 247-248, §217, Pāc.103; T.1435, pp. 325c25-326a11, Pāc.109 (T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (審為眾)).

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e. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.130 (pp. 760c20-761b10, particularly p. 761b2-3)¹⁵⁶:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* confers someone the ordination¹⁵⁷ without the permission of the *saṅgha*, then it is a *pācittika*."

f. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.132 (pp. 761c13-762a14, particularly p. 762a7-8)¹⁵⁸:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, who has been [a *bhikṣuṇī*] for fully twelve years, confers someone the ordination¹⁵⁹ without the permission of the *saṅgha*, then it is a *pācittika*."

156. T.1443, p. 1004a22-b27, Pāc.107.

157. The precept in T.1443 says that, without the permission of the order, a nun may not accept someone as a disciple. The commentary to this precept further explains that 'to accept someone as a disciple' should be understood as 'to give the going forth and the ordination'.

158. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.IV, pp. 330-331, Pāc.75; T.1421, pp. 90c19-91a14, Pāc.103; T.1435, p. 325b17-c10, Pāc.107. T.1425 and the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School contain two precepts that are closely connected to the *Pācittikas* 130, 131 (see p. 33) and 132 of T.1428: Pāc.93 (T.1425, p. 533b21-c8; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 234-235, §207) says that a *bhikṣuṇī* who has been in the order for fully twelve rainy seasons but who has not fulfilled the ten requirements cannot take on disciples, while Pāc.94 (T.1425, pp. 533c9-534a11; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp. 235-236, §208) says that a *bhikṣuṇī* who has fulfilled the ten requirements cannot take on disciples without the permission of the order.

These ten requirements refer to the requirements that a *bhikṣuṇī* has to fulfill in order to become a teacher: she has to uphold the precepts (1), she has to be learned in *Abhidharma* (2) and in *Vinaya* (3), she must study morality (4), meditation (5) and wisdom (6), she must be able to purify herself of her offenses and to help others to purify themselves of their offenses as well (7), she must be able to remove a disciple who is being pressed by her relatives to quit her spiritual training to another place, or to have someone else remove such person to another place (8), she must be able to nurse her disciple when the latter is sick or to have someone else nurse the latter (9), she must have been in the order for fully twelve rainy seasons or more (10).

159. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*. In T.1421, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* who has been a *bhikṣuṇī* for fully twelve years may not accept disciples without the permission of the order. The commentary to this precept refers to the commentary to the preceding precept (= Pāc.102), according to which 'to accept disciples' should be understood as 'to be her *upādhyāyini*', and that the *bhikṣuṇī*, as an *upādhyāyini*, commits a *pācittika* offense when she confers the ordination

g. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.134 (p.762b21-c16, particularly, p.762c7-9)¹⁶⁰:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* confers the ordination¹⁶¹ without the permission of the parents and the husband¹⁶², then it is a *pācittika*."

T.1435 only says that the *bhikṣuṇī* who has been a *bhikṣuṇī* for fully twelve years may not admit someone into the order (畜眾) without the permission of the order.

160. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, pp.334-335, Pāc.80; T.1421, p.93a12-16, Pāc.126; T.1425, p.519b2-c6, *Samghāṭiṣeṣa* 7; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.135-137, §§158-159, *Samghāṭiṣeṣa* 7; T.1435, p.330b3-c1, Pāc.124; T.1443, p.1007b29-c19, Pāc.121.

161. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*. In T.1421, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* may not accept a married woman who is subject to her husband into the order. The commentary to this precept says that 'to admit into the order' should be understood as 'to confer the going forth and the ordination' (this corresponds to Pāc.102, p.90c17-18).

In T.1425, and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, it is said that the *bhikṣuṇī* may not accept a woman as a disciple without the permission of the woman's masters (其主: see note 162). The commentaries on the precepts explain that 'to accept as a disciple' has to be understood as 'to confer the ordination'.

T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (畜為眾). Finally, in T.1443, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* may not confer the going forth to a married woman without the permission of her husband.

162. It is not clear who exactly has to give the permission to whom. Since the candidate to be ordained is not qualified as a single girl (童女) or as a married woman (嫁婦女) (cf. p.27), it could well be that both of them are equally to be understood. A single girl is to be given permission by her parents, while a married woman certainly is to be given permission by her husband, but, maybe, also the parents' opinion is decisive.

The precept in the Pali *Vinaya* is similar to the one in T.1428.

A similar situation is to be found in the precepts of T.1425, of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and of T.1435, all saying that a *bhikṣuṇī* may not ordain a woman without the permission of her masters (主). The commentaries on the precepts of T.1425 and of the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School distinguish two situations: a single girl has to have the permission of her parents, a married woman should have the permission of her husband, her mother-in-law, her father-in-law and her husband's younger brother.

Explaining 'masters', the commentary on the precept of T.1435 distinguishes three situations: a single girl has to have the permission of her parents, a married woman who has not gone to her husband's house yet has to have the permission of both her parents and her husband, and, finally, a married woman who has gone to her husband's house, has to have the permission of her husband.

h. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.136 (p.763a27-b28, particularly, p.763b17-19)¹⁶³:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* says to a *śikṣamānā*: 'Sister, drop this. Study this. I will confer you the ordination,' but she does not take measures to confer her the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

i. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.137 (pp.763b28-764a3, particularly, p.763c21-23)¹⁶⁴:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* says to a *śikṣamānā*: 'Bring me a robe¹⁶⁵. I will confer you the ordination¹⁶⁶,' but she does not take measures to confer her the ordination¹⁶⁶*, then it is a *pācittika*."

Finally, in T.1421 and in T.1443, it is said that a *bhikṣuṇī* may not accept a married woman who is subject to her husband into the order.

163. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, p.333, Pāc.78; T.1425, p.537b25-c17, Pāc.110; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.255-256, §224, Pāc.110; T.1435, p.330c2-27, Pāc.125 (T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (畜)).

T.1443 contains two precepts that are closely connected with the above mentioned precept: T.1443, p.1008a5-28, Pāc.123, states that if a *bhikṣuṇī* does not confer the going forth to a woman who has done some household work for her, although she, i.e. the *bhikṣuṇī*, previously, had promised this woman to do so, providing she did this household work, her act constitutes a Pāc. offense. T.1443, p.1007b13-28, Pāc.120, states that if a *bhikṣuṇī*, although she knows that a woman finished the two-year study of the six rules and the six additional rules*, does not confer the ordination to this woman, her act constitutes a Pāc. offense.

* These rules are the rules that, according to T.1443, have to be taken into particular account by the probationer. See note 71.

T.1421 contains a precept that is closely connected to the latter precept of T.1443. It says that a *bhikṣuṇī* who, although there are no problems, does not confer the ordination to a probationer who has finished the two-year instruction, but, instead, says that the probationer should go on studying, commits a Pāc. offense (T.1421, p.91c19-27, Pāc.111).

164. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, p.332, Pāc.77; T.1421, p.91b24-c3, Pāc.108; T.1425, p.526a16-b5, *nihsargika-pācattika* 18; the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.176-177, §179, *nihsargika-pācattika* 18; T.1435, p.330a6-b2, Pāc.123; T.1443, pp.1007c20-1008a4, Pāc.122.

165. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1421, T.1425, the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and T.1443. In the precept of T.1435, the *bhikṣuṇī* is said to ask for an alms bowl, a robe, a door-key, and medicines.

166. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1425, the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L.

j. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.138 (p.764a4-b12, particularly, p.764b2-3)¹⁶⁷:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, when one full year has not passed yet, confers someone the ordination, then it is a *pācittika*."

k. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.139 (p.764b13-c11, particularly, p.764b29-c2)¹⁶⁸:

School, and T.1443. In the precepts of T.1421 and T.1435, it is only said that the *bhikṣuṇī* promises a woman to admit her into the order (度). Although nothing is mentioned as to the exact meaning of the term 度, the introductory stories to this precept give some indication, informing us how the *bhikṣuṇī* made the promise to admit (度) her, after the woman had requested the going forth.

167. This precept is closely connected with Pāc.83 in the Pali *Vinaya*, stating that a nun may not ordain two persons within one year (OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, pp. 336-337).

Moreover, all the *Vinayas* contain another precept saying that a nun may not ordain a person every year, precept which is closely connected with Pāc.138 of T.1428: OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, p. 336, Pāc.82; T.1421, p. 92b13-19, Pāc.118; T.1425, p. 536c13-23, Pāc.106 (the precept says that a nun may not take on disciples every year; the commentary to this precept adds that 'to take on disciples' is to be understood as 'to confer the ordination'); *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.250-251, §220, Pāc.106 (the precept says that a nun may not take on disciples every year; the commentary to this precept adds that 'to take on disciples' is to be understood as before, i.e. as 'to confer the ordination'); T.1435, pp.330c28-331a15, Pāc.126 (the precept only says that a nun may not accept disciples (度弟子) every year); T.1443, p.1008a29-b13, Pāc.124.

168. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, pp.335-336, Pāc.81; T.1421, p.92b20-27, Pāc.119; T.1425, pp.536c24-537a16, Pāc.107; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.251-253, §221, Pāc.107; T.1435, pp.331a17-334c29, Pāc.127.

Common in all these precepts, is the rule that an ordination ceremony has to be performed within one day. However, while all the introductory stories to this precept indicate that the ordination in the nun's order and the ordination in the monk's order should be held on the same day, not all precepts focus on the same aspect. According to T.1421, an ordination ceremony may not be interrupted and has to be held within one day. If not, the *bhikṣuṇī* who confers the ordination commits a *pācittika*. On the other hand, according to T.1428, T.1425, the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and T.1435, if a *bhikṣuṇī* lets a woman stay overnight after having ordained that woman in the nun's order, but before conferring her the ordination in the monk's order, this *bhikṣuṇī*'s act constitutes a Pāc. offense. Finally, according to the Pali *Vinaya*, there may be no day between the permission to ordain and the actual ordination. If not, the nun who confers the ordination commits a Pāc. offense.

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"If a *bhikṣuṇī*, after having conferred the ordination to someone, goes to the *bhikṣusamgha* to confer her the ordination only after one night has passed, then it is a *pācittika*."

4) The period following the ordination ceremony

a. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.128 (p.760a8-b14, particularly, p.760b7-8)¹⁶⁹:

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* admits many disciples, but does not tell them to study the precepts for two years¹⁷⁰ and does not give them support in two things¹⁷¹, then it is a *pācittika*.¹⁷²"

b. T.1428, *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, Pāc.129 (p.760b15-c19, particularly, p.760c11-12)¹⁷³:

169. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, pp.324-325, Pāc.68; T.1421, p.92c6-11; Pāc.121; T.1425, p.536b9-25, Pāc.104; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.248-249, §218, Pāc.104; T.1435, p.328a23-b10, Pāc.114 (T.1435 does not explicitly say that the *bhikṣuṇī* ordains the woman, but only states that the *bhikṣuṇī* admits her into the order (奉為眾)); T.1443, p.1006a6-19, Pāc.112 and p.1006a20-b3, Pāc.113.

170. This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1425, the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and T.1435. According to T.1421, the support has to last for six years, while in T.1443, no duration of the support is mentioned.

171. After the ordination, an *upādhyāyini* has to help her disciples for another two years and has to support them regarding two things: (1) in the law, (2) in clothing and food.

This coincides with T.1435. In the Pali *Vinaya*, in T.1421, in T.1425, and in the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, the teacher only has to help her disciples regarding the law. T.1443 has two precepts: in Pāc.112, it is said that a teacher ought to help her disciples regarding the precepts, while in Pāc.113, it is said that a teacher ought to support and protect her disciples.

172. The Pali *Vinaya* and T.1421 add the possibility that a teacher has her disciples helped by someone else.

173. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakaṃ*, Vol.IV, pp.325-326, Pāc.69; T.1421, p.92b28-c5, Pāc.120; T.1425, p.536b26-c12, Pāc.105; *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, ROTH, G., 1970, pp.249-250, §219, Pāc.105; T.1435, p.328a10-22, Pāc.113.

"If a *bhikṣuṇī* does not follow¹⁷⁴ her *upādhyāyini* for two years¹⁷⁵, then it is a *pācittika*.¹⁷⁶"

III. Conclusion

The admission rules, admission ceremonies and offenses against these rules and ceremonies as they are described above, display the exact 'theoretical' career of a nun in the Buddhist community. In this community, two orders can be distinguished, a monk's order (*bhikṣusamgha*) and a nun's order (*bhikṣuṇīsamgha*), the latter being dependent on the former. These orders gradually came into being, first the *bhikṣusamgha* and then the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*, and, as the number of monks and nuns continuously grew, the need was felt to have more regulations in order to organize this growing community.

In this organization, the admission into the order is a fundamental institution. This admission has been established for the monk's order first. The way these admission procedures developed and in which ceremonies they finally resulted, is described in the several *Vinayas*.¹⁷⁷ A survey has been given by FRAUWALLNER, E., 1956, pp. 70-78. Applying this survey to T.1428, we come to the following outline:

First, Buddha himself performs the ordination, i.e. by calling the first disciples to join the order by means of the formula: "Welcome, monk." (善來比丘). This formula simultaneously covered admission and ordi-

174. While according to T.1428, the new *bhikṣuṇī*, above all, has to listen to her teacher, the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1421, T.1425, the *Bhikṣuṇīvivhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and T.1435 all emphasize that the new nun has to serve her teacher.

175. After having been ordained, the new *bhikṣuṇī* has to follow her teacher for another two years and listen to her teachings.

This coincides with the Pali *Vinaya*, T.1425, the *Bhikṣuṇīvivhaṅga* of the M.-L. School, and T.1435. According to T.1421, the new nun has to serve her teacher for six years.

176. T.1421 adds the possibility that the new nun has her teacher helped by someone else.

177. OLDENBERG, H., *Vinaya Piṭakam*, Vol.1, *Mahāvagga* I, pp. 1-100; T.1421, 受戒法 (Chapter on Ordination), pp. 101a12-121a25; T.1425, several passages in 雜蘊跋集法 (Chapter on Miscellaneous Items), pp. 412b24-499a16; T.1428, 受戒律度 (Chapter on Ordination), pp. 779a6-816c4; T.1435, 受具足戒法 (Chapter on ordination), pp. 148a5-157c27; T.1444, 根本說一切有部毘奈耶出家事 (Chapter on Going Forth of the *Mūlasārvāstivādinaya*), pp. 1020b 23-1041a20.

nation.¹⁷⁸ Later, He permits the monks to perform the ordination by having the candidate recite the formula of the triple refuge (refuge in Buddha, in the law and in the order).¹⁷⁹ Also this formula covered both the admission and the ordination. Finally, He lays down that the ordination should take place by means of a formal act in which the motion is fourfold (a *jñāpticaturthakarman*^{20*}).¹⁸⁰ Hereby, a clear difference was made between the going forth (*pravrajyā*) and the full ordination (*upa-sampadā*). Hence two stages became necessary to acquire the full status of a monk (and a full member of the community) and to enjoy all the rights and privileges attributed to these members. In the first stage, one becomes a novice (*śrāmaṇera*) whose standing, rights and duties are different from those of a monk who has received the full ordination.

Bad behavior of young monks further induces Buddha to determine the minimum age for ordination as twenty years¹⁸¹, while the minimum age for the novice is fixed at twelve¹⁸². In case candidate novices are at least as grown that they can scare away the crows, the age may be less than twelve.¹⁸³ Many rules are further added to regulate who can be a candidate and who not, and who can accept disciples and who not.

At the moment Mahāprajāpatī Gautamī was allowed to become a nun, the monk's order (*bhikṣusamgha*) was already well organized. This explains why she can go to a monk's monastery in order to ask for the permission to go forth. Most likely, in the beginning, the order of nuns (*bhikṣuṇīsamgha*) took over the organizational pattern of the monk's community, and both orders further developed in the same general direction.

However, the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* is not completely independent and relies on the *bhikṣusamgha* in several ways. This dependency is laid down in the eight rules to be followed by the nuns in their relation with the monks. The fact that a woman can only become a nun if she is ordained by both the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* and the *bhikṣusamgha* is essential in these rules. This fact implies a control over the membership of the order by the monks.

178. T.1428, p. 799b1-3.

179. T.1428, p. 793a13-21.

180. T.1428, p. 799c12-29.

181. T.1428, p. 808b25-26.

182. T.1428, p. 810c22-23.

183. T.1428, pp. 810c24-811a3.

In addition, the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* possesses some regulations, different from the ones of the *bhikṣusamgha*. For the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha*, a stage between the going forth (*pravrajyā*) and the ordination (*upasaṃpadā*) is added. This is a probationary period that lasts two years, during which the woman candidate, as a probationer (*śikṣamāṇā*), has to prove that she is fit to become a nun. Furthermore, some rules specific to women and nuns are added to the rules for monks, e.g., the rules relating to married women.

As it was the case for the *bhikṣusamgha*, also the formation of the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* was not accomplished in one day. As suggested by I.B. HORNER¹⁸⁴, the probation period for a woman candidate was the result of a gradual development: it is only when the need was felt, that an additional stage between the going forth and the ordination was introduced. This additional stage rapidly became a necessary condition to become a nun. In T.1428, this necessity is evident from the ordination proceedings as they are described in the *Bhikṣuṇīskandhaka*^{4*}: three compulsory steps leading to full membership of the community: 1) the going forth, 2) the two-year probation period and 3) the ordination. Also the *Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *pācittika* 121 draws attention to the necessity of these three steps, while the *pācittikas* 122 and 123 emphasize that a nun may not confer the ordination to a woman candidate who has not done the two-year probation period. Furthermore, also the fourth *gurudharma*^{6*} states that this period must precede the ordination.

It is, however, to be noticed that some precepts do not take the probation period into account: the introductory story to the fifth *saṃghāvaśeṣa* precept relates how a woman thief rapidly goes forth and receives the ordination, so that her persecutors are confronted with a 'fait accompli' and cannot arrest her anymore. In the *pācittikas* 119 and 120, respectively a pregnant woman and a breast-feeding woman are accepted into the order and immediately receive the ordination. We thus have to conclude that, at the time these latter three precepts were issued, the probation period did not exist or was not taken into account. This can only be understood if we consider the probation period as a practice that has been introduced after the order of nuns had existed for some time:

184. HORNER, I.B., *BD*, Vol.V, p. 354, note 3: "... this practice [the probation period] will no doubt have been introduced later, after an Order of nuns had been in being for some time."

since the organization of the *bhikṣuṇīsamgha* is founded on that of the *bhikṣusamgha*, the nuns are likely to have taken over the going forth and the ordination from the monk's community, and later introduced a third step in between these two. At the very beginning, this third step might not have been compulsory. Since the *Vinaya* texts do not mention that a woman candidate could freely decide whether or not to pass two years as a probationer – while frequently mentioning the three obligatory steps leading to full membership of the community – it seems safe to say that when the probation period was introduced, it rapidly, if not immediately, became compulsory, and that, consequently, there never has been a choice whether or not to become a probationer.

We have to conclude that to become a full member of the community, a woman first has to go forth and to become a novice (*śrāmaṇerī*). Secondly, she has to pass two years as a probationer (*śikṣamāṇā*), and, finally, she receives the ordination and becomes a nun (*bhikṣuṇī*). The minimum age at which she can become a nun, enjoying all rights and privileges attributed to full members of the community, depends on her being single or married. Neither a *śrāmaṇerī* nor a *śikṣamāṇā* can participate in the formal acts and in the ceremonies performed by the order. There is no essential difference between the position of a *śrāmaṇerī* and the one of a *śikṣamāṇā*, except for the social rank in the community, a *śikṣamāṇā* holding a higher position than a *śrāmaṇerī*.

st of technical terms

th first appearance and reference to explanatory note)

- śampadā* (P. *upasampadā*) : ordination, p. 43
idhyāyini (P. *upajjhā*) : teacher, p. 44, note 66
man (P. *kamma*) : formal act, p. 37
udharma (P. *gāruḍhamma*) : severe rule, p. 35; note 6
ptikarman (P. *ñattikamma*) : formal act consisting of a motion, p. 37, note 20
pticaturthakarman (P. *ñatticatutthakamma*) : formal act in which the motion is fourfold, p. 37, note 20
ptidvītyakarman (P. *ñattidvītyakarman*) : formal act in which the motion is twofold, p. 37, note 20
akṛya (P. *dukkāta*) : bad action (a very light offense), p. 48, note 79
ivāsa (P. *parivāsa*) : period of residence (a kind of penance), p. 37, note 22
ittika (P. *pācittiya*) : expiation? (a minor offense), p. 41, note 45
ājika : an offense that leads to a permanent, lifetime exclusion from the order, p. 47, note 72
śadha (or *upośadha*) (P. *uṭṭosatha*) : observance (a ceremony), p. 36, note 10
utidesāniya (P. *pāṭidesāniya*) : requiring confession (a minor offense), p. 48, note 76
ivāraṇa (or *pravāraṇā*) (P. *pavāraṇā*) : invitation (a ceremony), p. 36, note 11
ivrajyā (P. *pabbajjā*) : the going forth, p. 43
īksu (P. *bhikkhu*) : monk, p. 35
īksuṇī (P. *bhikkhuni*) : nun, p. 33
īksuṇīsamgha (P. *bhikkhunisamgha*) : order of nuns, p. 33
īksusamgha (P. *bhikkhusamgha*) : order of monks, p. 33
matva (P. *mānatta*) : i.e. a kind of penance (doubtful etymology), p. 37, note 17
śāpada (P. *sikkhāpada*) : precept, p. 44
samāṇā (P. *sikkhamānā*) : probationer, p. 36, note 14
imaṇera (P. *sāmaṇera*) : (male) novice, p. 48
imaṇerī (P. *sāmaṇerī*) : (female) novice, p. 45
ṅgha (P. *saṅgha*) : order (of monks or nuns), p. 36
ṅghāvaśeṣa (P. *saṅghādisesa*) : remainder in the order (an offense leading to a temporary exclusion from the order), p. 37, note 16

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